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Using Foucault’s notion of a dispositif or social apparatus, this thesis charts the 
pedagogical relations established in contemporary literacy discourse in terms of a space 
of visibility and a form of sayability, and analyses them as operating within power-
knowledge. It furthers this analysis by conceptualising the space of literacy as a 
normative heterotopia and as a recent mutation of bio-power, the government of the 
developing body. Such analysis problematises the discourse of literacy, from the term’s 
systematic indefiniteness to its real effectivity in producing subjects, spaces and 
disciplinary techniques. 
Literacy combines and interrelates a nineteenth-century establishment and a twentieth-
century rearrangement of pedagogical space. The national language, the developing child, 
as well as the world of demands and national progress: all emerge as part of the 
nineteenth-century educational state, forming a set of disciplinary procedures, a structure 
of perception and a desire to recognise and utilise language development. Literacy 
discourse appropriates these knowledges and multiplies the sites in which they operate. It 
articulates the recognition and enablement of non-sta dard literacies with the 
governmental project of intensifying and directing the powers of a population. The 
pedagogical relations operationalised in literacy discourse project a continuous 
disciplinary power over a general social space. 
Thus, literacy has become both a common and much theorised social concern, and a term 
which structures lives, spaces, discourse and power. Beginning with a close analysis of a 
recent education policy document, this thesis looks at the deployment of literacy as a way 
of organising experience through discourse and as a means of modulating the relations 
between three historically constituted terms: the student, the text, and the world. 
Schooling and literacy thus insert themselves into a machinery of social production and 
into the production of everyday concerns and processes. Consequently, literacy enters 
into our most material and non-linguistic moments through a teleological arrangement of 
time and space, a pedagogisation which is at the same time a textualisation of existence. 
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Introduction: A Difficult Space 
This thesis contends that the discourse of literacy maintains a social apparatus in 
which the space and power relations of schooling are implicated within practices of 
examination involving the student and the text. These relations in turn make possible 
knowledges about language, identity and the world which sustain the discourse on 
literacy. The historical correlations between identity, world and text are rendered 
intelligible via their relation to schooling. The school itself functions as a generalised 
heterotopia of deviance and normality, a space that is increasingly imposed upon a world 
defined as both opposition and extension of the school. In this space, language and text 
mark the collision between the student and the world and register the “truth” to which the 
student is subjected. 
Foucault’s notion of a dispositif, or social apparatus, is used to map the pedagogical 
relations structured by literacy discourse in terms of a space of visibility and a form of 
sayability, and to analyse their operation within power-knowledge. By power-knowledge 
I mean a circulating network in which ways of understanding and conceptualising also 
involve power and authority, and techniques of controlling, arraying and disposing 
people and objects are also productive of knowledge. Th  formulable/visible/operable 
“space” of literacy is conceptualised as a normative heterotopia and as a recent mutation 
of bio-power, the government of the developing body. Such analysis yields a coherent 
account of how the discourse of literacy articulates that term’s systematic indefiniteness 
with its real effectivity in producing subjects, spaces and disciplinary techniques. 
The literacy dispositif articulates two distinct historical strata: an establishment of 
fundamental terms and relations in the nineteenth century, and a reorganisation of 
pedagogical space in the twentieth. T e nineteenth-century educational state produced th  
national language and the developing child, as wellas the world of demands and national 
progress, in biological and linguistic models of human development and in the insertion 
of pedagogised subjects into a graduated national table. Around these notions formed 
disciplinary procedures, structures of perception, and a configuration of desire centred 
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around the recognition and utilisation of language development. Contemporary literacy 
discourse appropriates these knowledges and multiplies their sites of operation, 
articulating the recognition and enablement of all literacies (with an emphasis on the non-
standard) with the governmental intensification anddirection of the powers of a 
population. As a result of this convergence and articulation, the pedagogical relations 
inscribed within literacy discourse project a continuous disciplinary power into a general 
social space. 
Literacy has thus become a common social concern, a structuring of spaces, 
subjects, discourse and power. After analysing the integrated functioning of the literacy 
dispositif in a recent education policy document, the Western Australian Curriculum 
Framework, this thesis examines literacy in several levels of its operation and historical 
construction: as part of a discourse, as the substance of a power-knowledge regime, and 
as an organisation of space. Literacy is deployed as a way of organising experience 
through discourse and as a means of modulating the relations between three historically 
constituted terms: the student, the text, and the world. Schooling and literacy thus insert 
themselves into a machinery of social production and into the production of everyday 
concerns and processes. As a result, modern Western subjects live a pedagogised and 
textualised existence in which the most material and non-linguistic events are 
accompanied by literacy in a teleological arrangement of time and space. 
Thus literacy, along with the structured discourse it invokes and the set of implicit 
powers and knowledges it activates, structures knowledge and action in a wide variety of 
events and practices, establishing the historical and discursive relations through which 
language acts as a surface of recording and a substance of power. An anecdote illustrates 
this by revealing the curious persistence of a concrete social apparatus circulating and 
relating notions about literacy across a range of sites, practices, divisions, connections 
and knowledges. The anecdote also serves to introduce the questioning philosophical 
intent of the thesis, aiming as it does to map relations which already pervade social space 
but remain, after their own fashion, both self-evidnt and invisible.  
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My fourteen-year-old brother Miki and I are in a room, and I am helping him with 
his English homework. For over an hour, we have discus ed his assignment. Having 
noted his thoughts on the assignment and explored several ways of completing it, I have 
prompted him to criticise the fundamental assumptions behind the assignment’s question, 
and we have decided upon an argument that follows a Russellian analytic line, looking at 
the logical structure of the question and ordering his discussion of the text according to 
this analysis. The assignment question itself was taken by his teacher from an internet 
source, and contains enough modifiers, such as “sometimes” and “perhaps,” to make it 
meaningless. We logically reduce the essay question to: “In choosing to depict certain 
groups and human behaviours in certain ways some texts sometimes comment on some 
aspects of human society. Comment with reference to the film Coneheads.”  
Miki has written out an essay plan and is thinking, moving and uttering short 
phrases, talking about unrelated matters or arguing points as he alternately paces, sits and 
scribbles, always returning to his writing desk. I pace slowly or stand until I settle in a 
corner of the room. We are both aware that the essay i  due the next day, but the work is 
simultaneously relaxed and tense. We share an interest in logic, and our discussion takes 
us far afield from the assigned topic of stereotyping and the social values in texts. 
Recurrently, however, we return to the text and the qu stion, which we have read as 
unrelated (the final point in my brother’s argument is that Coneheads is not about human 
society at all). In the midst of this activity, I find that he has again moved from the desk 
and is repeatedly gliding his face just above the floor, and slowly mewing. I can tell he is 
thinking of various things to which our discussion has led him, and that he uses this 
action to pull his thought away from the topic, butalso to weave his thought around it. 
The mewing is non-phonemic; it results from the isolati n of a certain glottal position, 
and a continuous variation of the tone with itself. I laugh, and he looks up, his eyes focus, 
and he laughs back. The curious thing was that for some time we had both not considered 
this at all, either as funny, strange, disturbing or n rmal. It was only by isolating it that it 
became something, and the laugh became a discourse n th  object thus discovered. 
In its everyday strangeness, this little experience i volves a combination of spatio-
temporal structuring, social imperatives, practices and forms of knowledge. It represents 
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an ordinary, intimate and biographically singular event, but it also extends into a fully 
social regime, an ordering of spaces, knowledges and actions. The strangeness and the 
humorous charge of this event is marked by and stand  gainst a background, against a 
ubiquitous regime of disciplined language. In this latter sense, this ephemeral event may 
stand as an emblem of the difficult space this thesis xplores. It opens up from a single 
point and instantaneously to reveal a whole latent social architecture, against which it acts 
as a sort of comic inversion, interrogation and interruption.  
If there seems to be a shifting from “space” as signifying the episode with Miki, 
and “space” as signifying the socio-discursive space of literacy and education, it is 
because one is a part of the other. This space is part of a dispositif, a total social apparatus 
which coordinates places, discourses and practices. The space activated in this single, 
non-verbal performance involves a discourse: the formation of objects and concepts, 
speakers and statements. It is in this space that these objects (students, for instance) are 
operated upon and affected by forms of power. This space involves the formation of 
knowledge and the maintenance of power (techniques, tricks and tactics, ways of getting 
things done, programs, plans and procedures). The dispositif thus involves a certain 
articulation of power and knowledge within a single historical form. The specific form of 
this power-knowledge, moreover, is signalled by the relation of the mewing to language; 
language seems to be the substance running through this apparatus, the stuff that 
constitutes it, its residue and confirmation. A particular language of instruction – both 
that used in instruction and the language one is instructed to use – pervades this space and 
inhabits the various locations within it.  
In its refusal of language, Miki’s performance invokes and interrogates assumptions 
about the nature of language and its relationship to thought and identity, assumptions 
which have a crucial status in literacy discourse. To bring this ordered space, the time 
that accompanies it, and the underlying knowledges that support it to light, I use the work 
of Deleuze and Guattari to offer a radical philosophical critique and the work of Foucault 
to build up a more systematic picture. While some of the assumptions used to build and 
maintain this space are usefully interrogated by Deleuze and Guattari, it is to Foucault 
that I turn for a guiding analysis, and it is with a Foucaultian methodology that the thesis 
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proper continues. With his slow, historical uncovering of knowledge and power as a 
single space, Foucault’s theoretical oeuvre is the material from which I construct an 
analytic for understanding this space of invisible assumptions, self-evidences and lines of 
force.  
The first point to make is about the laugh that made this experience possible. 
Perhaps there was a certain uneasiness in that laugh; perhaps that laugh arose from a 
recognition that something quite outside of all previous discourse was taking place, and I 
was registering that anxiety which brought Foucault to a sudden confrontation with the 
fact that we order a “wild profusion of things” (Foucault, Order vii) which constantly 
threatens to get out of hand or, rather, escape from our systems of classification and the 
order they assume. But while Foucault’s laughter was directed at the fabulous ordering 
system of Borges’ Chinese encyclopaedia,1 my laugh was in response to a non-systemic 
action, to a combination of deep thought and other el ments (boy – floor – cat – 
homework), which had somehow found a tiny gap in the dense network of social 
determinations and elaborated itself. At one and the same time, the gliding meow 
announced the absurdity of an ordering of the world that did not include it, and changed 
that order by bringing in a profound doubt. 
But it could not have done this without the laugh that brought my brother back into 
order, that arranged the action as a complete act, situated in an objective past, within a 
time and space sufficiently distant and different for us both to laugh about it, and to 
wonder at it. The laugh was a break and a recalling into this world of something that 
might otherwise have passed and left no trace, a silence between events. In that, the laugh 
was certainly a christening act, making a unity, an object, of something. It was also, 
however, an intervention, a very real change in the experience, an activation of a certain 
set of things in action, opening them to new possibilities, connections and powers.  
                                                 
1 See Foucault (Order Preface). The Chinese encyclopaedia is mentioned in “The Analytical Language of 
John Wilkins.” Borges’ essay criticises attempts to create a transparent philosophical language on 
taxonomic and ideographic principles. 
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The laugh was not a word, much less a phrase or a description, but it functioned 
with all the facility of an elaborated system of indices, of optical equipment and indexical 
markers, to isolate the thing it transformed. In short, it was always virtually accompanied 
by a social complex that gave it precision as well as direction in its cutting up of “the 
world” into unchanging units and functions. There is a social world here, in the little 
room that we share, which comes in to invest the laughter at every point with 
potentialities over which we have only a little contr l. Foucault describes his encounter 
with this text, not merely as the recognition of an impossible other system that bears upon 
“our” own, but as “the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar 
landmarks of my thought” (Foucault, Order xv). Thus, it is a disordering that makes 
order itself visible. The laughter referred Miki’s action to a division of time, a system of 
structured and related spaces, and a cluster of assumptions about language. 
The first thing that came into view as a result of he meow was related to time, to 
how it is ordered, and how that was ordering our action. The homework is for the next 
day, when a minor authority (a teacher) will examine it for what it tells her about my 
brother’s understanding of a list consisting of certain properties of texts and language, 
and his performance of a certain capacity of producing thought on demand in essay form. 
It is clear that time is divided into two, into school time and home time, and labour is 
likewise doubled. No doubt this has much to do with an educational view of the human 
mind, but it is also a way of marking two arrangements of time; a chaotic or free time 
which is characterised by an anxiety focussed upon the deadline, and a tightly prepared 
time which is distributed into periods, activities and subjects of study/instruction.  
This situation also involves division of space, a way of organising it and making 
certain things appear. To take an example, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (and 
Miki’s activity could easily have activated this anxiety about the inability to order one’s 
faculties) can be diagnosed only if a child is disruptive in two distinct social settings. 
Thus, the division of a child’s life, of the reality of childhood, into two distinct spaces, 
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creates an overall space of correlations.2 In fact, all of school performance is correlated 
with aspects of another environment, one which is used to explain a wide range of 
performance characteristics as they are manifested in the school’s observational regime. 
This space – and the practices of recording and reasoning operating within it – makes 
visible an ideal student, one who is abstracted from all complicating forces and appears 
as a justification for various interventions. Among the indices of this ideal student is a 
path of optimum literacy development. This developmental destiny converges the parts of 
a total instructional environment around the figure of the developing student. The little 
room in which the homework is being done is tightly joined to a network of spaces 
concerned with observing, evaluating and forming the student. 
The space which impinges on us, here and, in a certin sense, everywhere, is a 
space concerned with the control of conduct; it is a “governmental” space, to use 
Foucault’s terminology. It is concerned, moreover, with my brother’s conduct of a certain 
set of behaviours believed to indicate the development of language in the individual. 
There is also here, then, a way of making a certain language appear, of controlling that 
language and turning that control into an imputed nature (universals, invariants, 
constants, implicit rules, language as a vehicle for values and world views). This is not to 
say that this model of language is untrue, but rather t at it is a particular treatment of 
linguistic facts, and one closely related to the techniques that structure its appearance. 
Language may be said to contain invariants, but that is only when it is cleansed, in a 
presumptuous way, of anything that varies, including the way a “constant” is used. A 
presumptuous delimitation of language, denied by our little performance, seems to 
inhabit this impinging space of governance and concern, and seems to light up in the fire 
of our laughter, to glimmer as the substance upon which this governance is exercised. 
Beyond this, and approaching assumptions of which it is difficult to speak, the 
mewing and the laughter bring into question the fact of language. The language of 
governmentality is illuminated by a counter-language, by a sort of impugning, doubting 
                                                 
2 See the American Psychiatric Association’s DSM-IV for diagnostic criteria. For a discussion, see Taylor 
and Timmi. Graham furnishes a Foucaultian reading of ADHD as constituted in discourse, but 
unfortunately confuses “performative” with “emotive” language. 
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figure of difference. This strange thinking assemblage of place and sound and bodily 
disposition occasions a doubt whether there is sucha thing as language, or whether it 
operates only as an object under certain regimes, or if it hides different objects under one 
denomination, or if it is heterogeneous and contains “non-linguistic” things in its essence. 
In any case, it brings into question what role of the school in legislating the boundaries of 
language and of a language, in designating not just what is correct but also what is 
linguistic and what is English. To mew is clearly not a linguistic fact – it is a 
paralinguistic vocalisation, according to accepted d limitations – but it is a way of 
carrying thought within the body and reordering its components. Gliding the face above a 
surface is not linguistic but somatic, a way of drawing a particular quality of voice, 
enacting a particular type of thinking. What it is not geared to is communication or 
representation, the cardinal qualities of language in linguistic disciplines.3  
The mewing speaks: it introduces a positive characte isable practice; the laughter, 
on the other hand, marks the enormous distance between this act and the disciplined 
language, ordered in time and space, which we had taken for granted the moment before. 
In its very rejection of linguistic form, Miki’s actions summon up a group of assumptions 
about language, about what it is composed of and what it is for. These assumptions form 
a kind of substance through which this discourse tak s form. How does one achieve the 
distance to view the outline of so a self-evident a otion as language, and how may one 
relate it to this situation? To do justice to the immanent critique that informs our laughter 
and to further this charting of an insistent space, it is necessary to take two directions. 
The first is to look at notions of language, via Deleuze and Guattari, from a radical 
philosophical perspective, and the second, using a Foucaultian methodology, is to 
examine the relationship of language to the other elem nts of a total social apparatus.  
                                                 
3 Grace argues that descriptive linguistics is undercut by its attempt to describe languages dominated by a 
prescriptive elite, drawing on Kloss’ distinction between Abstand and Ausbau languages. Grace’s argument 
relies on the assumption that there are changes that are natural or internal to a language – that is, actual 
usage “when languages are left alone” (Bailey 10) – and external changes. Assuming language to be 
integrated into a social assemblage, however, suggets that “language” is a convenient demarcation, and 
that linguistics therefore arises from a presumptive definition of language as an integral system. 
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Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis in A Thousand Plateaus demonstrates that 
language is primarily neither communicative nor informational. Rather, they argue, the 
functions of communication and representation are de ived from modes that are usually 
considered by linguists as peripheral to the function and proper character of language: the 
performative and the illocutionary. The performative s a statement that is 
indistinguishable from what it says, such as “I swear.” The illocutionary is a mode in 
which language gets things done (“the command, the expression of obedience, the 
assertion, the question, the affirmation or negation” [Spengler, qtd. in Deleuze and 
Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 76]). From this beginning, Deleuze and Guattari develop an 
alternative model of language to mainstream linguistics.  
The mewing, understood in these terms – as a way of getting things done, as an 
instance of the illocutionary mode – is not a perverse use of voice, body and space; it is 
as language-like as any sanctioned utterance. It functions like Deleuze and Guattari’s 
radical project, destabilising the authorities establishing language as an object, returning 
language to the dynamic image of indefinitely branchi g systems in constant 
transformation, to a physis of constant rearrangement. Their project retrieves this event 
from the status of anomaly, instead creating a form f description and a way of 
conceptualising that resists the “organising” language (that is, describing and controlling 
it as if it were a system of functional interrelations with a common end). Like Foucault’s 
laughter, they shatter order and render visible the power that pretends to be a thing: 
When the schoolmistress instructs her students on a rule of grammar or 
arithmetic, she is not informing them, any more than she is informing herself 
when she questions a student. She does not so much instruct as “insign,” give 
orders or commands. A teacher’s commands are not external or additional to 
what he or she teaches us. They do not flow from pri ary significations or 
result from information: an order always and already concerns prior orders, 
which is why ordering is redundancy. The compulsory education machine 
does not communicate information; it imposes upon the child semiotic 
coordinates possessing all of the dual foundations of grammar . . . . The 
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elementary unit of language – the statement – is the order-word (Deleuze and 
Guattari, Thousand Plateaus 75-6).4 
The insistence of the space activated by the “statement” here, however, points to 
the inadequacies of Deleuze and Guattari for this the is, in both process and project. 
While they provide a salutary critique of the underlying postulates of linguistics, their 
ensuing reconceptualisations are more a rendering of language as rhizome, or its 
disaggregation into a chimera of transformations, than a set of landmarks, concepts and 
procedures with which to capture the kind of interrelations with which this thesis is 
concerned. Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with a defoundational project 
of repeatedly forming new concepts (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy 7), 
generating new terms with which to describe and intervene. Their emphasis is on 
changing the language of philosophy as they engage with it. Such a practice does not 
provide the analytic detail required to deal with the definite historical relations between 
spaces, words, gazes, gestures and meows activated n my brother’s action. Nor does it 
address what this thesis is more generally concerned with: a peculiarly open space or, 
alternatively, a space with distinct components which nonetheless form a series of 
communications, loops and articulations. If the language of the classroom imposes order, 
it also emerges from an ordering space. Deleuze and Guattari open up an analysis by 
putting into question what is taken for granted, while Foucault furnishes the analytical 
schemata for distinguishing the historical functions of this discourse. Moreover, Foucault 
makes the space in which this discourse operates analysable as a form of power-
knowledge. Language is not merely a way of getting things done: statements are 
themselves ordered by, at the same time as they ordr, the space in which they appear. 
This space produces a particular consciousness of the pressure of time and of the 
purpose of the exercise, which compels the desire to wri e the thoughts down. This desire 
is not yet a concern for literacy, for a display and ssurance of the capacity to read and 
                                                 
4 That classroom discourse is primarily an ordering is made clear in Bellack et al. While classroom talk is 
conceived as a language game, the analysis focusses pon “soliciting and responding moves” (87-132) 
“structuring moves” (133-65) and “reacting moves” (165-92). While the result of the research is a set of 
“rules of the language game” (237-52), it is clear that each of the teacher’s moves is an ordering, both in 
terms of setting out the conceptual, spatial and serial orders, and in terms of issuing instructions.  
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write, and to think of texts, in appropriate ways. It is, rather, the experience of an 
imperative that has spread itself throughout this time and space, throughout the social 
body, and has found an application here, in this room. This space is not any particular 
place, but, rather, the simultaneous interrelation and distinction of places.  
Such a disciplining space is marked by the insistent effort to make the child 
recognise itself both as an expression of the nature of language and as inhabiting a stage 
of development. That is, the desire to write thought down is an artefact of a pedagogical 
space that involves a subjection of the educational subject and the making-visible of a 
developmental scale. The school, as a place, as a set of persons, as a regime and a body of 
ongoing evaluations, knowledges and interventions, constitutes a complex social practice 
of constant training, not only of teachers and students, but also of parents, friends and 
relatives, in a game of concern and applause, tracking and tracing, a game which is 
simultaneously moralising and calculating. The school/ me division is a loop of 
subjectification. It creates in the student an observation of her/himself, and of an order, 
parallel to this self-observation, into which s/he fits and which s/he expresses. This 
circulation involves a distinction and articulation f persons. Through this game of 
concern and training, through this constant observation, a subject of education emerges 
who is also subjected5 to education. Concurrently, the school separates itself off from 
“the world out there” and brings this world back in various fashions: as different ways of 
speaking, writing, reading and knowing, as the demands of the new economy, as the 
order of nature. The school, as place and practice, is the perfect spatial metaphor of the 
privacy of thought, of internal representations of the world, and at the same time an 
efficient mechanism for the disciplining of private thoughts, of their ordering into a text, 
of this desire to write thought for the judgment of progress. 
The space analysed in this thesis and referred to obliquely in the anecdote is also a 
special kind of social control by enclosure, separation, treatment and release. The ease 
                                                 
5 There are a number of sites involved, and a variety of subjects, but they are all related to a single system 
of pedagogical subject-formation. See Covaleskie for a discussion of the subjection of students and 
teachers. Marshall (“Busno-Power”) argues that, as part of an attack upon the welfare state, neo-liberal 
discipline forms the pedagogical subject as a consumerist “autonomous chooser.” For an early formulation 
of education as a mode of subjection, see Adams (73). 
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with which this confinement (even though it requires a legal sanction) is accepted as a 
universal “cure” for childhood is the result, or the enactment, of complex relations 
between economic processes, institutions, authorities, practices.6 But these are themselves 
connected to the status of children as deficient but potential adults. The darker historical 
associations of childhood with disease and madness enter into contemporary disciplinary 
space, but they do not explain it. It may be that childhood is treated as an inevitable 
disease, but only according to a Renaissance model, since it must express itself and go 
through its various stages if the patient is to get bet er and become a healthy adult.7 
Nonetheless, schooled childhood presents a spatiotemp ral focus of vigilance that is 
curiously akin to watching the crisis of an illness. On the other hand, in the first 
formulations of insanity that emerge from “the great confinement,” childhood haunts the 
figure of regression, of a disease that arises fromthe reactivation of childhood patterns of 
thought and behaviour. Childhood is defined both as the foundation of adulthood (reason, 
order and work) and the symptom of its degradation (unreason, disorder and “play”).8 
This childhood-madness association remains virtually present in contemporary schooling 
because childhood is invested with the time of development, corresponding to a plotting 
and monitoring of appropriate stages. This is why a meow that acts as a vehicle for 
thought is so difficult to accommodate. The notion of childhood that operates within the 
space I am charting presupposes an imperative time that mandates intervention and 
diagnoses the disruption of an ideal trajectory. The fear of a type of madness (regression) 
and a type of bio-psychic disease (retardation/arrested development) intersect in this 
labyrinthine circuit of concerns and techniques, diagnostic suspicions and sites of 
treatment. The space here involves and invests obscure dreams and ghostly fears, all of 
which have as their object the child. These desires a  related to the insertion of the child 
into a cloud of disciplines and sites of interventio .  
                                                 
6 Although literacy theorists regularly point out tha  literacy should not be reduced to schooled literacy (e.g. 
Barton, 34; Freebody et al.), the use of out-of-school literacies is almost always to improve schooling. The 
recognition and codification of Aboriginal “ways oflearning” is a particularly clear instance of this (see 
Batten et al., 7-17). 
7 See Foucault’s Madness and Civilisation, 79.  
8 For a discussion of the historical status of play within education, see Brehony. 
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A single term, “literacy,” explains this space and the combinations of sites, objects, 
models and ideal entities, its interventions and recordings. It unites this space and makes 
its geometry seem orderly and beneficial, its power commensurate and proper, its 
knowledge sober and intelligible. Literacy is the sign under which my brother’s 
subjection occurs, and it is thus the term confronted and refused in that strange act 
marked by a laugh in the privacy of his room, that act strangely connected to the space of 
his subjection. Literacy is the central figure of this space, combining all of these concerns 
and processes in a single term. This term, difficult to define yet constantly invoked, is 
essential to making sense of this space and its divi ions and practices. This is largely 
independent of the various definitions of literacy nd the complex series of debates 
concerning the properties of this entity, the best way to assist in its development, the rules 
for its definition, engaged in by literacy theorists.  
The meow and the laughter mark the presence and witess the insistence of a 
structured and regulated practice of knowing literacy. Moreover, they arise from a 
difficult and circular relationship inscribed in this discourse between experiences and 
delimitations, between practices and their naming. The meow itself was indifferent to 
literacy as desired, to literacy as an object of concern and discovery and as a substance to 
build, and this indifference was underscored by a laughter of recognition. Nonetheless, it 
was this discourse, this network of desires, assumptions and ways of knowing which 
impinged upon this paralinguistic act as part of an inescapable “everywhere,” a sort of 
practiced reality. It is thus this relation of a difficult, perhaps impossible knowledge to an 
inescapable and everywhere evident reality that forms the outline of this self-
problematising discourse.  
Literacy discourse presents a series of problems that act paradoxically, putting the 
definition of literacy into doubt while guaranteeing its existence beyond discourse. The 
disciplines that involve literacy (it skips and jumps across and along various circles of 
signification) always tempt the researcher into examining the thing that is touched by 
literacy, that it skims upon. There is always a foundation, a nature, that literacy seems to 
rely upon, and that can be easily undermined in order to enter a new discourse, a critical 
one that leads us out of a labyrinth. This escape, this liberation from former strictures, is 
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always false, since literacy is a de-founded signifier which merely skips and skips back 
along different lines, with no ultimate regard for a foundation. It is a purely pragmatic 
construct, even when its discourse goes into the depth of the bodies it inhabits, the 
societies it changes, and the individual histories it affects. It is the critical mapping of 
literacies that assures their effect as tools of power-knowledge. 
Literacy, or the impulse to study literacy, can be sustained by the claims that are 
made for it (in connection with modernity, science, egoism, visual bias, rationality, for 
example) or by the emptiness of these claims (historical non-correlations, studies 
establishing the schooling-literacy distinction, critique of numbers and tendencies, of 
individual developmental sequence). Literacy motivates these visions; it is something like 
the ground on which the battle for its decipherment takes place. Again, the status of 
literacy is difficult to see here because of its necessity and self-evidence. One cannot 
even be sure what are the effects of certain practices and techniques of measuring literacy 
and what might be its ideal correlate: can we say th t the notions of language, text and 
student operating in this discourse precede the notion f literacy? The “there is” – not 
only of literacy but also of its concatenation of objects – may be only the necessary 
correlate of a practice of knowledge which produces its own objects. 
Moreover, tracing an historical experience of language, such a narrative contributes 
to an account of the means by which language came to b recognised as a single system. 
To speak of an elementary unit of language presupposes too much and leaves too much 
unexplained here. To search for statements as the structuring units of a discourse, on the 
other hand, does something different: it makes intell gible the extraordinary rendering of 
a space of correlations by the meow and the laugh that marked it, or by the regulations 
and definitions in the Curriculum Framework and in many other documents like it. 
Where a culture locates and controls, studies and exacts language qua language (as both a 
picture of itself and a symptom of its quality) has considerable bearing on the question of 
language’s primary nature, whether it should be seen as a variable assemblage of forces 
or as a system of representation. This specific and privileged site of language is entangled 
in a space of “non-linguistic” things – in persons, acts and times, in techniques and 
knowledges that are themselves part of the specific effects of this site. A historical 
 15 
account of how a particular taken-for-granted model of language is discursively 
constructed goes beyond an insistence on such heteronomous connections and the 
provision of evanescent examples of language as a bttery of effects. A discursive 
analysis situates the statement, not within the aleatory wanderings of a too-general object, 
but rather within a definable discourse producing its own modality of language.  
Thus, rather than announce a preferred view of literacy and language, this thesis 
looks at where these ideas go, how they are circulated nd put to work. This thesis is 
concerned with the function of the term “literacy” in the organisation of social space and 
conditions under which the development of linguistic competence become a kind of truth 
for human beings. It examines the historical and discursive relations under which 
language became the key to a form of recording which is also a form of power. It argues 
that the study of literacy is made possible only by a preceding historical arrangement and 
a co-determination of elements that secure its obviousness. Analysing a policy document, 
the 1998 Curriculum Framework  for Kindergarten to Year 12 Education in Western 
Australia, shows these historical relations in a highly organised form, at the end, so to 
speak, of a long process of assembly and articulation. From this terminus, it is possible to 
reconstruct a historical account of the elements of his discourse and to relate them to the 
present, while at same time underlining a set of historical differences. 
The space which was recognised as activated in a sigle, non-verbal performance 
(though as a node of that space, not as a representation) is an insistent space, involving 
the formation of objects and concepts, speakers and statements. In addition, it is a space 
in which something like those objects (for instance, th  persons marked as students) are 
operated upon, are inserted into forms of power, coerci n, incitement, cultivation. One 
should not say that there is a difference here betwe n discursive elements and operations, 
but rather an interaction of what may be taken as two distinct levels. On the one hand, 
this is a space for the formation of knowledge (holding and relating bits of language as 
much as non-linguistic materials, perceptions, situations and events) and, on the other 
hand, it is a space pregnant with powers (techniques, tricks and tactics, ways of getting 
things done, programs, plans and procedures).   
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Since literacy is discussed in a range of vastly different sites, this attempt to 
delineate a single discourse is a big gamble. Such a discourse does not correspond to a 
scientific discipline, nor is it limited to a range of them, but is, rather, distributed 
throughout the social field. The thesis requires a definition of discourse that accounts for 
all these facts, and is able at the same time to chara terise this diffuse speech as a unity, 
as a single discursive formation. The material evidnce it looks to is a collection of 
words, graphs, formulas, even photographs; a set of objects, texts and acts which refer in 
some way to literacy. The convergence and interaction of these elements to produce 
power-effects and ways of knowing is established in the analysis of the Curriculum 
Framework as an exemplification. The contention of this thesis is that the discourse of 
literacy activates, and is activated by, a set of relations in which the space and power 
relations of schooling are implicated within practices of examination involving the 
student and the text. In turn, these relations make possible knowledges about language, 
identity and the world. The circuit of codeterminatons between identity, world and text 
are intelligible and thinkable only if one begins with a relation to schooling. The school 
itself, as a general type of space, functions as a heterotopia of deviance and normality, a 
space that is also a reflecting mirror upon a world which is defined by its very difference 
to the school. Language, and the texts that embody it, come to function in this space both 
as the signifying surface of collision between the student and the world and as the truth to 
which the student subjects her/himself. 
In moving from a particular manifestation of literacy to more general discursive 
and genealogical analyses, this thesis moves from a particular discursive site to more 
generally a discourse that surrounds, informs, imposes, measures and judges literacy. In 
doing so, it does not oppose a true understanding of the processes of reading and writing 
to mistaken and mythical ones. Literacy is dealt with not as a real substratum over which 
descriptive and prescriptive regimes play out a certain clarification or distortion, but 
rather as a set of formal persistences, patterns of being and saying, that constitute at one 
and the same time a discourse and its object. The thesis sets about, then, to characterise a 
discourse which is concerned with literacy. The terms identified as central in the 
Curriculum Framework provide a historical and discursive point of arrival, not only to 
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draw the past into an intelligible relation with the present, but also to focus the historical 
material while nevertheless emphasising its heteronomy, its distinct situation. 
Chapter One analyses a specific and recent manifestat on of the discourse of 
literacy, of the relations that persist in this difficult space. It argues that the Western 
Australian Curriculum Framework for English constructs and enacts literacy as a mens 
to know, assess and subject students. Literacy thus forms a linguistic substance 
connecting and articulating student and text, knowledge and ability, the school and the 
world. Each of these articulations is structured by the space of schooling as a component 
of a naturalised pedagogical form of power. Literacy provides the observable basis of a 
power-knowledge coupling in which the powers of the student as a linguistic being are 
intensified, multiplied and generalised as a model f development. This close reading of a 
policy document in the first chapter yields up a general thesis that literacy is central to the 
pedagogical organisation of social space and constitutes a key set of knowledges that 
render current forms of power inescapable. Securing this power is the status of literacy as 
both the necessary access to the world as text and as the natural substance of the student 
as subject. This allows literacy to function, then, as an insistent demand for a particular 
form of subjectivation, simultaneously liberating and disciplining the literate subject. 
The vantage thus gained makes it possible to interrogate the discourse of literacy 
more generally as the projection of knowledges constructed by the terms, spaces and 
practices involved in the schooling of a national developmental subject. The formation of 
literacy as an object of study in the discourse revals the persistence of a national 
developmental subject and an inevitable reference to an educational rationality. To this 
end, Chapter Two explains as a groundwork the analytic elaborated by Foucault in his 
investigations of historical discursive formations, that is, in the interrelations between 
objects, concepts, strategies and statements. Literacy discourse is examined as the 
construction of an object, in particular through “myth lists,” which establish an 
ontological guarantee of literacy while removing the possibility of its direct perception.  
These lists establish a world in which, whatever it is, literacy bears an imperative to 
be studied and investigated. Three types of listing are dealt with: the lists of theoretical 
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positions; the mapping of a public discourse; and the recounting of an ideological legacy. 
In each case, a world is drawn, simultaneously unified by the notion of literacy and 
assuming literacy as an unknown thing that is a concern for researchers, the public, the 
state and the educational establishment. Literacy is onstructed as an indispensable force, 
the contours of which are defined and redefined according to the practical context, social 
needs and political ends with which it is associated. As Foucault has argued about other 
historical concepts, the chapter argues that “literacy” is systematically constructed by the 
discourse and owes its existence to practices that allow it to appear. Rather than seeing 
literacy as discursively constituted, such lists asume that one may cleanse the concept of 
unwarranted accretions and recover a core or real definition. This is itself a mode of 
construction, positing a pedagogical space as terminus for the discourse, imposing a 
specific developmental urgency that is mapped onto bo h the student and society. 
Chapter Three shows that this guarantee of literacy as the protean object of the 
discourse involves literacy discourse in a set of undecidable circularities. Without an 
understanding of this discursive formation and the relations that are immanent in it, the 
discourse provides an insufficient account of literacy as concept, object or experience. 
The discourse fails to account for itself, systematically forming its object while at the 
same time obscuring this process. However, the statments of literacy persist in putting 
into play a consistent set of relations between schooling, the developing subject, 
language, text and nation-state. These radical inadequacies of the discourse, combined 
with this discursive consistency, call for a Foucaulti n understanding of knowledges 
concerning literacy as a discursive formation rather an as a persistent object over which 
definitional disputes are conducted and towards which d ffering disciplinary approaches 
may be applied. 
The practices that form its object are necessarily invisible to this discursive 
formation, are beyond the space bound and organised by its statements, its fundamental 
orientation, its array of speaking positions, concepts and possible arguments. Three areas 
of the discourse are analysed here, the historiographical, the epistemological and the 
political, all of which are involved in circularities and ambiguities inherent in the 
discursive foundation of literacy as an organising term for historical inquiry, as a 
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knowable object and as a political problem. Moreover, there is the general political 
problem of a form of knowledge that ineluctably affects implementation, policy and 
everyday practice. These circular relations or “analytics of finitude” (Foucault, Order 
270) are always presupposed and entered into by the discourse.  
Discourse analysis is not sufficient, however, to form a complete picture of literacy 
as a social apparatus, and how this operates in the Curriculum Framework. This 
discursive work is supplemented and transformed by recourse to Foucault’s analyses of 
how knowledge and power condition each other, and how t is may be thought as the 
analysis of a single complex social apparatus and a single, complex network of places. 
Chapter Four elaborates on the articulation of power and knowledge in Foucault’s work, 
explaining the notion of dispositif as a systematic relation between forms of sayability, in 
which statements operate, and spaces of visibility, where techniques of power work, 
within a larger schema of the operating ensemble. Power is discussed as a grouping of 
historical techniques of disciplining and arranging bodies in space and time. Power-
knowledge is the interaction between fields of knowledge and power, intensifying and 
supporting each other in a recent confluence in discipl nary sites such as prisons, schools 
and factories, and developing into distinct technico-political regimes such as bio-power. 
This set of concepts explains the power-effects of literacy better than standard accounts 
of context and ideology. The chapter continues by differentiating the uses of Foucaultian 
concepts in this thesis from other Foucaultian studies of education and literacy.9 Studies 
of literacy using Foucault are taken to operate within he literacy discourse, and thus to be 
part of the object under investigation. While this thesis also lies within the discourse, it 
differs from other Foucaultian studies by historicising the discourse of literacy as 
involved in the historical extension of pedagogical space, and thus employing the 
elements of this discourse – the statements and power-effects – in a new and differently 
critical way. 
Chapter Five argues that the discourse constructs and m intains a special type of 
space, a heterotopia, a type of emplacement that is connected in an uneasy way with the 
totality of social emplacements. This heterotopia is not the same place as the school, but 
                                                 
9 For an early overview and introduction to such studies, see Ball. 
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is structured by the relations of schooling. Literacy performs an important function, 
projecting the pedagogic heterotopia into the social sp ce at precise points, generalising 
the “pedagogical condition,” a set of relations that are becoming “visible” everywhere, 
hence a structure of perception, a way of ordering space. The danger for literacy theorists 
and literacy workers is that recognising subaltern and neglected literacies subjects the 
groups who bear them to more intense forms of pedagogical power. This recognition is 
not simply the sign of an expansion of rights and opportunities but also signals the 
extension of a discipline extended throughout social sp ce – in the workplace, the school, 
the family and even the self – in the observation, training and developmentalisation of 
language. 
In detailing the spaces, practices and forms of knowledge involved in the 
constitution of literacy and pedagogical governmentality, the thesis moves over a great 
deal of historical ground, frequently shifting from one continent, century or institution to 
another. This study does not seek to describe a past which is still with us in a certain 
relation of government to the moral regulation of individuals, although it does take for 
granted the long history of disciplinary techniques in education and their extension 
throughout the social field.10 Nor does it seek to unmask the ideological values underlying 
certain definitions of language, text and student. What it seeks to isolate is not an image 
of society as it really was or is. Rather, it seeks to determine a single level of existence, 
both practical and conceptual, at which the question of language traverses the school, is 
projected onto “history” as a whole,11 is found and examined within the workings of a 
student both ideal and typical, within a schema of successive steps, cognitive leaps and 
abilities, and where language assumes the aspect of a substance to be recognised as the 
truth of self and society, of a set of forces, needs and impositions, where the text emerges 
                                                 
10 See Foucault, Discipline 227-28. 
11 This projection is done in several ways: by positing written records as the precondition for historical 
knowledge (as opposed to archaeological and ethnographic); as the sine qua non of civilisational 
development; and as a fundamental factor of development. While the forms of projection have been used to 
promote ethnocentric Western arguments and privilege “Western” histories, it is nonetheless the entire 
historical field, and not merely a Western precinct, that is marked thus.  
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as the surface for deciphering, reordering and questioning the proprieties, rights, and 
possibilities of this space. In shifting from place to place, then, it determines the spaces, 
practices and knowledges of literacy as a historical formation, as a recent convergence of 
elements. This is distinct from literacy as an essence with an ever-receding origin, an 
eternally developing but nonetheless self-identical hing.  
It is precisely at this point that the thesis differs from the other works within the 
discourse on literacy. While even critical literacy theorists see literacy as an unseen 
constant substance with historically and culturally variable forms, this study treats the 
experience, practice and knowledge of literacy as arising only in a very recent articulation 
of schooling, developmental psychology, the nation-state, and a new set of relations 
between language and human subjectivity. The danger of this is that attempts to define 
liberatory subjectivities may thus be ultimately aligned with a deeper and more persistent 
project of pedagogised governmentality, thereby naturalising a multiplying form of 
power.  
In light of this danger, Chapter Six suggests some elements of a Foucaultian history 
of literacy in order to problematise, and to make visible, the taken-for-granted effectivity 
of the knowledge of literacy. This “counter memory” links the notion of literacy with the 
practice of schooling and a recent developmental construction of childhood. While 
neither a comprehensive historical account nor a full analysis of the relations in which 
literacy emerged, it dramatises the possibility of a Foucaultian history of literacy that 
describes literacy as a historically constituted power-knowledge assemblage rather than 
as a contested term, and of the introduction of newdimensions to the historical, epistemic 
and political understanding of this assemblage. Fundamentally, the thesis works to 
interrogate and interrupt what Mark Depaepe calls the process of “pedagogisation,” in the 
sense not of sabotage but of a different questioning.12  
                                                 
12 See Depaepe (“Demythologising” 220; “Comparative History” 119; “History of Education” 338). While 
Depaepe restricts his work to the emergence of a ped gogical discipline in the late nineteenth century, it is 
used in an extended sense here. In Foucaultian studie  of education, this term is almost exclusively rlated 
to the “pedagogisation of sex” as part of the histor cal turn to bio-power, the management of populations 
through the policing of health (Foucault, Knowledge 104). See Jose (33) for an exemplary application. 
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1: A Curricular Manifestation 
The disordering act presupposes the antecedent order it violates: the surprising 
epiphany begins in disorder with an inarticulate mewing, but the space it opens to view is 
secured by a network of official determinations, by an apparatus that polices the space of 
literacy in its everyday functions. Clearly, a space emerges that traverses social 
emplacements and marks them as places of learning, development, performance and 
assessment. This space is formulated through a set of knowledges that are activated, in 
more or less concrete ways, by the term literacy: ways of seeing self and other, ways of 
judging, marking, measuring and explaining with refe nce to literacy, to its levels and 
components. Conditioned by and conditioning a corresponding ordering of time, this 
organisation of space enables and informs operations and processes, interventions and 
interactions which are made intelligible in the light of these knowledges.  
This chapter maps some of the official orderings of this vast and ramified space. It 
investigates the statements on literacy in the 1998 Curriculum Framework for 
Kindergarten to Year 12 Education in Western Australia, looking at how this term works 
in the articulation of knowledge and power in national education policy. Analysing the 
way in which notions of literacy are deployed in this document clarifies literacy’s 
importance in the structuring of a national pedagogical space, integrating political, 
epistemic and technical elements into a single complex. In addition to rendering 
intelligible the placing of children into school for a period, and validating schooling as 
beneficial and necessary, literacy forms a complex that marks a whole set of things: 
material artefacts such as portfolios and transcriptions, modes of control, acts of 
regulation, and forms of evidence and knowledge regarding the essential nature of 
students of English.  
The Curriculum Framework allows us to understand how the practice of confini g 
the young in special institutions is made thinkable, and how that practice is tied, first, to 
both a knowledge of the young as beings specially destined to learn and incapable of 
living in the world outside of the institution and, second, to a set of special technologies 
for controlling and converting this population into this image, by way of designating 
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them as linguistic beings. The forms of power enacted by the schooling of literacy are 
most evident in documents like these, the procedures regulating its implementation and 
change being clearer and more immediate than anything in philosophical essays or 
popular representations.  
Added to the order disclosed by the mewing is a power enforcing and securing that 
order. The Curriculum Framework is a regulatory document accessing and controlling a 
real function, and a discursive component of a larger integrated social apparatus or 
dispositif.1 The dispositif realises a form of power. Within the dull, anonymous language 
of the Curriculum Framework is a prescription for transforming the child into a learner, 
for fashioning and seeing a being composed of a substance made visible by schooling. 
The literacy dispositif is not an immaterial pedagogical will, manifested without 
reference to a material practice that mandates it. Sta ements, practices, orders and 
procedures circulate “literacy” throughout the social as an articulation of power and 
knowledge.  
Central to this analysis, then, is the connection that education policy exploits 
between the systematic use of pedagogical discipline and the discourse of literacy. The 
Curriculum Framework incorporates literacy discourse, including critical literacy 
discourse, into the project of state-directed schooling. By instrumentalising the discourse 
of literacy within the rationality of schooling, and by defining the human subject as 
unavoidably a subject of language, literacy policy makes possible the extension of 
pedagogical discipline to the entire social field. 
The Curriculum Framework is an outline of the legally enforced standards and 
orientation of schooling in Western Australia. It codifies a system that had already been 
operating in compulsory education, and was to be ext nded to post-compulsory 
secondary schooling. It is based on an “outcomes” model of teaching and assessment, one 
that underpins the curricula of all Australian States and Territories. The outcomes 
describe “what students should know, understand, value and be able to do as a result of 
                                                 
1 O’Farrell (Michel 129) defines a dispositif as “the various institutional, physical and administrative 
mechanisms and knowledge structures, which enhance and maintain the exercise of power within the social 
body.” The importance of the concept is argued in Chapter 4. 
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their curriculum experiences” (Curriculum Framework 14). The main part of its three 
hundred and twenty-eight pages consists of an “Overarching Statement” (11-48) and the 
“Learning Area Statements,” each about 35 pages long (49-320). The “Overarching 
Statement” gives directions for the practice of schooling in general. It is divided into five 
sections: the “Overarching Statement,” “Principles of the Curriculum Framework,” “The 
Major Learning Outcomes,” “The Scope of the Curriculum,” and “Learning, Teaching 
and Assessment.” Each Learning Area Statement is also divided into five sections: 
“Definition and Rationale,” “Major Learning Outcomes,” “The Scope of the 
Curriculum,” “Learning, Teaching & [sic] Assessment,” and “Links Across the 
Curriculum.” It is in documents such as the Curriculum Framework that literacy assumes 
a function as power-knowledge, and it is in regulatory frameworks like this that the 
discourse of literacy achieves its most direct articulation with social existence and the 
forms of power pervading Western societies. The Curriculum Framework was chosen 
because it administers schooling, because its power f application extends over a whole 
state, because it stands in many ways for contemporary Western education, and because it 
is operated as a way to discipline teachers and to measure the compliance of teachers and 
schools. The focus of the analysis is the “English Learning Area Statement” of the 
document, as it most clearly exemplifies and enacts  pedagogico-political2 construction 
of “literacy” and “language.”  
The outcomes model and the full implementation of the Curriculum Framework 
(the successor to an almost identical consultation draft) have both come under sustained 
attack3 in Western Australia. Despite this, the Curriculum Framework remains 
paradigmatic as an attempt to institute a fully integrated national pedagogical regime. The 
criticisms, which are concerned with the articulation of clear standards and their 
                                                 
2 This is a compressed formulation, implying the useof at least two kinds of knowledge (knowledge taught 
and the knowledge of teaching) and two kinds of power (of educational and state institutions). More 
concretely, it denotes the merging of these into the concrete everyday forms of assessment and instruction, 
the ordering of time and the ranking of students as le rning beings. 
3 These attacks are mainly from parents’ and teachers’ groups, as well as televisual and print media. See the 
Education and Health Standing Committee’s report. They concentrate on several key factors: the vagueness 
of assessment guidelines; the lack of prescribed syllabus material; the difficulty in articulating marks with 
tertiary requirements; the implied ideology of social constructivism; the bureaucratic or technocratic 
evangelism of the model; and failings in consultation and teacher training. 
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implementation, reinforce rather than undermine the document’s claim to distil and 
codify a shared pedagogico-political project.  
While the conservative attacks on “post-modernism” and “Marxism” in literature 
and history teaching may fairly be seen as an ignorant “attack on education” (Brabazon 
286), the power-effects of integrating critical literacy discourse into the pedagogical state 
are often uncritically endorsed as a defence against conservative reductionism rather than 
a specific modality of the educational state. One of the major themes dealt with in this 
chapter is the problem of the transcription of “criti al” knowledges of literacy into policy, 
a problem which is also an explicit, coded, and repeated feature, and yet one which 
nevertheless appears to surprise the practitioners of critical literacy, and seems, moreover, 
particularly to be cast as a rewriting of progressive knowledge into a reductive 
implementation of a conservative agenda.4 As later chapters will argue, this is because the 
determining relations of the discourse of literacy render imperative the conversion of 
literacy into an intensification of pedagogical power, whether it be construed as liberatory 
or not. 
The term “literacy” is deployed in the Curriculum Framework to establish an 
epistemology of signs relating the surface behaviours f the student to a depth of 
understanding, allowing for the school’s observation and disciplining of the student as a 
being defined in language. Literacy operates as a subjectivating device, articulating the 
power of the school onto an observable series of acts which have the understanding and 
use of language as their originating object. This object (and, a fortiori, the student) is 
itself divided according to the various uses and needs it supplies, the forces that act upon 
it, and the modes in which it is manifested. Additionally, literacy allows for the 
inscription of school power as restraint by marking the student as incapable: by defining 
both world and student as linguistic and normative entities, it legitimates their temporary 
prophylactic separation. Literacy is the central articulating term, the very basis for the 
intelligibility and operability of pedagogy as power-knowledge. 
                                                 
4 See Green (“Re-righting”) for a discussion of the Australian context in the 1990s. 
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The epiphany was also of a power that pervaded every space, an everywhere in 
which language is inserted as a disciplinary substance, a material and mental substance to 
relay, display and learn. In deploying the discourse of literacy, the Curriculum 
Framework articulates power-knowledge with both a general social space and a 
specifically pedagogical space. The discourse of literacy at work in this document 
furthers a long-term process of defining all spaces as ubject to pedagogical intervention, 
control and measurement. Analysis of the Curriculum Framework demonstrates the use 
of literacy as a key term in binding together elements of pedagogical power-knowledge, 
defining as ineluctable a bond between concerns for the nation and the conduct of the 
subject within her/his relationship to language. Befor  the analysis proper, then, it is 
necessary to situate the Curriculum Framework within the context of pedagogical space 
and also with reference to the development of the “outcomes” model.  
The Curriculum Framework is both a historical terminus of older practices and
knowledges and a concentrated exemplification. The analysis undertaken here provides a 
detailed image of the operation of pedagogical space through the discourse of literacy, 
and an initial opening towards understanding the discourse, reconstructing the elements it 
articulates together and historicising their emergence and integration. The Curriculum 
Framework is thus a starting-point for the analysis of the discourse of literacy; it 
represents the surface of the discourse’s efficacy in official implementation as power-
knowledge. Its statements traverse and organise a general space of pedagogical power, a 
set of relations, practices and knowledges that together constitute a current social 
apparatus.5 The apparatus of social production that emerges from the analysis of this 
document delimits the subsequent focus of the thesis; this apparatus is explained in later 
chapters as the effect of historical discourses and lines of descent.  
                                                 
5 Daphne Meadmore has argued in a similar vein that the Queensland Student Performance Standards are 
an instance of modern governmentality: 
In terms of the national goals for testing and curri la which are in themselves expressions of 
governmentality, the production of subjectivity on a  individual basis, but also in a totalising 
way from the earliest years of formal schooling, is now an integral part of the competency 
agenda at national and state levels. Foucault’s “slender technique” of the examination 
continues to be a means of securing the goals of governmentality. In current assessment 
discourses, this technique, in various forms, delivers its promise of power/knowledge. 
(Meadmore 628) 
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In laughing, Miki and I were registering a knowledg relating to language as a 
measure and product of the mind and, linked to that, a knowledge of social chances and 
judgments arising from one’s performance of language. In putting literacy discourse to 
work in education policy, the Curriculum Framework weaves two aspects of this highly 
ramified discourse together: the psycholinguistic study of literacy and the sociolinguistic 
study of literacy as social capital. In mapping outthe powers of the educational state, the 
document utilises accumulated and selected knowledges concerning language in the 
development of an individual. Additionally, it puts into operation a group of 
understandings about how literacy distributes economic pportunities, how representation 
affects social relations and reflects social and economic interests, and how patterns of 
language embody social power. Moreover, the Curriculum Framework transcribes these 
knowledges and configures them as operational terms: they are mobilised into an array of 
disciplinary techniques and a strategy of social management.  
Perhaps what marked our laughter most was a combination of the multiplicity and 
ambiguity of literacy with its precise and differentiated regularities; literacy is amorphous 
as a whole but precise at the points of application. While “literacy,” like most terms, is 
amenable to certain uses, misuses and politically se ective definitions, its ambiguity and 
flexibility is structured and informed by the relations obtaining in its formation. Much of 
literacy discourse is written, as it were, with the“educational state” as an addressee, 
because of the role of the state in implementing literacy pedagogy and because a literacy 
theorist is virtually positioned at the same time as a literacy policy advisor. Policy does 
not univocally dominate and determine the knowledge of literacy and all that is said on 
the subject. A set of knowledges is drawn upon from a ore general literacy discourse, 
operationalised in a type of power and arranged to articulate various social sites within a 
pedagogical space. This space confers upon these knowledges of literacy their currency 
and efficacy. Insofar as this knowledge is operationalised in education policy, its outlines 
are determined by this space. Further, critical studies of literacy and literacies are adopted 
by the project of schooling because they render subjects of literacy more visible and 
multiply the sites in which pedagogical interventio s practised. It is important, then, to 
understand the Curriculum Framework as a node in a more general space. At the same 
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time, however, the Curriculum Framework arrays, disposes and maps a pedagogised and 
pedagogising space by using this network of power-knowledge. 
The discourse of literacy at work in this document is systematically related to a 
spatial organisation of pedagogical power. A set of “emplacements” or structured spaces 
exists in this discourse, corresponding to a set of modes of operation. The distribution of 
these spaces is not binary: one does not move, for instance, from an academic to a 
pragmatic mode and location. Nor is it a simple centre-periphery arrangement: no area or 
activity directly determines the form of the others, and one is not compelled to return an 
analysis to pedagogical concerns. Rather, the sites and ways are multiple in the practices 
they invite and in the knowledges they call forth. Literacy opens up an indefinite space 
calling for the multiplication of stages, of sites of intervention and study, in the act of 
reading. Because literacy discourse involves a relation between knowledge, power and 
space, it is not enough to note that the distribution of the concepts in this discourse is 
singular and recent, as is its tendency to address and to describe a society that mandates 
literacy and commands its visible performance. The Curriculum Framework must be 
analysed as effecting a practice, as activating a space and as enabling an ensemble of 
social relations. This practice is a form of power-knowledge, this space is heterotopic, 
and the entire social ensemble, the patterned interaction between knowledge, power and 
space is a social apparatus, a dispositif.  
While no space directly determines the others, the space of schooling models the 
knowledge of literacy and structures literacy’s penetration into other spaces. Miki’s 
homework (along with his other actions) was, after all, done in reference to the school’s 
judgments, rules and criteria. This pre-eminent pedagogical space is thus special, the 
implementation of literacy within a pedagogical form having a unique status, an 
importance assumed by the discourse, as both the destination and the home of literacy. 
Another space, the state – with the nation, society and the standard national language as 
its surfaces – is generated from this general activity, a derivate growing from real 
pedagogical space (with the family, community and school as its sites). The state codes 
the value of the primary activity and of the actors, in titutions and processes involved, 
and redistributes them onto the geographic scale of the nation. It is both for and against 
the coding of literacy by the state that literacy discourse is brought into being; the 
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discourse calls to be used in the formulation of policy by the state. The Curriculum 
Framework could not work without this disposition of relationships, this spatial and 
social array, and it is this space that determines th  ways in which the Curriculum 
Framework utilises literacy. The term literacy is particularly important because it is 
coextensive with this space and facilitates its operation; it binds these various sites in 
terms of a single substance.  
It is not that any of these sites carries within it its own political bias, although such 
sites may be said to have ways of proceeding: the dev lopmental psychology of reading 
requires a closed and restricted experimental form; the teaching of early reading in a 
classroom requires careful attention to individual circumstances and a familiarity with the 
pedagogical options; writing a book advising teachers on the politics and pragmatics of 
adopting new technologies involves an estimation of the audience, an ecumenisation of 
the political issues.6 Beneath and beyond this play of different protocols and regulations, 
unifying this geography of sites and rules, is the un asy union and mutual intensification 
of literacy and pedagogical discipline. Even where a work on literacy is not related, in 
content or manifest intention, to the state’s education l project, it is brought into a 
relation with it by the discourse as a whole. The dependence of authorities is always 
reconstructed in a chain reaching from the most abstruse study to the most explicit 
directives. No word is written that is not destined by the discourse to enter into pedagogy. 
This state process of pedagogical extension is, like critical studies of literacy, antagonistic 
to the reduction of literacy to school instruction and the “basics,” resulting in the strategic 
articulation of “conservative” and “progressive” modes of instruction. 
 
Outcomes, Frameworks and Transcriptions in Power-Knowledge 
Miki’s violation was not simply of language and pedagogical expectations but of a 
subjectivity which takes language as its substance d develops through language. The 
discourse of literacy as it operates in the Curriculum Framework does not seek to liberate 
the subject except at the price of rendering her/him a subject of language, a functor from 
                                                 
6 See Green, Lankshear and Snyder for one such attempt. 
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which variables are deleted in order to arrive at the truth of language. It is only at the 
price of a new subjectivity, of a new and different form of subjection, that a freedom 
emerges. This freedom, however, is a freedom of langu ge from its content; it is the 
abstract autonomy of a language, of the “system” to which one is subjected. Language is 
constructed in the Curriculum Framework as simultaneously immediate and unattainable, 
the whole set in an infinite series and accessible through any length as a general 
formulation. Language, moreover, is constructed as an induced performance, a set of 
rules for proceeding; distinct from signification ad signalising protocols, and from any 
particular effort at communication, it stands at an infinite remove from its manifestation. 
Nonetheless, language as system superintends language as performance, lending all 
textual performance a silent normativity, guaranteei g the predictability of texts, enabling 
a parenthetical delimitation on any scale: the letter, he phoneme, the syllable, the genre. 
Language, as it is presented in the Curriculum Framework, tells us we are merely 
following orders issued from a non-place, an unassailable source with no foundation. The 
world outside, the world of a strange and unanalysable flux, is somehow the outside that 
constitutes the unfathomed material pressures that necessitate a new location of 
knowledge both in and as language.  
The document’s statements on “literacy,” “language,” “conventions” and 
“understanding” are discursive constructions of concepts which regulate and manipulate 
the discursive objects, but unlike statements in the more theoretical works on critical 
literacy, they are both enabled and constrained by an intersecting discourse of 
governmental rationality. The “statements”7 of the document, that is, the immanent rules 
for forming objects and concepts that apply to thisdiscourse, are already implicated 
within a problematic of knowing, controlling, and rendering productive a population.8 
                                                 
7 For a definition of what Foucault meant by “the statement,” see Archaeology (51-7) and Chapter Two, 
below. 
8 As Bruce Curtis points out, Foucault’s use of “population” indifferently covers populousness, which 
involves the “hierarchical differentiation of essenc s,” the intermediate notion of the “social body” and 
population proper, which “depends upon the notion of a common abstract essence” allowing the 
identification of “analytic tools and objects of intervention, such as birth death, or marriage rates” (Curtis, 
“Foucault on Governmentality and Population”). The us  throughout this essay conforms to the latter 
notion, with language as the abstract essence.  
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Moreover, this document (and the form of rationality it enacts) has a form of executive 
relation with the work of schools and teachers, that is, a power-knowledge relation. 
Further, the Curriculum Framework assumes a place within a dispositif, a functioning 
apparatus of a form of power. This should not be confused with the governmental 
function, although an articulation with governmentality should be noted and analysed in 
its specificity.9 The document codifies the form of visibility involved in the practices of 
schooling, in the operations of techniques of power-knowledge on a group. Students are a 
construction in this discourse that has a determining effect on the form of power-
knowledge that schooling enacts. As objects of a structured visibility, students are 
constituted by, rather than pre-existing outside of, the practice of schooling. The concepts 
and objects of educational discourse have certain consequences for the relations between 
school, teachers and students. The objects constructed in policy documents correspond to 
and are constituted in a practice, and the kind of object constructed implies a form of 
power-knowledge involved in a particular practice. A limited set of discursive objects is 
arranged and related here: the student of literacy, the world, and the text.  
The document is part of a rearrangement of Australian regulatory inscriptions of 
education, in that it renders regulations as “outcomes,” drawing upon a method of 
evaluation: the “objectives model” developed in the US by Ralph Tyler in Basic 
Principles of Curriculum and Instruction and Benjamin S. Bloom and others in the 
1950s.10 David Hamilton itemises the features of the “objectives” thus: 
      the objectives model requires that the development team: 
(1) secures agreement on the aims of the curriculum 
                                                 
9 Foucault’s notion of governmentality may be summarised as “the rationalisation and systematisation of a 
particular way of exercising political sovereignty through the government of people’s conduct” (O’Farrell, 
Michel 106). Governmentality is a category that spans from the conduct of the individual to the 
construction of useful ways to determine the conduct of populations by the state. Foucault was concerned 
with governmentality because the concept opened up a field of analysis of modern forms of power (Lemke 
2). Pedagogical power thus coincides with a broad notio of governmentality, but labelling the Curriculum 
Framework as merely an instance of the latter risks erasing its specificity. 
10 See Bloom et al. (Taxonomy), Bloom et al. (Handbook), and Hamilton et al. This is not to argue that 
Tyler envisaged a standardised psychometric normalisation of teacher assessment. Indeed, Tyler’s work is 
presented by Helsby and Saunders (“Taylorism” 62-64) as an attempt to enlarge the scope of teaching and 
teachers’ agency.  
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(2) expresses them in terms of pupil performance 
(3) devises appropriate curriculum materials 
(4) measures the fit between pupil performance and intended 
outcomes. (Curriculum Evaluation, 46) 
The outcomes model is a modification of this, as is made clear by the confusions 
experienced by some teachers: outcomes assessment does not merely imply behaviours, 
as is the case with the objectives model, but incorporates a standardised set of 
interpretations of students’ performance and products, and builds up a language of 
achievement stretched over “developmental continua.” 11 Implemented from the early 
1990s, the outcomes model is a system of reporting that became virtually compulsory in 
every Western Australian primary and secondary school with the introduction of the 
Curriculum Framework (which functions as something like a compliance test for 
teachers) and has similar counterparts in other Australian states. Teachers have often 
characterised this new regime as scattering instruction into bits and pieces. In part this is 
because it is superficially similar to the prior “objectives” approaches.  
As Barry Kissane, one of the authors developing and adopting this system, pointed 
out in response to some teachers’ criticisms of the outcomes model, the problem this new 
model attempts to counteract is the historical tendency to scatter the syllabus into small, 
unconnected fragments: 
I do not deny that some can . . . reinterpret “outcmes” to fit the practices of 
the past; indeed, this may be precisely why the “outc mes based assessment” 
problem is described as a problem . . . . But the simple response to this 
problem is that such misinterpretations are missing the point about outcomes. 
(Canberra Mathematical Association 10) 
                                                 
11 Forster and Masters give a working definition of developmental assessment, show how to use progress 
maps to monitor student “growth,” compose an array of techniques to monitor the “full range” of outcomes, 
provide instructions on judging and recording performance and transcribing attainment onto progress maps 
and developmental continua, and demonstrate the use of descriptive and graphical reports of student 
achievement. 
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Outcomes are designed to render a normalised student knowable and tractable in depth 
and across time, and it is in this depth and fullness that we see the operation of power, as 
much as we see a division and exclusion at work in the haphazard scattering and 
fragmentation of objectives.  
This line of descent is supplemented by a process of absorption: a highly significant 
feature of the Curriculum Framework is its transcription of a wide range of elements of 
critical liberatory literacy discourses. Marxist, feminist and Foucauldian terms, concepts 
and phrases are incorporated into the educational mode of disciplinary power. The 
Curriculum Framework recognises the contingency of the meaning of texts – the 
historical, social and technological genesis of both text and meaning – and the relations 
between power and language (Curriculum Framework 82). These critical theoretical 
insights multiply and strengthen the disciplinary forces of the school, contributing to this 
mode of power by encouraging students to recognise themselves as subjects of texts and 
language and thereby legitimating the articulation between student and text. These 
insights also multiply the spaces and categories of observation of student achievement, 
removing neither the object nor the problematic of ontemporary schooling from the 
parameters of its operation as power-knowledge. Critical literacy discourse is employed 
in the formulation, mapping and assessment of student outcomes, and in the creation of a 
continuous field of intervention. This is done not at he expense of critical literacy theory, 
but rather as part of this discourse’s claim to represent the truth of human identity at its 
most essential, general and manipulable. Whatever the indifferent success of this 
particular manifestation of pedagogical power it represents – in contrast to Miki’s 
ephemeral refusal of the dispositif – a long-term trend and the legacy of an existing, 
elaborated rationality. 
A further essential for the document’s operation is a language of convergence and 
articulation. The Curriculum Framework is organised around a concentrated formulation 
of the problem of schooling: how might it “help ensure that students achieve the 
outcomes” (11)? This seemingly mundane question conceals both a history of the 
machinations and negotiations involved in coming to agree on the “values” and 
“outcomes,” and the subtle transcriptions of what te world requires which are written 
into these outcomes, the great variety of methods an  ultimate purposes that these 
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outcomes seek to accommodate and simultaneously neutralise. The school is the agency 
that transforms the student according to a set of normative and agreed goals legitimated 
by the apparent agreement about them. An array of techniques is already presupposed, 
techniques developed from the knowledge of the student as a manipulable and 
transformable object. It is important to note here that this project of transformation and 
agreement is made possible by the use of general terms, and that such terms reinscribe 
education and its goals as the issue of the state, the nation, the community at large. To 
speak in general terms is both the office of the state as the accommodation and 
nullification of difference, and a feature of the mtalanguage of critical literacy studies, 
as much as it is an aspect of normalising texts about the cognitive stages of reading, and 
other “reductive” treatments of literacy. In the English Learning Area, what enables and 
determines the knowledge behind the techniques of transformation is a complex 
articulation between students and texts.12 This articulation is conceptualised as literacy.  
Pedagogical power is already articulated with a body of knowledge of the student 
as reader. The careful articulation between these two heterogeneous orders is made 
possible by the discourse of literacy. The Curriculum Framework makes use of this, it 
does not impose it. The discourse of literacy performs a double function here: it enables 
and delimits. Without this conceptualisation of literacy as the meeting point between 
pedagogy and students, the relations of power between the school and its students would 
be, if not incapable of being put into practice, far more difficult to justify. The notion of 
critical literacy performs two functions here: at the same time as it allows the student to 
see the arbitrary and normative character of literacy, it reveals literacy as the unavoidable 
condition of the confluence of power and meaning. Further, the discourse of literacy 
allows one to speak of something visible, capable of being recorded and assessed, and 
materially related to the demands of the world, in the activity of reading. This is a 
growing, maturing thing, a thing acquiring ever new powers and functions. In the terms 
set up by the document, literacy exists both within e student and in relation to texts. 
                                                 
12 Edwards and Usher, like Green (I sistence), contend that the copresence of student and text involves a 
kind of Derridean violence, in which the “institutionalised violence, where bodies and souls are disciplined 
and controlled . . . is intimately linked, and perhaps . . . made possible, by the metaphysical violence within 
which the message and hope of education is concealed” (Edwards and Usher 139).   
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Literacy is defined as a capacity within the student which needs to be developed. As a 
propriety regarding the use of texts, literacy is ademand for sensitivity to “context.” In 
both cases, literacy requires the recognition of a truth: a truth of the subjectivated body 
(the organised capacity for language) and a truth of language (the system of which one 
partakes, of which one expresses a greater or lesser amount). The Curriculum Framework 
regulates schooling as it operates on the development of these truths through technologies 
of observation and assessment. This notion of literacy enables, and combines with, an 
ensemble of techniques which make the student as visible, knowable and manipulable as 
possible.  
The Curriculum Framework places the concern for providing students with literacy 
in the English Learning Area, which is accorded twoessential characteristics. This 
Learning Area is, first, an object of study, knowable in the organisation and functions 
peculiar to it, and, second, part of a technology of self-fashioning, a way of acting upon 
students and of transforming them into the improving object of the educational process. 
These characteristics are united in the figure of the student and are seen in what students 
do with English. The student is presented as a condensed construction, in terms of her/his 
interaction with (the English) language. First, students learn about language in terms of 
its effective practice, the systematic objectivity by which it may be observed, and the 
modality that is characteristic of it. Thus, they “learn about the English language: how it 
works and how to use it effectively” (Curriculum Framework 81), and they study 
language as a “vehicle for communication” (82). That is, language is encountered as a 
use, an object and a purpose.  
Second, studying English accompanies the variform development of the student: in 
study, the English Learning Area is involved in thedevelopment of literacy as the 
existing powers of language; it enhances the concurrent “learning in all areas” (Draft 
Curriculum Framework 74)13 and provides new ones, namely “functional and critical 
literacy skills” (Curriculum Framework 82). For the Curriculum Framework, English is 
an important part of the curriculum for two reasons, reasons that are simultaneously 
                                                 
13 Although the released Curriculum Framework does not retain this formulation in the “Definition a d 
Rationale” section, a close analogue is present in the “Links Across the Curriculum” section. This omission 
seems to be a negotiation between the specificity of English as a subject and literacy’s status as a 
fundamental basis of all schooled knowledge. See Curriculum Framework (108, 110). 
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related to two places (inside and out of school) and two times (before and after 
graduation). Studying English enhances students’ learning in all areas of the curriculum 
and, further, it provides them with “the ability to c ntrol and understand the conventions 
of English that are valued and rewarded by society” (Curriculum Framework 83). 
The importance of the English Learning Area is established through a relationship 
between literacy and the official national language: English “has a special role in 
developing students’ literacy because it focuses on knowledge about language and how it 
works” (Curriculum Framework 83).14 Literacy “gives [students] access to knowledge, 
allows them to play an active part in society and contributes to their personal growth” 
(Curriculum Framework 82). There is an implicit definition of the student here: s/he is at 
the same time a social and a personal being, but also, nd above these, a linguistic being. 
A certain parallelism is developed between outcomes and literacy, since they constitute 
and make accessible a level that persists across sites, that constitutes a position in a 
developmental continuum, a level that is simultaneously real and potential. 
At every point, literacy is accorded the greatest importance as both entry point and 
medium in the acquisition of knowledge, as the natural basis and measurable 
manifestation of learning, as the set of practices with which to respond to the changing 
world, and as an entity whose changeability enjoins schools and researchers to follow its 
transformations. Literacy is both the technical basis for discipline and the figure that 
unifies the endless differences separating its ephemeral forms. In the section just quoted 
and throughout the document, there are several definitions of literacy, each of them 
presupposing certain relations within which literacy o curs, is practised, defined and 
altered. Literacy is, first, a faculty, whether acquired or inherent, already there in the 
body, already present and active, when the intervention of schooling takes place. Second, 
what assures and directs the development of literacy is the study of English, a language 
which stands as the exemplar of language in its general conditions and properties, and 
which, as the sign of a social demand and propriety, defines those standards of language 
that are to be demanded of students. Third, althoug there are different forms taken by 
                                                 
 
14 Australia is the first country to develop a national literacy policy, with others following. For Britain see 
Department of Education and Employment; see Goodwyn for a critical appraisal. 
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literacy, literacy itself is also a kernel, a general identity that remains as it is transferred, 
as knowledge and ability, to the other learning areas. Fourth, specific forms of literacy 
are required and defined, both for the proper comprehension of texts and for the 
production of texts acceptable to the regimes, generic and disciplinary, represented by the 
learning areas and enforced within corresponding social sites. Fifth, social and 
technological developments demand literacy, in specific forms. Sixth, social and 
technological change define literacy, which is in itself an unstable and dependent entity. 
Literacy is therefore both something greater than the English Learning Area and a 
legitimation of the English Learning Area’s importance. 
Once again, literacy is both legitimated and problematised by the demands of the 
world: it is both the thing that will preserve students in response to the world, and that 
which must be carefully guided and controlled, that which must be altered, in order to 
conform them to these demands. The knowledge required to face the vicissitudes of life is 
supplied, the Curriculum Framework claims, by literacy, by the concerted interaction and 
control of the interaction between student and text. Students must have knowledge of and 
skills with texts because “Changes in the nature of work and social life and the 
development of new technologies have produced a proliferation of new and different 
forms of communication” (Curriculum Framework 82). Students must inhabit this 
“communication-saturated society” (82) with a functional and critical knowledge of 
language and texts.15 This world takes a position of prominence in literacy discourse.  
 
Students and the Demanding World 
An invocation of the world and of the changing expectations and demands of 
society has historically been a feature of education l discourse.16 However, 
representations of the demanding world have been either national and politico-economic 
                                                 
15 Lo Bianco and Freebody (8-24) give a more detailed construction of contemporary global change from 
within the rationality of literacy education. While their work distinctly echoes the Curriculum Framework 
and other official policy documents, it was not adopted as official policy. Green, Lankshear and Snyder hail 
it as a progressive step (79). Appendix A shows the world as graphically represented in the Curriculum 
Framework. 
16 See Mikulecky and Kirkley for an example. 
 38 
or national and humanistic, if they are not national and religious.17 In the Curriculum 
Framework, however, the world exerts a different kind of pressure, and bears the marks 
of new discourses and disciplines. The society that produces the needs of students and 
delineates the imperatives of schooling is technico-semiotic and technico-informatic,18 as 
is the set of needs it imposes. Setting aside the question of what the authors really think 
about the nature of society, and whether the invocati n of such pressures is not just part 
of the rhetoric of educational planning, this is nonetheless a significant difference, a vast 
shift in both the nature of the world described andin the mode of its influence. 
The idea that the outcomes respond to the demands univocally imposed by the 
changing world does not sit well with the way the outc mes were constructed: they arose 
from a long and complex set of negotiations, transltions (especially from the US model), 
and a ministerial level of formulation handed down for “consultation” and modification. 
The outcomes model derives in part from an internatio l trend in adopting management 
practices from commerce and business, specifying outcomes as “attainment targets,” 
“standards,” “benchmarks,” or “competencies.”19  The first formal statement of “Agreed 
National Goals for Schooling” was issued as the result of the 60th Education Council, 
attended and drafted by the State, Territory and Comm nwealth Ministers of Education 
in 1989. This, with its ten goals, was to provide th basis of the outcome statements, and 
established the project comprehensively to assess and monitor educational practice on a 
national level, within the bounds of a single document, the annual National Report on 
Schooling: 
The annual National Report on Schooling will monitor schools' achievements 
and their progress towards meeting the agreed national goals. It will also 
report on the school curriculum, participation and retention rates, student 
achievements and the application of financial resources in schools. The 
                                                 
17 For the first of these, one can draw a lineage which extends at least as far back as Joseph Priestley’s 1765 
“An Essay on a Course of Liberal Education for Civil and Active Life;” the second is exemplified in 
Arnold’s 1867-8 Culture and Anarchy, and the third by Comenius’ 1658 Orbis Sensualium Pictus.  
18 That is, it generates an imperative for the interpr tation and efficient operation of communications 
technology as the sine qua non of the social good. 
19 See Moore; Brindley; and Eltis. 
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annual national report will increase public awareness of the performance of 
our schools as well as make schools more accountable to the Australian 
people. . . In the history of Australian education there has never been a single 
document which informs the citizens of Australia about the nation's education 
systems and the performance of our schools. (Hobart Declaration).  
Moreover, the new framework would render teaching directly answerable to a 
hierarchy of supervision, a hierarchy simultaneously bureaucratic, political and expert, 
since the outcomes straddle the divisions between th se areas: 
In making judgments of student achievement, teachers relied upon a whole 
range of criteria based upon their experience and knowledge of their students 
and upon their familiarity with certain curricula documentation which also 
provided them with specific criteria. Among these wre documents 
comprising statements organised and sequenced in ways th t described 
achievement and progress in English language and literacy. These 
“frameworks” of student achievement were designed by expert teams 
commissioned by Commonwealth or States and Territories ministries to 
provide detailed descriptive criteria in order to inform teacher monitoring and 
their reporting of student progress to school and school systems throughout 
the State or Territory. (Breen et al. 5) 
The judgments of the National Report would be based on the criteria laid out by ministers 
as the “agreed” goals, with an argument derived from a representation of the changing 
world as the motive force for educational innovation. Aim 4 of the Hobart Declaration 
is: 
To respond to the current and emerging economic and social needs of the 
nation, and to provide those skills which will allow students maximum 
flexibility and adaptability in their future employment and other aspects of 
life. (Australian Education Council) 
From the standpoint of critical literacy studies, it is easy to contrast this imperative 
with sensitive analyses of the “New Times,” of “just-in-time capitalism” and the “New 
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Work Order,”20 but a simple contrast would miss an important dimension. The point here 
is not that critical literacy is being highjacked and translated into a vision of the 
transnational corporate state, but rather that a description of the changing world and its 
imperative for better communication (including criti al understanding of sources, media, 
genre, and of all the manifold interests and ideologies served by texts) serves as a bridge 
in this translation. Redefining Australia as a corporate enterprise and recasting literacy 
skills as communication skills are attractive both to educational planners and proponents 
of critical literacy pedagogy. Literacy discourse serves the purpose of running the state as 
a business in the communication-saturated world: 
A leading edge education and training system drives development of an 
innovative society. Information and communications technology in education 
and training has the potential to raise education sta dards and minimum skill 
levels, including information and communications technology literacy skills, 
necessary for the future economy. A workforce with access to individualised 
and flexible, quality training through new technologies will address 
Australia’s need for competent workers who learn thoughout life. 
(MCEETYA, Information Economy 29) 
This can easily feed into the growing construction of demographic knowledge 
which is itself purpose-built to intensify the (ministerial and state-sponsored) demand for 
greater surveillance of the achievement of outcomes and the standardisation of teaching. 
A National Report bolsters the need for “change” in educational priorities (that is, an 
intensified pedagogisation of the population) by citing research on the employment 
chances of early school leavers, while at the same ti e defining the imperative as 
national and economic. Thus, for early school leavers during the last two decades of the 
twentieth century 
                                                 
20 Gee et al. is the standard reference, but the phrase, and the associated concepts, have been adopted 
widely in critical circles, as the work of Faraclas, Farrell (“Reconstructing Sally;” “New Word Order”), and 
Luke (“Genres”) testifies. Similar conceptualisations of the inequities arising from the internationalised and 
textualised economic order can be seen in Pusey, Mickulecky and Kirkley, Porter et al., Seddon, Green 
(“Re-righting”), and Rassool. 
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there has been a growing body of research linking hgh levels of education 
and training to high levels of employment and, conversely, low literacy levels 
and early school leaving to high risk of unemployment. (MCEETYA, 
National Report 78) 
The National Report frames this as part of a project to develop people through 
education that might better serve the national economy: 
There has been a growing recognition that the streng h of the Australian 
economy is inextricably linked to the quality of education and training. Skills 
for Australia, published in 1987, highlighted the need for Australia to become 
a highly competitive trading nation with an industry base characterised by 
high levels of productivity, innovation, technology and workplace skills. 
(MCEETYA, National Report 80) 
The world sets the stage for this new project of intensely monitored schooling; it 
establishes a necessity as well as legitimating the en ral direction. It does not, however, 
determine the form of schooling. Indeed, the form of schooling and the developments in 
educational practice constitute an international climate in themselves: in March 1997, 
MCEETYA decided to “examine the common and agreed goals of schooling in Australia 
to ensure that they reflect current and possible future educational developments” 
(MCEETYA Common 4).21  
The demands of a communication-saturated world are appropriately met through 
the use of texts. The Curriculum Framework deploys the text as a way to connect its 
constructions of social demands, schooled discipline a d student subjectivities. Texts are 
indispensable, but the choice of text and content is subject to discretion, because texts 
                                                 
21 For a departmental description of the world as the context determining definitions and implementation of 
literacy, see the DETYA nnual Report 1995/96. This involves, inevitably, a definition of the nation state 
in terms of the international economic order, presented as a set of imperative “requirements” for continual 
acquisition of skills:  
These developments, together with technological change and the efforts to improve the 
competitiveness of Australia’s industry in the inter ational environment, have had major 
implications for the skills base of the Australian work force. The requirements for initial 
entry into the work force have been changing, and there is a growing recognition of the 
continuing need to acquire new skills, upgrade current skills and maintain the relevance of 
qualifications, that is, for life-long learning. (DETYA, Annual Report 3-4) 
Needless to say, externalising the reasons for intensifi d discipline places them, if not beyond critiism, 
then, at any rate, beyond control. 
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function generally: there may be better and worse texts, but they all demonstrate the 
workings of language, and they all develop literacy in the presence of a reader. 
Obviously, what really happens is a selection of typical texts selected for their generic 
conformity, not because the content is chosen for its lack of deviance from generic 
formulae, but because the generic outlines and the function of the text in teaching a 
systemic view of language convert each text into a textbook. If the school has a great deal 
of discretion in choosing texts, then, it is because, while the content of each text differs, 
its general function does not vary. Hence, texts “provide the means by which students 
achieve the desired outcomes of English” (Curriculum Framework 82). As the 
precondition for the outcomes and the surface on which outcomes are achieved and made 
visible, the text cannot be excluded from this space. The presence of the text is one of the 
conditions of possibility of literacy and literacy instruction. The text is aligned with the 
imperative for literacy that is established here as the supply of student needs, as both 
historical and endogenous forces.  
Literacy is constructed as a pedagogical imperative because of the functions it 
performs in relation to the terms established in the Curriculum Framework: namely, it 
contributes to the successful navigation of a communication-saturated world, because it is 
teachable, and because it is the precondition of schooled knowledge. Literacy permits the 
insertion of the appropriate subject into the world of proliferating texts, genres, 
broadcasting and technical communications, because it both adapts to this world and 
affirms it. The student of literacy is thus a historically singular being, simultaneously a 
sign of capacity, a storehouse of skills and understandings, and a degree of flexibility in 
adapting to the changing use of language in the world. Literacy must inhere in the 
individual as a discipline and as a set of measurable outcomes performed by her/himself 
within a space of freedom enclosed in a field of necessity. Far from being merely a vague 
term, literacy allows for the precise structure of divisions necessary to pedagogical 
power. 
This structure of divisions is repeated closely in the Curriculum Framework’s 
definition of functional literacy as “the ability to control and understand the conventions 
of English that are valued and rewarded by society” (Curriculum Framework 83) and has 
several consequences. The set of student needs related to the use of non-standard English 
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is subordinated to a greater need, secured by a soci l demand, for learning to use 
Standard Australian English effectively. While this new division does not necessarily 
mark non-standard English as deficient, it nonethelss subordinates it: what is necessary, 
therefore, is to translate the functioning of pedagogical power, namely subordination, to 
society, to its values and rewards. The agency of the school is simultaneously translated 
into the interior of the child in its deficiency and displaced into the society to which the 
school responds.  
Thus, when the document states that teaching in the English Learning Area 
“involves recognising, valuing and building on students’ existing language competence” 
(Curriculum Framework 82), it is performing this double operation of uniti g the social 
and individual dimensions in the one site. Existing competence, the interstitial site of 
operation, unites the divisions in a functional parallel, and provides at the same time the 
individual and social knowledge upon which pedagogy, in a constant and individualised 
elaboration, problematises and corrects, renders deficient and supplies, the student. 
Existing competence is the point at which the current state of the student is assessed and, 
as a result, instruction is enacted; it is the site at which knowledge is constantly 
generated.  
This intervention is superior to a mere marking of de iciency, or to the application 
of instruction to a tabula rasa, or even to a whole person, since it is the empirical 
intervention into an empirically apprehended object, the individuality of which is both 
internal (developmental, medical and teleological) and social (arbitrary, environmental, 
necessary for survival). Existing competence, locating the student as a point in a series of 
series (Foucault, Discipline 145) is thus an individualising technique at the leve s of both 
knowledge and procedure. One is evaluated according to one’s position between origin 
and destination, and pedagogical intervention is design d, evaluated and thought in 
relation to this position.  
In the Curriculum Framework, functional literacy is defined as having a number of 
uses and serving a number of purposes. In one sense, a whole generation of literacy 
research lies behind these statements, a whole tradition of defining literacy as that which 
is defined by its uses. In another sense, the literaci s of uses are returning to a reductive 
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state pedagogy, disguising the imperatives of the natio al economy as needs, impositions 
as services. The result is an extraordinary compromise, a cartography of the “basic” 
social uses of language and a mapping of how the powers of schooling are situated.  
These uses are separated into three domains: the interpersonal, the professional, and 
the intrapersonal. First, students need functional literacy as the basis of interpersonal 
communication: “to communicate ideas, feelings and ttitudes [and] interact with others” 
(Curriculum Framework 83). Second, professional uses of functional literacy serve the 
need “to cope with increasingly complex communication demands” (Curriculum 
Framework 83). The student is thus the inverse image of this demand to cope, to reflect 
the world and to be its sign, its efficient relay,  functioning component in the circuit of 
communication, continuously making her/himself adequate to these demands. Third, the 
intrapersonal needs “to explore and develop ideas, and to access an increasing range of 
knowledge and ways of thinking” (Curriculum Framework 83) mark the student as a 
cognitive being in need of a functional literacy in meeting the need to develop internally. 
Thus, the student stands in a threefold relation to literacy: as a social being, as a potential 
professional meeting the needs of a world suffused with “communication,” and as a 
private being in need of a way to develop ideas and integrate them within modes of 
knowing. 
Several assumptions operate here which are implicit but necessary. The student 
needs an ability, not an act. This small but important point is vital to the placing of 
knowledge in the depth rather than at the surface of b haviour. It is not that students do 
not need to cope with the demands for communication imposed on them by this world. 
What is at stake in the placing of the response to demands in the depth of an ability is the 
validity of schooling: this is a knowledge which is necessary if the acts demanded of the 
student are to represent a response, not to the school, but to the world for which it is 
preparing students. Students, beyond their need to cope with the demands of 
communication, need to be able to cope.  
Below the act, at its source, is a potential which is essentially removed from the act, 
which is its general, persistent nature residing within the student. A ground is established 
in the gap between the act and the potential for action, where the needs of the student and 
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the operations of the school intersect. This operation, where the knowledge itself writes 
the object and renders it subject to intervention, is ecessary: there must exist a potential, 
a depth where acts secure their repeatability. The sc ool must have a potential within its 
object attainable by its intervention.  
Within this division between act and ability, another opens up, both as consequence 
and as elaboration. The student’s acts become a body (of acts and abilities) divided 
according to a bifurcated and teleological organisation of time. The student, as the body 
on which intervention occurs, exists across the division between a current state and a 
desired one, between the state last tested and appraised and that to which it is destined. 
This temporal division marks the current student as deficient in knowledge and 
insufficient for a life in the world, and the future student as sufficient in knowledge, and 
as able and adequate for the world. Lying above this temporal division, a division of 
space renders it visible, physical and true. If the current student is saved from the peril of 
the world, it is because schooling effects the division of space and the division between 
student and world, in the same process. This studen, s parated from the world so that a 
transformation may be enacted in a space and time of the present, is confronted and made 
needy by the demands of the world and by her/his own social and private needs.  
The student, then, is defined in being divided temporally, spatially and socially. 
The nature of the student is anterior to a future life where s/he copes with the world’s 
demands and with the ubiquity of communications and the challenges of technology. 
Students, that is, cannot yet be part of the outside world because they are inadequate, 
incompetent, and incomplete: inadequate because they cannot yet meet the demands of 
society, technology and business; incompetent becaus  they cannot yet communicate 
appropriately or take a critical distance; and incomplete because they cannot yet 
elaborate their own thought and ideas, cannot yet be responsible for their own 
development through language. These three divisions assemble the criteria for, and the 
nature of, students as the object of intervention: they are constructed as a not yet that 
necessitates a careful control of their development towards a destination. Hence their 
incompleteness, which is neither pathological nor criminal, but a complex of 
normative needs regarding three spheres of activity. The school is positioned between 
the student and this complex, which in turn allows students to be defined as deficient 
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and in need of transformation. Literacy, in its many guises, is the substance of this 
transformation. These divisions, and others which reinforce them, are made necessary 
and palpable by the historical process of the separation of children from the world, and 
are perpetuated as necessary divisions in the practice of schooling.  
The Curriculum Framework then defines and operationalises critical literacy, 
which “focuses on knowledge about language and how it works” (Curriculum 
Framework 83) and on understanding the relationship of language to social relations. As 
a set of practices, critical literacy involves a sensitivity to the varieties of English in use, 
an understanding of the ideological legacy carried by English, and an ability to reflect 
upon the use of language, both one’s own and that of others (Curriculum Framework 82, 
83).  
Critical literacy here reinforces the authority of the school, for it reiterates the 
opposition between the student and the protean world of texts and language. Although the 
student’s release from the isolation of school is not conditional upon him/her becoming 
“competent, reflective, adaptable and critical” (Curriculum Framework 83), this is as a 
further condition for negotiating the world. Schooling is already aligned here with a stage 
of the body’s development, crucial to the accumulation of the desired qualities, thoughts 
and dispositions. The student is regulated according to certain propositional attitudes 
regarding language: what s/he is to believe, think, k ow and understand.  
This situating of the student in relation to knowledg  establishes a distance between 
the subject of knowledge and the knowledge itself. In the Curriculum Framework, 
students understand their knowledge as beliefs, not as things known. What is drawn here 
is a specific relation, not of indoctrination but of the management of the relation to 
knowledge through an understanding, over and above any specific knowledge, of the 
operations of language in constituting knowledge. Rather than impose a doctrine in 
teaching literacy, the Curriculum Framework enjoins schools to elicit a linguistic truth of 
being. That is, the Curriculum Framework encourages students to recognise themselves 
and texts as inhabiting a universe composed of the fabric of language, with its rules 
inscribed in the understanding and buttressed by an arr y of constitutive practices. 
Understanding, then, is not merely a euphonic synonm for knowing, but the encoding of 
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a displacement of knowledge, the opening of a space removed from belief, where belief 
becomes visible as a possible construction, and where a higher truth resides. 
Critical literacy is defined in the Curriculum Framework as consisting in three 
understandings, or sets of understandings, which may be roughly categorised as 
sociological, hermeneutical and political, each of which defines the student as a different 
kind of agent. The agency of students is triply determined here in their connection to 
language. In partaking of these understandings, students are participants in a shifting and 
dynamic social process (and inasmuch as their language is confined and cut off from its 
social purposes, it is all the more closely regulated and assessed); they are seekers of the 
truth of society through its manifestation; and as subjects of power, they are agents of 
their own power, affecting the power of others while themselves being also the objects of 
power. First, then, critical literacy requires an understanding that “language is a dynamic 
social process which responds to and reflects changing social conditions” (Curriculum 
Framework 83). Language is presented as coterminous with society, surrounding the 
subject and constituting the medium for social action.  
Second, students are to understand that language is  sign of society emanating 
from the social, that it is subject to a speech situation, and that it bears with it doxastic, 
ethical and cosmological dimensions. One must understand that language “responds to 
and reflects changing social conditions,” that “any form of communication depends on 
context, purpose and audience” and that the use of English “is inextricably involved with 
values, beliefs” and world-views (Curriculum Framework 83). The world appears in the 
interstitial gap separating words and things, texts and their complex sources. Language is 
the result, instrument and reflection of social forces; the text is the surface where the 
world is both made known and removed. Third, critical literacy involves “an awareness 
of the relationship between language and power” (Curriculum Framework 83). With this 
third set, language suffuses and controls the world, an  the student is placed in a definite 
relation to this world. The world described by this political set of understandings is one 
where language determines and redetermines the power of individuals as they use 
language as producers and consumers, and as speakers and listeners. Students reflect here 
on their own power as it is mediated by language, and use language as power in 
operation. 
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“The use of English is inextricably involved with values, beliefs, and ways of 
thinking about ourselves and the world we inhabit” (Curriculum Framework 83). This is 
the student’s necessary position, the universal position for language users, which critical 
literacy allows the student to understand. The three n eds of functional literacy are 
transformed by the understandings of critical literacy, so that social, personal and private 
life are penetrated by a series of knowledges reproduced in the student, who becomes a 
constant calculator of ideology, power and cultural conventions in her/his use of 
language, in the language of peers and family, and of professionals and companies. The 
school is the dividing line between these three groups and the student, and must represent 
them while removing them, to prepare the student for the desired kind of relation with 
each.  
As a concept, then, literacy arranges elements of the school’s power. It establishes a 
nature common to the student as the object of discipl ne, the text as a means of discipline, 
and the world as the source of needs: language. It establishes the existence and nature of 
student needs by providing a measure required for a su vivable (functional) and ideal 
(critical) life. It locates the school between the student, on the one hand, and self, 
community and the professions, on the other. It allows all activity to be observed, plotted 
onto a developmental schema, and evaluated according to outcomes. It also dictates the 
range of the outcomes, though not their specific content. Literacy constructs a student to 
be known, a truth to be extracted, and the nature of the acts – though not the acts 
themselves – to be elicited and observed.  
 
The Context Outcomes 
In specifying the “English Learning Outcomes,” the Curriculum Framework (84) 
adds a significant dimension to the visibility of students, where these outcomes, each 
occupying a small subsection for itself, create twosurfaces: one of deep inscription and 
one of codifiable behaviour. These subsections, cutting up the student’s behaviour into 
topical and behavioural divisions, lay down the table on which all students are ideally 
assembled, the model of which the classroom is but the instrument and shadow. These 
divisions are not an inventory of data to be gathered, but a table of spaces for any 
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collection or arrangement of possible data. These outcomes are both highly ideal, then, 
and highly corporeal: while some (outcomes 1-4) are concerned with language in general, 
others (outcomes 5-9) codify the behaviour of students, of their bodies, as manifestations 
of language. That is, the table makes this body, as both abstract and real, available for 
evaluation. This section composed of sections, the “English Learning Outcomes,” thus 
does more than codify the body for a teleological observation posing as descriptive: it 
also, as it describes them, puts into play the forces and forms, the justifications and 
orderings, informing the power of the school. A quite singular operation of the play of 
forces, involving its own modes of calculation and reasoning, is described here, a peculiar 
interaction between schooling’s objects and functios, specific to contemporary 
education. Each outcome codes a play of visibilities and operabilities within a dense 
series of discursive operations. 
These nine general outcomes are subsumed under two labels, “context” and 
“language modes.” “Context” covers four outcomes relating to “language as a whole.” 
Thus, in the first outcome, “students understand that t e way language is used varies 
according to context” (Curriculum Framework 84). Students “adapt to” and “appreciate” 
the role of context, reducing the specific text to a general relation, rendering their 
understandings intelligible in operating upon the int rplay between the specific and 
immediate text and an invisible, variable patterning of language. The student is here 
desired to understand a multitude of things, to adapt so as to render him/herself 
intelligible, and to appreciate diversity in textual practice (Curriculum Framework 86). 
The division between surface behaviour and propositional attitudes is made visible, once 
again and with more specificity, in the interaction between text and student. The invisible 
level of understanding, appreciating and adapting is manifested at the level of observed 
textual activity and related to the (invisible) truth of context. The second of these 
outcomes requires that “students understand that language has an important effect on the 
ways in which they view themselves and the world in which they live” (Curriculum 
Framework 86). Students are to understand that language affects their ideas about the 
world, that it is the mediator between the world an them. It is language that forms the 
plane of division between them and the world, and, as the product of the division between 
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world and student, also constitutes that in which “beliefs, attitudes, values and world-
views” (Curriculum Framework 86) are manifested. 
Language is the parallel image of a division effected by and for the school. It is by 
effecting a set of divisions, by constructing objects and concepts to traverse these 
divisions, that the school becomes the necessary remedy, as the representation of the 
world through language. Students are those who are separated from the world, and who 
cannot understand, appreciate, and adapt to the language that describes it and issues from 
it. It is this incapacity to appraise language which becomes precisely a problem in their 
isolation from the world and, paradoxically, makes it necessary to isolate them, to 
provide them with a regulatory space in which to reflect upon language. In this division, 
texts are the language of the world and the experience of students. 
Although situated on a division between words and things, texts are here primarily 
ideological. Students “identify different explanations or versions of the same events or 
phenomena in texts” (Curriculum Framework 87), not to get to the truth of the 
representamen, but to understand that, wherever there is language, it reflects, encourages, 
marginalises and influences beliefs, values, attitudes and world-views. Words, students 
are to understand, carry associations and connotations, and reflect ways of thinking and 
attitudes. Language here has a dual nature, both bearing a supplement of associations and 
working as the vehicle for attitudes and ways of thinking; it is both aporetic and precise. 
Its powers to influence, reinforce and reflect, to encourage and marginalise “may serve 
the interests of some social groups and disadvantage those of others” (Curriculum 
Framework 86). The understanding of students is situated between three terms: the thing 
represented; the representation as language; and the attitudes of the linguistic 
participants, observers of events, and subjects of representation. The uniqueness of the 
distribution of these domains and the specificity of their objects becomes clear with 
further examination. 
That to which the text refers is not necessarily outside the reader, and includes 
“individuals, groups, and concepts.” What marks refe nts is that they are outside the 
text, that is, they are things that may undergo a variety of explanations, that may be 
described in different versions, but nonetheless remain identifiable. Without this quality, 
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one cannot guarantee that versions are of the same thing, that they are versions: the 
referent of the text remains identical to itself in its separation from the text.22 
Representation and referent are placed in a certain relationship, where the referent 
is dense, rich and unknowable outside of the text, and the text is both the point of access 
to the referent and its trace. Further, representatio  has two aspects here, as a property of 
language in general and as an array of specific instances. These two aspects are united in 
their ability to inform affects, evaluations and perceptions through the text. Because the 
privileged site of textual representation is the reader of texts, the text, in this operation, 
mediates and constructs the psychological relations between the objects (rendering them 
subject to conceptions, beliefs and affects) and the affects of the perceiving subject, 
whose understanding of objects is, inevitably, mediated by texts. Words, because they 
must operate within this psychological ensemble, cannot be neutral, cannot simply bear 
the object to the perceiver, and cannot leave any direct perception of objects unaffected 
by prior representations.  
Because words, texts and language are connected with a certain social and personal 
residue, because they reflect or influence the affectiv  and cognitive relations between 
the self, objects and the world, they “can influenc people’s beliefs, attitudes, values and 
world-views.” In the Curriculum Framework, however, the referent, the object insofar as 
it is not the reader, is removed from the student, a d placed beyond the student’s reach, 
aligning the epistemology of reading directly with removal from the social world effected 
by the school. The relation between student and the objects represented, then, is 
constructed, by virtue of this separation, as “ways of thinking.”  
What remains in this absence is a mode of subjectivation where students must 
recognise themselves in this game of representation, where they stand for the subject of 
language in general, and know themselves as subject to the influence of texts, caught in 
                                                 
22 This referent is therefore similar to Kant’s noumenon or “thing-in-itself,” of which nothing may ever be 
definitely known. The function of the noumenon in reifying knowledge and separating it from action 
receives its classical expression in Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness. The function here is similar, 
but not underpinned by a teleological understanding of class. Moreover, it is the text that realises thi
“ideological” category, rather than a metaphysical experience of alienation. 
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the refractive trap of language, subject to beliefs and attitudes which are the vestiges of 
the object that lies beyond the text and which can be approached only through texts. The 
student understands representation as independent of its objects, as the arbitrary 
evaluative veil placed over the inaccessible event or phenomenon. The phenomena are 
not to be examined, experienced and known: they are evacuated; they form the hollows in 
which words are placed. Nothing is to be learned of them but the means of mediation 
effected by the text.23 
For students to understand – that is, to be observed as understanding – is for their 
manifest, visible and nameable acts to be translated in o the privacy of understanding. 
The state of the student named as understanding regulat s the space of instruction, the 
organised space between the teacher and the student. Students, superintended by a regime 
of observation and instruction, are to understand lguage as a surface meeting between 
the psychology of the language user and the text. The stability of this pairing is secured 
and maintained by the absence of the referent. This understanding of language is the basis 
of a subjecting practice, a series of complex operations elicited from the student, 
rendering the student available to assessment, operable as the agent and recipient of 
language. In recognising themselves (as required) as subject to the affective charge of 
language, students acquire a depth that is both social and individual. They are to conduct 
a self-examination which is simultaneously an examination of language in general. From 
this operation, a visible residue is obtained, which the teacher identifies and registers as 
the required understanding. A distribution operates h re, then, between a surface that is 
observable in this confined space, and the latent dpth that structures it, that may be 
recovered from it. The surface is constituted by acts, whereas the depth is composed of 
states or steady relations between students and the abstracted properties of language. 
Functionally, there is only one state here: understanding, which may also be rendered as 
knowledge or awareness. 
To be visible, understanding must be accompanied by an activity. The consequence 
of the school’s assessment is not a mere depth psychology, but a property, an activity and 
                                                 
23 Nevertheless, the object is a regulative category for teaching about representations; an intact identty is 
essential to thinking about “versions of the same events or phenomena in texts.”  
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a form of knowledge: the student’s knowledge-ability. This is not only a correspondence 
between act and understanding, since, if it is to signify a steady state, and not a fortuitous 
performance, it must be repeated. It is necessary to unify a multitude of acts, to array 
them as evidence of understanding, and some acts are given here as exemplary.24 
The regime of assessment brings into being the understanding as superior to mere 
beliefs and attitudes, a quality abstracted from language and the world it represents. 
Within this regime students recognise themselves as the ground, the representative and 
symptomatic ground, of the psycho-semiosis of the text, of representation, and of 
language in general. At the same time as the studen of literacy is at work dissecting 
her/himself, s/he is subject to the teaching gaze,  gaze ratifying this self-examination, 
aligning the perceptible and the nameable, allotting the true and the false, the mistaken 
and the intuitive.25 Thus, at the same time as assessment individualises the student as the 
privileged site of the workings of language, languae normalises the student as its 
manifestation: one accedes to the true nature of langu ge, known in advance, and learns 
to perceive oneself correctly, as the subject of langu ge. The student is normalised in the 
realm, and as the realm, of signs. 
If the student reaches the understanding by way of attitudes and beliefs, this comes 
about at a certain price, and alters the status of these preliminary states. The 
understanding accounts for them, and thereby marks them as the derivates of 
representation, rendering them inadequate experiencs unable to account for their own 
constitution. What is constituted as beliefs, values and attitudes (and these are brought 
into existence only from the vantage point of understanding) becomes something to be 
described, something available to assessment as overcom  and understood, as influenced, 
reflected or marginalised. As the student’s relation o the truth of representation and to 
herself intensifies, other relations (to objects, to others, to one’s own acts) are divided up 
                                                 
24With the Draft Curriculum Framework was released professional development literature, replete with 
carefully graded work, overwritten with the outcomes it demonstrates. Such literature was already 
published in the early nineties, following pilot projects, in light of the need to give model examples of 
implementer-teachers, especially in the wake of widespread confusion. Appendix B is from these, showing 
precisely how the outcomes model directs the overwriting of writing by the stages of language 
development, that is, how the discipline of the text adopts the forces of “language.” 
25 Teachers, no doubt, mark according to other criteria such as correctness; this is a description of the 
teaching inscibed within the Curriculum Framework.  
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and mediated within this understanding. A single ground, the space of assessment uniting 
the teacher and student, is also that on which the und rstanding is established as the 
background (or higher ground) from which to examine o self, to recognise language as 
the fabric of belief, as the basis of the self and the constitutive substance of one’s 
thoughts. The acts and signs of this space are always demonstrations of understanding in 
a machinery of approval, development, reporting and gui ance. The form of the 
understanding is always pre-empted, always subject to whether it fits an outcome, and to 
whether (and how) it meets with the teacher’s approval. 
The nation, as dominating and regulating force, enters in the third outcome, where 
“students use the conventions of Standard Australian English with understanding and 
critical awareness” (Curriculum Framework 87). The Curriculum Framework defines 
Standard Australian English as “the forms and usage of Australian English that make up 
the dominant languages [oral and written] of governme t, business, education and public 
life in Australia” (87). Between the student and the world, between her/his language and 
that of education, government and business, stands the mediating form of Standard 
Australian English, as sign of the insufficiency of students and of the function of the 
school. What is performed here is an adduction, a bringing into line of the language of 
students towards a language that claims both a certin power (of exclusion and inclusion) 
and a validity as representative of Australian society. Students thus are brought to 
“understand that many of the conventions of Standard Australian English are highly 
valued [and] following them is often rewarded” (87) and that “departing from them may 
be used by some people to make negative judgements about [the offending students] or 
discriminate against them” (87).  
In this way, forces are arrayed through and with language as a representation and a 
required understanding of deviation and its punishment. The language to be acquired 
marks the direction in which the the sppech of the student is guided: it designates a goal 
that is sought, an ideal language that is neither higher nor natural, but actual and 
powerful, a language that must be attained. With this description of the power relations 
obtaining between students and the great institutional rgans of the nation, this direction 
is ensured, insistently placed in the students’ understanding. From this a special physics 
of curved lines, of adduction, may be drawn: far from rigidly imposing correctness, this 
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language discipline continuously charts reorientations and approximations along with 
shifts in the destination itself. Moreover, because conventions themselves may change 
and produce further curves, changes in direction, changes in what counts as Standard 
Australian English, “people sometimes disagree about which conventions are 
appropriate” (Curriculum Framework 87). A further set of curves is produced in the 
student’s relation to established conventions: students “understand that some conventions 
may reflect attitudes, values or beliefs with which they disagree and that they can 
contribute to changing current practices” (Curriculum Framework 87). Nonetheless, this 
is built upon a knowledge of existing conventions, and it is against these, and against a 
knowledge of these, that the language of the studen is evaluated. 
Despite this freedom to question and change conventions, the school ensures, 
through its evaluation and intervention, a general trajectory of language development by 
managing particular deviations as mistakes and by corre ting them according to the 
appropriate forms. The articulation, through the notion of appropriate conventions, 
between students and public life, is clearly outlined in the examples given: 
Students may, for example, greet an official visitor to the school 
appropriately; check their own spelling in a letter; w ite an appropriate letter 
of complaint to an organisation; read an official document with 
understanding; speak appropriately to a representative of a government 
organisation; write a report for a wide readership; or produce an essay using 
current academic conventions. (Curriculum Framework 88) 
Not only does the Curriculum Framework suggest a list of activities and a range of 
acceptable activity, but it inscribes students within wo operations, two interactions with 
public life and its institutions. Students are to observe the conventions of Standard 
Australian English, and thus to redouble its censorship and exclusions, as well as its 
positive injunctions, within themselves. In addition, they are to adopt these appropriate 
conventions when in contact with the various audiences, representatives and functionaries 
of public life; that is, they are to work as part of the public ensemble. The range of 
possible actions here might extend to the contravention of standard conventions and 
speech situations to the point that the powers in question react and repress. However, the 
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dangers this poses to the authority of the school, and in particular to the relationship 
between the school and the public, between the studen  and the world to which such 
performances are addressed, whether fictionally or in fact, are controlled by the teacher’s 
intervention and judgment. Whatever the communication to the world, it is to be assessed 
and emended by teachers, who ensure the performances’ saf ty and appropriateness. 
In requiring that “Students select from a repertoire f processes and strategies when 
listening, speaking, viewing, reading and writing by reflecting on their understanding of 
the way language works” (Curriculum Framework 88), the “Processes and Strategies” 
outcome enjoins the discipline of students as the bearers and practitioners of a set of 
skills and corresponding capacities enabled, assessed and directed by the school. Students 
are here a stockpile of abilities, those persistent inner powers that guarantee a regularity 
of performance, a discipline, beyond and outside of school. In this outcome it is the 
abilities themselves that are organised and regulated s the appropriate selection from 
existing capacities of those that serve a given purpose.  
The strategies that students adopt depend upon, and are evaluated according to, 
“purpose, context and audience” (88). Purpose, which in literacy theory multiplies the 
possible forms of literacy, is here projected into a regularity residing in the student, 
multiplying the points of observation and interventio . That is, it provides a reference 
point for checking the proper application of the powers of literacy, for measuring their 
efficiency, in an environment where the consequences of the speech act are displaced 
onto the text. The normative purpose is defined as the transmission of information, the 
efficiency of which is evaluated and individualised, referred to the student’s level of 
development and to the relevant learning area. This evaluative and intervening 
observation is not, however, a mark of the authority of the teacher’s judgement: this, too, 
has to be trained, and professional development materials and teacher training in 
outcomes-based assessment is both assumed and enforced. 
Using a detailed list of expectations, teachers plot the student onto the scale of 
achievement levels. The teacher is engaged, then, in a hermeneutics, interpreting acts as 
signs of development, placing students within an array that is both logical and spatial. A 
student must be known and judged to be placed in the appropriate grouping, and this 
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placing in turn informs the evaluation (Curriculum Framework 93-101). The uses to 
which literacy is put are divided into five language modes: listening, speaking, viewing, 
reading and writing. What is expected of students, what the school must ensure, is that 
students accumulate the techniques appropriate to these modes, and the proper judgement 
in selecting these techniques. Thus, it is not onlywith abilities that the student’s body is 
invested, but also with strategies, which must themselves be accumulated, repeated and 
adapted to purposes. The student is an agent of choices superintended and assessed on the 
basis of to their appropriateness and efficiency. As the subject of strategies, the student 
occupies a unique position, participating in the relationship between language uses and 
ends, regulating this relationship, subordinating language strategies to the ends they 
serve. At the same time, this judgement and deployment is watched over, assessed and 
corrected: students are subjects of language only insofar as they are subject to the school 
and to the linguistic truths it produces. 
In this distinction between knowledge and ability the student duplicates the 
observing power of the school, continuing it long after the period of formal schooling. 
The student is developed in two ways: as a body of accumulated and practised strategies, 
and as a critical faculty, a deliberative regulation of these strategies. Schooling is the 
model, the structuring space, of the linguistic contact between the individual and the 
world, both as a cognitive diagram and as a real, observable practice. If the understanding 
develops a critical distance between student and text, a practice of reflection continuously 
develops the understanding itself, oscillating between the particular text and the general 
properties of language. The understanding is not sufficient for this, but a reflection on this 
understanding is necessary. This reflection is performed by both school and student, is 
enforced and normalised, and must be (if the outcomes are to be realised) internalised. 
The student poses the problem of the learning of new id as, for which the solution 
is the use of strategies involving language. In this reflection, in this representation and 
regulation in the depths and foldings of language’s s lf-representation, the relations 
between the subjectivation of the student, the topology of texts and the teleology of ends 
are elaborated. Students are brought into an unavoid ble relation to “new ideas”; they 
confront, collide with, produce and transmit new ideas. Language, as the activation of a 
supervisory power, swarms everywhere: students are to use the language that is outside 
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them, they are to appropriate and understand it, they are to relay new ideas with it. At the 
same time, they are to generate, through the internal c eative capacity for language, new 
ideas of their own.  
The division between outside and inside is a false nalysis insofar as it fails to 
represent the transmissions, modifications, mutations and reduplications of the interplay 
of language, thought and communication. It does correspond, however, to two levels of 
the practices that manage and record the use of language in students. Thus, in treating of 
ideas from the outside, the school measures the degr e of exact duplication of a text in 
the student’s answers, where a text acts as the arbit r between itself and the student’s 
account, use or reduplication of it. Naturally, tracing the life of language and ideas inside 
a student requires an indirect method, a sort of discursive interferometry, where a set of 
mutations becomes the legitimate form of the student’s own thought, and is neither error 
nor falsification. Beyond the relaying of ideas, then, a student must develop a self, a 
relation to the text of mutation and variation, as a guarantee of the presence of thought in 
confrontation with the text. The technological ensemble of the student must be tested 
against problems, difficulties, and new ideas. “The student” is a distinctive and unique 
development arising in part from the accurate reproduction of ideas. Each student is thus 
both the subject of an imperative of ideational reproduction and an elaboration of self.  
The problematic that opens the space around the stud nt has as its beginning and 
end the student’s practice of language. It is not eugh that this practice is visible, 
assessable and tractable: it must be rendered visible as something, as the expression of a 
relation, as the use of language in the solution of pr blems. All problems here are defined 
as problems of language. The student presents an inter al set of problems as a set of ideas 
with only potential content, and is invested with an imperative to name and to develop 
ideas through language. S/he also presents an external set of problems, with the demands 
of language in the transmission and understanding of ideas. These processes are 
assessable because a knowledge relates the invisible inside to a public, imperative, stable 
set of demands made visible and tractable by referenc  to a body of texts and to language 
as a general, systematic object.  
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In the birth of ideas, in the demand that ideas be made known, and in the division 
between the external and internal is generated a knowledge of, and a struggle for, 
development. Students “use strategies such as brainstorming and discussion” to develop 
ideas and experiment with language “as a way of developing their language skills” 
(Curriculum Framework 88). Development, a process that is both natural and 
compulsory, both enforced and observed, assures the visibility of the student. Above and 
apart from the development of skills and language, th  understanding superintends them, 
deploys the strategies of language, and produces a further dimension of visibility, another 
dimension for assessment. The abilities and the acts, together with the external demands 
and the internal necessity of language, are unified and coordinated by the understanding 
and its deployment of arrangements and strategies, of a permanent attitude of adjustment. 
The selection of strategies transforms the understanding into strategic action, turns the 
strategies onto an undeveloped inside, and assembles new forms. 
Quite apart from the specific problems mentioned here, a general field of 
“problems” is delineated in the development of langua e skills. The knowledges at work 
are delicately arranged, conditional, related to the existing developmental stage and 
referred to a problem. While fundamentally the imperative is that the student transform 
her/his language (as acts, skills and understandings), it is subject to a function of 
appropriateness, to whether a strategy solves the linguistic problem at hand. Even the 
repetition of an existing successful strategy may be a failure, if taken too far, if too 
mechanically applied, if in the repetition there is regression rather than the proper 
transformation. Under these pressures, under this reg me of surveillance, encouragement 
and problematisation, the student must regard and tr sform her/himself well and 
constantly. Each transformation must clear up a difficulty, resolve a problem, come to 
grips with a new idea and develop new language skills. 
This field of problems is knowable because of, and derives its specific character 
from, the purpose for which language is used. Four categories structure the purposes and 
problems: they are ideational, informatic, epistemological and ethical. Thus, students 
need to identify the ideas they seek, to “clarify what they need to know when seeking 
information for particular purposes” (Curriculum Framework 88). For the need to know 
and the act of seeking, purpose is the precondition here: ideas are drawn out, refined and 
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clarified in the search for information and under the evaluative gaze. Again, an inside is 
made visible by a technique of drawing its relation t  an outside, by tracing back from the 
purpose the formulation of ideas that were necessary to reach it. Further, the problems 
and purposes allow students to be assessed in their ability to use the heuristic conventions 
leading to information, a judgement involving an economy of time and motion against the 
location, and the path leading to, the information required. Hence, students are to “use 
key-word searches and their understanding of the conventions of informational texts . . . 
as aids in locating information” (88).  
Once it is located, the information must undergo anther set of more or less visible 
operations, judging its truth according to certain standards: students “assess the 
usefulness of information for particular purposes” and evaluate its “reliability and 
currency” (Curriculum Framework 88). Moreover, students must employ a range of 
representational devices in the quest to comprehend, and in the process of making 
comprehension available to a higher judgement: theyar  to “make notes and graphic 
representations of information and combine [it] into a coherent whole by summarising, 
comparing and synthesising” (88). Finally, the ethical set involves a rectitude in the use 
of texts, with students recognising the importance of proper attribution, of representing 
information in a way that is “not misleading,” observing the scholarly conventions of 
quotation and citation. Further, students “take into account the possible effects of and 
responses to the presentation of ideas and information” (88). Not only are the legal 
conventions to be observed, the whole fact of languge use is to be continuously 
submitted to a normative anticipation and anticipatory modification of language if 
students are to be the proper subjects of language. Students thus not only produce a set of 
actions, but also mimic and embody a normative developmental trail and a schema of the 
language-using mind defined in advance by the pedagogical regime. 
 
The Language Mode Outcomes 
Through a number of operations, divisions and tabultions, the outcomes under the 
title of “context” create a complex mechanics of recording and intervention and a 
teleological diagram of the student. What allows thi diagram to function is the more or 
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less manipulable, endlessly complex and ramified substance of language. The “language 
mode” outcomes enact this endless complication. This exemplifies the Curriculum 
Framework’s use and appropriation of critical literacy discourse for the project of state-
directed schooling. The “language mode” outcomes further the making of students as 
subjects to and of language, employing critical literacy concepts to complicate and 
further subdivide the student, creating a diagram both of pedagogical technique 
(observation, assessment, instruction, evaluation) and the workings of language 
(according to mode).  
The central terms of the context outcomes – purpose, awareness and critical 
understanding – are used as the core categories for the measurement and amendment of 
student achievement. These terms are mapped onto the language outcomes, which “relate 
to the specific language modes of listening, speaking, viewing, reading and writing” 
(Curriculum Framework 85). The transcription of one set into the other is perpendicular 
and reiterative; it is a series of cross-sections. These terms recur throughout the language 
modes: they constitute the central functions of language instruction and the destiny of 
students as developing and language-using beings subject to social demands. In addition 
to describing their object, these terms also correspond to the procedures for generating 
that object; they are corollaries of the technologies of observation and elicitation 
(purpose) practised by the school and through the knowledges (understanding and critical 
awareness) generated by it. While this ramification ge erates important details, it also 
establishes a central trunk. The transcription and reiteration of the “context” terms thus 
enacts an economy of reduction; these are the central lines of language in general as it 
concerns the outcomes. All else, however important for instruction, is peripheral.26 
It is enough here to note two points: the reiterative ranscription of the general 
nature of linguistic performance is given to some variation and complication as it meets 
the different language modes, and it divides language into functional modes that are at 
the same time sited on the body, related to its organisation, and coordinated as the 
intervention, the emendation and appropriation of the body as the bearer and being of 
language. Thus transcription is also a line of complication; these main terms are mapped 
                                                 
26 See Appendix C. 
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onto the division of language modes (with writing, for example, purpose and 
understanding are active, but critical awareness is not a stated concern).27 Hence, a new 
division is introduced, whereby the student is separable into the five modes of language, 
five ways of marking and directing language, five ways of mapping the acts of the body 
and correcting them, where language consists in the presence of purpose, understanding 
and critical awareness. This section of the Curriculum Framework reiterates and refines 
the mapping of language onto the body, escalating both the knowledge and the power 
involved in this mapping.  
This is a mapping of the body as a vehicle, as the possessor, as the organ of 
language. In the outcomes pertaining to listening, the student’s relation to language is 
governed by three imperatives: purpose, truth and obedience (assessing information 
according to a goal, clearing language of distortions and being critical of the sources of 
information, and obeying the orders of the teacher). The powers of the student are 
increased by her/his understanding of language, but only insofar as these powers are 
given definite normative forms. That is, the school traces the development of language as 
the understanding and following of conventions. This normative supervisory environment 
is signalled: “Students may, for example, contribute appropriately to conversations; 
follow directions; . . . use body language to signal attention, understanding or response 
[or] build on the comments of previous speakers” (Curriculum Framework 89). As the 
understanding of language, context acts as the landsc pe of forms by which language 
might be known by the student, allowing the understanding of the student to be mapped. 
The language modes exemplify and delimit the normative operations ensuring the 
student’s proper use of context.  
Two main figures dominate here: language constitutes both a relation between the 
student and truth, and a relation between the studen  and discipline. This first relation 
codifies the conditions of the student’s release: th  student must dissolve the wall of 
language in order to gain the truth. This is done by operating the criteria of truth upon the 
                                                 
27 The omission of critical awareness from the “writing” outcome belies the stated reliance on written work 
in assessing a student’s understanding. 
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text, upon the deceptive material that gives form to truth and necessarily imposes a 
distortion. Release is legitimate once the school has produced the proper subject, the 
appropriate seeker and evaluator of truth, and when t  student has cooperated with 
her/his own formation. The second relation, found in the appropriate uses of context, 
involves the student’s sensitivity to, and observation of, a whole set of impersonal 
instructions which will be carried implicitly by language. Students observe conventions at 
a number of levels: their speech and listening, their deportment (as a sign of attention and 
understanding), their potential thoughts, and the content of their thought. The school’s 
language corresponds to the wall that forms the conditi  for the power of students to 
understand and obey instruction. What is released is the docile body sensitive to the 
instructions embedded in language. At this point, the construction of language in literacy 
discourse has modified the operational and epistemic dimensions of schooling, changing 
the space from a crisis heterotopia into a transitional heterotopia,28 from a distinct 
institutional space to a persistent and unavoidable condition of the subject in language. 
This wall, which may have been an absolute threshold between childhood and adulthood, 
has assumed the form of a constant and inevitable division within the linguistic subject. 
In the “speaking” outcomes, student performance is distributed across a wide 
range and mapped as a self-reflecting, self-observing subject of language. The 
mapping of speech generates a whole ensemble of overlapping acts and knowledges, 
and renders visible a loop of subjectivation, where language moves in a circuit 
between the student’s mind and language to each speech context: “students speak in 
order to interact socially, communicate ideas and information, tell stories, reflect on 
their experience and values, explore ideas, express th ir thoughts, feelings and ideas, 
and for pleasure and enjoyment” (Curriculum Framework 89). The student is observed 
as a developing speaking being, and precisely as an observing being: the school’s gaze 
must be reduplicated, must be imposed by students upon themselves. The student’s 
experiences and values, in being spoken, are thus offered up to the reflection, 
observation and intervention of both student and school. The problem presented by the 
student is a normative one, the problem of making speech appropriate to every 
                                                 
28 See Foucault, “Different Spaces” (178) and Chapter Five. 
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situation. Language possesses here a will, a propriety in its modes and contexts, which 
functions to indicate student achievement and to erase the power of the school, to 
displace it to an impersonal and general demand of context. The forms of propriety 
may change, but its general function – imposing an awareness of language’s proper 
uses – remains constant. 
In the viewing and reading outcomes, the appropriate cri ical, aesthetic and 
informatic manipulation of texts is practised by students. The representation of gender 
and ethnicity are to be examined critically, as is “the use of language and manipulation of 
conventions” (Curriculum Framework 90-1). Text and context intersect, fixing meanings 
and determining what is appropriate, what is to be assessed, what place and value are to 
be given to each use. The truth that emerges from this meeting of assessment, the text and 
the student has four components: convention, represntation, exclusion and meaning. 
Representation comprises a power to enforce attitudes towards the social types and 
categories present in the text, and to marginalise or disempower, within the matrix of 
language. The surface of the text is to be interpreted as it acts upon the reader’s mind, as 
it assigns a place in representation to these types and categories. Propriety of 
interpretation is what is secured here, in three ways: in assessing the interpretation against 
the mutual determination of text and context (that is, in the relation between text and 
historical, social and technological forces); in measuring the student’s use of language 
against the problems and purposes that emerge from an encounter with a particular text; 
and in judging the consistency of the student’s language, both as a stylistic and 
propositional entity and against his/her current stage of development (Curriculum 
Framework 102-7). 
In the “writing” outcomes, students “communicate . . .  information, tell stories 
[and] keep records” (Curriculum Framework 92). However, the bulk of purposes involve 
writing as a manipulation and transfer of the contents of thought: students “communicate 
ideas . . . reflect on experience, explore ideas, express their thoughts, feelings and ideas, 
and [write] for pleasure.” The pattern of subjectiva on continues and intensifies: at the 
site and in the act of writing, the student is folded back into him/herself, and the inside is 
made available, in the process of its development, to the teacher’s observation. While the 
acts are the site of observation and intervention, he real object of this power-knowledge 
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is the inside, the reflective faculty of language. The students of writing are also self-
correcting and self-assessing in “testing their work with an audience, revising, editing and 
proof-reading” (92). What is achieved in the outcomes, what is aimed for in pedagogy, 
are students continually aware of their place in language and of the problems of power 
and representation, students aware of the power situated around inclusion and exclusion, 
and of the powers of punishment and reward circulating at the border of standard and 
non-standard languages. What is engendered is a sensitivity, locating the forces that 
determine the correctness of a use, and the demands that are associated with them. Rather 
than enforcing arbitrary forms upon the student, the school situates itself at the line 
between the student’s current inadequacy and the needs and demands, insofar as they are 
linguistic, of a successful and self-determining life participating in the forms and powers 
of the world. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has concentrated upon a single document, and upon the way it 
instrumentalises the discourse of literacy within te rationality of schooling. Literacy 
operates here as a transversal function repeating itself throughout the Curriculum 
Framework and the configuration of school power, functioning as a “statement.” The 
Curriculum Framework is not an unequivocal, unproblematic expression of school power 
and operation: however much it may seek to do so, it does not exhaust the way in which 
education operates within the state.29 It is removed from any particular site of schooling, 
it is general, consultative and administrative. However, precisely because of its generality 
it constitutes a diagram, a model that can be appropriated and adapted to a variety of 
circumstances. This diagram also represents a threshold for the acceptable workings of 
any school, and this general relation is important for its effect and power. 
                                                 
29 While the analysis here refers to the draft version of the Curriculum Framework, it remains valid for the 
final form, which was not substantially altered. The principles of the Curriculum Framework, moreover, 
form the explicit basis of much subsequent policy planning, including post-compulsory education, for 
which see DETYA’s (2000) Post-Compulsory Education Review. 
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Underlying both the schooling of English and the discourse of literacy are two 
central objects: the student and the text. Schooling, in its legitimacy and in the forms of 
its intervention, is referred to an outside, to the demands and usages, conventions and 
powers of a world of which schooling is a transient part, a passage and a preparation. 
Schooling relies upon the marking of the student as in dequate, and it is the site where 
this inadequacy appears, is mapped, modified and remedied. At the same time, schooling 
is the representation, the reduplication and substitution of the world through texts. The 
proximity and confrontation of text and student, and the isolation of these elements 
within a space of observation, form a condition of p ssibility for literacy education, 
whether it seeks to train productive citizens or teach critical cultural agents. This space 
and this combination are both the model and the refl ction of the textual workings they 
describe and problematise: the division between reader nd world, the mediation of this 
thin membrane of representation, the imperative to problematise this surface which 
affords both distortion of and access to a world beyond. The epistemology of this 
pedagogy, however much informed by critical social, historical, psychological and 
sociological scholarship, is thus haunted by a space of division and replication, a space 
both practical and conceptual.  
This is where it shares a certain basic identity with the discourse of literacy, a 
foundation for the transcription of literacy into education. The proximity between student 
and text and their isolation within the school allow these elements to commingle in a 
dance of truth where the student is to recognise and understand a state of affairs, a power 
joined to forces that train the body insistently. Pedagogy and educational discourse form 
their knowledges by observing and manipulating the int raction between student and text. 
Language, such a fugitive and ever-vanishing, yet ubiquitous object here, comprises the 
transcendent locus of this meeting, the system that is always at play and never realised, 
never glimpsed as a whole. It is the common substance of which student and text partake, 
and which allows them to interact intelligibly: it is their mutual order. Language, which is 
intersected and partitioned here in a variety of ways, remains whole, since it is a nature, a 
level of operation, a mode of being. 
A rationality superintends the meeting of these thre terms and codifies the 
techniques and knowledges that attend it. The technical operations of this rationality and 
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the knowledges informing it interpenetrate, building upon each other with new crossings 
and overlayings, absorbing the technical and critical discourses surrounding its object. 
This rationality is motivated by a central question: how is it best to make the student 
recognise the truth of language through the text? While the contours change with each 
configuration of text and student, with each introduction of new levels (context, stages of 
development, language modes), the boundaries and the elements remain constant. Thus, 
when the discourse describes a demanding world as the basis for literacy pedagogy, this 
is more of a permutation than an establishment of these relations. Accompanying the 
student, the text, and the isolated space of their contact is an array of techniques of 
watching, aiding and directing the student’s development toward a recognition and 
manifestation of the truths of language. This rationality enacts a hierarchy between the 
teacher and the student, a teacher who instructs and distributes students according to the 
place of each in the development of language, in the performance of those acts which 
stand as evidence of the knowledge and recognition of language. Language, the substance 
shared by student and text, the knowledge that mustbe acceded to and practised, 
homogenises and translates the forces and processes at work.  
Literacy, the notion of a set of abilities and understandings relating to certain social 
uses, demands and needs, is not merely an importation in o educational discourse but is, 
rather, intimately bound up with the knowledges andpractices of contemporary 
education. The notion of a faculty results from the regulation of performance, the 
laboratory quasi-repeatability of tasks, which establishes the existence of a faculty rather 
than the occurrence of an event. This faculty, which turns the fact of language into a 
human “organ,” has as its precondition the repeated nd assessed task, marked always 
with the observance of the signs of power (e.g., appro riate conventions) as the character 
of its health and maturity. I use the term “organ” because, although the parts of the 
production of language are not localised in a single mass, they are united in instruction 
under a single function – it is neither metaphor nor fiction to say that a human organ is 
manufactured under the sign of literacy. Literacy passes from its visible sign through the 
body and back into that organ: this rationality requires a protocol of recognition, a trained 
habit of seeing things backwards, of seeing in the surface effect a deep cause which lies 
at the centre of a being.  
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For this to be established, however, it is necessary to institute and refine procedures 
to produce that depth. A continuum is drawn between th  invisible and the visible; a set 
of divisions establishes need. A dispositif is generated, allowing a constant flow of truth 
between its elements, a truth that presents itself to student and teacher alike. The gaze of 
the school catches the tiniest details it is possible to catch, including the movements of 
the mind, and reproduces its gaze within its objects to render them facilitative and 
understanding, to allow them to agree in a place beyond disagreements, the place of 
language revealed. 
For that reason, it is difficult to see exactly how a liberatory pedagogy enters the 
discourse and remains liberatory. Within the workings of this social apparatus, the 
insistence of the copresence of text and student, and the whole impossible relation of this 
to the world of need and demand, does not serve to liberate the student but rather to 
articulate her/him with a putative representation of an indefinite and protean outside. At 
the same time, and far more concretely, the relation of the student to the text, to 
appropriate conventions and the other signs of power, as it complicates itself, as it 
integrates a more convincing account of textuality, forms the basis for a more complete 
subjection to a regime of language. It is by no means an automatic regime, one which 
merely presents the texts and watches and nurtures the development of a textual 
consciousness. For there are, as the discourse attets, many ways of reading, and a great 
many more ways of using, a text. Rather, the work of the school is to render the student 
serviceable to a knowledge of literacy through its d sciplinary techniques and its legal 
security; literacy assumes discipline and enclosure for the text and the reader to appear, 
and for the text and reader to return to the discourse the truth of their development and 
elaboration.  
The relations established here between expert knowledge and teacher practice, and 
between curriculum and student understandings, are a set of doxastic confirmations and 
subjectivating recognitions: the teacher confirms the expert view on the nature of literacy 
development as s/he becomes more adept at seeing and recognising the performance of 
language and text under the concept of a normalising schema, while the student confirms 
the expert account of language in the production of its performance and learns to 
understand her/himself as the relationship between a personal portfolio and general 
 69 
outcomes. The Curriculum Framework is both a grid of perception and a regime for 
enforcing that grid, for activating in every act of language an assessment and an 
evaluation, for referring every act to a general externalised goal, for seating language in a 
vast expanse between the mind and a world that demands something evanescent and 
shifting, flexible and adaptable from that mind. The Curriculum Framework removes the 
seat of power to a place so distant and ubiquitous that it evades all responsibility for 
laying down an imperative, while at the same time demanding the fulfilment of that 
imperative, and ordaining the achievement of outcomes that connect the soul to that 
world. It is within this place of operation that literacy attains an unchallenged power in 
setting the boundaries of the self, in defining its substance, and in charting the acts, the 
understandings, and the uses in which it is manifested.  
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2: Discourse, Authority and the Ontological 
Guarantee 
There are many aspects in the Curriculum Framework that are more or less 
uniquely contemporary and local, reflecting very recent changes in educational practices 
and specific circumstances. However, the document participates in a larger discourse of 
literacy, combining elements of pedagogical power-knowledge that emerged at least a 
century ago, and coalesced to form the relations spoken, enacted and operationalised in 
the Curriculum Framework. The general relations obtaining within the Curriculum 
Framework’s codification of literacy as a mark of development from immaturity to 
employment and independence, from the school to the world, are formed in the discourse 
of literacy at large. The discourse of literacy, however sensitive it is to the more recent 
uses of literacy within power, nonetheless operates within a system of general relations 
which combine and operate upon the student, the text, and language and, further, position 
these between the pedagogical power of the school and the economic and social concerns 
of the nation-state. What is needed, then, is a conceptualisation of discourse and a general 
account of literacy as an object acting within and produced by discourse. Thus, in laying 
out the philosophical and methodological legacy at work in the Curriculum Framework, 
this chapter discusses and applies the work of Foucault, going from a general 
characterisation of his work to a more detailed discus ion of discourse. To explain and 
explore these notions, it examines the use of “myth-lis s” in the discourse of literacy. 
These lists produce an ontological guarantee of literacy and secure the persistence of 
discursive relations that characterise the discourse, in terms of the circularities in its 
arguments and in terms of its historical articulation of spaces where literacy emerges as 
an object. Demonstrating a broad system of discursive regularities, this section lays the 
groundwork for the chapters to follow, which will deal with more specific elements of the 
discourse. 
The discourse of literacy, while being ostensibly about the one constant object, 
thing, or referent, arises within a complex field of relations which we may call, after 
Foucault, a discursive formation. This discourse cannot be assigned the status of an 
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ideology, since it neither serves the interests of a particular class or group (though 
ideologies and ideologues may select and deploy regions of it), nor explains certain social 
relations of production as inevitable, nor bears a particular social purpose for which its 
disciplining effects are intended. Nor can it be called a theory, since its authors do not 
even agree on a definition of literacy, let alone th  appropriate concepts and methods 
with which to study it (though of course there is a range of definitions and a scattering of 
methods). The discourse of literacy bears the appearance of a discourse about to collapse, 
judging by the extreme relativisation of the definition of literacy. Despite this appearance 
of conceptual fragility, however, it maintains a kind of regularity in a wider, more 
dispersed sense – in the public outcries it enables, in the concerns it excites in private 
exchanges, in the disputes it generates in pedagogy and the disciplines that inform it. 
Although individual participants in this discourse may construct strong or weak, 
principled or unprincipled arguments (and stake out tenable or untenable positions) 
regarding literacy, teaching, and the nature of students and the world, the dispersal of 
these positions and their effects follows a greater, more crystalline regularity. Analysed 
as a discursive formation, the discourse of literacy can be seen to actualise a set of 
historical relations regulating the appearance of discursive objects and speaking subjects, 
the formation of concepts and the elaboration of strategies.  
Foucault: Establishing an Archaeology of Literacy 
In order to situate a discourse of literacy, to identify its correlative field of power-
knowledge and the spaces into which this discourse is inserted, to chart its internal 
ramifications, its historical conditions of possibility (what made it possible to think about 
literacy) and its historical limits, this thesis uses the work of Foucault. What makes 
Foucault particularly useful is his delimitation of discursive formations, especially in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, at a level of existence which is not the same as th t of 
linguistic function, ideological systems, or logical architecture (Archaeology 10). Text 
and language, and questions of their status, uses, boundaries and extensions, are not 
therefore neutralised by assumptions about their nature, but may be situated as unities 
formed through discursive relations. Statements about literacy, moreover, are not referred 
in Foucault’s discourse analysis to an external being but may be described at the level of 
their conditions of existence. Other aspects of Foucault’s work, dealt with in later 
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chapters – his problematisation of the notion of power, his history of power-knowledge 
relations, the analysis of governmentality and heterotopias – serve a number of other 
purposes in relation to this thesis. They provide an understanding of techniques of 
observation and control which inhabit, and proliferat  in, schooling, explain the specific 
function of “the nation” within this discourse, and provide for a general type of cultural 
space with which the discourse concerns itself. Moreover, Foucault’s work provides an 
ethical attitude: in his proliferation of subsidiary projects and conepts (problematisation, 
eventalisation, limit-experience, the “endless ramification of reason,” the specific 
intellectual), one can see the outlines of an ethical practice of intellectual work which 
offers it up to social uses without prescribing refo ms. 
Throughout his work, Foucault has a consistent aim:to offer an alternative history 
of the human subject as a construction. Using his concepts has often been a fraught 
process for researchers, and a variety of adoption r cedures have been attempted. One 
may adopt the “toolbox” approach, where certain concepts and historical claims help to 
analyse various discourses and the processes associted with them; or an “ethical” 
approach where the forms of thinking and writing enaged by Foucault constitute a way 
of life, a way of operating as a responsible knowing person within a larger project of 
liberating the subject from knowledges which encircle and dominate her/him. In addition, 
Foucault has been rewritten into the disciplines of Gadamerian hermeneutics (Kögler), 
sociology (Gane), curriculum planning, educational psychology, philosophy, the history 
of science and the philosophy of history. This thesis approaches the discourse of literacy 
with a specific reading of Foucault’s work, its orientation, meaning and ethical attitude, 
its objects and strategies. At the same time, it uses his concepts in a fairly piecemeal way, 
since their modularity is one of the strengths of Fucault’s conceptual repertoire.1  
Foucault’s work is traditionally divided into three p riods, often thought to 
supersede each other: the archaeological period, concerned with discourse and 
knowledge; the genealogical, charting the formation of power-knowledge; and the 
ethical, historicising the human subject’s relation with itself. Foucault has claimed that he 
pursued the same underlying project throughout his p ilosophical and historical oeuvre, 
                                                 
1 For a thorough analysis of Foucault’s project see O’Farrell (Philosopher); for a clear and concise 
introduction to Foucaultian concepts see O’Farrell (Michel). 
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and that its abrupt breaks were occasioned by shifts in i s emphasis, objects and 
techniques. For instance, he characterises his workas a history of the forms of 
experience, as a history of forms of judgment and regimes of truth, as introducing new 
figures of thought, as specifying preterminal regularities (Archaeology 76), as writing 
books both as transformative experience and reflective transitions (Foucault, “Interview” 
241-46),  as a critique of the modern category of man (Order, passim.; Discipline and 
Punish 13; Madness, Chapter 1; Clinic 195-199), as an “historical ontology of ourselves” 
in relation to truth, power and self (“Genealogy of Ethics” 262), as the application of 
philosophical fragments to historical problems, as g me-openings and invitations, and as 
a history of problematisations (“Polemics”114). These self-descriptions, however, are 
undercut, not only by their shifts and incompatibilities, but by the frequent 
pronouncements that his work is informed by neither a theory nor a method.  
Foucault’s work on space and power-knowledge will be dealt with in detail later; it 
is important at this point to outline his notion of discourse. His first attempt to 
systematise this work was in The Archaeology of Knowledge, where he explains to 
readers and to himself what he has meant, in his previous analyses, by the term 
“discourse.” This summary may be thought of as a culmination of his “first period,” the 
historical treatment of discourse and knowledge. It is important to note, however, that the 
problems he would later address as power-knowledge aris from this first period, and 
determine the emphasis on discourse as a set of effective material relations. Hence, his 
formalisation of discursive analysis is also an opening to his subsequent work. Describing 
literacy in archaeological terms, then, establishes a first layer of analysis. Once the limits 
of this kind of analysis are reached, it will be supplemented by characterising literacy as a 
space that extends through all social emplacements (a heterotopia) and as a set of 
techniques and procedures and forms of organising and instrumentalising knowledge 
(power-knowledge). 
The constitution of literacy as an object involves a productive interrelation of 
knowledge, practice and space. In tackling literacy s a discourse, it is necessary to 
recognise that Foucault neither supposes that thereis something outside, a real and 
permanent object, of which this knowledge speaks (and may recover as a pristine reality), 
nor that literacy is merely fabricated from words. A material interface, implicating words 
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and things alike, a set of mutual interrelations which delimit and determine the object, a 
dispersal of it in speech and in space, is what is in question. A fundamental assumption is 
that literacy does not exist without something being said about it, and that the fact that 
something is being said implies a sensible, verifiable experience. In The Archaeology of 
Knowledge, Foucault identifies four major sub-fields which must be analysed in order to 
account for the constitution of a discourse, or a historical enunciative practice. These sub-
fields, or “conditions” for the formation of statemnts, are: a domain of objects, a set of 
enunciative modalities (or types of statement), a group of concepts, and a number of 
themes and theories (or “strategies”). Understood in these terms, literacy discourse can be 
seen systematically to construct and maintain its own bjects even as it claims to describe 
them. Such a description serves to explain the peculiar mode of existence in which 
literacy has both an ephemeral definitional fragility and a robust persistence. 
The term “surfaces of emergence”  signifies, for Foucault, the institutions and 
practices in which a particular object becomes differentiated from others before being 
“designated and analysed” (Archaeology 41, italics in original). In this analysis of the 
discourse of literacy, these include any institutions, groups and situations from which a 
prospective student could be isolated, where a set of behaviours can render schooling 
necessary, where norms and prohibitions produce the sort of partial expulsion that offers 
the child to the school. Before objects are “designated and analysed” they undergo a kind 
of primary differentiation, whether by becoming excluded by mute processes, as in the 
case of a working class adjusting to shifts in the labour market from production towards 
service,2 or by being designated as individual anomalies (the misbehaving child in a class, 
the truant, the “unrecognised” dyslexic). These surfaces of emergence are: the school; the 
family (the site of proper roles, concerns about attainment, diagnostic confirmation, 
dissonant attitudes to school, cultural deprivations); the regime of normative judgments 
(which extends to the policing of truancy, the measurement of self-esteem, and the 
recording of presence, aptitude and attitude); a whole network of surfaces on which one 
may misspell, misspeak, and be judged; the multitude of immediate sites where literacy 
                                                 
2 See LoBianco and Freebody (11) for an example of the way education and literacy are situated within ts 
larger social and economic construction. 
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and its absence may become visible, where it is posible to point them out, to begin to 
decipher their relation to existing spaces, to notice hem as themselves and not as 
something else. A regime of space, an arrangement which already inhabits power-
knowledge relations, is necessary for the existence of literacy to be noted, to constitute 
both a self-evident thing and a problem. 
By “authorities of delimitation” Foucault refers to the ensemble of institutions, 
professions and practices that were able to define discursive objects in a particular culture 
and time. They delimit, designate, name and establih an object (Archaeology 42, italics 
in original). It might be that teachers themselves are recognised authorities on what 
students are, or what education includes, but the authority of teachers has always been 
suspect and subject to supervision and training. Certainly, teachers have never been 
recognised authorities on literacy. Parliamentary committees, linguists, cultural theorists, 
historians, radical educationists and test designers have great difficulty defining the term, 
yet it persistently reappears in connection with a constellation of themes: new 
communication technologies, education, work, social cohesion, cultural achievement, 
language acquisition and development, national economic development, international 
trade and revolutionary struggle. What seems the highest authority is the national literacy 
testing body, which is at once a government body and an authority on pedagogical 
efficiency, psychometric methodology, norms of reporting and developmental 
progression. However, this too is an analysing and complicating authority. If literacy is 
given anywhere as an object, it is where students are offered to examination, that is, 
primarily in the school, with its systems of reporting, referral to psychological authorities, 
failure thresholds and pedagogical specialists. It i  from this institutional site, too, that 
literacy comes to designate a community in the form f a statistical table, at its largest 
scale designating a world divided into literates and illiterates. A set of national and 
international bodies defines the learner as endowed with a right to education and literacy 
(basic, functional, or level-specific) while at the most minimal and obvious level the law 
and the police ensure the spatial co-presence of learning cohorts and define the 
surrounding institutional spaces into which non-attendance may place the deviant. 
The authorities of delimitation define and designate in ways which are historically 
available in a culture. An inspectorate, for instance, may by virtue of its power to observe 
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and judge, to command a response from pupils and their teachers and to inspect the 
conditions of teaching, designate an improper practice of reading, map a whole system of 
relations where, against a norm for which they act, literacy is not taking place. For 
literacy to appear as an object, before any analysis, researchers chart it as a concern 
pervading the social body, signaling vague anxieties or legitimating nation-wide testing. 
The hierarchy of authority, distributed as it is throughout a variety of scientific disciplines 
(psychology with its behavioural, cognitive and medical divisions; sociology; 
anthropology; linguistics; and the various hybrid dsciplines), is also extended throughout 
the social field, to the family and the neighbourhood, the teacher (and, at various times, 
the head teachers, assistants, pupil teachers and me tors), newspaper editors, reporters 
and readers, employers worried about competitiveness, media commentators, and to 
communities seeking empowerment and independence.  
Such designations can have quite different spaces and objects as their immediate 
targets: a government campaign can designate a moment of crisis extended throughout 
the nation or localised in an ethnic group; a report on schools can point to a group of 
failing institutions; a psychologist may diagnose a child as needing special instruction; 
parents may demand more effort in light of a given r port card. Also, authority is based 
here not so much on the logical consistency of an analytical schema or the agreement of 
hypothesis and result, but on the existence of power relations established through 
techniques that place, number, measure and judge. It is not so much the respect accorded 
to judgments that sanctions these operations as it is their effectivity and their concurrence 
with concerns arising in particular social setups. For instance, class, sex and ethnicity 
may have a greater determining effect on social chan es than literacy does, but literacy is 
more easily mapped and more clearly rendered in existing recording and remediation 
mechanisms. 
The “grids of specification” are for Foucault “the systems according to which the 
different ‘kinds of object’ are divided, contrasted, related, regrouped, classified, derived 
from one another as objects of  discourse” (Archaeology 42, italics in original). The 
division of courses – into commercial and classical, or between English grammar and 
English literature – divides a body of students into heterogeneous units in relationships of 
complementarity, opposition, or prefiguration. As was seen in the Curriculum 
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Framework, the division into “phases of development,” grades and levels hierarchises 
students along lines of cumulative instruction.3 I  addition, a three-dimensional schema 
of development situates students in relation to a nrm according to a typical hierarchy of 
development, a plane of skills and understandings within a subject, and a comparison 
with other subjects. Placement of students into percentiles ranks them in relation to both 
their immediate group and to a national totality;4 his also arranges schools according to 
comparative success. Schools themselves, as institutions holding aggregates of students 
and producing particular results, are again distribu ed according to sector – public, private 
or independent – and this is submitted to further analysis, in terms of career destinations, 
social and economic origins, ethnicity and behaviour of parents. Literacy not only 
operates in schools, in Australia providing a national average for grades 3 and 6, grading 
and separating by State, by school and sector, and mo itored across subjects, but divides, 
by a complex of markers, different types of il/literates. A parasitic political discourse also 
operates here, manufacturing a crisis, constructing or repeating a false causality between 
illiteracy, crime and unemployment. This, however, modifies the rules for interpreting the 
“legitimate” table of correlations and allows for a more diffuse system of myths to 
emerge. 
Grids of specification can be seen in the various species or kinds of literacy, with 
the historical and anthropological field dividing partial “scribal” literacy from a full 
social one, but also deriving the latter from the former; in psychology and ethnography 
one detects literate modes of thought without noting a y necessary skill in writing and 
oral modes of thought that may accompany writing skills.5 More generally, literacy as a 
mapping of social usages spawns a whole range of subdivisions: scientific literacy, 
computer and technoliteracy, emotional literacy, print and media literacies. Finally, a 
hierarchical and cultural model distinguishes literacy in its various levels and 
complexities, from a general understanding that texts carry meaning to a variegated 
                                                 
3 See Curriculum Framework 93-101. 
4 See, for example, Rothman. 
5 For examples of work in these areas, see Luria; Green, Lankshear and Snyder; and Cole and Scribner. 
 78 
ability to reflect upon the capacity of language and text to construct power relations, to 
de/legitimate types of knowledge of the world, and to construct identities.6 
Discourses, Foucault points out, not only constitute discursive objects, but also 
regulate the appearance, status and roles of enunciating subjects. The planes of 
emergence, authorities of delimitation and the grids of specification complete a work of 
making-visible, but they do not, of themselves, constitute knowledge. There is the crucial 
question of the speaking subject, which Foucault takes, not as the knowing subject, 
whether as transcendental consciousness or psychological empiricity, but rather as a 
dispersal of subject positions with their own rules for relating to objects, their specific 
distances and functions. Enunciating subjects operate according to enunciative 
modalities. This is an important dimension in accounting for a dispersal of positions 
concerning the definition and promotion of different literacies, not as a pure contestation 
but as a set of regularities. 
The first of these modalities is the status of the speaker, which allows the 
researcher to identify who can speak, under what conditi ns, in relation to what, and to 
whom. Each category of speaker is subject to further subdivisions which affect their 
authority, their area of competence, the situations n which they speak, and the 
institutional and practical effectivity of their speech. This area of analysis examines what 
particular speakers can speak about, and whence a sp aker’s authority is derived. 
Teachers, for example, are capable of pronouncing authoritative statements about 
particular students, and about students as a collectivity in relation to a mode of teaching. 
The teacher’s status is built up by its many relations with, and involvement in, 
institutions, forms of training and accreditation, a d legal rights and restrictions that 
specially apply to it. In Australia, for instance, t achers were frequently rearranged into 
categories based on age, position and sex (a table from the 1890s enumerates a Head 
Master, Head Mistress, Assistant Master, Assistant Mis ress, and a girl or boy Student 
                                                 
6 See Goodwyn (19-21) for an analysis of the recent poli ical prominence of “literacy” as a favoured term, 
and a discussion of its proliferation of “phrases incorporating the word literacy.” See Sensenbaugh for an 
early list of “multiplicities of literacies.” Barton (13) also mentions this multiplication, as is mentio ed 
below. For science literacy, see Aikenhead; Shamos; and Sagan; for computer and technoliteracy, see 
Green, Lankshear and Snyder; for emotional literacy, see Steiner and Perry. 
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Teacher, each having a different set of requisite skills and tasks), and certification 
through a hierarchical arrangement of authorities.7  
Moreover, each category of speaker is situated within a ramified field, connected to 
other speakers, with their own authorities, jurisdictions and effectivities. In Australia, at 
the level of the administrative educational authorities above the teachers, there have been 
a number of persons, offices and institutions: the Inspectors of Schools (particularly the 
Inspectors General), the Minister for Education, the members of the Central Board of 
Education, the Curriculum Council, and other supervisory Boards and Committees. These 
are qualified to speak about education as a codified and observed whole on a State or 
Federal level, on the amount of funding, facilities, the powers of committees, the general 
quality of the current students, the quality of teachers, the problems of attendance, and on 
the relevance of courses and methods to community concerns. The status of these 
authorities involves the differences between their fi lds of concern (literacy, health, 
curriculum, work opportunities), range of comparative knowledge or experience (the 
Inspectors General constantly reported on practices in other countries, and committees 
frequently refer to international and foreign models), egal powers and duties, and 
relationships with groups outside education (various b siness sectors, the judiciary, the 
press, civic groups, government).8 
A range of diverse speakers also speak about a general student, an object 
intersected by various faculties and processes (lexical acquisition, conservation of 
quantity, IQ, moral development, the effects of ethnicity, parental inputs in development, 
gendering effects of schooling), reported on in different ways by linguists, psychologists 
and sociologists, to use very broad terms. These derive their authority from institutional 
settings, publication, academic credentials, and inclusion in educational reports and plans. 
They speak from the site of the university, which involves a hierarchy of knowledge, an 
organisation of time (timetables for classes and meetings, annual reports, deadlines) and 
hierarchies and departments of knowledge. They also speak from the “laboratory” (a 
                                                 
7 For a detailed discussion of Foucault’s concept of the speaker’s status, see Archaeology (50); for the 
Australian examples, see Rankin (28-9). 
8 See Archaeology (50); Australian Language and Literacy Council (53). 
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place involving the control of variables and the ability to verify general hypotheses), the 
field of selected social data, and a “documentary field” which involves a global 
correspondence and staging of debates.9  
There are, then, many speakers in literacy discourse, with very different statuses 
allowing them to speak in specific situations, on certain matters, and in particular ways. 
One must not confuse this array of speakers with individuals, since different statements 
imply a different subject: a teacher’s report to the school, for instance, does not involve 
the same relation between speaker and object as the sam  person’s report to a family, or a 
reflective book on pedagogical practices. This discourse does not present a single 
speaking subject to state it: it distributes these positions according to the operation of a 
particular statement.10 In terms of an interrogative project, these speakers are involved in 
the struggle to recognise true (or at least best) literacy. As a series of programmatic 
designs, they address a set of authorities and processes at the level of a national polity 
(this includes national governmental bodies themselves, which address each other).  
What is more, the authority of a speaker may be transferred to another situation and 
made subject to new forces by means of quotation, as the following excerpt from The 
Australian of 10 July1980 (qtd. in Green, Hodgens and Luke ch. 5) shows: 
The report [the interim report of the Committee of Inquiry into Teacher 
Education in Victoria] said: “Looking realistically at all the influences that 
affect the acquisition of literacy and numeracy, and t the competition that the 
school faces from homes with poor communication, impoverished language, 
absence of quantitative logic and excessive television watching, it is clear that 
the beginning primary school teacher should have a basic competence in the 
teaching of literacy and numeracy if the child is to be equipped to meet the 
increasing demands made by the community.” 
The authority of the report is used to reinforce th “realistic” mythology of a 
culture threatened, by its own forms of communication, with educational 
                                                 
9 See Archaeology (51). 
10 See Archaeology (54). 
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decadence. The role of the teacher and school is coded as the final defence against 
this threat, and “literacy” and “numeracy” stand as “order-words” for this defence. 
The authorities, moreover, are hierarchised, so that teachers submit to the 
appropriate supervision, and this is in turn made palpable, visible and 
unobjectionable by the same words, by the same repeat d invocation of “literacy 
and numeracy.” 
In other words, the quotation demonstrates the working of a circuit of discourse 
between popular concerns and authoritative definitio s, within which each enunciation 
has a specific position. The effect of the statement is modified, however, by the position 
of the speaking authority. Thus, while the Curriculum Framework may be situated within 
the same circuit, it operates from a different positi n, and therefore establishes a different 
relationship between the relevant speakers and objects. At the same time as the 
Curriculum Framework claims to address popular concerns through consultation with 
“community reference groups” and feedback, it presents an official authority in defining 
what literacy is to be, consolidating its definitions, orientations and measures by listing 
the “expert learning area committees” involved in assembling the document (Curriculum 
Framework 323).  
Discourse analysis also offers a means of investigatin  the formation of concepts as 
a material practice. Foucault divides his discussion of the formation of concepts into 
forms of succession, forms of coexistence and “procedures of intervention” that occur 
within groups of statements, and makes further distinctions and divisions within these 
three groups (Archaeology 56-9). This is a powerful inventory, allowing the researcher to 
see, for instance, the discursive implications of describing the progress of a student in 
semesters (a type of succession), or of the overlaying of student work with letters that 
stand for outcome statements, and thus relate the marked work and student to a generic 
set of statements (as a type of dependence [cf. Ar haeology 56]). Schooling assembles a 
legitimate corpus of student work, marking it not only with a grade but with the 
fragments of a schema of judgement, and assembling with it, as the year’s work or in 
forms such as a portfolio, the character, stage and r te of an individual student’s 
development. 
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The formation of concepts also involves a field of presence, the “statements 
formulated elsewhere and taken up in the discourse” (Archaeology 57). The Curriculum 
Framework’s description of national economic priorities (itself a reinscription and 
simplification of economic modes of description) and the discourse on criminality (in a 
parsimonious set of assertions bearing little relation to criminology) as repeatedly 
brought into educational documents and speeches, oprate in this way. These are not only 
reactivated and given a legitimating force (as in the quotation from The Australian); they 
are also subjected to scrutiny, criticism, discussion and exclusion (taking the same 
quotation as included in a critical study of the “literacy debate” by authoritative 
researchers). What concerns discourse analysis is not these formulations in themselves 
but the relations established with them in the discourse: “the relations established may be 
of the order of experimental verification, logical v lidation, mere repetition, acceptance 
justified by tradition and authority, commentary, a search for hidden meanings, the 
analysis of error” (Archaeology 57). The discourse of literacy establishes a critical 
relation with popular theories, explains partial theories or observations with subsuming 
metaphors or more extensive definitions, and excludes certain historical or psycho-
cultural interpretations by narrowing the criteria of rigour. That is, it uses a set of 
analysable techniques of concept-formation, which may be studied as historical and 
material relationships between statements. 
An archaeological account of educational discourse must also analyse the 
conditions for the formation of strategies. That is, it must chart the field that produces the 
thematic structures and theoretical options available to a discourse at a given time, in a 
particular dispersion and pattern of recurrence. In this connection, the constant themes of 
the civic, personal and national economic utility of education present themselves as the 
products of a certain ramified arrangement of establi hed forms of argument, with rules 
for appropriation, relationships to other discourses, “points of diffraction,” and even the 
positions of desire that are discursively possible (Archaeology 64-70, italics in original). 
Foucault notes that the above groups of productive relations are not in themselves 
enough to account for the formation of statements, but that one must look also at the 
relations within each group and between them. Together with the analysis of relations 
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productive of statements, this thesis deals with statements themselves as operations that 
modify the correlative field of constitutive forces that allows them to appear. 
“The conditions necessary . . . if one is to ‘say an thing’ about” an object of 
discourse, constitute a complex set of relations. These are difficult to identify, but one 
can already see, developing in the archaeology, a realm that is productive of objects, that 
offers them at the edges of “saying.” The discursive object “exists under the positive 
conditions of a complex group of relations” (Archaeology 45). A communion exists at 
precisely the discursive level, which is defined as at the edges of discourse: “these 
relations characterise not the language (langue) used by discourse, nor the circumstances 
in which it is deployed, but discourse itself as a pr ctice” (Archaeology 45). The 
difference between these relations and those of power-knowledge seems infinitesimal, 
and yet it is because the model followed refers, after all, to systems of representation, to a 
distance in which one may speak of something, that the dimension of the statement is a 
distinct one. The relations that permit objects to be spoken of “determine the group of 
relations that discourse must establish in order to speak of this or that object, in order to 
deal with them, name them, analyse them, classify them, etc.” (Archaeology 46). 
What characterises a discourse is the interaction of these levels of operation, unified 
as they are by a transversal function, the function of the statement in ordering and 
evoking a correlative field. A discursive formation is a structured way of speaking about 
something, but its object does not exhaust its characte isation: it is united as a practice in 
the way it forms, distributes and relates objects, concepts, speakers and strategies. This is 
important in explaining the relationship of the Curriculum Framework to the literacy 
discourse in general, since it is not to be assumed that all the possible arguments about, 
and uses of, literacy, are to be found in the document. While the Curriculum Framework 
selects definitions of literacy and applies these to a particular social institution and model 
of subjectivity, it is important to note the “statem nt” function, the insistence of the 
general discourse, the way its evocation is also inv lved in structuring the possibility of 
the knowledges and practices at work in education policy. In its discursive provision of 
this possibility, the discourse of literacy announces an ontological guarantee, in a way 
that demonstrates the interaction of the correlative field within the condensed statements 
 84 
taking the form of lists detailing the alternative d finitions, disciplinary allegiances, 
popular myths and political usages to which the term literacy is subject. 
In applying a Foucaultian analysis, then, one cannot expect to discover a simple 
level, onto which the more elaborate details and theories are superadded. Each statement, 
if it is to be taken as such, also involves the operation of a whole discourse, mobilising 
and altering the relations that make it possible. However, approaching the discourse 
where the establishment of its object is most schematic allows us to see the discourse, 
qua discourse, more clearly. Literacy is established as a guaranteed object of discourse by 
the use of lists in authoritative academic studies. These lists are not literature reviews 
merely, since they contain mention of non-academic theories, unwarranted assumptions, 
abuses and anecdotes, side by side with research from different disciplines. Examining 
such lists of the myths, debates, models and ideologies of literacy reveals a complex 
discursive interplay between the social production of literacy as an object, the status of 
certain speakers with regard to a true or useful model, the validation of certain concepts, 
and the mapping of available strategies of argumentatio . Above all, however, they 
guarantee the status of literacy not only as an object of social concern but as a reality 
about which one must speak, a truth with which one must contend. 
Myth-Lists: Charting the Literacy Discourse 
This discourse can thus be approached transversely, but from within, charting these 
myth lists from the viewpoint of their production of ordering statements. The myth lists 
order the discourse, representing its rules, possibilities, personae and social importance, 
as well as guaranteeing the existence, beyond the discourse, of literacy as a definiendum, 
that is, “that which is to be defined,” namely, a re lity just beyond the definitional 
disputes. Taking the discourse and explicating it in th s way is not a survey of all the 
work done on literacy, nor is it an examination, by recourse to authorities, of an inferior 
discourse (myths about literacy, mistakes and misconceptions). Rather, it is a 
cartography, a charting, of the material production of this discourse, including the 
transcription of statements between authoritative, ex cutive, bureaucratic and popular 
sites. The myth lists arrange the group of authoritative discourses concerning literacy and 
the relations obtaining between them and the whole field of their production, the 
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necessary relations through which they achieve their existence. Rather than reveal the 
discursive conditions of possibility proper to various disciplines, they array and 
coordinate a hybrid form, the discourse that concers itself with literacy, traversing as it 
does a variety of disciplinary domains. 
A central function of these lists is their setting out of what it is possible to say, in its 
greatest extent, of literacy at the time of their publication, reproducing the positions, 
interests, emphases and definitions available at that time. This is not to ask what literacy 
is today, nor what may be said to be true within certain regimes of veridiction. Nor is it a 
question about the meaning of literacy as a term, for what is said in this discourse 
concerns also what meanings are to be disallowed and what connections cannot be drawn. 
Rather, the question is: what things, whether represented as true, false, doubtful or 
beyond question, is it possible to set out as statements relevant to a discourse of literacy? 
What it is easy to say in the discourse of literacy has been established, varying 
across a number of social sites. It is important to note that this discourse has also emerged 
in a set of authoritative and executive sites. Within ese sites, literacy is no longer just a 
set of popular prejudices, which the enlightened researcher must combat. No longer is 
literacy unproblematically the strong causal agent of Western consciousness, visual bias, 
industrialisation, and so on. No longer is it in any sense merely the possession of an 
individual or a quality of her/his mind. That is, there is a long trail of the more and less 
theoretical fallacies which it is possible to record, order, and restate in a familiar formula. 
This kind of restatement, this setting out of the landscape of literacy, is an important and 
persistent feature of this discourse. The lists of fallacies, presuppositions, myths and 
beliefs about literacy are a fundamental staple of literacy theory. They define what is 
being argued against, what contentions are being modified and abolished, what general 
associations will be ruled out for literacy, what will (for the theorist, at any rate) survive 
scrutiny. In addition, these lists situate literacy s a social product, as the result of a 
certain struggle and cooperation in the effort to obtain social goods and political power, 
as the effect of a cultural network of assumptions, as the object and site of mediation for 
certain anxieties about a culture’s identity, about its redefinition in facing an uncertain 
future. 
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The list of myths comes almost always at the beginning of a work, and it secures 
the social importance of literacy, and the intellectual importance of properly defining it, 
for the work dealing with it. It always seems that these lists are dispensable, that what is 
being said could, in principle, be understood without reference to the myths and 
misrepresentations of literacy. Nonetheless they recur with a great deal of consistency:  
literacy is routinely lamented as misunderstood and politically manipulated, as invoked in 
specious arguments for Western cultural superiority and cultural imperialism. Such lists, 
then, provide a ground for the existence of w rks on literacy and, in this sense, tell us a 
great deal about the organisation of literacy as a discursive field, as a means for the 
production of statements.11 That is, at the same time as they claim to represent discourse, 
they put into play real discursive relations, calling up and relating statements, affording 
them a form of coexistence (cf. Foucault, Archaeology 56). How exactly is literacy 
constructed, in the first place, as an invocation, as a call to thought and attention, as the 
alibi for the appearance of another book? The functio  of myth-lists in literacy discourse 
is to establish literacy as an object endowed with an unshakably necessary ontological 
guarantee. The boundaries delineated for this discour e – by the functions which literacy 
serves in it – prevent it from understanding literacy s a discursive entity. Thus, however 
“constructed” it may be, “literacy” is always at the foundation of this discourse, uniting 
fields which have no other topos, no other ground of correspondence upon which to 
appear. The specific discursive function of literacy, the very historical interactions of the 
term “literacy” (with normative practices, veridical discourse, and ethical ways of self-
reflection), render it impossible, within this regime of statements, for such a grounding 
function to be recognised. This listing of lists performs a double function, showing that 
literacy is involved in a discourse that sets it out in its various versions and orders it; and 
giving an outline, by way of other authors, of what positions are held regarding literacy. 
Among other things, literacy lists establish a set of rules for the consequences of 
                                                 
11 Defined by Foucault as a “distribution” that may be reconstructed, “with the things said and those 
concealed, the enunciations required and those forbidden . . . with the variants and different effects – 
according to who is speaking, his position of power, the institutional context in which he happens to be 
situated – that it implies; and with the shifts and reutilisations of identical formulas that it also includes” 
(Archaeology 171). 
 87 
discussing literacy in different ways, tabulating dependencies attached to various 
strategies.  
In Literacy: An Introduction to the Ecology of Written Language, David Barton 
furnishes a list, based on Kenneth Levine’s (1986) work, of “ways of talking about 
literacy,” “metaphors” which entail assumptions about the nature of learning, the 
purposes of reading and writing, and presuppose a set of power relationships (Barton 12-
13). Barton arranges a table where the absence of lit racy is the condition (sickness, 
handicap, ignorance, incapacity, oppression, deprivation, deviance), which is met with a 
response (treatment, rehabilitation, training, therapy, empowerment, welfare, control) via 
a means (clinical intervention, compensatory aids, and so on), pursuing a particular goal 
(whether it be remittance or political rights), and may involve an application (a context 
where intervention is appropriate). The full table is reproduced below (Barton 13): 
Condition 
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tuition 





















Barton expands on the dangers and benefits of metaphor, noting that literacy itself 
has become a metaphor: “in terms like computer literacy, visual literacy and political 
literacy,” where literacy means “loosely . . . understanding an area of knowledge” (13). 
Argumentation about literacy is tied not only to its power as metaphor, but also to 
different regimes, processes and interests, tabulated in o quasi-Aristotelian categories. 
At the same time as it cautions, such a list records and circulates literacy as a range 
of metaphorical extensions that may be adopted and utilised elsewhere. A remarkable 
number of such metaphors, for example, simultaneously operate in the Curriculum 
Framework, coordinating these arrays of meanings within a single concise network. This 
is partly to do with the polysemous blandness of the document’s language that is 
nonetheless carefully accommodating of these metaphorical additions, and is partly the 
result of a discourse that has already been mapped, and is capable of extracting these 
complexes of established social meaning and practice. In addition to this complex 
interaction of statement and discursive field, there is a more fundamental operation at 
work in tables like Barton’s: these tables guarantee not only the “field” of literacy as a set 
of social meanings and uses, but literacy itself, as an entity of broad concern and a 
constant behind the table of variables. 
Instructing the Practice of Discourse 
Beyond mapping the discourse as knowledge, lists establi h it as a practice. In The 
World on Paper, David Olson produces a list of “widely shared beliefs or assumptions 
about literacy” (3). Such a recital recurs regularly in the work of literacy researchers, and 
the destruction of such myths, of “widely shared beliefs or assumptions” is routine. 
Olson’s recitation mostly outlines alternatives in argument about the proper definitions 
and associations of literacy. Ostensibly recounting a list of myths, he assembles the 
image of the discourse of literacy as a strategic pra tice, setting down a map of topics, 
arguments and counter-arguments. Moreover, he construct  an image of a world in which 
a plurality of debates concerning literacy emerges. To these ends, he outlines the pros and 
cons of six common propositions: 1) that writing is the transcription of speech; 2) that 
writing is superior to speech; 3) that the alphabet is a superior technology of 
transcription; 4) that literacy is a precondition of s cial progress; 5) that literacy is the 
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key to scientific modernity; and 6) that literacy is synonymous with schooling. In Olson’s 
discussion of these myths, in the limitation of alternatives and the return of implicit 
themes, the discourse works to connect literacy to imperatives of national economic and 
social development and to the practice of schooling. 
Olson’s point in making a list of myths and controversial propositions is not to 
argue that myths should be demolished, but rather to ins ruct the researcher as to how 
literacy is to be argued about in an already constituted field of controversy, and to 
establish an underlying orientation towards teaching a d studying individual and social 
development through literacy. It is not a refined dfinition of the necessary relations 
between writing and speech; it is a reflection on what literacy acquisition inherently is, 
and on how that may teach “us” how to read, and understand reading, better. An inherent 
quality of learning is appealed to as the arbiter of better teaching: “Learning to read in 
part is a matter of coming to hear, and think about, speech in a new way” (World 8). It is 
the lessons about learning, teaching, and policy that are paramount, even here. It is not a 
question of a voluntary ideological position, it is a matter of ineluctable discursive 
relations, a mapping of the discourse where each topos is a point of bifurcation. At the 
same time as these points in the discourse are mapped, another point is silently 
established. This is the ontological guarantee that there is something, obscure and not 
directly approachable, yet too self-evident to deny: literacy as the object beyond the 
discourse. 
Olson begins by discussing the role of writing, assembling reasons to support and 
to refute the contention that it merely transcribes spoken language. Writing, he states, is 
widely supposed to be the transcription of speech, but writing only captures some 
properties of speech (“verbal form – phonemes, lexemes, and syntax”), leaving other 
aspects absent (World 3); moreover, the unsaid in writing, when resupplied as “intonation 
and emphasis,” can “give rise to a radically different interpretation” (World 8).12 While 
neither argument is clearly preferred, the relationship between writing and speech is 
                                                 
12 This cannot, of course, be an exhaustive critique. Writing systems produce, in addition to transcriptive 
effects, graphical and temporal relations that cannot be directly verbalised (cf. Roy Harris 164). The table 
by Barton, above, is an obvious example, as are algebraic equations. 
 90 
established as an important issue. Literacy, lying invisible and unstated, renders the 
controversy intelligible, as that to which both sides of the proposition refer.  
Merely outlining the theoretical options for various positions and arguments gives 
the literacy theorist the opportunity to occupy and rgue for a series of positions, 
beginning again at each new theme, thereby charting what Foucault calls the “points of 
diffraction” in the discourse. This can be seen in Olson’s discussion of the legacy of Eric 
Havelock, Milman Parry, numerous UNESCO documents ad, in effect, every 
educational authority since the 1870s, addressing their propagation of the myth of “the 
superiority of writing to speech” (World 3). As Olson points out, this idea is as old as the 
Renaissance.13 This myth is, on the surface, at odds with the derivative status of writing. 
Rousseau, at any rate, argues from the first position that a mere mode of transcription 
should not receive such care as writing does. Olson’s provides a counterargument by 
quoting Rousseau and Saussure and arguing against the uperiority of script, stating: “So 
convinced are modern linguists of the derivative quality of writing that the study of 
writing has been largely neglected until very recently” ( World 8). This argument is, of 
course, at variance with the point that is made to rebut the “transcription” argument. 
Countering the characterisation of speech as “loose and unruly,” Olson states that “all 
human languages have a rich lexical and grammatical structure capable, at least 
potentially, of expressing the full range of meanings” (World 8). Olson assumes a 
position he has already disqualified, namely, that written language communicates the 
same thing as the spoken. However, the assumption is taken to the more difficult plane of 
meaning, rather than verbal form. Concluding, Olson remarks, “One’s oral language, it is 
now recognised, is the fundamental possession and tool of mind; writing, though 
important, is always secondary” (World 8). How speech is fundamental is not explained, 
and the old status of writing as derivative seems to be reinstated in the interest of this new 
argument. The difference here is one of emphasis – writing may be secondary, but it is 
not purely derivative. Writing is always surrounded by speech in its preparation and 
explanation, it is always something that can only arise through, with, and assisted by 
                                                 
13 Mignolo (1995) confirms this in some detail. 
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speech, but cannot be without its counterpart.14 Despite his seeming preference for one 
side, then, Olson is charting the possible branchings from a point where the discourse 
offers them. 
Next in Olson’s list is the belief that the alphabet is technologically superior to 
other writing systems. This idea is charted back to Rousseau’s division of scripts and 
societies into the pictorial (hieroglyphic) signs of savages, the ideographic scripts of 
barbarians, and the alphabetic systems of civilised peoples (World 4). The argument 
substantiating this prejudice as historical and sedim nted comes from a variety of 
different sources from different levels. The French language, with its “alphabetisme” for 
“literacy” seems to assume that the alphabet is the only true system of writing, and thus 
that non-alphabetic readers and writers are not truly literate (World 4). Samuel Johnson is 
corralled alongside “the three classical theories of the invention of writing” . . . “ Cohen 
(1958), Gelb (1963) and Diringer (1968),” all of whom “treat the evolution of the 
alphabet as the progressive achievement  of more and more precise visible means for 
representing sound patterns, the phonology of the language” (World 4). From Havelock, 
Olson adduces a Western presumption of the “genius” of the alphabet as an “invention” 
of the “Greek mind,” and underlines the epochal meanings attributed to the advent of an 
arbitrary set of phonographic signs with a quote from McLuhan. From these criteria, 
“alphabetisme” is superior in its universal applicability, its simplicity and its learnability. 
In answer to this, Olson points out that the alphabet was an adaptation of existing 
technology to a new use, and its conceptual novelty was unnoticed until recently. What is 
more, it is less than optimal for monosyllabic langua es like Chinese.15  
The arguments for alphabetic superiority, Olson continues, have been unmasked as 
ethnocentric and selective:  
Nor is the simplicity of the alphabet the major cause of high levels of 
literacy; many other factors affect the degrees of literacy in a country or in 
an individual. Finally, our tardy recognition of the literacy levels of non-
alphabetic cultures, especially the Japanese who routinely outperform 
                                                 
14 This is demonstrated by Roy Harris to be an argument from a special case, namely, transcriptive writing. 
15 For a full discussion of “graphic relativity,” see Bugarski. 
 92 
Western children in their literacy levels . . . has forced us to acknowledge 
that our view of the superiority of the alphabet is, at least in part, an aspect 
of our mythology (8). 
Quite symptomatically, Olson cannot escape the anonym us, Occidental 
perspective even as he denounces it: “we” are concerned about whether the alphabetic 
few of the West acquired a tool or agent of reading a d writing which, whether because 
of a genius or not, had certain other, world-shattering effects. The distinctions and 
hierarchies of a previous and contradictory tradition of self-flattery and cultural 
imperialism give way to a guarantee that the importance of literacy, whether it is 
connected to superiority and progress or not, is also n imperative. Beyond the myths 
there is a thing, both guaranteed and resistant to his rical manipulations, which forms 
the grain of a real process, which in turn determines the efficacy of instruction. This is 
why the alphabet, curiously, has taken on an explanatory role for western literacy levels, 
as if these were defined by a well-known standard, s if (high levels of) literacy were a 
social good. It does not change things that Olson, like most other literacy theorists, does 
not consider literacy an unambiguous social good. Any intervention like this is bound, at 
every point, to reactivate the assumptions floating about the term, to use the prejudices in 
their argument, since literacy itself is socially determined by the popular discourse in 
which it is constantly spoken of.  
The insistence of a popular discourse is even more evident in Olson’s presentation 
of the most recurrent, most fugitive and denounced myth: that of “literacy as the organ of 
social progress” (Olson 5). Literacy, by virtue of its correlation with other social factors, 
is assumed to have some causal status vis à vis productivity, industrialisation and 
democracy. Olson cites Carlo M. Cipolla as a prime example of this contention and 
comments that “The correlation invites the inference that literacy is a cause of 
development, a view that underwrites the UNESCO’s commitment to the ‘eradication of 
illiteracy’ by the year 2000 as a means to modernisation” (5). Olson’s rejoinder to this 
myth cites the various studies which see literacy as a means of social control (10). Olson 
ignores the distinction between, and thus reinforces th  fusion of, literacy as a historical 
argument and as a policy objective. The slippage in t rminology Olson allows here is not 
a symptom of sloppy thinking but an index of how the “public debate” has connected 
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these issues, especially with the all-purpose term literacy, which is not as institutionally 
identifiable as education: 
A number of historical studies have suggested that literacy is a means 
for establishing social control, for turning people into good citizens, 
productive workers, and if necessary, obedient soldiers (Aries [sic], 1962). 
Strauss (1978, 306) concluded that the emphasis on l teracy by the Protestant 
church in Reformation Germany could be seen as the at empt to convert the 
populace “from their ancient ways and habits to a bookish orthodoxy resting 
on the virtue of conformity.” The rise of universal, compulsory education has 
rarely, if ever, been sought by the uneducated as a means of liberation but 
rather imposed on them by a well-meaning ruling class in the hope of turning 
them into productive citizens (de Castell, Luke andEgan, 1986; Graff, 1987; 
Katz, 1968; but see Tuman, 1987, Chapter 5, for a critique of revisionist 
accounts). Recent calls for improvements in basic skills whether in Canada, 
the United States or Britain, come largely from employers in business and 
industry rather than from the workers themselves. And, with notable 
exceptions, the demand for evening, adult education courses, is a direct 
function of the amount of education people already have. So, is literacy an 
instrument of domination or an instrument of liberation? (Olson 10)  
Somehow, literacy becomes equivalent, in an unspoken way, to imposed literacy, 
and to an imposed education. Divisions of knowledge and class, the state and its 
populace, the learned and the ignorant, are superimosed, via the categories of the 
educated and the uneducated, onto the literate and the illiterate. In determining the 
function of such a list it is important to note that the argument, that literacy is a cause of 
social development, is hardly glimpsed. This is not only because the measures have 
changed, the scales have been altered and the very terms tailored to other questions, but 
also because the list functions to lay out a set of rhetorical and social possibilities for 
literacy. Here the central question is whether the state and its representatives and 
powerful groups, its measures of progress and development, are the same as, or can ever 
coincide with, the good of the majority, the people, the “workers themselves.” More than 
this, there is an implicit disaffection with the status quo, with existing educational 
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inequality as a mark of continuing broader social inequality. The question, “is literacy an 
instrument of domination or an instrument of liberation?” signals these concerns, for an 
instrument is to be wielded by someone, for some purpose. What is at stake discursively 
is that literacy is historically implicated in projects of domination, and the literacy 
researcher is inevitably speaking about this question. Whether liberation is or is not 
always (at least historically) the domination of another, the necessary assumption is that 
literacy is, at any rate, an instrument of change at some political and systemic social 
level.  
Because the myth list is a setting out of alternatives and an establishing of a 
controversial field of parents, teachers, researchers, students and policy makers, Olson is 
necessarily inconsistent in his use of the criteria of social development and progress. 
Olson cites Clanchy’s From Memory to Written Record in stating the case for two 
literacies in nineteenth-century Europe, one for the elite and another for the rest, in the 
interests of preserving the social order from critial assaults (Olson 10). With Cipolla and 
Graff, he notes that “advances in trade, commerce, and industry sometimes occurred in 
contexts of low levels of literacy” (Olson 10). Moreover, he quotes Kaestle et al. that 
“literacy must be analysed in specific historical circumstances and that ‘although for 
purposes of public policy, increased literacy is asumed to benefit both individuals and 
society as a whole, the association of literacy with progress has been challenged under 
certain circumstances’” (Kaestle et al. 27, qtd. in Olson 11). The inconsistent use of 
criteria involves a simultaneous mimicry and presentation of literacy as a social and 
rhetorical entity. Thus, it is not to be assumed that Olson agrees with economic measures 
and ethnocentric cultural values or that the notion of progress is open to question for him. 
This is clear when he furthers his argument by citing cross-cultural historical studies: 
The same point has been made in regard to the lack of scientific and 
economic development in other countries. In China the number of highly 
literate people always greatly exceeded the number of mployment 
opportunities available . . . and in Mexico while lt racy levels have been 
found to be related to economic growth those effects were restricted largely 
to urban areas and to manufacturing activities. (Olson 11) 
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It is beside the point to take issue with the implicit teleology and progressivism in 
the remark about “scientific and economic development,” or with the mapping of cultures 
according to Western categories, or with the slipping back and forth, throughout Olson’s 
list, of “from above” and “from below” criteria of progress. Beyond simply summarising 
the researches of others and reactivating certain cl ss-related sociological assumptions, 
Olson is distributing the discourse into points of dif raction and into possible speaking 
positions. What is evident, moreover, is that literacy, as a term that has accrued so many 
meanings, and that has been used in so many battles over the definition of the good,16 
inescapably reactivates these battles and their corresponding strategies, tropes and 
truisms. 
The omissions in Olson’s reasoning highlight a number of features of literacy 
discourse. Olson equates the theoretical option of connecting literacy and social 
development with the ideological and political movement that produced, in a number of 
powerful sites, the notion of “functional literacy” (Olson 11) and relegated non-industrial 
and non-capitalist societies to the status of the superstitious, the imbecile and the 
inefficient. Opposing this dualistic ideology in his role as advocate for both sides, he 
contends that it is only appropriate to view literacy s beneficial in specific settings. 
While he relates literacy to a setting and a purpose, he does not fully pursue the 
formulation “functional for whom?” (Olson 11): he situates literacy at the level of a 
service for individuals, though it has both been imposed on entire countries and situated 
in one region of the brain. The research he himself has cited does not speak of individuals 
but of social systems and classes and the relevant social unit for which literacy varies in 
value. That Olson does not fully address the question of benefit is symptomatic of the 
fundamental pedagogical orientation of the discourse rather than of his own failings as a 
theorist: literacy in the functional mode, and as an imposition, must have above all a 
benefit for the imposer. The question “for whom?” if it s to be relevant, must include 
uses of literacy other than acquiring it for oneself. This, however, entails a lack of 
presumption concerning the purposes of (and persons involved in) defining, packaging 
and disseminating literacy. Here the presumption is that such activity is, or ought to be, 
                                                 
16 “Good,” that is, in the various dimensions discussed by Olson: individual and social benefit, 
communicative superiority, civilisational advancement, distribution and political power. 
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an effort to serve, benefit and advance the interests of individuals, within their existing 
social roles. This concern for helping – this propaedeutic theatre – is not merely a 
rhetorical device; it is a fundamental condition for the existence of literacy and a direct 
result of how the discourse is situated within a social and epistemic context of operation. 
It is in engaging with and distributing these positi ns in the discourse that literacy 
is established as an object of therapeutic concern, as an enduring and mysterious force 
and as a problem of national schooling. To fully understand the functions of a listing such 
as Olson’s, then, it is necessary to examine it in its entirety. Olson contends that as a 
recent tradition, more or less echoing an earlier on , has maintained, “writing and literacy 
are in large part responsible for the rise of distinctively modern modes of thought such as 
philosophy, science, justice and medicine and conversely . . . literacy is the enemy of 
superstition, myth and magic” (Olson 6). In the light of further study, however, claims 
about the fundamentally literate mode of western (ancient Greek) thought, and about the 
primitive or non-scientific character of oral societies have been questioned, leading to 
wide disagreement on the affinity between “higher” thought and literacy (Olson 12).  
Finally, Olson enumerates the literacy myths relevant to a pedagogical site of 
application: 
Genuine knowledge, we assume, is identifiable with that which is learned in 
school and from books. Literacy skills provide the route of access to that 
knowledge. The primary concern of schooling is the acquisition of “basic 
skills,” which for reading consists of “decoding,” that is, learning what is 
called the alphabetic principle, and which for writing, consists of learning to 
spell. Literacy imparts a degree of abstraction to thought which is absent from 
oral discourse and from oral cultures. Important human abilities may be 
thought of as “literacies” and personal and social development may be 
reasonably represented by levels of literacy such as basic, functional or 
advanced levels. (Olson 7)  
To this Olson provides the rejoinder that knowledge, far from being identical with 
its vehicle, can be presented in a number of ways. The tone is properly educational: 
“Emphasis on the means may detract from the importance of the content being 
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communicated” (Olson 12). That is, the discourse her  is addressed to teachers, as well as 
to others whose care is also to oversee and ensure cognitive development and ability. The 
intellectual claims are tested on the basis of pedagogical space and teacherly concern: 
“Reading ability depends upon not only letter and word recognition but in addition on the 
general knowledge of events that the text is about; consequently, a strict distinction  
between basic skills and specialised knowledge is indefensible” (Olson 12). Moreover, 
“the role of the school is not to displace children’s pre-school perceptions and beliefs but 
to explicate and elaborate them, activities that depend as much or more on speech as on 
writing” (Olson 12). Similarly, the use of literacy as a measure of general competence 
“underestimates the significance of both the implicit understandings that children bring to 
school and the importance of oral discourse in bringing those understandings into 
consciousness – in turning them into objects of knowledge” (Olson 13). 
The entire critique here derives its persuasive force f om several problems, all of 
which are associated with the relation between the literacy discourse and the project of 
schooling. Olson uses schooling as the site to which literacy discourse defers, a site onto 
which it opens, as its evidence and its rationale. First, Olson is concerned with the 
relation between the preexisting knowledge and skills of students and the optimal speed 
of cognitive development. Second, and partially superimposed upon the first, is the 
question of the right mix of modes, both oral and literate, to facilitate this development. 
School does not equal, but is somehow closer to, the literate mode, while home is where 
one acquires one’s first and most natural language. Third, he argues that the fundamental 
role of the school is to bring that which is implicit within a competence “into 
consciousness.” The skills of discourse must be not o ly practised but also represented, 
recorded and reproduced at another level separate from the level of practice, which it is 
the end of schooling to reproduce. Olson is not singular in claiming this; he is 
representing the bifurcations of existing arguments. Li eracy has been constantly placed 
within the truths of educational discourse and has assumed the positions and cares of the 
school. Its very definition, if not identical with e course of the mind as conceived 
within schooling, is nonetheless accountable, as a source of danger (in “ideological” or in 
“mistaken” conceptions) for schooling, for knowledg and for the society it creates.  
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An autonomous level disrupts Olson’s discourse, for, to pay it a proper tribute, 
literacy is everywhere to be discovered, promising a d forbidding a better world, 
inhabiting fantasies of “our” superiority, subject to confusions and premature definitions, 
closure and control, and working as the tool of a neocolonial tutelary order. It has 
escaped the boundaries of easy lists, if in fact it ever corresponded to such boundaries. 
Literacy is a shimmering, an obviousness established by its ubiquity, subject to dangerous 
misconstruals. It is an item of such power that this m sunderstanding will make it 
available to dangerous misuses which will change the nature of knowledge itself, insofar 
as literacy is social and involved in power: “despite the fact that virtually every claim 
regarding literacy has been shown to be problematic, literacy and its implications cannot 
be ignored” (Olson 13). The ontological guarantee of literacy, its insistent dangers and 
definitional pitfalls, entail a discursive, and a specifically pedagogical, imperative. 
Rescuing Literacy from Myth: Understanding and Implementing  
The danger posed by misunderstandings of literacy appe rs also in another type of 
list common to the discourse, wherein the list directly presents literacy myths as popular 
misconceptions and manipulative political distortions. Harvey J. Graff’s list of myths, 
presenting a different kind of “public debate” material, opposes the simplistic 
identification of literacy with democracy and progress to the methodological rigour of 
historical studies. He has two fundamental strictures for anyone researching literacy: first, 
“a consistent definition that will serve comparatively over time and across space.” This 
means primary levels of reading, since this is the most reliable measure historical sources 
can give. Second, one must “stress . . . that literacy is . . . a technology or set of 
techniques for communication and for decoding and reproducing written or printed 
materials.” Literacy has too often been identified with putative consequences which 
empirical studies do not support, on the one hand being credited with changing 
personalities, thought patterns and cultures, and on the other with propelling “economic 
development, ‘modernisation,’ political development a d stability, fertility control, and 
so on and on” (Graff, Legacies 21). Literacy does none of these things, writes Graff: the 
mistake made here is to argue from a notion of literacy in the abstract, which is at best a 
“set of techniques . . . [at worst,] meaningless” (Legacies 271). Quoting a colleague, he 
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asserts that “The only literacy that matters is the literacy that is in use. Potential literacy 
is empty, a void” (M. M. Lewis, qtd. in Legacies 271). 
Graff’s best-known work, The Literacy Myth, outlines the mythic elements in a way 
specific to his techniques and concerns. He begins with the conceptual muddle which 
pervades the public sphere, citing US Senators, newspapers, education studies and 
postage stamps:  
[T]hese are only samples of recent commentary that has become 
commonplace. The recent bombardment of woeful talesof literacy decline, 
drops in Scholastic Aptitude Test scores, low levels of preparation for 
fulfilling and productive lives, and illiterate high school graduates can too 
easily obscure the significance that lies behind these familiar words. (Graff, 
Literacy Myth xiii-xiv)  
His list continues, more as an itinerary for argument than as a conspectus of all the 
relevant myths. The first “myth” is not a myth at all, but the value, arising through the 
“western tradition,” which has been attached to literacy since the Enlightenment or even 
the Protestant Reformation. This value is the source, a cording to Graff, of much 
confusion and misrepresentation, of premature definitions and question-begging research. 
The two fundamental problems of literacy, as a social entity, are its taken-for-grantedness 
and the inordinate value placed upon it. But this is all a repetition of a historical 
discourse, of a constant rhetoric which characterises the west: 
Contemporary discussions about literacy, basic skills, and mass schooling are 
hardly unique . . . . They are at once reflective and derivative of ideas and 
[Enlightenment and post-Reformation] assumptions . . . . These are ideas that 
permeate the trans-Atlantic western cultural heritage nd influence social 
thought broadly and deeply: in our assumptions and theories of society, 
economy, culture, religion, as well as education. Indeed, the 
commonplaceness and ordinariness, I fear, have reduced their significance to 
many. (Graff, Literacy Myth xiv)  
The “primacy of print . . . has advanced to universality,” and the outcome is the 
unquestioning acceptance of literacy’s value. According to Graff, the consensus (in 1979, 
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when The Literacy Myth was written) was that, whatever its uses, the value of literacy for 
a whole range of sites, and for society as a whole, was unquestionable. These sites, 
beginning with the advent of mass schooling, form one great interacting field of progress:  
Value to community, self- [sic] and socioeconomic worth, mobility, access 
to information and knowledge, rationality, morality, and orderliness are 
among the many qualities linked to literacy for indivi uals. Literacy, in 
other words, was one critical component of the individual’s road to 
progress. Analogously, these attributes were deeply significant to the larger 
society . . . . From productivity to participation, schooled workers and 
citizens were required if the best path to the future and its fulfilment were to 
be followed. (Graff, Literacy Myth xv) 
For Graff, the history of the rise of literacy is tha  of a series of ideological 
accretions, equivalences and evaluations that reflect d the rise of print dominance. The 
“primacy of print” takes the institutional form of mass schooling, mass schooling 
becomes associated with progress and enlightenment, and literacy, seen as benefiting the 
individual and society, comes to be identified with progress itself (Graff, Literacy Myth 
xv). The problem, from the standpoint of a historian, is that an unvarying story, seated in 
these self-serving prejudices, comes to be repeated by scholars: “in theory and in 
empirical investigation, literacy is conceptualised . . . as an important part of . . . the 
evolution of modern societies and states” (Graff, Literacy Myth xv). Underlying this 
persistent simplification is the assumption of literacy’s value, and the result is an 
unchanging myth:  
Primary schooling and literacy are necessary . . . for economic and social 
development, establishment and maintenance of democratic institutions, 
individual advancement, and so on. All this, regardless of its veracity, has 
come to constitute a “literacy myth.” (Graff, Literacy Myth xvi) 
Constructing an epochal moment in this narrative, th  turning point of its 
subversion, of the dethronement of literacy, Graff situates himself alongside a growing 
minority of researchers, a “movement,” which had begun to reappraise this legacy (Graff, 
Literacy Myth xvi).  
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In constructing a narrative of the consolidation of cultural notions and the 
investigator’s work in clearing those notions of their unwarranted historical accretions, 
Graff’s list is more diffuse, more addressed to populist notions, than Barton’s or Olson’s. 
His list invokes a world of misunderstanding brought about by the accidents of history: 
the mistaking of literacy, an historical element of “progress,” for the progress itself. In 
Graff’s account literacy is on the one hand a sign for an ideological phantom, an alibi for 
self-congratulation, a delusive, overstated misrepresentation of a real process. On the 
other hand, however, it is a real thing, minimal, atomic, and yet with a substance all of its 
own, reacting in different ways to the various practices, understandings, purposes and 
techniques with which it comes into contact.  
The list of Graff’s preface to The Literacy Myth, in addition, leads to another, in 
which the deficiencies of past research establish a et of criteria, and a set of imperatives, 
for studying the topic. As in other lists, popular and theoretical conceptions of literacy are 
but part of a continuum, and the needs of theory are also the needs of society, of a global 
but western “us.” “A literacy myth surrounds us,” he claims, “our uncertainties and 
anxieties are striking” (Literacy Myth 2).  It is not simply the European countries that 
have a literacy crisis; the underdeveloped world is suffering from “book hunger” and 
UNESCO has made literacy a global concern (Graff, Literacy Myth 2-3). “We” are all the 
responsible agencies, “ranging from the U.S. Census Bureau, the Army, and the Navy to 
the census authorities of Statistics Canada and the Unit d Nations,” and governments 
around the world (Graff, Literacy Myth 3). It is with a view to these agencies, in a 
conversation with them, that Graff presents his most ba ic criterion. Against the failure of 
these agencies to define literacy, in light of their purpose of recording its rates and 
proportion in the population, of enforcing and planning its dissemination, Graff sets out 
the criteria of a “useful” definition. 
In his discussion of definitions, Graff adopts a systematic ambiguity: while the 
usefulness of a definition is subject to criteria such as clarity and flexibility, it clearly also 
relates to the recording, assessment and teaching of populations. UNESCO’s definitions 
of literacy and functional literacy, while they acknowledge the context-specific nature of 
literacy and its subordination to certain needs and uses, fail to define these latter terms 
and are thus “less than useful” (Graff, Literacy Myth 3). Likewise, David Harmon’s 
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distinction between literacy as tool, skill attainment and ability developing in necessary 
stages is “a useful beginning” but replete with unwarranted assumptions (Graff, Literacy 
Myth 5). The obstacle is not only to a theoretical understanding but also to the testing of 
literacy, to its being rendered within useful programs unencumbered by a dislocation 
between the actual skills needed in a particular time and place and the method of 
recording them.  
Enumerating the various misunderstandings of literacy as a changing historical 
practice, denouncing the manipulations of popular prejudices, drawing out the 
provenance of ideological distortions and criticising existing official and scholarly 
definitions, Graff’s list also performs a subsidiary but discursively essential purpose: it 
establishes literacy’s existence and places it just beyond final definition. To be sure, it is 
a thread to draw through history, a thing to be explained by recourse to social and 
economic categories, but it is itself guaranteed before explanation and definition. 
Disciplining Literacy: Literacy as Inevitable Substance 
The socioeconomic history of literacy exemplified by Graff is one of many 
disciplinary types of discourse surrounding and investing literacy. In order for the 
discourse to constitute itself, it has brought these into a single space, but it is only with a 
great deal of effort that these can in turn be brought into some kind of order, mapped and 
tabulated. One such effort is the tabulation by NazR ssool. Rassool discusses popular 
literacy mythologies worldwide, as well as the various policies, in particular colonial and 
post-colonial, in which literacy has been implicated in the maintenance of hegemonic 
relationships. It is in this context that she arranges authoritative literacy discourse 









Subject discipline Literacy foci 




Decoding of texts 
Functional literacy 
Methods of instruction 
Cognitive psychology Focus on individuals and groups 
Impact of literacy on intellectual development 
Abstract thinking skills 
Social psychology Focus on groups 
Variety of positions taken: 
a) great divide theory – differences between oral and literate cultures (e.g. Goody 
and Watt; Hildyard & Olson) 
b) emphasis on development of cognition and consciousness in relation to social 
relations within external world – ideological and political aspects of literacy 
(e.g. Luria; Vygotsky) 
c) emphasis on need to understand various ways in which different societies and 
cultures make sense of their world – challenge great divide theory (Scribner; 
Cole & Scribner) 
Psycholinguistics Focus on the individual 
Reading and writing process 
Internal relations between perceptual processes, orthographic systems and reader’s 
knowledge of language 
Meaning production at interface of person and text
Sociolinguistics Focus on individuals and groups 
Different forms and functions of written and spoken la guage within variety of social 
contexts 
Bilingualism and multilingualism 
Discourse and subject registers 
Communicative competence 
Social anthropology Focus on groups 
Interpretations of social consequences of literacy elated to groups of people within 
their sociocultural contexts 
Social change 
 
This tabulation arranges conceptualisations of literacy within two levels: as a set of 
foci and in their relationship to a discipline. Implicit in the table is a historical progress 
and elaboration of the concepts, away from the indiv dual and towards groups and 
sociocultural contexts. Where a concept of literacy emerges, it is the excrescence of a 
discipline, the effect of a certain organisation of knowledge. Such a table constructs 
correspondences between forms of knowledge, concepts and their social expression as 
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policy (Rassool 39). Beyond this, however, lies the object that organises the table, and 
that guarantees it at the same time as it is establi hed by it. Literacy is the meta-object, 
the thing to be remade in the image of a discipline, that must be subject to an ever wider, 
ever more socialised conceptual network. In beginning her mapping of literacy “with the 
question, ‘What is literacy?’” (1), Rassool sets out from literacy as a guaranteed term, 
which allows her to anchor her analysis of the various informal notions and hegemonic 
truths about literacy, even where these differ to a degree that suggests, not only that 
literacy is a contested and flexible term, but thatere is nothing there to conceptualise, 
that nomination and conceptualisation are exclusively related to a power struggle. Indeed, 
Rassool’s attempt to characterise literacy seeks to integrate real literacies, whether 
subaltern languages or official dialects, with myths relating to literacy and development, 
histories of restricted access and hegemony to official l teracies, and the symbolic suasion 
of the definitions of literacy. It is through, and not despite, this thoroughly constructivist 
and socialised account of literacy, that the completely de-foundational but ontologically 
secure guarantee of literacy is uttered.  
In “Mapping a Typology of Literacies” (10), Rassool moves from pedagogical 
forms of literacy (3) to the struggle for power played out within the nation-state (59-128), 
to the changes in international policies, definitions and socioeconomic relations (129-
214), and finally back to the need for a new pedagogy of multiliteracies in response to the 
needs of a changing world (215-40). Her typology is thus increasingly socialised, 
connecting the multiple identities – charted through the concept of literacy – to new 
needs, designing a new relationship between the school and the world. It is important to 
recognise here that a similar mapping of these understandings (as well as their 
coordination and operationalisation) occurs in the Curriculum Framework and similar 
policy publications. However much the myths of literacy have proved illusory, literacy 
remains in them the inevitable substance invoked in this mapping of the world.  
The chart, then, is part of a larger process of establi hing the ubiquity of literacy 
within the ensemble of social forces, as a reactive agent of power and hegemony, as a 
contested term in struggles for justice and recognition, and in official and disciplinary 
definitions. Finally, literacy carries here an imperative for the right literacy, historically 
and culturally appropriate but otherwise arbitrarily defined, to be provided. Beyond the 
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nation-state, the world establishes its demand and sets out the parameters for the needs of 
its inhabitants. Thus, Literacy for Sustainable Development “explores the range of skills 
and communicative competence, knowledges and awareness [ ecessary] to function 
effectively in the democratic process, within the flexible parameters of the information 
society (Rassool 21).” 
The discursive functioning of myth-lists and social and disciplinary cartographies 
thus begins to explain how literacy discourse operates so insistently in both private 
experience and national policy. These lists establish a world in which, whatever it is, 
literacy implies an imperative to be studied and investigated, for all of the things it 
touches, whether discursively, historically, politically, socially, pedagogically or 
practically, and at whatever scale. Several types of li ting, often overlapping, are 
practised: the theoretical distribution of positions and counterpositions; the analysis of a 
public discourse; the historicisation of an ideological and institutional complex; and the 
tabulation of disciplinary concepts. In each case a world is drawn, simultaneously unified 
by the notion of literacy and assuming literacy as an unknown substance, a misconstrued 
but present thing, a concern for researchers, the public, the state and the educational 
establishment. Literacy is a silent, anonymous force, the contours of which are difficult to 
grasp, are presumptively defined and redefined according to the practical context, the 
societal needs and the political ends with which it is associated. This is close to, though 
not quite the same as, the imperative world, the world of change and challenge, which 
prefaces the policy planning literature and demands the creation of a literacy which will 
lead the nation into prosperity, competitiveness, development, and so on.  
The lists are ordered in a variety of ways: according to a serial list or in two 
dimensions on a table: as a series of pros and cons or as a flat plane of interaction 
between the disciplines, a field of interactions and disconnections. None of these lists 
explicitly characterises a discourse of literacy: rather than seeing literacy as discursively 
constituted, they assume an absolute separation between the organisation of knowledge 
and the object of knowledge. The practice of listing itself assumes that the same object is 
being spoken of and that an educational purpose is and should be served in any study, in 
conjunction with the proper national and international bodies. That is, listing assumes that 
one may cleanse the concept of unwarranted accretions and recover a core or real 
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definition. A Foucaultian analysis suggests, on the contrary, that this object is 
systematically constructed by a discourse and at the same time owes its existence to 
practices that give to the object the possibility of appearing. The cleansing of the object 
performed by these lists is itself a mode of construction, and participates in a pedagogical 
space which acts as a problematic terminus for the discourse, as the source of a specific 
















3: Three Circularities 
In the analysis of the Curriculum Framework in Chapter One, statements on 
literacy were shown to integrate the various elements of a national project of schooling. 
These elements are comprised of a set of knowledges concerning texts, students, 
language, the world, and the nation; a way of disciplining the population through 
schooling, measurement, analytical distribution andpe agogical intervention; and a 
referring of these knowledges and practices to the space of schooling, reifying this space 
as both travesty and image of world and nation. Chapter Two demonstrated that literacy 
is discursively established as both the guaranteed foundation and the unknown object of 
study. This chapter advances further the analysis of l teracy as a discursive construction, 
arguing that the discourse of literacy presents a set of circularities obscuring the 
discursive formation that supports it even as its statements activate it. That is, the 
discourse suppresses its conditions of possibility, with the result that knowledge of 
literacy encounters a number of curved horizons beyond which the discourse ceases to 
operate. This chapter’s discursive analysis situates lit racy within a set of relationships 
internal to the discourse and enables the thesis to progress to a fuller account of literacy’s 
historical provenance. This guides the later analysis, in Chapters Four and Five, of 
literacy within the contexts of power-knowledge regimes and historical spaces. Through 
these overlaid and integrated levels of analysis the thesis will account for the efficient 
articulation of pedagogical discipline and conceptual construction, via the term literacy, 
in the Curriculum Framework and also within a pedagogised social space. 
The discourse of literacy engages in three forms of circularity: historical, 
epistemological and political. First, in its historical treatment, literacy is either the source 
of social thought or a site determined by social relations. Second, the discourse defines 
literacy as both the basis and object of knowledge, thus creating an analytic of finitude, 
an undecidable epistemological circularity. Third, n the political relations it establishes, 
the discourse ties literacy to changing the world to serve people, and to changing people 
to serve the world, involving it in an ambiguous and i eluctable relationship to power. 
The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that these ambiguities are immanent to the 
discourse, and so accounts for the systemic ambiguities and constitutive themes exploited 
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within current policy literature, as exemplified bythe Curriculum Framework. At the 
same time it also explains some of the anxious laughter with which the thesis began. 
“Literacy is,” this virtual content of the lists, is not merely an affirmation, but a 
statement arising from a discourse, that is, from a social ordering of thought. A discourse 
does not correspond to the boundaries established by participating disciplines, to any one 
set of ideological values, to hierarchies of propositi ns, or to a succession of phrases. 
Nonetheless, this statement operates in a privileged way, as an unobtrusive and 
unnecessary affirmation, even when its very definitio  is put into question. In fact, 
literacy has already claimed a separate site for itself, as a hub between different 
systematic bodies of knowledge, and it is constantly claimed that “literacy studies” have, 
or are about to attain, the status of a separate discipline.1 Looking at the circularities that 
result from the ontological guarantee of literacy opens up the prospect of an historical 
account of the discourse of literacy as the effect of an ongoing intensification of 
pedagogical power. Analysis of the discursive peculiarities and limits of the literacy 
discourse bears out Foucault’s contention that discourses systematically construct their 
own objects while disguising this construction as the gradual revelation of a pre-existing 
reality. As a consequence, the discourse of literacy exhibits symptomatic paradoxes, 
irreconcilable dualities and circular relationships between object and ground. In 
apprehending these features of the discourse, one can begin to chart the broader set of 
historical relations immanent to the emergence, experience and practice of literacy. 
To describe literacy as a discursively produced object of knowledge, it is 
necessary to go beyond standard accounts of the structures and divisions of knowledge 
into which literacy fits. The extraordinary flexibility and polysemy of the Curriculum 
Framework, combined with its precise operationalisation of knowledges of literacy, are 
effects of the structure of this knowledge, of the porous and undecidable nature of the 
relations it establishes between itself and social pr ctices, and of its inscriptions of text, 
subject and world within its very constitution. Thus, it is insufficient to note that literacy 
is related to a division between disciplines in their modern form, as Goody and Watt have 
done: 
                                                 
1 See Street, “Introduction,” and Black. 
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The accepted tripartite divisions of the formal study of mankind's past and 
of his present are to a considerable extent based on man's development first 
of language and later of writing. Looked at in a temporal perspective, man 
as animal is studied primarily by the zoologist, man as talking animal 
primarily by the anthropologist, and man as talking a d writing animal 
primarily by the sociologist. (304) 
Far from fitting into this disciplinary correspondence, literacy, as an organising notion 
and as a set of knowledges to be applied to data, is he product of a very recent 
confluence of events, discourses and practices. What the discourse takes as an object is 
not merely the sociological construction of “man as a talking and writing animal” but 
humanity insofar as its language interacts with institutions, practices and knowledges that 
together form the literate subject as the object of kn wledge and discipline, study and 
correction, across a variety of disciplines. 
Applying a Foucaultian archaeological technique allows one to outline the unity 
of the discourse in its parallelisms across disciplines, and in the circularities and 
undecideable problems that it concerns itself with. In historical studies, using the 
category of literacy to select historical data is illegitimate (or deeply problematic) as 
history, but also necessary. Moreover, it results in an address to a transcendental subject 
of history, even where this is explicitly denied. Even the most critical histories, anchored 
and instigated by the category they seek to challenge (literacy), retain the language of the 
powerful mythology they challenge. Interpreting these circularities as orderings effected 
by statements suggests that the history of literacy, while a paradoxical enterprise in terms 
of representing a real entity, is intelligible as the construction of a social reality. The 
discourse is structured by possible strategies of definition and argument, which are 
themselves undecidable. These dispersals are part of the ne discursive formation. 
Similar circularities pervade the epistemological and political problems faced by the 
discourse, revealing a discourse that finds itself both impossible – in terms of defining a 
real object, forming concepts or prescribing policy – and at the same time imperative, 
because literacy must, regardless of its lack of definition, its historical dubiousness and its 
political implications, be researched, argued about and used as a pedagogical tool. 
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While studies from a variety of disciplines investigate literacy from quite different 
perspectives, the discourse they form faces difficulties which arise not merely from 
logical considerations, nor from the structure of these disciplines, but from the function 
and dispersal of literacy in them. Moreover, a set of associated themes, claims and aims 
resurface despite being dismissed or falsified. Literacy is not merely an object, or a 
concept, in this discourse. Rather, it functions precisely as what Foucault calls a 
statement, as a transverse element organising and constituting the discourse, organising 
what can be said into a set of concepts, themes and trategies, and involving historically 
specific speaking subjects, in a patterned dispersal (Archaeology 54; 122). This discourse 
behaves according to an “analytic of finitude” (Order 364), where the term under 
discussion forms both the limit and the possibility of knowledge, thereby confining it 
within a circularity. These three broad aspects of the discourse are arranged, that is, as 




The history of literacy defines and discovers literacy within circularities set forth 
in the discursive relations that constitute the knowledge of literacy. These relations 
determine the possible hypotheses concerning the roles and uses of literacy, which are 
themselves the consequences of the possible definitions of literacy, pre-given and 
determined by the rules for the formation of statements. In their objects, in the roles and 
modes of possible speakers, in the branching of alterna ives and in the distribution of 
concepts, the history of literacy presents itself as a division between two alternatives: 
theories based on the “Great Divide” hypothesis and theories that emphasise a context of 
use. These are two available branchings within a single distribution of possible positions. 
These options occur within the one system of dispersal, within a set of strategic positions 
already activated as part of the discourse, already operating as a condition of its 
existence. The history of literacy, in assuming the existence of literacy, cannot historicise 
its own emergence as a discourse because it finds it ecessary to project a modern notion 
of literacy onto historical data, rearranging this data as a result. It cannot help but 
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reactivate certain constitutive themes: the transcedental social subject, the development 
of both the individual and social mind, and the relationship between mind and textual 
form. Literacy is recovered by reconfiguring the historical archive along the continuum 
between individual and social usage, creating artefc s as a result, such as the hybrid text 
(a text showing traces of both “oral” and “literate” culture) and social meanings, which 
are in fact projections of pedagogical categories. An interpretive spiral, moreover, 
endlessly renews the concept of literacy by renderig it both historically insufficient and 
necessary. 
Within a variety of disciplines and perspectives, literacy offers to the researcher a 
line of historical development. But this is not as pure knowledge, as description bereft of 
any instruments and desires. Indeed, the first impulse is to reform, to save the neglected 
or mutilated subject, group and epoch from a distorting linguistic violence, a violence 
overlaid with a power that distributes bodies, biographies, fortunes and social goods. 
Beyond this gaze into the silence of a mute alterity, but reproducing it in another 
dimension, lies the paradox of the illuminating sequ nce of leaps in consciousness, where 
the present state of the Western mind stands as the destination to which history tends, 
marking every epoch as both a leap forwards and as a prior absence, and possibly also as 
an amputation, as the presence of an unreachable other. Beyond its internal divisions, the 
literacy discourse is concerned with finding traces of literate activity and referring them 
to the problem of the relationship between text and the development of a subject who is 
social, individual and typical at the same time. 
The discourse’s writing of the history of the west a  the development of literacy, 
rather than disclosing the progressive revelation of a structure that was already there, of 
the material relations that lie beneath the level of ideology and prior to the moment of a 
positive discovery, constitutes the emergence of a discursive formation. A group of 
discourses on literacy undergo a series of operations establishing their unity. However, no 
unity is guaranteed by the fact that these discourses are concerned with what appears to 
be the same object (Foucault, Archaeology 32). The discursive formation surrounding 
literacy is characterised by “the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance 
of objects during a given period of time” (Archaeology 33), by “a group of relations 
between statements,” the forms in which they appear, and the subjects who produce them 
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(33-34), by “the simultaneous or successive emergence” of concepts, “in the distance that 
separates them and even in their incompatibility” (Archaeology 35), and by “the 
dispersion of the points of choice that the discourse leaves free,” or the “field of strategic 
possibilities” (Archaeology 36-7).  
A discursive formation, Foucault proposes, is travesed by statements, both 
determining and determined by the space of its dispersals and possibilities. Unlike the 
relation between a proposition and its referent or that between a sentence and its meaning, 
the statement does not name a thing so much as it activates domains: 
what might be defined as the correlate of the statement is a group of domains 
in which . . . objects may appear and to which . . . relations may be assigned: 
it would, for example, be a domain of material objects possessing a certain 
number of observable physical properties, relations of perceptible size – or, 
on the contrary, it would be a domain of fictitious objects . . . [or] a domain of 
spatial and geographical localisations. (Archaeology 91) 
The notion of the statement is the essential component for Foucault’s 
archaeology, for in the rareness of statements one finds the historical specificity of a 
discourse, rather than being lured by the retrospective illusions and “conveniences” of 
what Foucault terms “traditional history.” In this case, the historical field is selectively 
arranged wherever literacy appears and, in addition, literacy confers meaning on history, 
bestowing a shape to affects or intuitions, drawing a developmental line as the biography 
of either Europe or the Western mind. The fundamental paradox in these histories is not 
that they are unable to fix the boundaries of literacy, but that they transfer a recent, dated 
concept into a historical experience structured by concepts pre-dating literacy, and often 
quite at variance with it. Hence, either a proper account of reading and writing is 
structured by the meanings held in the past, in which case these histories are no longer 
possible, since the reading-writing couplet is structured by a notion of literacy, or the 
account of literacy is avowedly a fiction for today, in which case it can no longer claim to 
represent the meaning of the experience of reading and writing in the historical past. 
As Chapter Two demonstrated, lists of claims about literacy, whether of positive 
claims or myths, are a way of establishing literacy, of providing it with a place in 
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discourse. But this is not the only function of thelists, and not the only part of 
establishing the existence, and perpetuating the exp rience, of literacy. It is not only that 
literacy is, but also that it is a certain way, and that it is necessary for us to recognise it. 
These lists also establish the overall form of the discourse, the various phantasmatic 
binarisms, the popular and scholarly fallacies, and the whole range of epistemic, 
ideological and political abuses to which these are put. As the Curriculum Framework 
suggests, and as the historical works on literacy reiterate, literacy teaches the Western 
subject, by way of internal necessities which are also ccidental and historical, to separate 
text and interpretation, to lie, to confess, to be an individual. At the level of discourse it 
does not matter that these contentions are routinely questioned, undermined or falsified. 
These contentions organise the discourse, they give flesh to literacy, and form the axes 
around which strategies immanent to the discourse oppose each other. These axes, 
insubstantial in themselves, form the substance of literacy while at the same time leaving 
room for a further substance, deferring to that impossible object which is known only by 
the name of literacy.  
The great explosion of historical studies of literacy, concerning themselves mainly 
with national statistics, demographics and class, occurs from the 1960s, but this tradition 
is preceded by decades of work on orality and literacy in classical studies. These two 
“traditions” in the history of literacy are dealt with here: that arising from the work of 
Milman Parry and extended by Havelock, Ong, Illich and Sanders; and that emerging 
from demographics and class analysis as exemplified in the work of Cipolla, Graff and 
Vincent. These selections, though restricted, are arguably representative of these two 
ways of doing the history of literacy. A part of a discursive formation, this history forms 
the objects of which it speaks and the problems it confronts are discursive effects. It 
arranges the field of history according to a set of statements.  
These two ways of historicising literacy begin with the re/construction of an 
exemplary text that is both literate and oral, thereby uniting and separating two modes of 
language. This hybrid text furnishes a composite from which one may extract a literate 
and an oral mode. What is said of the oral/literate hybrid text finds a domain of 
candidates; that is, various textual traces of “different” combinations of oral and literate 
modes are rendered discoverable. At the same time, what is claimed for literacy finds a 
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domain of falsification: on the basis of the traces found in the hybrid text one can claim 
or contest, on the one hand, that literacy inhabits bo h the literate mind and its 
civilisation, or, on the other, that it organises a field of uses into social meanings. In 
organising a space for the arrangement and reconstitution of history – according to 
reliable literacy rates, or with regard to concepts implied in the forms taken by certain 
exemplary texts – histories of literacy perform a productive function on the archive of 
historical data, constructing the literate society or the literate mind. Works dealing with 
the history of literacy arrange statements in terms of a style, as either a biography of 
western thought or a series of understated affect-object connections, and they imply a 
transcendent subject, conferring meaning across time. The histories here are not 
scatterings of opinions, but rather evidence of a patterned dispersal. Rather than judge 
these histories as failed attempts to represent some historical object, then, the thesis deals 
with them as part of a discursive formation.  
The classical tradition of literacy studies begins with Milman Parry’s work on 
Homer. A “first work” always has antecedents to be discovered, but Parry’s work is 
credited by several literacy scholars (Havelock, Ong, Illich) as the work which produced 
the possibility of a rigorous historical study of literacy. Whether it was preceded by other 
work on orality, it was the earliest to be recognised and used as the foundation of a 
possible history of Western literacy. Parry, writing i  the 1920s and 1930s (“Traditional 
Epithet;” “Epic Technique”), established that the poems of Homer show patterns of 
construction which differ fundamentally from other poems in the Western canon. Certain 
functional parts, such as ornamental epithets, were eith r meaningless in Homer’s time or 
irrelevant to the meaning within a passage. Parry explained their presence in the Homeric 
poems as insertions to keep the metre and rhythm of a line. This formulary character 
derives from the oral delivery and composition of the poems, relying on a repertoire of 
learned formulas which would maintain the rhythmic ovement of the poem while 
leaving the narrative relatively unhindered. 
Parry’s analysis has had several consequences. First, it e tablishes definite criteria 
for the recognition of a true transcription of oral poetry; second, a new aesthetic 
experience is described to recognise the real value of oral poems (with the ear as the 
organ of appreciation); third, a fundamental difference can be perceived between oral and 
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literate experience; fourth, all “literate” criteria are prima facie invalid for the judgment 
of oral literature and constitute either an injustice or a misrepresentation (for instance, 
there is no “original text” of Homer). A whole other world is established, defined and 
delimited, different in kind to “ours.” Our world, the literate world, becomes, as a 
negative image of this, a mass of literate automatisms and blindnesses, and bears the 
possibility of a new kind of characterisation. For the first time, the oral mode is accorded 
a positive and constitutive difference, not as a lack, but as grounded within a set of proper 
cultural virtues (the values of “heroic” culture, in the Homeric example), its own aesthetic 
situation: the sound of a musical composition (not a recitation) going to the appreciative 
ear, and a recognisable cluster of forms. It is no lo ger caught up in a mistranscription 
that had devalued and despecified it for over a century. 
Parry establishes the distinction, for centuries vague, unsystematic and scattered 
over a wide range of discourses, between the literate and non-literate cultures, between 
two modes of speech, two ways of thinking and perceiving, two types of society, two 
types of mind. At the same time, light is suddenly thrown upon the relative values of 
literate culture, values which appear only in the light of this positive difference. 
Havelock, taking up and inflecting Parry’s work, reconstitutes a long transition from the 
“oral mode” to the “literate mode.” If literate cult re is haunted by a set of assumptions 
which have for millennia blinded it to the proper appreciation of Homer, what are these 
assumptions? How has the form of writing and reading constituted the perception and 
experience of language in the literate mind? For Havelock, the alphabet forms both the 
absolute condition for the rational and analytic character of Western thought and the 
beginning of a series of graduated conceptual changes, seen in their effects on the form of 
texts over the centuries. All that we take for granted about language – the text, the author, 
commentary and analysis, the decomposition of speech into words, the idea of a single 
language as both written and spoken, the distinctio between form and content, and even 
the notion of language itself – are consequences of this literate revolution. 
For Havelock, the invention of the “true alphabet” is an opportunity to investigate 
for the first time the historical conditions of the d velopment of Western thought in its 
analytical, rational and scientific structures. Without the alphabet, there would be no 
concept of words as separable elements, of language, of the text. Going further, he and a 
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group of scholars – Illich and Sanders (ABC), Olson (World on Paper), McLuhan 
(Understanding Media; Gutenberg Galaxy), Goody and Watt (“Consequences”), Goody 
(Savage Mind; Traditional Societies) and Ong (Orality) – claim that alphabetic writing 
and the technologies of writing building upon it are the necessary condition for “the 
forms of consciousness found in modern Western thoug t” (Fleischer Feldman 47). A 
proliferation of lists of cognitive consequences ari es from this work, sometimes at 
variance with each other but nonetheless univocal in their assertion that Western literacy 
is the latent basis for Western thought.  
This tradition has produced a sequence of important literacy events, signposts, 
rearrangements, crises and revolutions that indicate a new stage in the development of 
latent conceptual structures of the West. The first Greek adoption and conversion of the 
Phoenician script constitutes the first true reduction of sound to script; the Homeric texts 
attest to a compromise between poet and scribe and the Platonic dialogues mark the point 
of departure between an oral philosophy and a new, p rhaps reluctantly literate one; the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries see the oath replac d by a contract, and from then on 
someone “holds” land (as a tenancy guaranteed by a title deed) rather than sitting on it 
(“possessing”); the book at this time becomes an indexed, randomly searchable document 
catalogued in a library (rather than merely put there), and the common people are taught 
that their lives and afterlives are controlled elsewh re, in account-books and the Book of 
Life. These, among other things, are the landmarks of literacy, as both a cultural 
syndrome and a road to modern reason, before the acceleration caused by the moveable-
type printing press (cf. Havelock, Preface; Illich and Sanders, ABC; Ong, Orality).  
In an old move – at least as old as Ferguson’s Civil Society – contemporary non-
literate societies are drawn into this not only as an illustration of the great gulf between 
our thought and theirs, but also as an intimation of the character of the preliterate 
ancients. Thus, a traveller’s tale of oral inventios is related by Havelock to illustrate his 
point that early histories are remnants of creative oral fabrications: 
Achieving alphabetisation, in a period restricted to craft literacy, these 
“histories” were able to survive. Preceding compositi ns lacking this 
advantage would have enjoyed only an ephemeral existence, the character of 
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which can be gauged by analogy from the reported experience of a 
nineteenth-century explorer of the Sudan. (Havelock, Literate Revolution 23)  
The quotation follows, telling of Sir Samuel Baker’s discomfiture in having a highly 
fanciful “history” sung of him, and especially at having to pay an exorbitant price for the 
performance. Havelock expands this into an observation on the essential difference 
between oral memory and literate history: 
oral record of what is supposed to have been the past represents an act of free 
composition, not less so when cast in epic form. It can never be historical in 
our sense. The true parent of history is not any one “writer” like Herodotus, 
but the alphabet itself. Oral memory deals primarily with the present: it 
collects and recollects what is being done now or is appropriate to the present 
situation. . . . What it preserves of the past is partial and incidental, and is 
woven into coherence by the use of fantasy, like the Mycenaean background 
emplaced in the Homeric poems. (Havelock, Literate Revolution 23) 
Though Havelock is credited with perpetuating a Great Divide, he proposes that 
the Western mind was built in heterogeneous steps corresponding with new 
conceptualisations of writing, the text, and language itself: 
The change (from pre-alphabetic to alphabetic cultures) became the means of 
introducing a new state of mind – the alphabetic mind . . . [T]he alphabet 
converted the Greek spoken tongue into an artefact, thereby separating it from 
the speaker and making it into a “language,” that is, an object available for 
inspection, reflection, analysis. Was this merely a matter of creating the 
notion of grammar? It is true that Greek originally had no word for a word 
singly identified, but only various terms referring to spoken sound, and that 
syntactical categories and parts of speech first becam  subjects of discourse 
toward the end of the fifth century, after nearly three hundred years of 
alphabetic usage. But something deeper was also going on. A visible artefact 
was also preservable without recourse to memory. It could be rearranged, 
reordered, and rethought to produce forms of statement and types of discourse 
not previously available because not easily memorisable. If it were possible to 
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designate the new discourse by any one word, the appropriate word would be 
conceptual. Nonliterate speech had favoured discoure describing action; the 
postliterate altered the balance in favour of reflection. The syntax of Greek 
began to adapt to an increasing opportunity offered to state propositions in 
place of describing events. (Havelock, Literate Revolution 7-8) 
The Great Divide is not so much a divide as a serie of steps charting the development of 
Western man and his distance from the oral, preliteate, and illiterate Others he has left 
behind him. 
It is a small step from this general form to the elimination or substantial 
modification of the categories of development and progress deployed in these works. As 
analysis of the Curriculum Framework demonstrates, the discourse imbues literacy with a 
flexibility derived from its interaction with social demands and ways of mapping and 
tracing it as an index and cause of social development. If each age or society represents a 
different modification of oral and literate modes, then there is no fully literate t los to 
which the human mind, civilisation and society tend. Moreover, the recovery of statistical 
data has fueled arguments over the interpretation of this data, and of the criteria for 
progress with which one argues for or against. Statistical and social-psychological 
histories of literacy, though they claim to be at odds in their object and its measurement, 
are really two versions of developmental history, two ways of arguing for or against 
literacy’s association with progress. Beyond this division of discourses is a version of 
development divorced from progress, where mutation and transformation constitute the 
key concept and progress is a matter of preference or political project. There are two 
important events to be noted here: the introduction of statistical tables and sociological 
concepts, with literacy becoming a matter of populations and percentages, and Graff’s 
questioning, in the context of a statistically informed social history, of the association 
between literacy and terms associated with progress. As a consequence literacy, while 
never given the status of a real essence, becomes a proliferating and protean entity 
requiring endless study. Literacy is no longer an absolute limit but rather a variable form 
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(according to usage), an element in larger mosaics (varying with roles of other 
components), a sociopolitical self-image, a recoverabl  clue to the suppressed Other.2 
What secures this interplay and flexibility of concepts, however, relies upon a 
basic circularity in the discourse, where the object to be explained and studied is also the 
foundation of this knowledge. This leaves a series of questions unanswered, since the 
discourse disclaims its construction of this object. Hence, it cannot date the birth of a 
coherent, integrated concept of literacy. Nor can it explain why this concept seems to leap 
from its scattered popular, technical and speculative uses to an absolute division between 
two types of mind. It generates undecidable oppositions and unanswerable questions 
because it constitutes literacy outside of history. Literacy as a historical object is 
inconstant both in terms of its meanings and its practices, and thus one can never be sure 
that histories of literacy delineate the one thing, the one set of concerns, signified by 
“literacy.” These lacunae and ambiguities do not silence the discourse; rather, they 
mandate the extension of literacy to the entire social field, as both object of study and 
area of demand, concern and intervention. It is therefore important to examine these 
circularities in explaining the Curriculum Framework’s extension of literacy into the 
categories of the nation and economic and cognitive development. It is also important to 
examine the problems and questions that this discour e, by its very constitution, leaves 
unaddressed. 
In providing an insight into the practices where “literacy” emerged, where 
“industry” and “intelligence” may have come before, historians not only cast light on the 
notions surrounding literacy, but they also throw the notion of literacy itself into doubt. 
This is not a question of the refinement and redefinition of the concept, but a question of 
extension. If concerns about literacy are really about a particular structure of relations 
among language, observation and instruction, or derive from a modern form of 
subjectivity where language is an absolute limit and defining substance of the human, 
then the value of literacy as a historical heuristic concept fails. First, former and other 
ways of reading and writing must be understood as anticipations within a teleological 
development towards literacy proper, or there is no particular connection, and the idea 
                                                 
2 See Mignolo for an extended discussion. 
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from which one began looks like cultural hubris. Second, it may be that “our literacy” is 
simply a regional example of other ways of ordering a d practising language through 
marks; but then the question arises as to whether we have abstracted our experience as the 
kernel of experiences which may only have an identity when seen from the perspective 
we are forced into as subjects of our relation to language.  
Historical studies of literacy, then, are faced with the suspicion that their founding 
assumption, the existence of literacy (and therefore its effects on the historical domain) is 
valid only where literacy constitutes a particular historical experience. Thus, in a culture 
where non-literate capacities were the foundation of education, the effects of literacy are 
either the effects of a cultural ensemble not recognising literacy (and literacy is not the 
effective unity), or literacy is a set of material f cts operating autonomously in relation to 
a cultural apparatus, or it is merely an element, recognised from one historical 
perspective, with no general law or explanatory value outside of a particular cultural 
practice.3 But the intelligibility of a history of literacies, the reason for their being, is 
“our” recognition of literacy as a real entity. The concepts underwriting this intelligibility 
are not writing and reading, but the character, effects, possibilities and powers these 
bestow upon ways of thought, lives and societies. 
The later historical tradition in literacy studies, which uses statistical evidence and 
sociological concepts, also comes up against a series of problems. Literacy and illiteracy 
have remained terms that are difficult to define, th  evidence for which, on a population 
level, is difficult to interpret. Historically, and particularly before the advent of literacy 
studies, a variety of measures were taken. In any cse, as soon as a division between 
literate and illiterate is given, a borderland inevitably opens up, with its profusion of 
differences: 
the word “illiterate” may be employed to connote a person unable to read a 
text, whether printed or in manuscript. Logically one might be tempted to 
                                                 
3 Most treatments of literacy claim more than one of these propositions, differing as to whether the materi l 
or the cultural elements are more determinative in forming literate scientific practice, social relations or 
experiences of internalised thinking (Olson, World on Paper; Eisenstein, Printing Press; Havelock, 
Preface; Illich and Sanders, ABC), establishing a problematic interaction connecting society, cognitive 
spaces, scientific and technological progress, economic and political circumstances, and book format 
conventions (tables of contents, index pages, alphabetical ordering, emblemata and illustrations). 
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deduce from this that a person who knows how to read is “literate,” but the 
deduction is not a legitimate one. Between the totally illiterate and the literate 
there is the intermediate army of the semi-illitera. There are, to begin with, 
those who can read but cannot write. . . . However, those who can read but 
cannot write are not the only inhabitants of the uncertain land of semi-
illiteracy. There are those who can both read and write but can hardly 
understand what they read and can hardly write anythi g besides their 
signature. (Cipolla 12) 
The difficulties were already present in Cipolla’s 1969 book Literacy and 
Development in the West, and they have only proliferated since then. For instance, 
Cipolla points out that while a high number of literate workers is recorded as building the 
Fabbrica del Duomo, the large number of sculptors, a trade involving more education 
than most builders, makes this figure unrepresentative of the wider society. “Another 
group of labourers working on a different building” without all the Duomo statues “would 
have included fewer scultori and more muratori and consequently would have shown a 
lower rate of literacy” (Cipolla 57). The meaning of these numbers, rates and 
percentages, however, is not confined to a dead referent. The agencies for which they 
were produced, the new instruments of statistics, the powers, concerns and character of 
the modern state become both a problem and a set ofanswers. A society introduced 
measures of compulsion and assessment precisely when the literacy of its members 
became a concern and the substance of its power. Th meaning of literacy becomes a 
problem in that it can no longer be confined to the sil nt processes of economics, but 
must be found in the unrepresentative supplement of aut biographies, anecdotes, and 
ideological pronouncements (cf. Graff, Literacy Myth; Vincent, Popular Culture; Mass 
Literacy). Cipolla had already called for studies into “what people read and to what 
purposes,” but his assurance that “the set of values pr vailing in a given society 
ultimately determines to what use existing techniques will be put” (Cipolla 109) both 
masked and revealed the problem of the relation between literacy and power.4 
                                                 
4 This kind of circumspection has also entered into studies of ancient literacy: see William V. Harris. 
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Cipolla’s judgment, since overturned many times, was that literacy, while 
presenting a danger to social stability in the eighteenth century, was an essential 
ingredient in the technological and political progress of the nineteenth. His chronological 
scope is almost as great as that of “cognitive” historians of literacy, but the strategies 
adopted are significantly different. It is not the quality of a mind that characterises a 
civilisation, but the economic structure of a nation that interacts with the proportion and 
class of literates in the population. His most famous successors in economic and 
institutional histories of schooling in Europe, Harvey J. Graff and David Vincent, have 
since restricted the temporal scope of such work, and have transformed the notion of 
“values in a given society” into dialectical struggles between authorities and workers, and 
multiplied the forms and status of the uses of literacy. The discursive function remains, 
however, the tying of literacy into notions of development, and the insistence on 
organising social, economic and personal development as instances, correlatives and 
qualifications of notions of literacy. In this historical tradition as in the first, literacy 
orders the field by acting as a substance that makes the historical data intelligible, and as 
that which is to be discovered, explained and qualified by the interpretation of these data. 
Moreover, literacy invests an ambiguous transcendent subject that unites the nation, the 
society and the individual. Whereas this subject is marked by the exemplary text in the 
“philological” tradition above, in this sociological mode it is structured by a variety of 
different instruments: statistical tables, case histories, policy pronouncements and 
autobiographies. 
Though Graff claims that The Literacy Myth focuses “on individual men and 
women in society and the meanings of literacy to them” (19), it consists mostly of a 
statistical argument pitted against the “literacy myth.” Rather than present Western 
cultural history as successive realisations about texts, Graff decorrelates literacy and 
illiteracy from the various concerns they have been linked with, both in nineteenth-
century North America and in contemporary Western societies. The people are allied with 
the powerful truth of the statistical table against the myths of the press and the 
educational authorities. Thus, in arguing against the notion that literacy brings economic 
rewards, Graff’s contention that people did not see it this way is substantiated by the 
statistical evidence: 
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An illiterate could achieve some success in the working world of the 
nineteenth century. These conclusions form one baseline against which to 
assess the rhetorical claims of middle-class school promoters and by which to 
understand the criticisms and aspirations of the working class. Much more 
than the skills of literacy were at stake to them; other issues were thought to 
be at least as central to the curriculum of the future workers. (Graff, Literacy 
Myth 200)  
Graff contrasts the exactness and authority of recent statistical research into 
literacy and employment against the opportunistic inexactness of nineteenth-century 
officials such as Horace Mann. Strangely, this form f argument elevates the reviled 
falsifier to the status of interlocutor, while silencing the people for whom Graff is 
ostensibly speaking. Discussing Mann’s abuse of statistics to show the moral and 
economic advantages of education, Graff chides: 
Mann also failed to show that additional education for each child was 
economically profitable, exaggerating differences btween markers and 
signers, and ignoring the factors of age and ethnicity. He further confused the 
value of education to parents with its worth to the community, firms or 
individuals – these could be very different. Finally, his use of wage rates 
ignored the imperfection of the labour market, social inequality, and 
discrimination. (Graff, Literacy Myth 204) 
Literacy here organises the lives of workers, so that one may see what effect it has on 
them. While in cognitive histories one finds in literacy the explanation for an ideal mind, 
here it is the ephemeral and contradictory phantom placed and removed over otherwise 
silent lives, in the context of their labour, their mployment, and their relations to the 
powerful institutions that largely determined the economic content of their lives. In the 
first kind of history, the ideological and the historical elements are perfectly coincident; 
in the latter, ideology forms the veil to be drawn back, and also the alibi for writing of the 
great historical processes in which literacy has only a  accidental role to play. 
For Graff, literacy is always characterised by a purpose. It is not that the essence 
of literacy is modified by the end to which it is put; rather, it attains an essential character 
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only within the pursuit of some end or other. Hence, any knowledge of literacy is a 
knowledge of purposes. Actual processes can be measured only with reference to a goal. 
There is no universal scale of higher and lower functio s. The shoehorning of one literacy 
(a rule-bound dialect, say, used strategically to order social positions via authority and 
bonhomie) into another (a national educational scale, for instance) will misrepresent the 
fact of success (whether the literacy in question has attained its end) and will code the 
other literacy as a deviation and failure of the onmeasured. Nonetheless, a minimal 
relation of resemblance permits all literacies to be classed as forms of the same thing. 
As a consequence, the literacy researcher has to be sensitive and discriminating, 
keeping the purposes of literacy study in mind. Theidentification of different literacies 
illuminates both the essential character of a literacy and the nature of society:  
The study of literacy, I urge, is important not only in and of itself; it also 
illuminates the dynamics of society and provides penetrating insights into 
how its processes functioned – for example, in stratific tion, in mobility, or in 
family adjustment. Literacy study therefore constitutes a valuable mode of 
analysis for students of society. (Graff, Literacy Myth 19)  
The study of literacy is a study in social cartography, in the variable benefits derived 
from literacy and the involvement of literacy in forms of social gain and injury. This 
historiographical perspective is an ironic counter to the “literacy myth,” and, indeed, the 
demolishing of this massive, ramified and diffuse cloud of fallacy and misconception is 
frequently invoked as a reason for studies of literacy: the historical study of literacy is 
“one way of confronting directly the literacy myth, t e value assigned to literacy, and its 
place in social theory” (Graff, Literacy Myth 19). 
Here, literacy functions on two scales: as the sympto  of a total social 
environment and as the meaning and uses of reading nd writing in the lives of 
“individual men and women” (19). That two things are being studied is the sign of an 
essential agonistic impulse behind the writing, andthe result of the social apparatus 
producing both the myth and the facts. Literacy, the course of writing and reading at two 
distinct levels, characterises a society as the indx of its complexity and contradictions. 
The agonistic impulse is to denounce the pretensions of an ideological complex and to 
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bring it into conflict with these pretensions at the point of its application. Thus, society 
produces and maintains inequalities alongside the provision of literacy, and distributes 
different literacies according to existing social hierarchies and divisions. Further, the 
study of literacy aims to recognise the excluded individual or the marginal social group, 
with their specific forms of speech, their existencs marked out by the exclusions of 
power and the difference peculiar to them, outside of the presumptuous mismeasures and 
declarations of a social centre. 
In order to engage in such a study, however, one must comply with the 
fundamental division of individuals into literate and illiterate, and fortify this division 
with the solid language of economics and demography: 
The daughters of illiterates who persisted in the citi s, in sharp contrast to 
other illiterates and many literates, remained at home longer; the persisting 
families’ ratios of children at home are nearly equal. For settled families, it 
was apparently less important to send out young femal s into service and 
thereby to further reduce family size and dependency ratios. (Graff, Literacy 
Myth 178) 
As a consequence, literacy functions as both the obfuscation and the revelation of a social 
structure and the people within it. The transcendental social subject that was discovered 
in the philological tradition was replaced by an analytical image of social structure 
derived from the ordering of various sources into stati tical tables. 
In The Rise of Mass Literacy in Europe (published in 2000), David Vincent 
reinstates the transcendental subject as “meaning” a d “society,” while retaining the 
appearance of cautiously objective history. He alsoexcises orality from his history while 
acknowledging it. The operations of the correlative f eld of literacy, the insistent desire to 
locate literacy in the discourse and to rearrange the archive around a modern experience 
of literacy, are difficulties posed by the object founding the discourse being also its 
definiendum. The battles for the definition of literacy bear the marks of a long tradition in 
The Rise of Mass Literacy, a history that presents working-class autobiography as the 
other side of the state ideologies and uses of literacy, and where a degree of popular 
militancy secularises the curriculum. The dispute between the “autonomous” and the 
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“ideological” model is a barren one, writes Vincent, ot because it has been proved one 
way or the other but because “the limitations of measures of nominal literacy,” for a 
social history based on statistical tables “are so well established” that the historian may 
study only “the use to which the skills might be put” (Vincent, Mass Literacy 5). Vincent 
is referring, in fact, to Graff’s earlier formulation: 
Basic or primary levels of reading and writing constitute the only flexible and 
reasonable indications that meet the criterion; a number of historical and 
contemporary sources, while not wholly satisfactory in themselves, can be 
employed . . . . Only such basic but systematic indications meet the canons of 
accuracy, utility, and comparability that we must apply consistently. 
Otherwise, quantitative and qualitative dimensions cannot be known, and 
only confusion and distortion result. (Graff, Legacies 3-4)  
In Vincent’s work, this limitation is bypassed, since the transcendental category of 
the Western Mind is replaced by an aggregative one.This collective mind, which had 
disappeared under the prohibition against myth, resurfaces as the mind of society, as a 
social assemblage of feelings, pleasures and associtions operating at a manifest material 
level. Thus, with the Europe-wide change from parochial to standardised time, new 
combinations of feelings with space or objects are traced out in a spare and cautious 
language: 
Fact was sold as newspapers, further anchoring reading to the formal 
calendar, although for most of the labouring poor, it was only Sunday that 
was identified in this way. (Vincent, Mass Literacy 107) 
What is signalled in this passage is what one can no lo ger say: it is too much to 
propose that people believed newspapers contained fact, or even what the status of that 
fact was; it is overstepping the bounds to name those who identified Sunday, lest one 
attribute thought where there was none. Instead, a number of evasive substitutions both 
erase the expressions and reinstate them, at the level of a social semiotic that pretends to 
be only the material residue. History becomes a studied vernacular of rigorous material 
statements of meaning; society, without quite becoming the grandiloquent destiny of the 
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West, echoes the text of the great cognitive history in a series of new pleasures and 
private communions: 
A new dimension of privacy was made possible as individuals transmitted 
their secrets to each other over long distances, and families established lines 
of contact beyond the confines of their villages and neighbourhoods. . . . And 
the use of [postcards] reflected both the growing variety of applications of 
literacy and the unpremeditated appropriation of the labours of the teachers 
for the pleasures of the poor. (123) 
An empty space reopens in this passage: who is not premeditating? Society? The 
teachers? The poor? An empty, transcendent consciousness leaves its mark in the 
impersonal volitions and social feelings, granting to the historian a unity of meaning. This 
is because literacy discourse always hails a transcendental subject, whether national and 
social or individual and universal, for it cannot d away with the double pedagogical 
knowledge that calls it into being. 
In dealing with the problem of an oral culture, Vince t argues it out of existence. 
First, “the ‘oral tradition’ is now regarded more as  by-product of European intellectual 
history than a substantive category of cultural analysis” (91). Second, it was long dead: 
“at least in western Europe, communities uncontaminted by the written word 
disappeared at the Reformation and Counter-Reformation – if ever they existed” (91). 
Having dismissed this category, he is free to discus  the various interactions between 
voice and print in the new social order of the nineteenth century. All signifying activity in 
modern Europe thus becomes “literacy,” and its literacy, in turn, becomes an expression 
of the character of society as a whole. Oral culture is subordinated to the study of 
“Reading and Writing in Modern Europe” (the subtitle of Vincent’s book). The use of the 
oral other in making the literate self visible is a persistent pattern, beginning with Parry’s 
recordings of Yugoslav minstrels to confirm his conlusions about Homeric poetry. In 
this determination of the literate through the oral a flexible boundary asserts itself, one 
that refers both to the geographical and cultural domains proper to literacy, and to the 
boundary between sociological and cognitive history.  
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But there is a further boundary, another level of excision, the local expression of a 
dispersal common in literacy discourse. If an oral culture is studied, or if it is not Western 
(or “modern”), it belongs to comparative studies. An illiterate group within the West, on 
the other hand, partakes of its essentially literate social subjectivity. Further, the 
opposition between oral and literate, which structured this discourse in its beginnings, is 
rearranged. There are oral elements, but all of social reality is corrupted by the presence 
of the written text: prayer book passages were readout to Hungarian peasants, the names 
of newspapers were shouted in the streets: “Preachers, street-sellers, workplace and 
fireside readers engaged the illiterate in the world f print” (95).  
The undecidability of literacy’s boundaries depends on where one sees its primary 
manifestation: in social discourse and the characte of a society, in a text symptomatic of 
such a mind, in the extent of educational institutions, or indeed in the negation of literacy. 
The search for literacy in oral discourse is completely reversible. This excision of the oral 
is inverted in the hunt for the vestiges of orality within a written text. If the oral is 
everywhere possessed of an original or distinct form f perception, this can only be 
demonstrated in an exemplary hybrid text, a proper transcription. Or, if a text cannot be 
found to meet the criteria defined by Parry’s and Lord’s successors, then the certainty that 
this transition took place allows one to find other v stiges of orality, in a way that restores 
the distinction between the two ways of relating to the word. Thus, when Illich and 
Sanders fail to locate a true transcription of oral composition, an analogue of Parry’s 
Homeric hybrid, at the end of the European Dark Ages, they rearrange and reread the 
Book of Kells according to their existing hypothesis about a transition from oral to 
literate society: 
The book talks as if literacy had not yet settled in. It talks through the style of 
its meandering threads. They challenge the reader to weave the one story of 
Christ’s life out of four tales, thereby fleshing out the “Word of God,” the 
Gospel Truth. Seen in this way, the Book of Kells is a kind of “Homeric 
page” in which, at an early date in England, oral storytelling has been for a 
moment visibly frozen in the cadence of knot and lik that punctuates the 
series of letters – just as the strum of the lyre punctuates the utterance of the 
singer. (Illich and Sanders 30) 
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If we accept the Great Divide hypothesis, we inevitably write about oral life 
within literate categories; if we accept an indefinite variety of oral/literate combinations, 
of different modes of literacy, we risk misinterpreting these with a contemporary, class-
based or universalising model. Each strategic reordering of the boundaries of difference 
imposes a silence which will nevertheless be broken. Thus, with Illich and Sanders, both 
language and words, which are made possible with the alphabet, are inapplicable to oral 
experience, and therefore there can be no real history of the time before writing: 
The historian misreads history when he assumes that “language” can be 
spoken in that word-less world. In the oral beyond, there is no “content” 
distinct from the winged word that always rushes by before it has been fully 
grasped, no “subject matter” that can be conceived of, entrusted to teachers, 
and acquired by pupils (hence no “education,” “learning,” and “school”). 
(Illich and Sanders 7)  
[The] immense yet evanescent power [of the songs of preliterate poets] eludes 
description, and those who uttered them were unable, for all their oral skill, to 
see their own speech as a string on which words were th  beads. (Illich and 
Sanders 7) 
It is this very silence, the violence of the misrepresentation, which establishes the 
unrepresentable other as either the mute, black background against which a knowledge of 
the effects of alphabetisation begins, or calls for representation as another form, 
peremptorily excluded by a machine of power and presumption. Indeed, the threat of a 
violent incorporation takes both epochal and intercultural forms in the same book: 
As the two of us wrote this book, the literary we constantly silenced us, a 
deafening silence that makes it impossible for the reader to know anything 
about the writer. Using this contemporary we, the speaker engages in 
semantic violence, incorporating groups, whose way of formulating the we is 
heterogeneous to that of the observer, and thus driving them into silence. 
(Illich and Sanders 127) 
At the level of discourse, literacy is a fundamental reinscription of history, society 
and knowledge, either as the great necessity for an eve t, concept or experience, or as the 
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parasitic level which silently shaped their character. But this set of propositions is also 
ordered as a set of fundamental alternatives. That is, one speaks either for the deep 
wellspring of thought or for the epiphenomenon which may, at times, achieve a measure 
of prominence. The delicate line of division between these alternatives in historical 
studies is carefully charted not only with relations of opposition, tabulation, critique and 
exclusion, but also with strategies of reinscription and changes in emphasis.  
The reinscription of history through literacy is insistent and exacting, often 
prescribing the causalities to which historical features of societies should be tied. Indeed, 
sometimes the difference between the account of a liter cy sceptic, claiming the 
fundamental cognitive structures do not change withliteracy, and a literacy proselyte, 
claiming that literacy is indispensable to anything to do with texts in the West, is almost 
unnoticeable. This rewriting is, however, crucial to the maintenance of literacy as a 
discursive entity; it is in the regular distribution f such oppositions that literacy is 
sustained as an object. A particularly clear case is David Olson’s review of Elizabeth 
Eisenstein’s The Printing Press as an Agent of Historical Change, in which he attempts 
to reinstate a cognitive model of literacy as the basis of the Protestant Revolution, 
rejecting Eisenstein’s more materialist interpretation. He quotes her as writing that 
“Intellectual and spiritual life were profoundly transformed by the multiplication of new 
tools for duplicating books in fifteenth century Europe. The communications shift altered 
the way Western Christians viewed their sacred book and the natural world” (Eisenstein, 
Printing Press 704, qtd. in Olson, “Modern Science” 150). This may sound like an 
endorsement of literacy as a rewriting of cognition by the book, but Olson takes issue 
with it, since it does not accord literacy the deep organising role it must have, in his view. 
The problem is not that Eisenstein advocates “a multivariable explanation even while 
stressing the significance of a single innovation” (Eisenstein, Printing Press 702, qtd. in 
Olson, “Modern Science” 151). She has failed, rather, to see literacy in the depth that 
explains history as meaning: 
Admittedly, Eisenstein provides abundant evidence that printing (and writing) 
did serve different purposes in religion and science, yet a second look reveals 
a deeper relation between them than she allows. (Olon, “Modern Science” 
151)  
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That we may assent to his recasting, the appropriate reorientation of perspective 
must be written in, which allows us to see literacy just below the surface and tied to 
everything: 
To see this we must distinguish skill in the medium of writing, that is literacy, 
from the technology of printing. Printing may indee have been used in quite 
different ways by science and religion as Eisenstei suggests. Yet writing as a 
medium of communication and the required competence with that medium – 
literacy – played much the same fundamental role in the Protestant 
Reformation as it did in the rise of modern science. (151)  
Hence, Eisenstein’s contention that the printing press was better suited to the 
service of science than that of the Church (and therefore was important in their 
separation) is reordered, with literacy in the centr  and in the depths, guaranteeing 
an underlying homology between the critical distance established by the printed 
text and that involved in scientific scrutiny: 
In both cases [literacy] permitted the clear differentiation of the “given” from 
the “interpreted.” Literacy generally, and printing i  particular, fixed the 
written record as the given against which interpretations could be compared. 
Writing created a fixed, original, objective “text;” printing put that into 
millions of hands. (151) 
Such rewriting is possible because of the system of strategic ambiguities in the 
discourse, where it is possible to define literacy s social and individual, as the text 
generating change and the society dictating the uses and forms of texts. Lying at the basis 
of this set of ambiguities is a circularity, tying the changing causal status of literacy to 
changes in its definition. The strategic rewriting goes further than this; it imposes a need, 
an imperative, to distribute and reconfigure literacy throughout the historical 
reconstruction of the social. One must create the need, within the text, for a better popular 
and scholarly culture concerning literacy, create a desire to purge the concept of 
binarisms, multiply the forms of literacy, expose th fallacies, uncover and reform the 
abuses. One should lay down a complex circuitry for the endless renewal of the concept, 
its currency, its urgency. Thus:  
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In most urban and suburban communities, most children will pick up the 
printed code anyway, school or no school . . . . Itis likely that teaching 
destroys more genuine literacy than it produces. But it is hard to know if most 
people think that reading and writing have any value anyway, either in 
themselves or for their use, except that they are indispensable in how we go 
about things. Contrast the common respect for mathematics, which are taken 
to be about something and are powerful, productive, magical; yet there is no 
panic if people are mathematically illiterate. (Paul Goodman, Compulsory 
Miseducation qtd. in Graff, Literacy Myth 1) 
This circuitry depends, however, upon the selection of data as evidence of 
literacy, demonstrating certain arguments about its na ure. A set of historical data, for 
instance, which comes from marriage registers and military tests, as well as educational 
examinations, is subjected to scrutiny: did signing o e’s name imply the ability to write, 
or just to sign? Were there social relations which prohibited signing, even when the 
ability existed? Does the language of the Prussian and Austrian scales of literacy 
correspond even approximately with developmental stages? At first, these measures are 
admitted, then rejected, then readmitted with greater caution, since they cannot be done 
without, but cannot be assimilated with certainty. A communication is maintained 
between the level of data and that of interpretation, and meanwhile the data widen, to 
include working-class biographies, anecdotes, court transcripts, non-literate “reading” 
methods (the slave who reads to the illiterate master, the mass that is read to the 
congregation, the radio script read to a mutually anonymous audience), non-western 
writing systems, and writing below the familiar thresholds of phonological and 
ideographic representations (quipu, pictographic stelae, psychic writing). Literacy, 
destroyed at its mythic level from the outset, renews itself and multiplies the sites in 
which it appears. 
A discursive circuitry like this is not, however, the complete circuit, for the 
discourse of literacy demands also that recordings be made, that populations be 
assembled and measured, distributed according to age, sex, ethnicity and disability. This 
whole disciplinary apparatus is not directly derived from a desire to serve the knowledge 
of literacy (or even of the learning process); likewise, the discourse of literacy does not 
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always serve these techniques of display, measurement and division. Nonetheless, the 
physical arrangement and measurement of performing bodies is the physical and political 
fact that lies behind the knowledge of literacy we have today, and the discourse of 
literacy makes sense of this arrangement of bodies. 
All cultures differ in their employment of literacy and orality (Street, Gee, 
Lankshear, Green) or, mutatis mutandis, literate and oral cultures are essentially different 
(Havelock, Ong, Illich and Sanders). The discourse produces two different historical 
divisions, on the axis either of culture or of literacy. Both divisions suggest that the 
identity of a culture is related in some essential w y with the unity of its literacy 
practices. Sometimes, an established social group or subgroup is the basis for the 
discovery of a specific literacy (the middle class, working-class girls). In other instances 
even the most individual utterance can be assimilated to a major literacy practice. The 
hybrid text resurfaces in a new space, where the truth of children before they are captured 
and reshaped by the powers commanding literacy shine  through. 
At the historical level, literacy can be assigned as neither cause nor effect. Prior to 
this, however, it requires a commitment to a particular definition, or rather to a relation 
between literacy and social processes, cognitive structures and textual practices in order 
to see one or the other literacy at work, or in order to see literacy as a relevant factor at 
all. It is literacy, moreover, that confers a new status on the text as a historical artefact, 
not in its material appearance, nor as a message addr ssed to someone, but as a 
succession of abstract historical models of arrangements of signs and organising 
structures in a graphical space. Moreover, the text, in its form and frequency or in the fact 
of its having been written by someone, is evidence either of the il/literate character of a 
society (and the structure of meanings and distribution of cultural goods within it) or the 
condensed image of a social mind. The Curriculum Framework utilises these discursive 
powers of literacy to mark all social practices as relevant, to mark surfaces as 
manifestations of depth and development, and to mediate expert knowledges and popular 
expectations. In unifying the system of dispersals, the available theoretical and political 
options, curriculum policy is also the site par excellence of this discourse. 
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Insofar as the history of literacy operates as a system of regularities, it is circular 
and undecidable. The hypotheses about the role of literacy are consequences of preceding 
definitions of literacy, which are themselves given in the rules for the formation of 
statements, in the objects one should refer to (not o ly literacy but the text and society), 
in the way one may speak of them (whether one distinguishes an underlying depth or a 
multiplicity of correlations), in the branching of alternatives (the Great Divide leads one 
to the unfolding of literacy in the Western mind; cautious demographics permits a history 
of local conditions and a specificity of struggles which nonetheless constitute a 
communal meaning), and in the distribution of concepts (the circular codetermination of 
mind and text or the fight for kinds of texts). However, these are not two distinct 
discourses; they are two possible branchings of a single distribution of alternatives. Even 
if a struggle occurs between them (falsifying the claims of the Great Divide or rewriting 
the sequence of social usage as the epiphenomenal development of the single underlying 
history), or if a reconciliation is attempted (where the Great Divide is written as aleatory 
and subject to uses and ideologies, but is nonetheless the history of “our” literate selves), 
these options occur within the one system of dispersal, within a set of strategic positions 




The discourse of literacy is a historically constituted circulation between social 
practices and the forms of knowledge that take these practices as their object and in fact 
require them as the conditions of knowledge. It is important to examine the 
epistemological circularities operating around notions of writing, language, text and 
knowledge that inform the discourse and project a complex of knowledges upon literacy 
while denying their historical constitution. By tying language and literacy to notions of a 
fundamental truth of humanity and the world, the discourse of literacy creates an 
imperative to study the various manifestations of textuality and at the same time to banish 
its object to a vanishing-point beyond the reach of analysis. Hence, a second group of 
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circularities in the discourse, those relating to its epistemological organisation, need to be 
described and analysed. 
If the Curriculum Framework suggests that subjects are constituted in textuality, 
it draws upon a fundamental feature of literacy discourse, which locates subjectivity 
within the marks left by the text and, conversely, marks the subject, humanity and 
consciousness as a form of textuality, a visible mark in a system of meaning. The 
discourse recurrently presents the text as the model of our humanity, encircling us in a 
native power that can best be seen in the uncorrupted narrative of oral peoples, as in 
James Paul Gee’s example of a tale told by a small black girl, “L.” Having recounted L’s 
“show and tell” story about the freedom of her puppy, the brutal authority of her father, 
and her attempt to understand, and having identified ts array of devices, he muses: 
Why is there so much similarity between oral poetry and narrative in oral 
cultures . . . myths, and certain types of “high literature,” and what some 
black children and adults can do when telling a story? The answer, it seems to 
me, is that it is in these cases that we see the fullest, richest, and least 
“marked” expression of our human biological capacity for language, 
narrative, and sense making generally. (Gee, “Narrativis tion” 92-3)5 
The text is seen in the very absence of written langu ge because, in distributing 
the text into the social, the discourse transmutes th  text and language, projecting their 
                                                 
5 The identification of oral narrative style with examples of “high literature” tends, then, to gesture at an 
elusive essential linguistic mode, at the deep biological seat of language. Here Gee aligns the oral 
performance of L with literary modernists and modernisms from “Pound and the Imagists” to “Frank and 
Spatialisation,” returning to an essential identity with a deep spring of language that unites these to “ arly 
Hebrew poetry, Greek epic, American Indian narratives, or African poems and stories.” He uses this motif 
elsewhere, for example, “Meanings,” where it recurs, almost word for word, in his discussion of another 
text: 
The language of this text is recognisably part of an African-American cultural tradition that 
has now been fairly well studied . . . . The child uses language in a poetic, rather than a 
prosaic way; she tries to “involve the audience, rather than just to inform” them (Nichols 
1989). She uses a good deal of semantic and syntactic p rallelism, repetition, and sound 
devices (phonological sequences, intonation, and rate changes) to set up rhythmic and poetic 
patterning within and across her stanzas, just as do Biblical poetry (e.g., in the Psalms), the 
narratives of many oral cultures (e.g., Homer), andmuch “free verse”(e.g., the poetry of Walt 
Whitman). (280-81) 
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operations onto the body and onto the world. This operation can be seen in Derrida’s 
interrogation of notions of writing, in which he deconstructs the claim that the alphabet 
constitutes the key to Western history. His work is often invoked in the discourse as an 
authority on the meaning of writing.6 In Of Grammatology, he describes the paradoxical 
quality of any Western history of writing: 
What Saussure saw without seeing, knew without being able to take into 
account . . . is that a certain model of writing was necessarily but 
provisionally imposed . . . as instrument and technique of representation of a 
system of language. And that this movement, unique n style, was so 
profound that it permitted the thinking, within language, of concepts like 
those of the sign, technique, representation, languge. The system of language 
associated with phonetic-alphabetic writing is that within which logocentric 
metaphysics . . . has been produced. This logocentrism, this epoch of the full 
speech, has always placed in parenthesis, suspended, and suppressed for 
essential reasons, all free reflection on the origin and status of writing, all 
science of writing which was not technology and the history of a technique, 
itself leaning upon a mythology and a metaphor of a natural writing. It is this 
logocentrism which, limiting the internal system of language in general by a 
bad abstraction, prevents Saussure and the majority of his successors from 
determining . . . that which is called “the integral and concrete object of 
linguistics.” (Derrida 43) 
Can one write a science of writing when writing is both the condition and the limit 
of that science? Writing itself is the presuppositin of all scientific knowledge. Thus, all 
science is at one and the same time both enabled and sile ced (at least as concerns its 
conditions of possibility) by writing. For Derrida, the notion that writing is a system for 
the representation of spoken language is both the foundation of the science of language 
and a false delimitation of language on the basis of a “bad abstraction.” He questions 
Saussure’s characterisation of the linguistic sign as arbitrary, which hinges on the 
                                                 
6 See Ong, and Mignolo (317-21). 
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opposition between nature and institution. Derrida argues that this is a false opposition, 
since the material relations of writing are shared by all systems of signification: 
If “writing” signifies inscription and especially the durable institution of a 
sign (and that is the only irreducible kernel of the concept of writing), writing 
in general covers the entire field of linguistic signs. (Derrida 44) 
Since difference, and not the supposedly natural bond between sound and thought, 
is the source of meaning, all systems of signification, including “the world,” are 
analogous to writing. The science of linguistics, in short, derives its claims to scientificity 
from a bad metaphysical fiction, but this fiction (of presence, representation) is the 
pudenda origo7 of Western science and metaphysics, the presumptive exclusion which 
has no basis in logic but which nevertheless serves as the basis of logic. Thus ends 
logocentrism, and a general practice of writing, a eneral condition of textuality, invades 
the space that was always there but hidden for the exigencies of logocentric thought. 
Writing, in the sense of meaningful differences, is the model for all signs, and the vulgar 
concept of writing as an orthographic system of sound-representation, particularly as it 
relates to “phonetic-alphabetic writing,” is a deadly error, keeping us from the play of the 
world.  
For Derrida, there is no difficulty if a knowledge of the alphabet is the necessary 
precondition for both the misrecognition of writing as a separate and derivative form of 
language and for the recognition that the world is, in its play of difference, primarily a 
form of writing. This is because, for him, writing is both logically and ontologically prior 
to any system of inscription. The histories of a great mind constituted through literacy, of 
a mind made in the image it beholds, moving from ear to eye, seeing its thought, 
arranging and analysing it as both outer and inner text, are histories of a logocentric 
colonisation. Writing, in the sense of differences manifested in the trace, is what is 
repressed in the logocentric search for certainty ad sharp, absolute divisions.  
Thus, when Derrida invokes “writing before the alphabet,” he is not being 
ethnocentric. It is understandable that Mignolo (271) misreads this as an ignorance of 
                                                 
7 “Shameful origin.” I take this terms loosely from Nietzsche, particularly The Will to Power, where it is 
characterised as a first step in the critique of accepted (and especially moral) concepts and evaluations.  
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other, non-alphabetic, non-book writing systems. Derrida situates the notion of writing, 
however, as prior to systems, as something that is both “instituted” or “arbitrary” and, at 
the same time, “natural.” For a Foucaultian analysis, Derrida’s analysis may be 
interrogated in its historicity: this rewriting of the world as text is a historical practice 
with a discursive determination and derives from histor cally constituted entities (text, 
language, writing). Writing became the condition for knowledge of the world, that is, 
under certain historical conditions. 
Apart from these general conditions, literacy is also continually and visibly 
constructed, systematically as a concept within scientif c and formalised disciplines, 
therapeutic and pedagogical practices, and unsystematically (but with precise functions) 
within policy planning, parental concern and popular culture. Since literacy is dependent 
upon these for its definition and uses, should these be the criteria for determining the 
particular level of reality it inhabits? Does literacy have a substance apart from a social 
definition? Is a minimal definition at all tenable when the actual social practices of 
literacy have only writing in common, and when even the notion of writing is a 
troublesome one (cf. Ginsburg, “Morelli” 88-89)?8 In fact the discourse of literacy relies 
on the assumption of a set of problematic concepts, in particular of language as system 
and representation, and as the unity that is being r alised in all instances of literacy.  
Participating in the epistemological circularities of the discourse of literacy, 
policy literature inherits its circularities and definitional problems. By situating 
subjectivity within textuality, the Curriculum Framework is compromised by the 
problems inherent in the way knowledge of literacy is dependent upon, and restricted by, 
the situated material manifestations of language. In assessing the language of a person, in 
distributing performance across a developmental graph of abilities and knowledges, does 
the measurement of literacy measure the language only as it inhabits the body at the price 
of eliminating its function? Is the condition for the pedagogical and psychological 
                                                 
8 Ginsburg proposes a continuum from the tacking narrative of hunting societies (“something passed here 
two days ago”) through Mesopotamian divination and the image of “the book of the world” to medical 
semiotics. Because the mental operations in each are similar (with differences such as the level of 
abstraction in signs, and whether they point to future, past or both), Ginsburg suggests a genealogica 
descent of the interpretation of natural signs thatcomes close to destroying the possibility of a clear 
analytical distinction between written character and physical trace, and thus between the writing of the 
world and the writing of the book. 
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measurement of literacy the silencing of language? Is it not then fundamentally a 
mismeasurement? If literacy functions differentially according to purpose and setting, 
does literacy testing not assume a set of conditions, a set of expectations, that measure 
only one type of literacy, namely, that brought out, shaped and constructed for the 
purposes of testing? Is the space of visibility in which an object called literacy emerges, 
then, both the only means by which we can know literacy and, at the same time, a 
guarantee that this same literacy does not operate lsewhere? Does the isolation of 
literacy as a cognitive entity within testing distort the complex object from which it is 
abstracting an essence? The discourse’s vacillation between a social and an individual 
entity is deployed in the peculiar ventriloquy engaged in by the Curriculum Framework, 
in its consistent claims to represent an objective economic situation that demands certain 
forms of literacy, a social demand that rewards certain literacies and, at the same time, a 
personal set of needs that are supplied by the literacy provided. 
Literacy is, insofar as it can be attested, a serie of performances which assume 
certain unities and properties. A psychological test or a pedagogical examination restricts 
the tested individual in the materials s/he would use to discern meaning. The set of 
relations which aid or impede effective understandings is narrowed to a triangulation: the 
subject is given a text and a question, and mediates between text and question to produce 
an answer. The text is assumed to bear the right answer, even though a number of ruses 
and external disturbances are acknowledged – teachers will instruct their students on the 
correct procedure for navigating a test; questions will be deliberately misleading, coding 
the question rather than the text as authority; test results may be minimised as a measure 
of true literacy in favour of judgments about ethnicity, gender and class. Nonetheless, 
these relations produce an ideal entity that relies for its existence on a testing regime, and 
cannot exist anywhere else in this form. Despite this, it remains an indispensable notion 
in our understanding of the life of language in the individual, and a fundamental measure 
of her/his potential value. Literacy is fundamental to this discourse: regardless of how 
many correlations it sheds (economic, cognitive, political or personal) or how much it 
eludes characterisation, literacy is after all the organising term. 
Is the problem here that intimations of language (and the knowledge-ability 
nexus) in the individual are destined to remain intima ions because there is an 
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impermeable barrier between surface manifestation and inner reality, or is it that language 
does not operate, even in literacy testing, on the basis, and within the site, of the 
individual? It appears that knowledge of literacy is actuated by a desire, not to see the 
effects of language and its course, but to see the career of language insofar as it concerns 
the individual in the presence of a known text. Theconcern about language is a concern 
about the replication of a capacity to use a text in approved ways (though not necessarily 
to replicate its approved meaning) and to situate the truth of the individual in his/her 
relation to the text. 
This is even more the case when orality is constantly brought back into a positive 
relation with the text. Whereas for Ong, Havelock, Olson, Goody and Watt, Eisenstein 
and others, literacy derives cultural and cognitive significance from the experience of 
language as a separable text, anthropologists like Carol Fleischer Feldman and J. Peter 
Denny emphasise that the “fixing and interpreting of texts” are features “present in 
nonliterate hunter-gatherer and agricultural groups” (Denny 86). In Fleischer Feldman’s 
view Western culture does not have “oral systems of text and interpretation,” not because 
they are impossible but because they “have been handed over to writing” (Fleischer 
Feldman 62). Her evidence, and therefore evidence that li eracy was not the key to 
Western consciousness, is the anthropological literature on “highly patterned and artful 
oral forms found, usually, in cultures that have no important (or any) written literature” 
(47). The text is reinstated in the silence from which it emerged as the positive condition 
of the Western mind, and the discourse produces the abstract image and drama of the 
human being confronted with and growing in the presence of the text. The history of 
literacy, in this view, is the history of the different relations in the human-text dyad. But 
the text, which separates language and thought from the utterance of the speaker and the 
time of utterance, does not become the new key to consciousness, nor does it dissolve the 
insistence of literacy as the object of the discourse. Rather, the relationship between 
subject and text becomes a universal condition, and literacy becomes a universal 
substance.9 
                                                 
9 At certain points in this thesis, the “substance” is nominated as “language.” This “language” is that 
constituted by, or invoked in, the discourse of literacy. Although literacy is more often conceptualised as a 
relation, and thus may be thought of as the “form” to the “substance” of language, it is impossible to make 
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The textualisation of the world structures the reciprocal relations of causality 
between language as social demand and as individual performance. Literacy is, thus, 
formed as an object of knowledge in its relationship to language dysfunction and in the 
correlative interactions between the language-making subject and her/his environment. I  
Western cultures, literacy emerges in a relation to language abnormalities and 
normalising institutions, within which the proper performance of language, and language 
itself as a normative complex, are defined. For Alexander Bannatyne, knowledge of 
language function and dysfunction are co-determinant elements in the study of literacy: 
the absence of a function in certain disorders allows ne to see the real components of 
language, which emerge as absences: 
The major problems for the genetic dyslexic are (a) auditory fluency and 
sequencing, (b) auditory vowel discrimination and closure, (c) associating 
auditory symbols to sequences of visual symbols and (d) sound blending or 
vocal-motor sequencing. (Learning Disabilities 25) 
Language dysfunction, according to Bannatyne, also points to the familial and 
social preconditions of linguistic competence: hence, primary emotional communicative 
dyslexia is caused by the absence of a good mother (marked as the presence of 
disinterested, depressed or angry mothers), or by other anomalous early situations 
(institutionalisation, twins, living in a foreign land) (17-19; 27); in the case of “social, 
cultural or educational deprivation dyslexia,”  
the published evidence indicates that several superim osed causes may be 
operating, namely, a language barrier between child and teacher, a subcultural 
value system which undervalues education and a lack of personal motivation 
in the father in the form of job ambition. (Bannatyne, 26) 
The dispersal of language dysfunction into the brain and body,10 into personal and 
emotional aetiology, into social institutions demanding or rejecting literacy, is necessary 
                                                                                                                                       
such a strict distinction. This is because both terms are strategically redeployable, and because they 
alternate between surface and depth. 
10 Dronkers  provides a short history of language-brain studies and their conceptual dogmatisms; see also 
Hissock. 
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if one is to relate language disorders to their causes, and establish an essential and 
hierarchical classification.  
A dyslexic subculture, a dyslexic social class, or a dyslexic organism, all become 
visible in terms of the institutions whose functioning they interrupt. The study of literacy, 
then, situates the subject within a set of institutions – the family, the school, the 
psychiatric institutions, business – and therefore inevitably involves, as therapy, the 
restitution of their smooth functioning, either as better versions of themselves or as the 
production of an individual better suited to them. The literate subject is thus not only one 
to be known, but also one to be made: the function of the knowledge of literacy is to 
enforce literacy and to eradicate its other. As a consequence, this knowledge also seeks to 
eradicate the classes, cultures and institutions that produce this other at a social level. If 
language is the being that speaks us, then literacy, the smooth functioning of language, is 
the being that we form, enforce and regulate from that speech.  
At the physical level, this psycholinguistic typology disperses the opposition 
between literacy and illiteracy, but at the social level it multiplies it. It identifies the 
essential order behind the surface order of symptoms. Bannatyne assumes, if not an 
allegiance with the social order, at least a principle of economy: the quickest way to 
return the system to optimal functioning is to remedy the proximate cause. There is a 
distribution of the dyslexic subject here within the social circuit of language-production, 
tracing the distributed function of speech. In addition, there is the silent and 
polymorphous writing around the dyslexic: not only is s/he reduced to a symptomatology, 
but also to statistical analysis, to a regimen of testing and recording her/his language, 
inscribing it upon a personal and family history, and enrolling the social field in the 
remedy. Needless to say, the psychologist is the subject of this enunciation, is the 
authority who draws the social field; but the social field must first appear at the other side 
of the description, testing and diagnosis.11  
Literacy discourse has been characterised, famously, a  one side blaming the 
victim and the other side blaming the system (Gee, “Narrativisation” 273). But between 
them these sides constitute the field they claim to describe. Literacy discourse involves a 
                                                 
11 Earlier studies follow this general pattern; see Gray and Schonell as examples. 
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fabrication, a thin tissue of recording and communication, a surface of mutual inscription 
between the literate subject and the world. In a radically relativist construction, the 
writing is different wherever one goes, whatever one uses it for, but it is always 
codetermined by a social context. Social context and individual purpose are thus brought 
together to become two sides of the same plane. Hence, as in the example of Gee and 
“L,” the literacy researcher imports a new social code for appraising (but in fact rewrites 
as stanzas) the performing subject’s work and derives not only a new text but also a 
universal human subject of language. This removes “L” to the world of literary appraisal 
(or, more exactly, literary appraisal within a book on literacy studies), and out of a 
classroom where the same performance was deficient. This means, however, that the 
discourse of literacy can never have an “unmarked” r lation to the speaking subject, but 
is destined, within this arrangement of elements, to ee the world as an act of constant 
inscription. This is not, however, because the subject of this constant inscription is not an 
object of this discourse – s/he is both subject and object, and under the same conditions. 
Inscription is both the limit and the origin of knowledge in literacy discourse. It is 
the origin because it is only by drawing a surface of inscription between the subject and 
her/his socius that we derive their reciprocal “meaning” in history, in school. It is the 
limit because a transcendental subject is written into literacy, whether as the social 
totality (nineteenth-century Europe, for example) or as the mind of a civilisation; it is the 
totality of which any individual performance is an instance. In recognisably analogous 
terms, Foucault describes the general function of “signification” and “system” in the 
“human sciences”: 
The role of the concept of signification is, in fact, to show how something 
like a language . . . can in general be given to representation; the role of the 
complementary concept of system is to show how signification is never 
primary and contemporaneous with itself, but always secondary and as it 
were derived in relation to a system that precedes it, constitutes its positive 
origin, and posits itself . . . in fragments and outlines through signification; in 
relation to the consciousness of a signification, the system is indeed always 
unconscious since it was there before signification, si ce it is within it that 
signification resides and on the basis of it that it becomes effective . . . . In 
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other words, the signification/system pair is what ensures both the 
representability of language (as text or structure analysed by philology and 
linguistics) and the near but withdrawn presence of the origin (as it is 
manifested as man’s mode of being by means of the analytic of finitude). 
(Order 361-62) 
This analytic of finitude, this circularity and bringing back of representation to the 
conscious subject, occurs because the human sciences, though deriving their concepts 
from biology (function, norm, development), economics (labour, need) and linguistics 
(sign, system, meaning) found their knowledge of “man” upon a notion of representation 
as both object and condition of knowledge: 
representation is not simply an object for the human sciences; it is, as we have 
just seen, the very field upon which the human sciences occur, and to the 
fullest extent; it is the general pedestal of that form of knowledge, the basis 
that makes it possible. (Order 363) 
Two consequences follow from this: the human sciences tend to extend representation 
everywhere (in this case, everything is a text), and “they find themselves treating as their 
object what is in fact their condition of possibility,” thus constantly unveiling themselves:  
It is always by an unveiling that they are able, as a consequence, to become 
sufficiently generalised or refined to conceive of individual phenomena. On 
the horizon of any human science, there is the project of bringing man’s 
consciousness to its real conditions, of restoring it to the contents and forms 
that brought it into being, and elude us within it. (Order 364)  
In literacy discourse the level of analysis is consta tly raised to a 
transcendental one, to a meta-language (cf. Gee, “Narrativisation”) or to an account 
of the way “our civilisation” thinks, or to an exhaustive table of causes. Derrida’s 
contention thus has the aspect of a historical arrangement rather than an ontological 
priority, and shares with literacy theory the epistemic circularity of this analytic for 
archaeological, not for logical, reasons. The Curriculum Framework is heir to this 
circular and necessary inconsistency in the definitio s of language and text. In the 
extraordinary regulation of the relation between self, t xt and world, it performs an 
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The Curriculum Framework is also haunted by literacy’s ineluctable connection 
to power and distribution, presenting it with unresolvable conflicts between liberatory 
and prescriptive literacies, and between the extension of social power through literacy 
and the hierarchising of literacies as the basis for restricting social goods. Some form of 
exclusion is necessary to the operations involved in literacy: a definition and delimitation 
of language (not only of what the proper language may be, but also what language itself 
may consist in), and a separation of people according to levels of literacy and the 
literacies of their language communities and places of work. Several points about the 
discursive connection of literacy to power and the political need to be made at the outset, 
before dealing with instances invoking this connection. 
First, there is a connection, ineradicable and necessary, between literacy made and 
literacy made known. It seems that the knowledge of literacy arises from an attempt to 
make or to induce the performances recognised, codified and problematised as literate. 
Knowledge concerning literacy and its induced and reco ded performance are two 
distinguishable but inextricable moments, two aspects of the same process.  
Second, this co-implication of recording and imposing, of knowing and inducing 
the appearance of the object, means that a political field is generated, a field concerned 
with the technical achievement of literacy, with a constant redefinition of literacy as a set 
of goals and conceptualisations (inclusion, exclusion and general formulation), with an 
evaluation of techniques, and with the formulation of criteria of evaluation. Moreover, the 
co-implication produces the general political problem of a form of knowledge that always 
ineluctably affects implementation, policy and everyday practice. Simultaneously, 
literacy study is involved in determining or questioning what is good (and bad) in literacy 
and orality; what is practicable and possible (and impractical and impossible); and what 
the object of literacy study is.  
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Third, there is a set of restricted relations that characterise the productive relations 
of literacy (as knowledge and power, as the extraction, recording and planning of 
performance), and a set of exclusions, eradications and restrictions. It is important to note 
that these do not exist in a dimension of power separate from that of knowledge: the 
operations of power directly inform the knowledge constructed, and the knowledge 
gathered directly invests the power operations, in their extraction and constitution of 
performance. 
Fourth, the very terms in which literacy is discussed cannot be freed from the 
suspicion that they are reifications of contemporary fo ms of control. It is not simply that 
the knowledge of literacy reifies a dispossession or distracts from a real dispossession;12 
literacy discourse is constituted within a dimensio which is directly political, which 
directly involves dispossessions and empowerments through language.  
This means that one cannot escape the political by shifting the scale and distance, 
by concentrating upon a single field, such as the historical or the cognitive and 
mechanical. Indeed, one may distinguish between the political effects of the different 
disciplinary emphases, noting the authority each derives and the field of practice encoded 
into it. A historical argument may claim that a numerical progress has occurred,13 or that 
the definition and uses of literacy have altered, and that consequently policy should be 
concentrated upon numbers, or upon the engineering and definition of effective literacies 
within the present context of use. Again, a psycholinguistic developmental sequence will 
be instrumentalised in the construction of an optimal literacy experience and the design of 
a mapping system and the training of teachers in recording the progress of their pupils. In 
each case, a political use is already codified and has already a set of consequences.  
While this positioning of literacy discourse in a relation of articulation with 
pedagogical technologies and policies implies a respon ibility concerning definitions, 
programs and evaluation, this political immanence is itself a part of the discourse, a part 
of its problematisation of itself and of its effects. This is not a privileged moment of self-
consciousness; it occurs in a set of well-known patterns, as a reflection upon the social 
                                                 
12 The argument that literacy reifies a dispossession based on class and race is made most forcefully by 
Stuckey. 
13 See, for instance, Vincent, Mass Literacy; Cipolla; and Stone. 
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and individual effects of literacy discourse and teaching (determining whose languages 
are excluded, what kind of society is constructed or privileged) and as a reflection upon 
the demands of the world (specifying what needs to be done in response to the challenges 
and demands of new technology and economic organisation, new cultural forms and 
norms). When regarded as a set of social and individual effects, the implementation and 
epistemisation of literacy is active and constitutive; when thought in relation to the world, 
the operations of literacy are reactive and compensatory. Literacy is both a choice of 
necessarily arising political effects and a necessary choice of response to political and 
economic demands.14 
This co-implication does not constitute the impossibility of literacy in politics, but 
it does mean that the discourse is characterised by a certain circularity. Whatever naive 
discourse was involved in the study of perceptual and cognitive processes in reading has 
long since abandoned the promise of learning what is involved in reading per se, but is 
interested in retaining the auxiliary role it always had in technicising the constitution of a 
population instructed under the gaze of the state. Th  problem of the political presents a 
division, or bifurcation, of political alternatives, not because some prefer a monocultural 
and others a multicultural society, but rather because the acquisition of literacy involves a 
contest over the definition of this concept and a controversy over the proper and most 
efficient relation between non-standard and standard literacies. The problem, then, is not 
the exclusion of certain minorities, but the inclusion of the entire population, whether or 
not their cultures treasure literacy, or their minds are capable of developing it. The whole 
political problem, written as one of exclusion, is precisely the opposite: it consists in the 
explicit aim to subject everyone, without exception, to a rule of language connecting and 
distinguishing margin and periphery. What is at stake in the discourse is the delineation 
of specific relationships between a population which is “made” through literacy, and a 
world that demands and defines this making. 
This political project of constituting a single subjected population must account 
for and respond to the requirements of hegemony, of the acceptance of the governed to be 
subjected in this way. Consequently, a range of political options runs from the 
                                                 
14 In this connection, see Lu and Taylor as exemplary c ses. Taylor takes the transcendentalist view that 
power will always be an intractable problem.  
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representation of the governed insofar as they concern the provision of language, to the 
demands of the world insofar as they can be a problem of instruction. Below the practices 
and projects of the state, with its objects (the population and the individual as writing and 
written beings) and its alibis and actual practices (the world’s demands, the literacy needs 
of different groups, the working of subtle and explicit exclusions) there operates a 
process of inscribing difference and power as languge, as writing, as the image of a 
linguistic reality that hovers just beyond the appearance of things and can be reconstituted 
only by a constant effort of inducing its performance. These relations determine the 
operations of literacy in the Curriculum Framework, and are characteristic of the 
discourse. 
There is a persistent set of themes even in the early twentieth century, in which 
reading became, for the first time, the one essential road towards emancipation. Mortimer 
Adler, later to become associate editor for the Encyclopedia Britannica’s Great Books of 
the Western World series, in 1940 wrote How to Read a Book. It includes a critique of 
how American schools are failing democracy, and anticipates many of the points made by 
contemporary researchers. As for the reign of newspapers and advertisements, indifferent 
schooling prepares us for a life of gullibility: 
Slighting the three R's in the beginning, and neglecting the liberal arts almost 
entirely at the end, our present education is essentially illiberal. It 
indoctrinates rather than disciplines and educates. Our students are 
indoctrinated with all sorts of local prejudices and predigested pap. They have 
been fattened and made flabby for the demogogues to prey upon. Their 
resistance to specious authority, which is nothing but pressure of opinion, has 
been lowered. They will even swallow the insidious propaganda in the 
headlines of some local newspapers. (Adler, How to Read a Book 75) 
The secret to an active, critical and democratic mode f life is the art of docility: 
To be docile is to be teachable. To be teachable one must have the art of 
being taught and must practice it actively. The more active one is in learning 
from a teacher . . . and the more art one uses to master what he has to teach, 
the more docile one is. Docility, in short, is the pr cise opposite of passivity 
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and gullibility. Those who lack docility—the students who fall asleep during 
a class—are the most likely to be indoctrinated. Lacking the art of being 
taught, whether that be skill in listening or in reading, they do not know how 
to be active in receiving what is communicated to them. Hence, they either 
receive nothing at all or what they receive they absor  uncritically. (Adler, 
How to Read a Book 75) 
For Adler, the problem of reading was tied to the disintegration of civilisation. 
The Great Books were not being read, or were read without being understood. They had 
lost what he supposed to be their proper historical ole in stimulating an ongoing “Great 
Conversation” between ages and members of Western civilisation.15 The substance of 
freedom was already a relation to the text, in this ca e the corpus of the Great Books, 
which would transform the individual reader into a proselyte for a better, more critical 
way of life, and in turn transform her/his friendships, and thus, ultimately, the character 
of society. The Great Books were conceived as the indispensable higher knowledge that 
casts a searching light of reason upon other texts, and other, more ephemeral forms of 
reasoning and action.  
Adler defines the concern for reading as both the prerequisite for subjectivation 
and the condition of freedom early and precisely. While his discussion owes much to the 
Culture and Anarchy tradition, there is also a novelty in his work in that the quality of 
reading, as a technical and cognitive exercise, becom s directly related not only to the 
understanding of the text but to the quality and viabil ty of society as a population to be 
disciplined. This is completely unlike Matthew Arnold’s “sweetness and light,” since 
Arnold is explicitly not concerned with “civilisation” or institutional politics, whereas 
Adler, an active controversialist in economics and political theory, is directly concerned 
with the effectiveness of political rule, with the p rsuasiveness of true and “great” 
thought over the art of the “demagogue” and the advertiser, two figures that dominated 
the plans and the fears of this period in both capitalist and communist countries. The 
distinction in the forms of rule was, for Adler and many others, between a totalitarian 
                                                 
15 See Hutchins’ introduction to Great Books of the Modern World for the full argument. 
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country with a literate but uncritical style of reading, and “democratic” countries with a 
critical and actively participating constituency.  
For Walter Mignolo, the definitions of literacy, relying very much, from the 
fifteenth century, upon the presuppositions of the culture of the book, mark cultures using 
other sign systems as deficient, both in terms of their access to truth and their ability to 
represent and extend thought apart and away from the forms imposed by speech. Thus the 
quipu16 were not only misunderstood, but served as an othering device within the practice 
of colonial conquest.17 The mute, the idiot, the illiterate and the society without books, are 
established as the negation of, and hidden basis for, our experience of knowledge. 
Acutely aware as Mignolo is of all the powers of English in the postcolonial 
system of difference and identity, of power and speech, he recognises that language is at 
the same time the road to recognition as it is the unlocked door that keeps the excluded 
out of the sanctuary of culture. Thus, he relates his decision to write his study of 
Renaissance definitions of the book and language, and their connection to early 
colonisation, in English, because in that language the book has a greater chance of being 
heard. Two important things occur: the book is the vehicle for the recognition of excluded 
textual forms, and English is the language in representing the racial exclusions of the 
Spanish Conquest. The question of writing in a dead Indian language, or even in a 
surviving dialect, is not even a possible one, since the market does not exist. Inevitably, 
the material effect is a reflection of the discursive arrangement of elements: a fading 
language is rendered in a strong one; the non-book is rendered within the pages of a 
book; and the book itself takes the form imposed by a market that is acknowledged as 
political and exclusionary.  
This positioning of resistance within a form of power, an inverted image of the 
Curriculum Framework’s extension of power to subjugated groups, is not the result of a 
poor navigation in the currents of power, but rather of an exemplary one. Quite properly, 
if one is sensitive to the prestigious forms through which power is exercised, divided and 
reproduced, the result is a book that writes power into itself as its problematic but 
                                                 
16 The thread and cord recording devices made and deciphered by Quipucamayocs in the Inca Empire and 
in the early period of the Spanish conquest of Peru. 
17 See Mignolo (69-122). 
 151 
necessary form. It is perfectly consonant with the idea and aim of recovering a silence 
and a silenced subject, for this is precisely what t e discourse claims to do and at the 
same time finds itself, or its correlative practice, failing to do. Literacy discourse 
proposes the positive mission of recognition and authenticity, with the effect of laying 
down the criteria and the experience of linguistic ex lusion. It makes such an exclusion 
thinkable and palpable. It trains the gaze to discern the ineffaceable result of a state-
supervised production of language. The standard justification for making the workings of 
power visible is that it makes power harder to exercis . And yet such a political 
epistemology has nothing to back it but a conviction, perhaps an imaginary store of 
dramatic images, memories and scenes of discovery. The material effect is to attach a 
respectable opposition to power to the greater effici ncy of the power it opposes.  
Knowledges concerning literacy do not occur in a vacuum, nor in relation to an 
object which exists independently of the power-knowledge in which it is inserted. The act 
of constituting literacy within a knowledge is always attended by power-effects, by the 
enabling of some subjectivities and practices, some forms of control and conduct, to the 
exclusion of others. Literacy, as a constant social reinvention and indispensable 
productive mechanism, is particularly sensitive to the statements defining it: it constantly 
changes according to the political imperatives imposed upon it, the substance assigned to 
it, the body described as bearing it, and the authority f the discipline in which it is 
inserted.  
Literacy embodies, thus, certain relations of domination: literacy as a class marker 
(Cressy); as a device of exclusion and division (Stuckey); as an index of productive 
capacity relative to population (Vincent); as part of bio-power (Marshall); as 
indoctrination in middle-class norms (Gee, Williams, Luke and Freebody); as the basis of 
hegemony (Graff). Finally, literacy functions to explain, and to correspond with, the 
schooling regime and its attendant legitimating scien es. These relationships between 
literacy and power engender problems which remain circular as long as the relationships 
hold. Is it a liberating strategy to expand the number and range of permitted and 
recognised literacies, or to close down the schooled society? How does literacy relate to 
the way we use and experience power? If literacy establi hes, or operates upon, a 
mechanism of power through the governance of “knowledge-ability” through the life-
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cycle, can one possibly escape this power? If expanding knowledge and effectivity is the 
basis for our agency in a pedagogical society as well as the site at which power seizes, 
produces and enables the individual, is it possible to think beyond it, without reverting to 
a romantic muteness, or a mad speech, or a speech byond competence and the work of 
representation? 
Literacy is constituted as a substance by means of which power may be exercised. 
It unites a regime of control and manipulation with a regime of observation. It does not 
coincide with the recognised divisions of class: at the same time as it makes class visible 
(or audible), it slides away from class to divide th population in different ways. There 
are two simultaneous relations between literacy and power: on the one hand, because its 
uses are defined by structures of power and authority, it s a contested term which, by 
virtue of its fingency and effectivity, may be an important point of articulation between 
ideologies and practices. On the other hand, literacy is also the result of an a priori 
delimitation, the artefact of an immemorial division n which our experience, and our 
political imagination, depend. Literacy, while a tool f contestation, is also a horizon of 
modern political subjectivity. 
If linguistic performance in literacy tests is subject to a pervasive coercion, 
enticement, or normalisation of obedience, then does not the docility of the population, in 
being tested, signal a circuit of truth and power, a way of measuring and controlling? The 
very existence of the concept of literacy marks the c aracter of a form of domination and 
normalisation. And yet, is not literacy itself the k y to liberation, the way towards a better 
understanding of domination today, and a means of ecaping, resisting, and liberating? In 
short, is not the means for liberation the same as the ubstance and witness of oppression? 
And is it not the sign of a form of therapeutic internment, like that of mental patients, 
with which society claims the right to protect itself from the irresponsible youth until s/he 
becomes capable, of easing not only the economic burden s/he presents, but also the 
moral and political dangers s/he presents?18 In short, literacy presents us with the bad 
                                                 
18 See American Youth Policy Forum, which relates that e authors  
presented evidence, from their research and by others, that America's schools are failing to 
help students attain . . . critical skills. As a result, many public policy interventions have been 
either ineffective or failed to directly address the problems young people face in attaining 
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conscience of our form of freedom, the exclusions which allow us, the sane, the healthy, 
the mature, to minimise the disturbance threatened by the insane, the sick, and the 
irresponsible, to our way of life. 
At the level of the politics of pedagogy, a certain transcription occurs, where 
the recognition of local literacies reinforces a central and universalising one. This 
can occur in subtle and circuitous ways, but the same relations resurface, as the 
effects of a social organisation of knowledge and of the state’s inscription of the 
demands of the world. The literacy researcher finds him/herself engaged in the 
inscription of power, in the enforcing of definitions. Thus, in the National Literacy 
Survey, the validity of local practices must echo te ruth of the central authority: 
The Management Committee has written an introduction to the Report which 
documents its role [in] developing and implementing the Survey assessment 
methodology. This assessment methodology was unique in th  way it linked 
the richness and validity of classroom assessment prac ices into the 
framework of a reliable national data collection process. While the focus on 
teacher judgment meant that this methodology was more c stly than 
assessment processes dependent on external marking, the methodology 
proved to be a very effective tool in obtaining assessment data across a wide 
range of achievement that was reliable and valid. Additional strengths of this 
assessment model included professional development benefits for teachers 
and the enhancement of teacher professionalism throug  the emphasis on 
teacher judgment. (Forster and Masters iii) 
There is a distinction in this passage between data th t are valid and those that are 
reliable, corresponding to a distinction between the local, intractable but observational 
and empirical data of a teacher, secure in its context, and the decontextualised, abstracted 
and essentialised, but tractable and centralised, data of standardised testing. Professional 
development does not merely bridge the gap between teacher assessment and external 
testing; rather, it is the subordination of “valid” teacher assessment to “reliable” external 
                                                                                                                                       
labour market success. This, in turn, has led to an education system which often wastes its 
scarce resources. 
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tests. At the same time that the teacher is being introduced into the collection of these 
data, she/he is being erased and omitted, converted into a redundant double, a validation 
whose difference is simultaneously cancelled out in a univocalising move that is meant to 
reinforce validity.19  
As far as contemporary literacy studies are concerned, political threats are posed 
within words, within images, within the ceaseless discourse of everyday life. This occurs 
on two fronts: the media-saturated arena of consumption, where everything becomes 
commodified, where rhetorics of cool and authenticity entice youth into needless 
consumption and unthinking attitudes; and in the information-rich arena of production, 
where the structure of work-relationships, the ethics of the corporation, the forms of 
domination, are rendered natural within an ongoing, ever-changing use of language.20 The 
illiterate have three obstacles here, situated on three entirely different planes: the 
functional, which secures at least the right to work, the right to subjection; the critical, 
which allows one to question and modify that subjection; and the powerful, which allows 
one to participate in government, law, science, and other prestigious genres. This follows 
from the recognition that the form of contemporary power is constituted within language.  
Literacy discourse was traversed from its beginning by a question that relates the 
study of literacy to the making of a person, a society, and a mind, a question that asks not 
only what “we” are (as opposed to “them”) but also how we may be remade, either in 
defence of essential cultural forms, or in the interests of constructing a better version. The 
question assumes the involvement of a state, a society, and the authorised and subaltern 
forces which in reality form a social character. In all its far-flung meta-historical 
speculations, in its mapping of cultural recombinations and neuropsychological correlates 
to literate processing, the question which remains t every level of this discourse is not 
far from educational planning. It is precisely stated by this literature: how may schooling 
best “help ensure students achieve the outcomes?” (Curriculum Framework 11). This 
question organises the entire discursive field. All literacy workers want to make children 
literate according to their own preferences, commitents and so on. The knowledge 
                                                 
19 See Keeves and Masters. 
20 For examples, see Lo Bianco and Freebody (Chapter 1) and Curriculum Framework (inside cover and 
passim). 
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generated is rarely against literacy per se, and even in such cases it is still in the interests 
of forming a better person through a good education. 
The question makes it clear that, whatever one’s hopes for literacy, the power to 
define it is available principally to the state, the (inter)nation, the educational policy-
makers. One is thus always in a relation to governmntal definitions of literacy, and 
always making (scholarly authority permitting) an attempt to influence policy. This is 
exemplified in debates between official survey bodies and literacy theorists. In a response 
to the published findings of the first International Adult Literacy Survey in 1995, Harvey 
J. Graff launches into a thoroughgoing critique of the presumptuous and mythic 
definitions of literacy to be found in the document: 
The research cited and the great revision in thinking about literacy challenge, 
qualify and contradict the science and certainty of Literacy, Economy and 
Society from the assumptions of its first paragraph to its last. Ironically, or 
perhaps not, the results of IALS needlessly circumscribe themselves as they 
reveal, to borrow my own phrase, the persisting power and costs of the 
literacy myth. (Graff, “Power and Costs” 3) 
The IALS report closely follows the definitions of functional literacy, it 
perpetuates a deficit model, ignores recent research both into literacy and work pattern 
(the “New Work Order”), and rewrites new, progressive terms into old, reactionary ones: 
The terminology for describing the complexity of literacy practices likewise 
suggests a reductionist view in which what “really” counts is skills and levels 
rather than the broader and more complex uses and meanings of literacy 
indicated by such terms as “practices.” While the term “literacy practices” is 
frequently employed, there is equally often a slide towards more narrow 
functionally defined evaluative terms; skills, activities, levels, tasks, and 
abilities are used as though they all meant the same as, and were a gloss on, 
“literacy practices.” Under the heading of “literacy practices at work,” for 
instance, a gloss is provided that immediately reduc s practices to the test 
situation: “most adults must face some literacy tasks at work;” and again 
under “literacy practices in the community” we are told “everyone, whether 
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employed or not, can engage in literacy activities.” (Graff, “Power and Costs” 
7)  
In other words, state institutions have the power to absorb and reinscribe the 
meanings of research, to deploy progressive or theoretically nuanced research in the 
pursuit of long-standing institutional and ideological goals. In criticising the IALS study, 
Graff also makes visible the inevitable relationship between the literacy researcher and 
official implementation and instrumentalities. Brian Street supplements Graff’s criticism 
with similar findings and a number of close analyses of the survey questions. He 
concludes: 
There is a power relation, then, between the research rs and their 
respondents, on the one hand, and between this partcul  style of research 
and other research traditions, on the other. The res arch team indeed have 
immense power as the very debate now going on about their findings 
indicates. . . . That they do not draw attention to this power but instead write 
as though their findings are the neutral product of objective scientific inquiry 
is itself a classic procedure of institutional power. (Street, “Literacy, 
Economy and Society” 11) 
Stan Jones, the author of the data analysis on the chapters, replies with a defence 
of the non-ethnocentricity of the survey questions, and describes Graff’s and Street’s 
work as that of a modish but useless new school of research: 
Graff and Street represent a view of literacy and a view of learning and social 
science research in general, that has had a brief prominence, but has failed to 
deliver insights which are helpful and which move policy forward. (Jones, 
“Ending the Myth” 14) 
Jones cites the accuracy of the IALS data, their superiority over other 
questionnaires and surveys when correlated with other data, and the accuracy of his 
information on the job market. Moreover, the fact that literacy does not correlate with 
employment opportunities or socioeconomic status does not prevent it from having some 
effect (21). His decisive argument comes, however, when he states that it is not he (or the 
survey team) who define literacy, but society: 
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Street and Graff are sure to claim that we have thus privileged this one kind 
of literacy. But it is not the IALS researchers who have privileged it, it is 
society. While we might determine test scores, we don't determine 
employment, income, social participation or any of the other characteristics 
we found associated with IALS literacy. It is not fr the IALS research team 
to determine whether it is fair that this one kind of literacy is so valued by 
society. It would have been negligent of us, however, having discovered these 
connections not to have reported them. (Jones, “Ending the Myth” 20) 
The social world inscribes the subject once again, and this time the researcher provides a 
recording and an amplification of that inscription, raising it to the status of an 
international benchmark for success; defining the form that success ought to take. Does 
the understanding of literacy as the result of power, as the sign of a hierarchical social 
structure inscribing its own uses into the subject, free the subject, or is this merely the 
ghost of the promise that Adler brought into the discourse, the promise of subjects freer 
and more discerning, more self-making, than the form f society would allow? Is it, 
moreover, the consequence of the discourse having made a contract with a “democracy” 
it distrusts, with a world that it both seeks to serve and to overturn? 
Within these three areas the literacy discourse engages in peculiar forms of 
circularity that distinguish it as a discourse. First, it accounts for the historical existence 
of literacy within an undecidable polarity, where lit racy is either the source of social 
thought or where the organisation of uses by the social determines the form of literacy. 
Second, it situates the analytical problem of literacy in such a way that literacy is both the 
basis of the discourse about it and the object, thus creating a circular analytic of finitude 
characteristic of Foucault’s “human sciences.” Third, t involves a relationship to politics 
which is both completely tied to serving society by changing the world to serve people, 
and insistent on changing people to serve the world, depending on the shifting boundaries 
between student and world.  
To paraphrase Foucault, the discourse of literacy cnnot speak of literacy 
precisely because literacy is the condition of possibility of the discourse. That is, the 
practices that form its object are invisible to it f necessity, are beyond the space bound 
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and organised by its statements, its fundamental orientation, its array of speaking 
positions, concepts, and possible arguments. And yet these relations that form an outside 
are always presupposed, entered into, activated and acte  upon, in the discourse. It is thus 
necessary to go beyond this discursive analysis in order to more fully account for the 
ways in which literacy effects its role in the pedagogisation of social space, to determine 
how it articulates the elements of a dispositif, and how it secures the insistent and 










4: A Passage to Power 
This chapter outlines the work of Foucault that extends the archaeological treatment 
of discourse into an analysis of space and power-knowledge, and explains the place of 
discourse within a concrete social apparatus, or dispositif, a complex of heterogeneous 
social practices that forms a historical unity, constituting the historical substance of 
literacy through an interrelation between forms of ayability, spaces of visibility, lines of 
power and curves of subjectivity. To do this it is necessary to show how, in Foucault’s 
work, the concepts of discourse and power-knowledge are interrelated and necessitate 
each other. Foucault’s integration of discourse and power-knowledge within the dispositif 
allows this thesis to chart the discourse of literacy both as discourse and as an effecting of 
power relations, not merely of the relations the discourse claims to analyse, but of those 
relations within larger cultural experiences of subjection. This mode of analysis goes 
some way toward characterising literacy as a discursive entity, moving away from the 
discourse’s use of it as definiendum, removing the distance that confers upon it an 
ontological guarantee.  
The deployment of Foucaultian analytical terms and procedures does not 
necessarily yield a satisfying explanation of the pedagogical extension of textualised and 
disciplined subjection in policy documents like theCurriculum Framework. The second 
part of the chapter discusses the work of theorists of pedagogy and literacy who use 
Foucault, and charts the differences between them and this thesis. Beyond the mere 
encoding of power the Curriculum Framework connects literacy to a whole array of 
powers and to a configuration of procedures and spaces. Foucaultian theorists of literacy 
and education both miss and enable such an articulation in various ways: in their de-
specification of Foucaultian concepts, their appeals to national and transcendental 
subjects, and their axiological distortions.1 The discussion of their work is therefore both 
a review of their contribution and a critical analysis of their power-effects within the 
literacy dispositif. 
 
                                                 
1 Keith Hoskin (“Examination”) goes to the length of claiming Foucault as a “crypto-educationalist.” 
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The Dispositif: Foucault, Power-knowledge and Space 
Studying the discourse without a space of correlation and a power-knowledge 
nexus produces a number of ramified oppositions and ultimate circularities, and is 
therefore not sufficient for understanding the discourse of literacy. Thus, to invoke 
cultural context as the explanation of different definitions and uses of literacy, or to 
multiply literacies in an indefinite taxonomy of practices is to reaffirm these circularities. 
Context explains certain co-constitutive relations contributing to certain literacies, but it 
does not explain the space that makes literacy visible (or the space that is adjusted to 
enable its recognition), nor does it explain the complex array of interventions, concerns 
and assessment techniques that come into play.  
Turning away from the circularities in the discourse, it is clear that the 
concatenation of propositions about what literacy is and is not operates in a field of power 
relations: these propositions are focused not on a problem of definition but on the issue of 
pedagogical techniques and educational policy. On the one hand, there is a variety of 
official and lobbying bodies arguing the benefits for literacy education, literacy standards 
and literacy-based skills, and on the other there are theorists defending a moderate view 
of literacy’s social benefits, a recognition that there are no good standards to go back to, 
and that current standardised testing has questionable social value.2 It is from here, from 
what is essentially a political debate, that literacy derives its status as an object of 
extreme scrutiny, continual research and public controversy. Literacy is established not as 
a guarantee of social progress but as a pivotal term in the definition of the political 
community, in assumptions and fears about social reproduction and survival, where 
language, power and identity coincide.  
The Curriculum Framework draws upon a historical development of educational 
discourse, wherein literacy has become a term indispen able in the exercise of 
educational power. In it, language becomes the single unifying term in educational 
discourse, the object and the instrument of education. It is through language that children 
                                                 
2 Graff (LiteracyMyth) and Street (“Introduction”) argue for a broadly Marxist understanding of context, 
and Stuckey goes to the extreme of defining literacy as a reification and obfuscation of class inequality; 
Curtis (Educational State, “True Government”) argues that nineteenth-century Canada is an example of a 
modern “educational state” forming disciplined and productive citizens through education and inspection. 
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learn, and all subject areas, all disciplinary fields, are but differently organised ways of 
using language. The definition of literacy, then, is a direct intervention in the definition of 
knowledge, and an indirect attempt at defining the power-knowledge nexus of a society. 
With centralised, national education policy, this is a debate about how to (re)shape the 
nation-state.  
The puzzle posed by the Foucaultian analysis of the Curriculum Framework is not 
what, if anything, literacy is, but why it has very recently become a substance, and such 
an important one. This substance is not only something which is made up of some kind of 
matter, and which exhibits certain properties in all the forms in which it manifests itself; 
it is also a historical discovery and invention, something to be seen, measured, and acted 
upon. It operates as the object of a knowledge, as the ground for normative interventions, 
and as a site of self-reflection. In addition to the problem of what it does there is a 
question posed by its affirmation, by the asserted fact that it is and must be investigated. 
The discourse opens out onto, invites, reproduces and incorporates a space and an array 
of powers that offer, modify, and instrumentalise this substance. To treat literacy as an 
historically produced substance means, then, to recnstruct a mechanism for its 
production, to look at the formation of institutions, objects and processes that combine to 
secure literacy as an object of scrutiny, manipulation and concern. Understanding the 
operation of this substance in power-knowledge takes th  analysis beyond the recognition 
of the discourse’s undecidability and beyond the ext rnalisations of power such as the 
appeal to context, and enables a conception of literacy as a modality of the imposition 
and spread of power-relations. 
To outline a picture of this power, it is important to note the way in which literacy 
is divided, put into use and established in the discourse. Literacy is distributed between 
two sets of scales, two sets of instrumentalities and objects of visibility: the social and the 
individual. On the one hand, it is that which will lift millions out of unemployment, 
render national economies vital and competitive, reduc  crime, contribute to democracy, 
redistribute social goods and so on. On the other hand, it is the substance that animates 
the linguistic performance of children, which can be seen by applying a certain vigilance, 
eliciting performances, and checking them against a diagram of normal developmental 
stages. Between these two poles is the nucleus of the ontological guarantee: it is not so 
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much what is seen, nor is it necessarily what is there in the observed subject, that forms 
the basis of the discourse. What is important is an invisible act of affirmation, that 
literacy be agreed, by all concerned (except possibly a few reluctant subjects) to be there. 
As an object appearing in a space of visibility and substance of power-knowledge, 
literacy is a set of experiences, knowledges and operations dependent on the pedagogical 
organisation of space that connects with its dispersal in discourse in a productive way. 
Literacy is the indispensable assumption in the pedagogical disciplining of language. 
The relationship between the often unspoken affirmation of literacy that operates 
within the discourse and a structured space that makes literacy visible threatens to defy 
analysis. An insuperable dichotomy presents itself, ince the said and the seen, the known 
and the done, each have their own separate modes of being. What makes the isolation of 
students and the training of performance into a recognisable manifestation of literacy is 
by no means the result of a simple connection. Since much of Foucault’s work addresses 
this problem, it is important to discuss that work in some detail. Of particular importance 
is the crucial role played by concepts of space, power-knowledge and dispositif.  
Foucault provides a way of posing a problem and arranging an argument that 
escapes such dichotomies, stepping back to examine the historical conditions under 
which knowledge and its objects are constructed, always relating knowledge to a 
reorganisation of space and the practice of power. This is exemplified in Mental Illness 
and Psychology. In this short book, Foucault executes a strategic reversal in epistemology 
typical of his work. He organises what he takes to be the central elements and problems 
of psychological discourse, then elaborates the fundamental lines of a deep epistemic 
problem (“can psychology really know madness?”). After answering this in the negative 
through a discussion of how knowledge is constructed in the case at hand, he proposes a 
different way of understanding both madness and psychology. The notion of mental 
illness we now have was made to appear through a silencing and confinement, an 
historical event quite peculiar to Western societies, and this has affected the forces that 
constitute madness, and the experience of madness its lf. Psychology cannot speak of 
madness because madness is the condition for the possibility of psychology. Those 
neutral presuppositions, the division of body and mind, the use of discourse as a 
symptomatology, the dual tracing of an evolutionary development and a personal history, 
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are made possible by a history that locks madness up, and finds its truth in what is 
isolated and set apart from the world, a mind that both hides and reveals itself.  
Like madness, literacy appears to its investigators as omething that has always 
been present, at least for the past five thousand years, since human beings began to 
inscribe characters onto materials, or, alternatively, the past three thousand years, that is, 
since the Greeks won for themselves a “truly phonetic” system of transcription, an 
alphabet. This invention is presented by a number of scholars3 as a world-historical event 
that changed the entire horizon of human possibility. The alphabet made possible the 
inspection of past thoughts, their accurate reproduction, critical assessment and revision. 
It shifted the experience of language from the ephemeral medium of sounds which passed 
from the mouth to the ear to a relatively permanent r cording of utterances onto the visual 
plane, passing from the page to the eye. Thus, language, and thought along with it, passes 
from an essentially temporal experience to one that tends to be localised in space.4 The 
old formulaic speech of epic poetry, where thoughts are amalgamated and connected in a 
narrative, becomes the philosophical treatise, organised into topics, divided according to 
analytical elements. That is why, they contend, the discipline of rhetoric loses its gestural 
components and certain characteristic verbal components such as redundancy, to become 
the essay and the dissertation.5 Finally, it seems, this historical career is qualitatively 
changed by the printing press, which democratises th  word and opens it towards an 
empirical criticism of its representational status: the printed word announces the 
possibility of the empirical sciences.6 Literacy is written into history as the hitherto 
undiscovered but real substance of an epochal transformation, rather than as the recently 
invented object that animates a new discourse. 
In order to account for a discourse’s formation without recourse to an autonomous 
and pre-existing object, Foucault frequently, across all his works, deals with the role of 
historical spaces in the construction of discourses. Foucault’s work is dominated by the 
notion of spaces, by the variety of spaces in history, whether they present figures of 
                                                 
3 It is promoted by Havelock and Ong in particular. 
4 See Goody (Savage Mind, Traditional Societies), Ong (Orality and Literacy); Illich and Sanders (ABC). 
5 David Hamilton (Theory of Schooling; “Fordism”) is a proponent of this view; Ong (Ramus) is an early 
source. 
6 See Ong (Orality and Literacy), Olson (World on Paper) and Eisenstein (Printing Press). 
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enclosure and confinement, tables of resemblance and difference, sites of reflection, 
inversion and representation, or places of subdivision and discipline. To explain the 
advent of the modern experience of madness, for example, Foucault finds it necessary to 
isolate a total reordering of space in the “Great Confinement.” To explain the emergence 
of clinical medicine in The Birth of the Clinic, likewise he demarcates the novelty of the 
regulated observation of ordered bodies made possible by teaching hospital. In deriving 
the historical convergence leading to disciplinary society, he points out the construction 
of a classificatory space: 
The organisation of a serial space was one of the great technical mutations of 
elementary education. It made it possible to supersede the traditional system 
(a pupil working for a few minutes with the master, while the rest of the 
heterogeneous group remained idle and unattended). By assigning individual 
places it made possible the supervision of each individual and the 
simultaneous work of all. It organised a new economy f the time of 
apprenticeship. It made the educational space function like a learning 
machine, but also as a machine for supervising, hierarchising, rewarding. 
(Discipline 147) 
In Foucault’s work space unifies words and things, seeing and saying. Historical 
spaces integrate and explain relationships between knowledge and power, and historical 
uses and knowledges inform the creation of spaces. Indeed, the preface to The Birth of the 
Clinic proclaims that “this book is about space, about langu ge, and about death; it is 
about the act of seeing, the gaze” (Clinic ix).  
As Chapter Two points out, Foucault’s notion of discourse is always situated at the 
edges, opening discourse to particular spaces, to forms of power and larger social 
processes: it is a matter of relations, investigating their form, strength and selectivity, 
their historical range of possibilities. A discourse i  a complex arrangement that arises 
from a set of interlocking elements which cannot be reduced to linguistic elements. 
However, analysis at this level discloses only a dispersal of statements and a set of 
fundamental dependencies, an established circuit of affirmation and the branching 
complications within it. Discourse analysis explains how the notion of literacy operates 
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within the discourse, but does not explain the discourse’s relation to processes and 
practices that cut across it, invest it with power, and establish the spaces with which it 
operates. For such an understanding the proper unit of analysis is the dispositif, the total 
social apparatus, which is a set of relations, practices, spaces, instruments and procedures 
that allow particular things to be said and done, ad that ensure the saying and doing of 
particular things.7 This is not to be confused with the broad social context mentioned 
earlier. A dispositif is a lean, parsimonious attempt to explain elements of existence that 
are consciously done, that are techniques even whenthey pass into automatism. Thus, 
even those elements which do not cohere and threaten the structure must in some way be 
dealt with. As Deleuze notes, the dispositif is an analytic tool explicitly designed for 
Foucault’s project of integrating heterogeneous levels, a tool built by an “archivist” rather 
than an anthropologist (Deleuze, Foucault 70-85).8 Analysing literacy as a component 
produced by a total social apparatus extends and incorporates the discursive analysis, and 
permits a more systematic understanding of its historical mode of existence. 
The interrelation of power-knowledge, discourse, space and subjectivity in 
Foucault’s work, then, is best explained and schematised as a dispositif, or “concrete 
social apparatus” (Deleuze, “Dispositif” 159). The dispositif is a tangle of heterogeneous 
lines. These lines follow directions and trace balances. Foucault has traced four kinds of 
lines in his studies: lines of visibility and articulability (together forming knowledge), 
power and subjectivity. However, the dispositif has many dimensions, and the four types 
of lines discerned by Deleuze in Foucault’s work are “by no means contours given once 
and for all, but a series of variables which supplant one another “ (“Dispositif” 159): 
These apparatuses, then, are composed of the following elements: lines of 
visibility and enunciation, lines of force, lines of subjectification, lines of 
splitting, breakage, fracture, all of which criss-cross and mingle together, 
                                                 
7 Deleuze’s account of the dispositif is used here because it carefully charts its utility in constructing a 
theory of the historical articulation of heterogeneous elements, thus moving away from the 
“archaeological” emphasis on discourse.  
8 Admittedly, Deleuze’s interpretation is in dispute. O’Farrell argues that the dispositif is equivalent to the 
“historical a priori” of Order and the later notion of “regimes of truth” (Michel 66). While I concede that 
“dispositif” designates in some sense “the same levl” as the “historical a priori,” (O’Farrell, Michel 66), its 
deployment within an analytic of power-knowledge results in the more articulatory notion presented here.  
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some lines reproducing or giving rise to others, by means of variation or even 
changes in the way they are grouped. (“Dispositif” 162) 
What, then, might be the elements of a dispositif of literacy? Cutting across the 
conventional distinctions established by the discourse, it is possible to propose a different 
list of historically constituted spaces, persons and practices. These are: the student, the 
school, the text and the teacher. For each of these el ments, there is a complex and quite 
contingent history, relying on small changes in practice, in unforeseen rearrangements 
and convulsions, in timid suggestions, and in the occasional migrations of knowledge and 
practice. At a certain point, a confluence productive of “literacy” occurred. Literacy 
studies owe their persistence to this accidental merging of elements into a machine that 
produces, if not the concept of literacy, then the conditions for its emergence. While the 
present study dates the emergence of these elements in a recognisable modern form as 
occurring in the nineteenth century, their confluence and arrangement in the production 
of literacy as concept, material entity, historical process and visible symptomatology is a 
far more recent development. 
The student: literacy involves a number of necessary prior constructs, without 
which a compulsion to speak about it would have been untenable or absurd. First, it 
requires a population whose existence has become a problem, and whose ability to read 
and write is examined as part of that problem. Shortly after Bentham published the 
Panopticon letters, wherein he decisively connected observation with reform, convict 
transport ships were carrying doctors to teach transportees the reading and writing of 
morally improving works, particularly the Bible and the Book of Common Prayer. 
Sunday Schools were begun with the dual purpose of k eping a troublesome population 
(in this case of poor children) away from public space, and imparting moral virtues that 
their parents would/could not, particularly by instructing them in the reading of the 
Bible.9 A national statistical apparatus measuring the effici ncy of instruction was fully 
                                                 
9 See Reeves (“Literate Society”). This was by no means the case universally, even in the Commonwealth: 
as I point out in Chapter Five, the Sunday-schools in Wales were an indigenous invention whose functio 
was the performing of communal theological disputations. In addition, Biblical morality was problematised 
by the emerging discourse of educational psychology, as it was by the later use of economics in moral 
instruction. 
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underway in Europe by the mid-nineteenth century, measuring the national space in 
districts, and giving literacy historians what would become the basis for their analyses.10 
This situation has obviously not remained static sin e the early nineteenth century, 
and the problematic population itself (or at least the parents and relatives who were for so 
long the teachers’ enemy) as well as the liberal state came to take up and change the 
schools and their work. By the end of this period, working-class and indigent families had 
won the right to secular education by a constant pressure of numbers, and the schools had 
dropped much of their religious instruction, though not all of it, and introduced technical 
and “vocational” studies, along with the “Three Rs” and English grammar. When Great 
Britain finally instituted national compulsory elemntary education in 1872, it had 
already overseen and recorded the operation of schools for decades and developed a 
sophisticated statistical apparatus for measuring the achievements of students. The 
proximate reason for instituting a universal education system was the problem of finding 
a way to manage the poorer groups after a long series of popular risings culminating, in 
Britain, with the massacre at the “Battle of Bossenden Wood” in 1838.11 The problem 
population became a national, indefinitely divisible and analysable one. A recording 
apparatus, especially one by which government measur d its performance, required a 
reliable sign of success or failure. This internal concern for order was supplemented by 
anxieties regarding the power of the population as a productive force. That Germany had 
a greater number of people than Britain, it was argued, meant that the latter’s population 
needed to produce more goods and generate more wealth.12 Education became not only a 
problem of moralisation and population control, buta matter of national survival, strength 
and progress.13  
The problem population of today, that is, the one subject to literacy instruction in 
documents such as the Curriculum Framework, retains many of these imperatives. More 
immediately important, however, are the particular knowledges that constitute the student 
as subject to, and of, literacy schooling. The student is tabulated as a visible surface of 
                                                 
10 See Vincent (Mass Literacy). Hunter (Rethinking) draws attention to the nineteenth-century emergence of 
a new statistical apparatus in education policy. 
11 For a detailed account of these developments, see Vinc nt (Literacy and Popular Culture). On the 
“Battle of Bossenden Wood,” see page 85 of the same. 
12 See Wardle (Schooled Society 173), Connell and Irving (206). 
13 See Curtis (Educational State) and Graff (Legacies). 
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behaviours and artefacts, utterances and assignments. These must be easily recordable, 
and are ideally unambiguous and consonant with a national and standardised language of 
description. The visible surface, however, refers to a deep structure, upon which the 
regime of instruction operates.  
This encoding of surface and depth is cognitive and moral, in part. The student 
acquires understandings, and even a restructuring of the ways of knowing along with 
their accretion. Also, these understandings affect b haviour and disposition. Students 
become available to examination, they organise their act vities and concerns towards it, 
and reproduce it within their own thoughts and routines. What do I know now, and how 
am I to say so when examined? The depth of students is thus divided into knowledge, 
understanding and ability. Ability is a partial reification of performance, a pushing of 
surface behaviour into the depth it is to call forth; ability is the term that authorises the 
power to detain, instruct and assess. This process mu t be lengthy, not only in order to 
produce a fully developed and skilled student, but also to ensure her/his reliability under 
assessment. 
In addition, students are arranged according to a temporal and developmental 
dimension. At first they are unable, and therefore unfit, to enter the world. They are 
deficient in three ways: in relation to themselves, to their community, and to the world of 
work (at least as far as the dimension of literacy is concerned).  What the student needs is 
defined by these deficiencies. As with internment in a penitentiary setting, the discourse 
is greatly concerned with the readiness of inmates to enter the outside world. As students 
develop, their deficiencies are replaced by a quantity of reflection, of engagement with 
their community, and of work skills. While the prison was designed to moralise the 
offender, school was designed to erase the dangers posed by deficiency and to save the 
child from the vicious influence that may come from the environment it is born into. 
Three objects of knowledge are elaborated here: the dev loping human being, the text, 
and a world knowable in the form of demands. 
Insofar as they are conceptualised as children, students engender a special 
problematic quite apart from that posed by other populations. Children, as observable and 
manipulable beings confined to a regular schedule of tasks and to a regime of reward and 
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punishment, become a map of typical development. One ca  enumerate a series of stages 
and design particular regimens, texts and experiences to optimise development. There is a 
dual horizon here: a set of stages and activities typifying/producing them, and a proper, 
organic or natural sequence which sets limits on optimisation. This model, which limits 
the arbitrary imposition of discipline and operates upon a biological thinking being, has 
entered most Western education systems since its introduction by Seguin in 1844.  
The student, as this notion appears in the Curriculum Framework, in other policy 
documents and in the discourse generally, is a diagnostic indicator of national health, at 
least insofar as s/he appears in a mass. It is important not only that students should be 
literate, but also that they be literate to a certain level at a certain stage. Failure to achieve 
the corresponding adequate level means that the school/teacher has failed, or the parents/ 
social milieu, or the larger society. It is via the conceptual structures of optimal 
development and optimal (national) economic productivity that children acquire the right, 
inter alia, to be students. This is not merely a general cultural anxiety, but one that has a 
specific history and coordinates, allowing policy documents to sanction and codify a 
practice of power. 
The school can be: an area of planning (a topic of organised thought), a particular 
body of training and technique, a real individual school, a jurisdiction, or a complex 
designed for instruction. The early schools in Engla d and Australia were frequently 
small, isolated and subject to a quick death if peopl  did not patronise them. Under 
Inspectors and a system of “payment by results,” the schools were often shut down, and 
in Australia were compromised by the need of labourers for seasonal work in farming 
areas, as well as by hostile attitudes among the poor in towns and cities, often making the 
minimal fulfilment of attendance requirements impossible.14 The great task of the schools 
in the three decades after 1872 was to enforce the compulsory attendance law. The school 
from here on assumes the presence and regular reappear nce of students; it is the 
condition of possibility for thinking about students and for acting upon them. It is the 
place in which they appear; it renders them visible. 
                                                 
14 See Austin and Selleck  (67, 118). 
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The school is specially organised. The central functio al unit is the class, which 
usually is located in a separate and specially design d room. This room is designed for 
maximum effectiveness in drawing out the repeated performances of students and for the 
recording of their developing understanding, knowledge and ability. The national school 
being necessarily tied to a national statistical burea , it renders results available for 
national and international comparison. While literacy percentages were initially fairly 
simple affairs (even in the Swiss army, where five or six literacy levels were 
recognised),15 the introduction of a developmental scale and a moving-target 
historical/economic perspective have complicated matters and necessitated tests designed 
and overseen by experts from outside the school.16 
This organised disciplinary space also relates to the rest of the social space, to the 
various ways in which pedagogical knowledge subdivides and orders the population, and 
aggregates and composes groups and nations. The first mass literacy tests were the 
product of another institution of instruction and iternment, the army. The technique 
arose from disciplinary practices and psychometric testing, and probably drew on earlier 
experiences with convicts.17 In any case, national supervisory and testing bodies 
constitute an area affecting the school rather thana separate element of the dispositif. The 
school is related to other sites in complex ways that end towards a flexible 
pedagogisation of social space. The interrelation of pedagogical spaces does not mean 
that school is simply the model to be imposed upon other pedagogical emplacements. 
One can see this in national testing, a consequence of which is the ideal unmarked 
student, whose case is fully explained by correlative factors of age, ethnicity, parents’ 
occupation, residence and so on. The space of schooling emanates into the wider world, 
but it mutates as it does so, engaging in an integra ive coordination rather than in the 
formation of purely analogous spaces.18 
                                                 
15  See Cipolla, 12. 
16 See Forster and Masters. 
17 On instruction of convicts, see Reeves Literate Society 131. 
18 The literature extending literacies to ever more aren s – especially work and leisure – and measuring, 
assessing and typologising them, grows almost daily. Belfiore et al. is a particularly enthusiastic example of 
pedagogising workplace literacies, while Knobel andLankshear is a good example of assembling a 
pedagogy derived from mapping new critical discourses related to the internet. Watson and Johnson take 
this process to the mapping of “multiliteracies” in computer gaming.  
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The school is the site where a series of primary divisions is enacted, dramatised and 
made visible. The school functions as an encircling wall, from which students win the 
right to emerge when they are deemed sufficiently capable to operate in the outside 
world. It is thus a second world, a habitable and navigable simplification, in some cases a 
second world consciously designed for the construction of better social agents, where 
students are enabled to transform the corrupt world outside. What follows from this is a 
public concern about whether students are learning the right skills, appropriate values, 
self-control, strong personal defences, or a proper understanding of aspects of the world 
outside. Such concerns presuppose a school that bears responsibility for every child (or 
for a national child), rather than, say, a family, which bears a limited right to rear its 
children as it sees fit. With regard to literacy instruction, the concern produced by the 
school is that a student comes to understand the true nature of language, and to be able to 
use a set of skills within it. The pedagogical relations of schooling are distributed 
throughout the social field, while its functions of enclosure, representation, assessment 
and discipline generate a proliferating space, a division between self and world, a 
heterotopia relating the individual to the social through langua e and the text. 
The text: within the school the student increases, in a wayopen to observation, 
her/his knowledge of the components of language, understanding of its principles, and 
facility in using it. This requires a regime of testing, a technology of eliciting 
performance, and a carefully selected group of texts. Whatever is being taught, it is the 
function of the text to manifest it. The text is a relatively static artefact upon which one 
practises interpretation. The fluctuation of the student’s interpretations is visible against 
the stable textual background, as a source of accury, as a means of enriching prior 
interpretation, and as a way of examining features lik  structure and context.  
Locating the text within the dispositif of literacy leads to some disturbing 
consequences. Insofar as it is part of the discourse of literacy, the text is above all an 
artefact of schooling. It relies on the isolated unworldly space wherein the student comes 
into contact with the text and has revealed to him/er the contours of its mysterious 
essence, language. That particular set of knowledges which is designated as language is 
also an artefact of schooling. Language is something that, above all, occurs in texts. In a 
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school, even speech is a text. These are functional elements that are necessary to a 
functional assemblage rather than “real” things towards which language can only gesture.  
Naturally, the text of schooling is the site of conerns regarding the ideologies it 
carries, its effects on the reader’s character, and its complex relationship to a society’s 
events, forces and tendencies. These concerns recognise the role of the text within the 
schooling apparatus, and are quite appropriate to it. It is the apparatus itself, as well as its 
elements, which remain beyond question. Both traditional and critical literacy 
perspectives are fixated upon this singular relationship between the text and the student, 
and advocate different truths of language with which to prepare the latter for the outer 
world. At best, the school is a reproduction of fantasies and projections of the useful 
truth, which is no doubt why Foucault condemns it as a place of make-believe.19 The 
student, the text and the world will be the focus for the chapters that follow. 
The teacher: while the status peculiar to teachers cannot be fully discussed in this 
thesis, they form a necessary precondition for much of what is discussed. Teachers are 
both a necessity and a danger in this apparatus. Historically, teachers have played a 
number of roles, such as the authoritarian missionary, quite often also as a foster family 
(it was common for the head teachers to be married and to conceive and conduct their 
roles as parental). Teachers might also be fellow students, as in monitorial schools, or 
apprentices, as in the colonial Australian schools. Today, they are closely regulated as to 
the results they provide, the procedures of instruction, and the norms of affective 
behaviour they observe.20  
The teacher of “English” has for a long time enjoyed a special status within popular 
culture as one particularly important in the transmission of ethical and aesthetic values in 
connection with the teaching of text and language. In many ways, they are responsible for 
the pastoral care of their students, even though that function has been recently 
redistributed.21 Obviously, teachers have to carry out the work of the school in the 
classroom (and the playground, but that is another matter). While they no longer 
explicitly gauge “character,” English teachers recod the understandings of students 
                                                 
19 See Foucault (“Rituals”). 
20 See Masters and Forster (45). 
21 See Hunter (“Personality” xi). 
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concerning language, many of which have an ethical or meta-ethical character – for 
instance, that texts carry their own value-systems, or that tolerance ought to be observed 
(Curriculum Framework 75).  
This outline of the dispositif must be elaborated on, with respect to the provenance 
of Foucault’s notion of power and its relationship to discourse and space. Returning to the 
notion of power and power-knowledge in Foucault, the emergence of these concepts can 
be found in Foucault’s attempt to relate the visible and the sayable without reducing one 
to the other. Further, the notion of discipline offers a wealth of historical detail on the 
development of techniques through which human bodies were rendered knowable, 
mappable and manipulable, thus providing a model analysis of power-knowledge. 
Tracing the development of these Foucaultian concepts permits an elaboration and further 
definition of the literacy dispositif. 
Foucault’s work on the relation between the visible and the sayable is particularly 
important to analysing the literacy discourse, since this is where two central elements of 
literacy discourse – the subject of literacy and the text – emerge. This relationship is an 
especially acute problem in Foucault’s early work, and is crucial to his development of 
the concept of power-knowledge. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, Deleuze writes, 
Foucault was not able to articulate the relations between these two lines, these two 
historical dimensions: 
Between the visible and the articulable we must maintain all the following 
aspects at the same time: the heterogeneity of the two forms; their difference 
in nature . . .; a mutual presupposition between th two; a mutual grappling 
and capture; the well-determined primacy of the one ver the other. (Deleuze, 
Foucault 68) 
None of this dexterous manoeuvering and careful tracing of relations could be 
enough, since there was no reason for the two to enter into any kind of coherent relation, 
and thus there was a need for a way out of this mutual evasion and capture. Foucault 
“needs a third agency to the determinable and determination, the visible and the 
articulable, operating either beyond or this side of the two forms” (Deleuze, Foucault 68). 
This third agency was power, which operates in a fundamentally different way, but in a 
 174 
relation, to knowledge. While knowledge is concerned with substances, and functions 
“divided up segment by segment according to the two great formal conditions of seeing 
and speaking,” power is a “pure function” without ends, which passes through points 
“which on each occasion mark the application of a force” (Deleuze, Foucault 68). Two 
forms of operation, power and knowledge, thus work in conjunction, forming the social 
apparatuses to which we belong and within which we act (Deleuze, Dispositif 164).  
For the complex of power-knowledge involved in literacy, then, there is a 
composite form of power (techniques relating to life, labour, language) and forms of 
knowledge (ways of relating statements to visibilities). There are lines of truth, light, 
enunciation and subjectivity to be traced, but there is also the question of a space of 
visibility, or at least a space of coherence, where the dispositif manifests its objects, 
where they may be recorded and acted upon. The sparfigu e of the reader and the text, 
manifesting a knowledge of Western (or universal) man and of the world, and of the 
individual, replicates the functions of a school space, with its regime of writing and 
speaking, and of learning about the outside while oth rs are learning about the learner. 
The model for this combination of sayability and visib lity, for this functioning of power 
as both linguistic therapy and normalisation, is also the model of a school. That is not to 
say that this form of power-knowledge generalises th  school: its functioning adapts, 
while retaining the minimal figure, to local conditions as the effect of its dispersal. 
In Foucault’s early work, the relations necessary fo  the appearance of objects 
intersect with what would later form the field of power in Discipline and Punish. In the 
Archaeology of Knowledge, the distinction is maintained between concrete power 
relations and relations of knowledge, but there is a surface of attachment, a form of co-
implication, which limits the relations of appearance to the role of offering an outline, a 
historically constituted visibility, in which it may, in a doubling motion that is 
nonetheless heterogeneous, be constituted in the “sayable:”  
These relations are established between institutions, economic and social 
processes, behavioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of 
classification, modes of characterisation; and these r lations are not present in 
the object; it is not they that are deployed when the object is being analysed; 
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they do not indicate the web, the immanent rationality, the ideal nervure that 
reappears totally or in part when one conceives of the object in the truth of its 
concept. They do not define its internal constitution, but what enables it to 
appear, to juxtapose itself with other objects, to si uate itself with relation to 
them, to define its difference, its irreducibility, and even perhaps its 
heterogeneity, in short, to be placed in a field of exteriority. (Archaeology 43) 
What was to become power in Foucault’s later work – the invention, disposition, 
and proliferation of power-relations – is in the Archaeology something that “offers” but 
does not impose. In Discipline and Punish power would intersect with this constitution of 
objects, with the whole field of correlations activated by the statement. The correlative 
field plays a prominent, if problematic, role in the earlier works, buried in the description 
of statements but insistently resurfacing as the figure of a scattered, multiple and 
unsystematised dispersal, a ceaseless activity of power which acts throughout the social 
field, especially upon and through statements themselve . The description of statements 
in their rarity, accumulation and exteriority, in their extrasubjective operations (arraying 
speaking subjects without an author), in their extralinguistic relations (not to things, but 
to fields and regularities) within archaeological analysis, already follows their operation 
across a dimension of power and formulates it in relation to power: 
[statements] are invested in techniques that put them into operation, in 
practices that derive from them, in the social relations that they form, or, 
through those relations, modify. [Moreover, statements when considered as] 
things do not have quite the same mode of existence, the same system of 
relations with their environment, the same schemata of use, the same 
possibilities of transformation once they have been said. (Archaeology 124) 
Foucault attempts to situate the practice of discourse, the description of statements 
as both events (in their conditions of enunciation) a d as things (insofar as they function) 
within two closely allied conceptual loci: the historical a priori and the archive 
(Archaeology 129). Analysing a discourse is a matter of deriving a general horizon of 
description and situating it, in finding out what, bove the mere patterns of statements, he 
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had been describing, what relation it bore to a knowledge of ourselves, and what general 
project it furthered.  
In later work Foucault shifts the ground, but not entir ly, to one’s relationship to 
power, to reinstate both knowledge and the historical subject within the rationalities and 
swarmings, and the historically specific modes of pr liferation, proper to relations of 
power. Power is not massive and oppressive, but strategic, multiple and productive: 
What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that 
it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. 
(Power 120) 
The power enacted under the sign of literacy is also productive as much as 
restrictive. The act of inscription, the knowledge that is produced by the discourse on 
literacy, is both produced by and productive of a power that sustains our interest, our 
belief that the relation to the text, this enclosure of the subject within a membrane that 
both renders her/him readable to the world and allows him/her to read the world, is a 
substance of power. It renders one subject to control, manipulation, measurement, 
therapeutic intervention; but also makes one the subject of one’s own inscriptions, 
interventions, retrogression and progress.  
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault made use of the concept of power-knowledge to 
designate both an “eternal” relation (for no field of knowledge escapes power, just as no 
form of power is without a corresponding organisation of knowledge) and an intimate and 
modern binding of the concrete procedures of power (th  regulation of time and motion, 
disciplinary and reformatory techniques, establishment of control through visibilities). 
Power is not to be located in official pronouncements: rather, it is dispersed within the 
social body. In speaking of “discipline,” Foucault notes that it cannot be thought of as the 
possession of a state apparatus, or indeed any stable etting. His analysis of this key term 
informs the present study of pedagogical power and exemplifies the conceptual utility of 
power in resolving the antinomy between the sayable nd the visible. 
“Discipline” may be identified neither with an institution nor with an apparatus. It 
is, rather, a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of 
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instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets; it is a “physics” or an 
anatomy of power, a technology (Discipline 215). “Discipline” is an array of techniques 
that aims to control the movements of the body, trained motion, volition and overall 
patterns of behaviour, fixed individuals into places, organised their traversal of 
institutional spaces; in short, it constitutes Foucault’s catalogue of the modern repertoire 
of power, and of its rationalities. At this level of analysis, the imperceptible gap between 
power and knowledge, which had been treated in Foucault’s early work as a 
communication of surfaces, takes the shape of a mutual conditioning: 
Taken one by one, most of these techniques have a long history behind 
them. But what was new, in the eighteenth century, was that, by being 
combined and generalised, they attained a level at which the formation of 
knowledge and the increase of power regularly reinforce one another in a 
circular process. At this point, the disciplines crossed the “technological” 
threshold. First the hospital, then the school, then, later, the workshop were 
not simply “reordered” by the disciplines; they became, thanks to them, 
apparatuses such that any mechanism of objectification could give rise in 
them to possible branches of knowledge; it was this link, proper to the 
technological systems, that made possible within the disciplinary element 
the formation of clinical medicine, psychiatry, child psychology, educational 
psychology, the rationalisation of labour. It is a double process, then; an 
epistemological “thaw” through a refinement of power relations; a 
multiplication of the effects of power through the formation and 
accumulation of new forms of knowledge. (Discipline 218) 
The most immediately relevant form of power-knowledg  for this thesis is the 
assembly, from the eighteenth century, of what Foucault calls “the disciplines,” a set of 
“techniques for the ordering of human multiplicities” (Discipline 218).  
While “discipline” is not to be confused with an institutional site or a particular 
state apparatus, disciplinary techniques emerge from a number of sites, including the 
school, and operate, in relation to multiplicities, “a tactics of power that fulfils three 
criteria” (Discipline 218): they operate power while minimising the economic and 
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political costs; they intensify the effects of power to their maximum; and they “link this 
‘economic’ growth of power with the output of the app ratuses (educational, military, 
industrial or medical) within which it is exercised” (Discipline 218). The “historical 
conjuncture” in which these techniques spread through t the social body is composed of 
two main processes: a rise in the itinerant population, which the disciplines served to fix 
and to order; and an extension of production, which was dealt with by installing 
discipline within production: 
the disciplines have to bring into play the power relations, not above but 
inside the very texture of the multiplicity, as discreetly as possible, as well 
articulated on the other functions of these multiplic ties and also in the least 
expensive way possible: to this correspond anonymous instruments of power, 
coextensive with the multiplicity that they regiment, such as hierarchical 
surveillance, continuous registration, perpetual asses ment and classification. 
(Discipline 220) 
Just as production was the site for disciplinary techniques in the eighteenth century, 
literacy forms a process, a natural goal and a set of imperatives through which, or 
alongside which, various disciplinary schemes operate. It is the standard against which 
they are measured and the site of an anatomical study of efficiency. Like production, 
literacy permits both the consolidation of certain techniques within particular institutions 
and at the same time allows for their social extension, and frees up the disciplinary 
modalities according to the sites it encounters (cf. Discipline 211). Where the panoptic 
and the carceral effected a “diagram,” a way for power to extend and adapt itself to 
different sites according to a general abstract model, literacy extends to new spaces of 
intervention and appraisal and opens up a new field of concern, study and planning, a 
new possibility for the composition, disaggregation and control of multiplicities. 
This is not to say that “discipline” exhausts the op rations of literacy: power-
knowledge comes in more than one form. Foucault has expanded on a range of practices, 
ways of doing things, modes of the dispersal of power. In The Will to Knowledge he 
connects the discourse of sex with a whole range of practices connected with control of 
the birth rate and the population, a power situated  the level of human beings insofar as 
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they are subject to biological regularities. This form of power, operating on the basis of 
an “anatomo-politics of the individual body” and a “bio-politics of the species” also 
traverses the subject insofar as s/he is defined as a l bouring being, measurable in the 
capacities and competences related to the production of wealth. Finally, and crucially, 
this thesis follows Foucault’s lead in tracing the operations of power upon the subject, 
one who emerges in the discourse of literacy as the ubject of inscription, in charting 
power as it seizes him/her as a speaking subject, makes of language a truth and a destiny, 
and performs a multitude of humble operations upon this textual being. Life, labour and 
language are the three empiricities of the human sciences mentioned by Foucault, and the 
practice of power that operates at the surface of the discourse of literacy makes use of all 
three.22 
In combining and arraying these three empiricities, however, literacy does not act 
merely as the vector for a diagram, as the vehicle for the spread of a topo-sensitive 
disciplinary miasma. While it is true that thinking a site under the sign of literacy 
involves a disciplinary reconfiguration, it is not sufficient to characterise the operations of 
literacy – as an experience, process, knowledge regime – in its relations to the general 
social space. This is because, at the same time that a space, a body or a group is 
reorganised as a site of literacy, it becomes a model – and a remodelling – of a general 
condition of representation, of a series of division  structured by the separation between 
the text and the world, the “inside” space that represents the space outside, the possibility 
that haunts the actual world. Literacy reorders the world of production, taking 
representation in general as the condition for producing the world, whether as future 
utopia or as a set of knowledges that prepare one to work in the real world. It reorders 
space simultaneously as a representation and travesy of the world, as encyclopedia and 
utopia. Literacy permits the extension of a heterotopia of deviance and normalisation, a 
kind of place which while connecting with all other social emplacements, at the same 
time operates as a closed-off recreation, inversion, critique and site of regeneration of the 
world (“Different Spaces” 183).  
                                                 
22 James D. Marshall (“Foucault and Neo-Liberalism” 45-60) coins the term “busno-power” to articulate a 
putatively recent mutation of power-knowledge, where the values and imperatives of the world of business 
are built into the curriculum as normative values. 
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While the diagrammatic extension of panoptic power may be one form of 
heterotopia, the extended pedagogical space that lieracy organises bears a crucial 
difference in the way it relates to, represents, contests and reverses “the world” by 
regulating, at a very general level, the interface, th  ever-present membrane between the 
world and the self constituted through the text. Literacy as pedagogical heterotopia 
organises and relates a group of institutional sites, practices, and forms of knowledge and 
control that emerged in the nineteenth century in something like their current form, and 
disperses this structured space of power-knowledge as a complex, mobile and modifiable 
set, configurable to a variety of scales, groupings and levels of generality. What swarms 
with literacy is not merely a set of techniques, a general space or a physics of power, but 
a general problematic of representation, to which dsciplinary techniques are applied. 
 
Marking Out Differences: Other Foucaultian studies of Literacy and Education 
The genealogical analysis undertaken in this thesis is different in important respects 
to the understanding and use of Foucault in other Foucaultian studies in related fields. 
There is an extensive literature on literacy and education which uses Foucault, or certain 
parts and interpretations of Foucault’s works. In this section the work of several scholars 
is discussed, taken as representative of certain ways of appropriating Foucault. Rather 
than subject them to a disqualification, the thesis charts the distance and the specific 
trajectory it takes in relation to these works. In the persistence of characteristic objects, 
concepts and themes, these works are also shown to be part of the discourse of literacy or 
at least to share its major presuppositions. If this esis is unable to escape such a 
determination, it aims nonetheless to inhabit a different area of the discourse. 
The work on education and literacy utilising Foucault may be distinguished and 
categorised according to the connections it draws between Foucault’s work and the works 
of others, by the political or epistemic project upon which it embarks, by the selection of 
Foucault’s texts used, by the field of application, by the target of its criticism, and by its 
status with regard to Foucault’s project. In the first series, one should distinguish between 
the “twinning” of Foucault with some other figure (Max Weber, Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques 
Lacan, Judith Butler, Valentin Voloshinov) and the situation of Foucault within a pool of 
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authorities (postmodernists, poststructuralists) sharing with him, more or less, the same 
contours (a general scepticism of essences, a suspicion of text-power relationships, a 
hostility to the rational founding subject).23 Further, such work may use Foucault’s “twin” 
as a corrective, as a supplement, as confirmation or as a resituation and reinscription of 
Foucault’s ideas in the field of education and literacy.  
The authors dealt with below are considered as exemplary instances of particular 
uses of Foucault. Their work is important in bringing questions of power, exclusion, 
representation and the constitution of subjectivities into education and literacy. It is at the 
margins, at the points at which they take certain culturally constituted entities for granted 
even while claiming to historicise them, that they are interrogated. Not infrequently the 
educational field is resituated in a sociological analysis of the construction of knowledge 
and the distribution of power through representation, or on the political terrain of 
representation. The intention here is not to demonstrate that the use of Foucaultian ideas 
is incorrect or misguided, but rather to question the cost at which the pairing of Foucault 
with other critical theorists, or his inclusion in a postmodern interrogative tradition, is 
brought about. In certain ways that are important for he present work, Foucault’s ideas 
are despecified in the works discussed here, at the pric  not only of misrepresenting his 
fundamental ethical and intellectual project, but also of reifying what should be 
cautiously questioned.  
This thesis assumes that work on literacy using Foucault is itself part, and not 
outside of, the literacy discourse. Further, it is mportant to show exactly the difference 
between this thesis and the work of other theorists, to how how they do or do not relate 
to this thesis. The section on Valerie Walkerdine, whose work does not directly address 
literacy, serves a special purpose in showing the persistence and effects of textualising 
                                                 
23 Sometimes this pooling is a long litany of attitudnal equivalences, as in Ira Shor’s equivocations of 
critical literacy: 
Critical literacy, then, is an attitude towards history, as Kenneth Burke (1984) might have 
said, or a dream of a new society against the power now in power, as Paulo Freire proposed 
(Shor and Freire, 1987), or an insurrection of subjugated knowledges, in the ideas of Michel 
Foucault (1980), or a counter-hegemonic structure of f eling, as Raymond Williams (1977) 
theorised, or a multicultural resistance invented on the borders of crossing identities, as 
Gloria Anzaldùa (1990) imagined, or language used against fitting unexceptionably into the 
status quo, as Adrienne Rich (1979) declared. (“Critical Literacy”) 
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pedagogy somewhat beyond the limits of literacy discourse. The texts presented here are 
assumed to be broadly representative of different traditions, even though they are dealt 
with in detail as individual texts. They represent several features of literacy discourse that 
can also be found in non-Foucaultian work, and theyalso represent certain theoretical and 
strategic options within the discourse. The works discussed here are by Robert Veel and 
Caroline Coffin, Valerie Walkerdine, Allan Luke, and Ian Hunter. There are several 
themes, tropes, and terms that run throughout the critique: the transcendental subject, 
pedagogical desire and textual subjectivities. The thesis takes certain points of distance 
with each author. With Veel and Coffin, the pedagogical desire for reform and 
recognition of subjugated subjectivities results in the reification of the text as demand. 
Walkerdine’s work assumes a universal mechanics of the sign and the project and 
presence of a transcendental subject, and, although it is ostensibly concerned with matters 
other than literacy, it repeats the general relations required by the discourse. Luke shifts 
the text to a “meta” level and assumes that the text produces subjectivity, thereby eliding 
its function and constitution within power mechanisms. Finally, Hunter replaces the 
transcendental subject of textuality with the universal subject of deportment.  
This discussion operates, then, as a critique rather than as a list of authorities. 
However, it does not claim a transcendent position here: this thesis is implicated in the 
discursive relations within which it operates. It does not speak beyond these thinkers, but 
seeks to locate the horizon of what can be said and thought about literacy; it seeks the 
edges of discourse in order to indicate a region frm which thought may speak. The 
analysis of these theorists establishes the specific ways in which this thesis diverges from 
Foucaultian work on literacy and education, in terms of method, object and orientation. In 
seeking out the self-evidences assumed by other authors it establishes the possibility of 
tracing the construction and lineage of certain persistent themes, objects, desires and 
concepts, rather than disqualifying them a priori as unwarranted. By drawing attention to 
the discursive construction of these elements, however, it does present them as doubtful 
and open to interrogation. In particular, the thesis establishes its specific difference by 
providing a Foucaultian account of the ways in which these assumed elements are 
involved in nationalised power-knowledge.  
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The combination of a Foucaultian perspective and the li eracy discourse is evident 
in a chapter by Robert Veel and Caroline Coffin, “Learning to Think Like an Historian: 
The Language of Secondary School History,” in Literacy in Society (Hasan and 
Williams). The discursive arrangement of pedagogical desire operates here to align the 
demands reified in the text with the recognition of subjugated literacies, echoing the 
Curriculum Framework’s arrangement of literacies as a progression from “oral” to 
“critical” textual uses.24 Veel and Coffin report on research conducted by the 
Disadvantaged Schools Program in Sydney, analysing the linguistic features of history 
texts and the development of types of “consciousness” implied by these features (193). 
Taking four exemplary passages, the researchers break down each of them into generic 
structure, register and lexicogrammatical features (201-05), which categories are further 
subdivided. Having analysed the texts, and concluded that they enact a progression of 
thought from a concrete and linguistically simple “oral” style, through “grand narrative” 
to an abstract, persuasive and specialised style of argument, they signal their concerns for 
a “critical orientation” to historical texts through “shared knowledge about language 
between teachers and students, and the explicit use of this shared knowledge to 
deconstruct and learn to write historical texts” (224). It is useful to examine this closely, 
to look at the function Foucault has here, to discern the operation of educational 
imperatives, and the systematic dependence on notions of text, language and literacy at 
work here. 
Veel and Coffin cite two works by Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and 
The Will to Knowledge. In the text itself, Foucault is invoke in a critic sm of the New 
South Wales History 7-10 syllabus, and of Australian school syllabi in general. They 
argue that the History 7-10 syllabus is deficient in a number of ways: its outc mes are 
very broad and rely on each school to devise its own program (195); it lacks “specific 
reading and writing outcomes, making it very difficult for teachers to determine what 
meanings and what modes of expression will be most valued” (195-96); and it allows 
implicit norms of assessment, which result in exclusion. The criteria for assessment in 
history education, Veel and Coffin argue, are primaly linguistic, and failing to specify 
such criteria is a way of perpetuating inequality: 
                                                 
24 Further examples of such literacy hierarchies are Hasan, Luke et al. (“Genres”) and Cope and Kalantzis.  
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The invisibility of linguistic criteria often has the effect of marginalising 
those students (and teachers) who cannot read the implicit messages in the 
syllabus and cannot “naturally” develop the reading a d writing abilities 
expected by the syllabus. . . . The consequences of this invisibility will be 
worse for socio-economically disadvantaged students, since they are less 
likely to have access to privileged meanings from surces outside school, 
and are therefore less likely to “read between the lines” and determine what 
is expected of them in school assessment. (196) 
Foucault is specifically brought in at the description of another shortcoming of the 
syllabus, its failure “to contextualise itself sufficiently with regard to competing 
philosophies about the nature of historical knowledge and competing views about 
teaching and learning history” (196). It is not enough to note that Foucault is used here as 
the sign of alternatives, particularly poststructuralist alternatives, to “‘grand narrative’ 
conceptions of history” (196), nor to point out that what is given of “the Foucaultian 
conception of history” (197) is here inaccurate. Foucault functions here as the challenge 
of the alternative, both philosophical and pedagogical, to “dominant discourses” (224). 
His name authorises the decentring of a unitary master narrative, the introduction of a 
form of history which is situated neither in a traditional procession of causes nor in a 
proliferation of views, but rather within the linguistic structure of a teachable text in the 
transitional space of the school. 
It is important to emphasise this. The discourse of literacy, whatever authorities it 
draws upon, is invested with a pedagogical desire to code learning within language and 
within its exemplary manifestation, the text. That is not to say that any one person desires 
to do this, or that the desire to create freer, happier and more powerful subjects is a 
subordinate one, but rather that a pedagogical formation of desire offers itself within the 
discursive field as the way to realise programs, to establish a mode of operation, to fix 
what is wrong. Thus Veel and Coffin recommend, as away of eliminating disadvantage 
in history education, the explicit teaching of “knowledge about language,” a “functional 
metalanguage” (225). “Shared knowledge about language” (226) and the “critical 
orientation” (226) it engenders is an epiphanous experience of cognitive liberation, a 
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recognition of the workings of social power within language, and at the same time the 
pedagogical production of historians through their subjection to language: 
By teaching about how discourses are constructed through choices in the 
resources of the linguistic system, one is not only e suring that students have 
access to socially powerful meanings and practice a making these meanings, 
but also changing the way students view these meanings. By this we mean a 
simultaneous understanding that powerful meanings, while often being 
powerful for very good reasons, are in no way “natur l” meanings – they are 
constructed by particular groups of people for particular reasons. Just as these 
meanings have been constructed, so too they can be deconstructed and 
reconstructed for new purposes. A critical orientation o the language of 
history is not just about making students effective readers and writers of 
history; it is also about making them into good historians. (227) 
It is certainly not from a judgment of their work as wrong that this thesis distances 
itself from Veel’s and Coffin’s program and from similar enterprises. In terms of 
describing the power-knowledge field at work in literacy discourse, however, the project 
of rearranging the space of schooling as a strategic intervention for social justice is itself 
part of the distribution that produces the ambiguous power-effects at work in pedagogy 
and education policy: the universality of schooling makes the difficulties involved worth 
the effort in a broad attempt to change the world into a fairer one, and the student into a 
more empathetic, power-sensitive, world-transforming agent. It is necessary to take some 
distance from this discourse, to question its instruments, to investigate the substances it 
has recourse to, to interrogate the truth it speaks in the name of relativising truth.  
Veel and Coffin provide a background to their research, the Write It Right project in 
the Disadvantaged Schools Program. Over the course f this project, there emerged a 
“protocol” of linking and explicitude designed, by recourse to the analysis of language 
structures in texts, to render the acquisition of valued styles of thought transparent and 
accessible to all students (and no doubt also to all eachers). It is within this protocol that 
the relationships between educational institutions, governmental bodies, texts, students, 
language and outcomes are made most explicit, in a la guage of protocol, learning 
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design, and program-making. It is the relation thatresearch establishes with the demands 
of schooling, with a power that does not produce what it seeks (it produces inequalities 
rather than outcomes), that invests the statements of such research with their special 
position, with their call for effectiveness and change. It is from the protocol that the call 
to explicit language instruction approaches an institutional, programming addressee.  
The protocol, quoted in full, is as follows: 
1. Analyse the range of written genres encountered by students in their 
reading practices and required of students in their wr ting practices. A 
detailed consideration of both reading and writing practices is needed to 
build a picture of the learning demands of a subject. In the Write It Right 
project, about 4,500 texts written by students in a range of school 
disciplines (English, Geography, History and Science) were collected and 
analysed for their generic structure and a range of indexical 
lexicogrammatic features. Of these about 1,000 texts were in the area of 
history. In order to analyse student reading practices and access to any 
“model” texts for writing, a range of textbooks and other classroom 
materials were also collected and examined. 
2. Locate the genres in relation to the syllabus, otcome statements, public 
examinations, school programs, school assessment and cl ssroom practice. 
As well, broader academic and public debates about the nature and role of 
disciplinary knowledge, and of the pedagogical practices surrounding the 
use of a written text, need to be taken into account. 
3. Analyse register shifts (field, tenor, mode) in genres across subject area. 
Link these to broad aims and rationales in syllabuses. 
4. Analyse lexicogrammatical shifts in genres across subject area. Link 
these to specific learning outcomes in syllabi. (194-95) 
Texts are here assigned the status of a collective sign of school demands, as the 
cumulative, statistical, linguistic pattern for the assessed performance of knowledge, as 
the expression of reading and writing practices requir d by schools and school subjects. 
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Language is taken to be the total set from which texts select certain features to express in 
a composite, ideal way the knowledge that is to be acquired and practised in school. The 
researchers speak from a world made through texts manifesting the powers of language, a 
world that exists outside of power and is drawn into it by texts. It is imperative for 
students to learn a shared knowledge of language if th y are to participate as powerful 
actors in this textualised world. It is also imperative that certain transcriptions are 
performed, that links are established, between this knowledge – and performance – of 
texts and the various sites of assessment and definition.  
Within these practices of statistical recording, linking and knowledge-sharing, the 
text assumes the peculiar status it has in the discour e on literacy; that of a truth which 
embodies a knowledge necessary for the school to bec d d as a transitional space, a 
space not only reorganising the deficiencies of students into the competencies of adults, 
but also operating as the truth through which the world is rendered knowable, changeable 
and reformable. But it is also in these practices, and far more directly, that students are 
assessed and separated into successes and failures, mapped onto explicit codings of 
power and performance, separated into those who can think in the appropriate ways and 
those who cannot or will not. The protocols of research are precisely designed to increase 
the school’s power to produce the appropriate subjects, to produce subjects of a language 
which lies in an ideal space behind its textual realisation. To operate a Foucaultian 
inversion, it is language, that ideal and mute origin of texts, that secures the propriety of 
all those practices by which we constitute the experience of literacy. It is by referring the 
operation of texts to language that the question of power, of the many sites and practices 
to which reading and writing are subjected, is elided, reified, made inevitable and shifted 
from its immediate point of application to the process of transition, to the problem of the 
world outside the school, with its linguistic distrbution of power, opportunity and 
recognition. 
The work of Valerie Walkerdine represents another toretical attitude altogether. 
She engages with Foucault’s analysis of power and sexuality within the several dispersed 
sites: the developmental child, the knowledges produce  by mathematical assessment and 
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developmental psychology,25 the counter-knowledges displayed by (working-class, 
female) children themselves, and particularly the articulation between the authoritative 
veridicality of development and the subaltern knowledges of sexualisation, oedipalisation 
and embourgeoisement of the developing child. She provides a valuable argument about 
the genealogy of developmental knowledge and argues, as does this thesis, that children’s 
fiction, with its pretensions to representing the “natural” language of children, was an 
important component of the emergence of a national child (Schoolgirl Fictions 25). These 
lines will be pursued later in this thesis, but for the present her work is examined for its 
universalisation of a quasi-Lacanian “sign” and its recourse to a transcendental subject, 
and thus its participation in several general relations at work in the literacy discourse. 
While Walkerdine’s work, which is concerned with mathematics pedagogy and girl 
subjectivities, is not strictly part of the discourse on literacy, it mobilises many of the 
critical and technical disciplines concerned with developmental pedagogy. As a result, 
her theoretico-historical account of the formation of the pedagogised child overlaps to a 
significant degree with the domain covered by the literacy discourse. She provides a 
strong critique, moreover, of the institutions and k owledges involved in constructing the 
developmental child of schooling. Although her work does not fall within established 
disciplinary bounds, her multidisciplinarity is itself paradigmatic, in that it outlines the 
sources and the uses made of them for a proper “post” theoretical view of the schooling 
of reading and writing. Walkerdine’s deployment of F ucault is twofold: she is concerned 
with such a reading in terms of psychoanalytic categori s nuanced by a historical 
Foucaultian argument, while her more specific work concerns itself with mathematics 
and the constitution of “reason” in the disciplinary regime of schooling.  
Walkerdine thus provides both a general and a special case of a larger discourse 
involved with the critical interrogation of education. Her work does not belong to a 
discipline: she is already distanced from an “origin” or a training in developmental 
psychology, since she has set out to make an end of it, t  critique its foundations and its 
social power. This critical and interstitial position manifests important relations of 
                                                 
25 Walkerdine is associated, in particular, with the (Foucaultian/Lacanian) historicisation of the 
psychoanalytically disciplined child of education. Other prominent work in this area includes that of 
Caroline Steedman (Strange Dislocations) and Deborah Tyler.  
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transcription, since the “post” discourse, the combination of Lacan, Freud, Foucault and 
various other thinkers, is paradigmatic of “post,” and is transcribed, altered to function in 
the particular ways according to its discursive place. Such critical discourse on education, 
articulating critical social theory with educational concerns, is absorbed into the circuits 
of the discourse of literacy. Critical discourse on education, in its proximity to literacy 
discourse, offers up certain strategies and orientatio s for the latter to absorb and adapt. 
Walkerdine’s work is crucial as an intermediary node in the transcription of broader 
critical discourses into the discourse of literacy. In its claims to speak for marginal and 
silenced subjects, postmodern theorising on the constitution of educated subjects 
demands a textualisation of pedagogy, a textualisation through which the discourse of 
literacy acquires some of its wider legitimacy. More ver, critical concepts such as the 
split psychoanalytic subject and the unmarked masculine subject are made available to 
textualising strategies of power. It is thus necessary to interrogate these concepts and 
their application as they are made appropriable by the literacy dispositif. 
Walkerdine’s work is exemplary in that it obeys a number of rules followed in the 
literacy discourse. First, a distance is drawn betwe n the practitioner of critique and the 
tools she uses for critique, by delineating a brief outline of “‘post’ theorising” 
(Walkerdine, “Beyond Developmentalism” 451). Second, a set of proper targets is 
identified: the patriarchal phallocentric imaginary, the colonial, and so on. Third, an 
iconoclastic attitude is maintained, underwritten by the idea that things will be better if 
we see them in a new way by recombining “post” works and the order of the unconscious 
to see what is really going on. Fourth, and this is where she differs a great deal from 
literacy theorists, her work engages in the denunciation of a totality, of this order of 
things, of the patriarchal symbolic order that makes girl subjectivities impossible. These 
features play an important part in conditioning the transcribability of “post” into literacy 
discourse, in (re)aligning post with pedagogy.26  
Walkerdine’s work differs fundamentally from the present thesis in several respects 
which make it impossible to use as an authority here, but it permits a better definition of 
the project of this thesis. First, she embarks on the difficult project of negotiating a 
                                                 
26 Walkerdine is transcribed into literacy discourse by Cormack, Comber and Kamler, and Calkwell, among 
others. 
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theoretical account between Foucault, (post-) Lacan (p rticularly the reworking by 
Urwin) and her own account of gendered schooling. Second, she assumes the symbolic 
presence of a privileged subject (one who is, nonethel ss, “impossible” for working-class 
children and girls generally). Third, while she is interested in the operation of texts in the 
constitution of phantasy and symbolic identities across a number of sites, this thesis 
focuses on the constitution of the text (in all its possible forms) as the site par excellence 
of the veridical regime of literacy. Fourth, her work ften slides without distinction from 
genealogical and discourse-analytic arguments about forms of knowledge and domination 
to Lacanian arguments about symbolic identity, sexuality and desire which situate 
subject-formation within the mute structural mechanisms of a mal/functioning bourgeois 
norm.  
Although this thesis agrees that schooling is gendered (and ethnicised, 
heterosexualised, nationalised and classed), the recognition and investigation of such 
processes, and in particular the concern about the role of texts in organising and 
legitimating forms of exclusion, suggests that normalisation is practised not on the model 
of an ambivalent oedipal construction but rather within a grid of observation. Thus, where 
Walkerdine sees the systematic construction of failure for girls and its explanation in a 
phallogocentric symbolic economy, she focuses only  the “dominant” mode of 
judgment underlying the lived experience of subjectivity, and not on the proliferation of 
studies and remedies for inequality and the determination to discover and redress the 
causes of inequality (and even to interrogate the historical specificity of “equality”) 
within education systems. The desiring positions avail ble in literacy discourse are not 
exhausted by those operating on unconscious, embodied levels: indeed, desires for the 
finding, diagnosis and remediation of problems are distributed along its entire extent. 
Further, Walkerdine argues that “developmental psychology universalises the 
masculine and European, such that peripheral subjects are rendered pathological and 
abnormal” (Walkerdine “Beyond Developmentalism” 451). What is relevant to the 
project of the present thesis is the identification of a subject invisibly present within a 
form of knowledge, as part of a discourse that constantly problematises its knowledge. 
While it is true that Walkerdine’s suspicion is directed at developmental psychology in its 
relation to mathematics pedagogy, this deciphering of inequalities and exclusions occurs 
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also in literacy discourse on a regular basis. For a Foucaultian analysis, such deciphering 
is neither false nor true, but is rather an available move in establishing modes of 
problematisation. It is also the exact operation of the Cartesian, Western, rational, self-
founding subject, one that is more an artefact of the critical discourse than the direct 
production of authoritative knowledges, that needs to be discovered, rather than assumed, 
in this thesis.  
Another problematic feature of Walkerdine’s research for the project of this thesis 
is her tendency to move from Foucaultian lines to Lacanian. While this shifting and 
combination generates a cogent critical discourse within a feminist deconstructionist 
tradition, it significantly inflects the operation f Foucaultian analysis. While she argues 
that knowledges are historically constituted, that e “truth” of “woman” as deficient in 
reason is constituted through the very practices set up to test that proposition, Walkerdine 
relies on a certain concept of the sign which subtly rewrites a Foucaultian understanding 
of discourse into a binarising machine of self and Other, “man” and “woman.” Thus, 
while Foucault distinguishes very clearly between, on the one hand, the statement and its 
correlative field and, on the other, the relation of signifier and signified, Walkerdine 
redefines discursive relations as semiotic and Lacani n: 
the “real” of a child is not something which can be known outside those 
practices in which its subjectivity is constituted. The signified forms a sign 
only out of fusion with the signifier. The signifier xists as a relation within a 
discourse. The material can be known as a relation only within a discursive 
practice. To say, therefore, that “the child” is a ignifier means that it must be 
united with a signified. Particular children therefore both become children – 
but also present behaviours to be read – which may be normal or 
pathological. (Walkerdine, Schoolgirl Fictions 139) 
This sign, as both statement and semiotic coupling, closes off the complex field of 
correlations that Foucault sought to stress by givin  the statement, as signifier, a destiny. 
That is, the manifold relations between objects, speakers, concepts, themes, power and 
knowledge that characterise a field, a set of discursive and operating spaces that raise 
certain problems, impose certain ways of seeing, knowi g and acting. In reducing the 
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statement to the sign, Walkerdine invokes a pedagogical image of the child as readable 
sign, an image generated through the relations of schooling. Abstracting the textualised 
child from its conditions of appearance, moreover, obscures any attempt at a historical 
analysis.  
Walkerdine is somewhere inside the discourse of pedagogical social relations, 
which literacy discourse touches on, where the questioning of the foundation of 
authoritative knowledges has increased alongside the proliferation of scientific disciplines 
in the study of the child. In order to conduct her critique, she must separate off a veridical 
discourse of description, of the psychoanalytic/semiotic nature which stands in the place 
of real effectivity, from the parsimonious denial of ambivalence and difficulty 
characteristic of program and protocol. Foucault is therefore used as one of a number of 
strategic operators, as the authority for a counter-history of child psychology, as the 
producer of the epistemic scandal (in his claim that a discourse constructs its objects and 
does not reveal them), and as the historicising anchor of the psychoanalytic. Walkerdine 
thus constructs a discourse of struggle, articulating the Foucaultian history of power with 
a Lacanian reading of gender identities and a post-structuralist diagnosis of mathematics 
pedagogy as a site of struggle between “man” and “woman”: 
within current school mathematics practices, certain f ntasies, fears and 
desires invest “man” with omnipotent control of a calculable universe, 
which at the same time covers a desperate fear of and desire for the Other, 
“woman.” “Woman” becomes the repository of all the dangers displaced 
from the child, itself “father” to the man. As I have argued, the necessity to 
prove the mathematical inferiority of girls is motivated not by a certainty but 
by a terror of loss. In all these respects, I have wanted to suggest a story in 
which these very fantasies, fears, desires become the forces that produce the 
actual effectivity of the construction of fact, of current discursive practices 
in which these fantasies are played out and in actual positions in such 
practices which, since they can be proved to exist, literally have power over 
the lives of girls and boys, as in Foucault’s power/knowledge couple. 
(Schoolgirl Fictions 139) 
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There may well be a symbolic figure of “man” within educational discourse, but its 
centrality, efficacy and status are evident only given Walkerdine’s theoretical 
commitments. The procedure of psychoanalytic interpretation, however much it is 
steadied by a post-structuralist meta-language of signs and signifying chains, is a 
deciphering of the familial “structure” within social space. In educational discourse it is 
part of a larger set of practices relating the familial to the pedagogical, as in the relations 
of correlation (e.g., the economic class of the family predicts the child’s achievement), 
articulation (programs of cooperation and correction, home instruction, family 
counselling) and division (removal of the child from the family’s pernicious influence, 
the contest of authority between school and family knowledge, the reluctance of the 
family to consult the teacher about the child). Walkerdine’s theoretical moves are 
effective in problematising and complicating the certainties of education; the function and 
the status of the “‘post’ theorising” done in education, however, assumes a character that 
is peculiar to the sites it deals with, to the types of “effectivity” it enables. 
There are a number of ways in which this thesis differs fundamentally from 
Walkerdine’s work. It attempts to provide elements of a counter-history, using the notion 
of the dispositif. The thesis does not treat literacy, or the developmental psychology 
which plays a part in its structure, as Walkerdine do s, “in terms of what postmodernists 
have called ‘grand metanarratives of science,’ large, universal stories whose central 
character is ‘the child’ and in which key aspects of the plot involve development, 
reasoning, cognition and so forth” (Walkerdine, “Beyond Developmentalism” 451-2). 
Each component has, on the contrary, and despite whatever pretensions it may have for 
itself, a particular set of possible values, positins and possibilities. To reduce such a play 
of multiple forces and processes to a psychoanalytic and semiotic struggle is as much 
symptomatic of the discourse as critical. Walkerdine’s exemplary work is also typical, in 
its eclectic appropriation of poststructuralist and Lacanian feminist work (here Althusser, 
Foucault, Lacan and Lacanian reworkings like Urwin’s), in its desire to recognise the real 
oppression of children in the contradictions immanent to socialisation. This involves, at 
the very least, a psychoanalytic subject desiring and negotiating syntheses. At the level of 
discourse, this desire to locate the real, to seek th  invisible pain of that which is denied, 
is the positive feature of the criticism of schooling. Rather than project a mechanism of 
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denial or model the impossible subjects that schooling constitutes, or chart the oscillation 
of desires between symbolic positions, this thesis xamines the desire that produces this 
search for tenable identities, a desire made available in the social-therapeutic space of 
schooling. The difficult space that structures the visibility of student identities 
accommodates a call to articulation and recognition. A Foucaultian analysis sans Lacan 
locates such desires within the dispositif, as a constructed and functional absence and as a 
way of knowing and acting within the disciplinary space of schooling. 
Walkerdine focuses, moreover, on the problem of developmental psychology in its 
relation to mathematics education and gendered schooling. Where her work ends is in the 
agonising recognition of impossibilities: the impossibility of “speaking for” the other 
(Walkerdine, Schoolgirl Fictions 195), the impossibility for a girl of both being a student 
and becoming a woman, and the impossible fiction of a conflict-free classroom 
(Walkerdine, Schoolgirl Fictions 29-60). Insofar as her work deals with texts, it is 
concerned with the particular subfield of the pedagogy of desire, with the constitution of 
desiring gendered subjects through text, and with the production of a counter-narrative of 
difficult truths against the neatness of the school’s accounts. Concluding a chapter on the 
role of fantasy in girls’ comics, she outlines this field of concern, wherein, again, 
Foucault and psychoanalysis are brought together to acc unt for the other of education: 
there is a complex and important relationship betwen theories and practices 
which produce truth and identities, and the contradictory, multiple 
positioning of the little girls. I have examined one example of a practice: the 
fantasy of girls’ comics. We might also look at thepractices of schooling 
which produce positions for girls and claim to know the truth of such girls as 
singular beings: with personalities, intelligence, and so on. (Walkerdine, 
Schoolgirl Fictions 103) 
The subsequent exhortation is a call to write desire differently in feminist fictions, 
to examine and appropriate this desire for feminist subjects, for “if current fictions 
produce such powerful effects, such potent fantasies, w  too must work on the production 
of other possible dreams and fantasies” (105). The text is the locus of operation for the 
transitive period of childhood, the site where a serch for the true nature of this 
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production is sought and found. Even at this slight remove from literacy discourse, 
however, Walkerdine’s statements are something quite different. Where the discovery 
and practice of “relevance,” “readability” and the engagement of children in a better form 
of subjectivity-production (as representers of the social, as negotiating subjects) is for the 
purpose of constructing the appropriate literacy in the one discourse, writing desire better 
is part of a mapping of overlaid and contradictory identity-constructions within a project 
of better and more sensitive schooling, in the other. 
The difference between the type of critical project mbodied in Walkerdine’s work 
and the deployment of critical social theory in literacy discourse is, however, easily 
collapsed when the former is put to use in literacy studies. To take an example, Nola 
Alloway, Peter Freebody, Pam Gilbert and Sandy Muspratt (Boys, Literacy and 
Schooling) use critical social concepts, including Walkerdine’s accounts of school 
subjectivities, in designing interventions which utilise school space for the production of 
“expanded repertoires” of literate practices and literate selves. In this program, critical 
theories of gender as performance are mobilised to secure the productive interrelation 
between selves, texts and school. The insight that gender and self are performed yield a 
program of diversifying the connections between self and the performance of literacy: 
teachers attempted to expand repertoires for presenting the self by, for 
example:  
– reconfiguring classroom literacy as active and embodied; 
– capitalising on choice and personal experience; and 
– focusing on boys’ sense of self. (Alloway, et al. 3) 
Using the critical understanding that masculinities are produced through the 
construction of modes of relating yields a program to engender a “repertoire for relating”: 
teachers attempted to expand repertoires for relating by positioning boys as: 
– “learners” in literacy classrooms; and 
– “class participants” in literacy classrooms. (Alloway, et al. 3) 
Finally, the program introduced the text as the surface of the world into the 
classroom, connecting the school with a mediated outside of sites and formations by 
means of “a repertoire for engaging with and negotiating the culture:” 
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a repertoire for engaging with and negotiating the culture. This entails 
looking beyond standard school to literacy-related materials from other 
cultural sites and formations, including contemporary commercial youth 
culture, integrating a wide range of modes of expression (oral, written, 
electronic, musical, visual, and so on), and cross-cultural or imagined (for 
example, fantasy) settings. For boys it also entails negotiating the hyper-
masculine world, along with what it means to be male in such a world, and 
the meanings and ways of being constructed through s c a world. 
As detailed in Chapter 6, teachers attempted to expand repertoires for 
engaging cultures by focusing on, for example: 
– the “real” and everyday; 
– popular culture materials; 
– electronic technologies; and 
– multimedia and multimodal work. (Alloway, et al. 3) 
Concepts used in the critical examination of the relations of schooling are 
themselves transcribable into, and instrumental in, the everyday implementation of the 
textualised discipline of literacy. Whereas Walkerdine is concerned with rewriting desire 
and with analysing the construction of gendered schooled subjectivities, this thesis is 
concerned rather with the specific instrumentalisation of critical social knowledges, 
among others, in the literacy dispositif. The difference between work such as 
Walkerdine’s and that of this thesis concerns the obj cts investigated: analysis of the 
dispositif requires a specific complex of techniques and concepts. The use of 
Walkerdine’s work within a pedagogised space of literacy research and implementation 
does not, however, mean that a kind of blind repression is happening, but rather that the 
productivity of this power-knowledge relies upon the enlistment of critical desires and 
that the general relations of the discourse perform a constant transcription at its borders. 
Again, the tiny but crucial difference that separates literacy discourse from 
Walkerdine’s critical account of schooling needs to be acknowledged. It is with this 
difference in mind, a subtle but crucial difference, that the thesis addresses the work of 
several literacy theorists who seek to engineer a better literate subjectivity, and who 
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foreground Foucaultian theoretical concepts in their efforts. This gap between “post” 
theoretical critiques and their critical-pedagogical deployments in literacy discourse is the 
difference between a call to write desire differently and a programmatic textualisation of 
student and world in a general intensification of pwer-relations. 
Foucaultian works like that of Allan Luke seek to establish a true nature of the text 
within a meta-level,27 which functions as a description of the power and identity-effects 
of language, of all the social interests and efforts to control and define that constitute an 
immanent politics of language as a representation of the world and an insertion and 
distribution of subjects within the world: 
Providing students with theoretically and historically grounded frameworks 
from which to approach cultural and textual constructs of identity gives 
students the discourse analytic tools with which to in errogate the 
sociocultural and historical contingencies of difference, exclusion, and 
marginalisation. (Luke, Social Construction 47) 
In this, the school is both a textual construction of the world and a space where it is 
imperative to double the texts of the world outside, a space where reflection of the right 
kind will prepare students for that world from whic this space is removed. Thus Luke 
calls for students to be taught to interrogate the textual universe of the school itself,  
from basal readers to science, geography or history texts in order that 
students question the politics of constructs such as “science,” progress,” 
“History,” discovery,” “populations,” “society and the individual,” and so 
forth. (47)  
It is by demonstrating the truth of language in all its multiple significance, its 
timeliness, its constructedness, in its complicity with power, that literacy discourse 
constructs a knowledge that may be measured and evaluated in its probable or traceable 
effects; it is in the recognition of language as the substance of truth, being and action that 
a student is constituted as the subject of a pedagogical practice s/he performs on 
him/herself and undergoes; and it is from the revelation of language that the school 
achieves its essential spatial purpose of representing the world while withdrawing it. If 
                                                 
27 See also Green (“Re-righting;” Insistence). 
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the Foucaultian scholars of literacy achieve the most radical account of language and 
power, this account is written in the interest of a greater efficiency; where the truth of 
being is higher, where it has nowhere further to go, where truth functions most invisibly.  
Unlike Luke, this thesis does not take the text as the site of the production of truth, 
subjectivity and power, but rather the knowledge of the text as a component of the power 
that subjects the student to textuality, as the Curriculum Framework analysis indicates. 
Luke stresses the tactical limits of genre education in its assumptions of power residing 
within text types. His instructional design and curriculum, however, are concerned with 
creating an assessment regime that gives the educational authorities greater knowledge, 
that ascertains the proper nature of the individual (by finding her/his context, by 
generating the right pedagogical forms from a number of co-present alternatives and their 
combinations) and adjusts itself to ensure that indiv dual’s potential, in terms of measures 
that conform as closely as possible to the “needs” of the individual him/herself. 
Governmentality is at work here: if Luke is at odds with proposed new measures of 
achievement, it is because these are misleading and would replace the existing composite 
methods, the latter providing a more comprehensive picture and better informing the 
choice about interventions at tactical (individual) and strategic (policy) levels. 
Literacy discourse is described by Luke as in the middle of a momentous struggle, 
at least in terms of defining what gets taught, how, what consequences should be made to 
follow, and what kind of life students get taught for. Yet what recurs again and again in 
literacy education is the advocacy of a subjection that is at once the recognition that one’s 
being is constructed through language, a pedagogy in wh ch students chart their own 
progress with a language about language, a production of oneself as a narrative and a 
portfolio, and a goal to develop the powers of language within the student as the 
substance proper to the student. This dilemma is as much real as it is the product of a 
historical mode of being in a dispositif: Luke’s argument elides the specificity of literacy 
discourse by aligning the discourse’s injunction to pr duce, map and discipline 
developmental-linguistic subjectivities with a broader project of social justice. As the 
Curriculum Framework shows, this concern to do justice to excluded subjectivities is 
readily transcribed into a power that accommodates nd disciplines linguistic difference. 
Rather than merely perpetuate and reflect existing d visions, the literacy discourse invents 
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a strategic recombination, incorporating critical metalinguistic awareness into a modality 
of power. 
Other studies use Foucault to reduce the emergence of educational rationality to the 
rise of the prestigious historical personality of the liberal academic. Unlike Ian Hunter 
and Geoff Stokes, this thesis does not assume that what dominates the “University Arts 
Faculty” is a prestigious persona that determines thinking about education in the arts, this 
persona being at odds with a rational bureaucratic one. Hunter and Stokes, in Accounting 
for the Humanities, use Foucault to further a Weberian argument about the personalities 
cultivated in certain institutional settings. An analysis of Hunter’s work shows that, while 
many of their individual findings are very valuable, such studies rely upon an untenable 
circular argument. 
In Accounting for the Humanities and Rethinking the School, Hunter argues that the 
ethical domain of educational administration is herm tically sealed, secluded from the 
influence of claims which, by virtue of this fact, are external to it. This claim is sustained 
by another claim – given more or less apodeictic statu  – that a historical ethical 
comportment is the unfounded basis of action in any modern form of life. The circularity 
of Hunter’s argument is clear. First, he asserts that t ere are separate, mutually 
unintelligible ethical comportments not amenable to criticism. Second, he reads the 
documentary record only in the light of this assumption. Third, he states that the 
documentary record proves that the history of humanities education involves separate and 
mutually unintelligible ethical comportments. Hunter is not especially blameworthy here, 
since studies purporting to be critical are by and l rge done in this way, as he shows in his 
rather limited analysis of “principled” critiques in Rethinking the School. Where he 
differs from most contemporary “critical” studies is in proclaiming his own circular 
argument as representing the undeniable historical t uth of education. 
Hunter introduces the main themes of Accounting for the Humanities by contrasting 
its theoretical commitments with those of more tradi ional studies. He quotes “a recent 
book on the role of the state in the development of mass education,” by Andy Greene, 
where class interests are used to explain and describ  educational developments. Hunter 
uses this example to discredit Marxist studies of education as presumptuous distortions. 
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According to Hunter, Greene misrepresents the contempt of a certain nineteenth-century 
factory inspector for workers’ children as “typical” (xi). Hunter notes that Greene “claims 
that [class] interest led to a narrow utilitarian view of education and a pedagogy based on 
discipline, rote learning and the inculcation of subaltern moral virtues” (xi). Greene is 
thus, Hunter contends, arguing that “economic position” determined the different 
interests in education held by the classes involved. Similarly, Greene is depicted as 
heroicising the Chartists and William Lovett in particular. Hunter is using Greene in two 
ways: as an introduction to and discrediting of Marxist theorists, and as an introduction to 
and discrediting of all “principled” critiques and histories of modern mass education. 
While Accounting for the Humanities makes no mention of “unprincipled” postmodernist 
work, Foucaultian historians are mentioned, and credited with coming “closest to the 
mark” historically.  
There are a number of methodological issues on which t is thesis disagrees with 
Hunter’s work. In dismissing “principled” histories, he is not only constituting the field of 
critical educational thought in a fairly narrow and typifying way, he is also proposing a 
“correct” analysis of and response to the historical, theoretical and practical problems of 
state education. The Marxists and the liberal critics, he argues, have been blinded by 
historically formed ideals which they have mistaken as eternal, immutable and 
achievable. These theorists, he contends, have been suff ring from a severe illusion. In 
order to establish his alternative as definitive, Hunter brings attention to a previously 
unnoticed but apparently pivotal clue which clarifies the true meaning of the history of 
Western mass education. The culprit, the key explanatory term, for this history is neither 
class nor the state, but something else passed over for being too vulgar by the idealist: it 
was the specific improvised technical-pastoral configuration of the state educational 
bureaucracy. 
In securing this conclusion, Hunter’s strategy is to concentrate on carefully selected 
evidence to the exclusion of much that is relevant. Thus, his initial ploy is to quote the 
Chartist leader William Lovett on the topic of the playground. “At the very heart of 
Lovett’s plan for a democratic and emancipatory working-class school,” writes Hunter, 
“lay a highly distinctive image of the playground.” He then quotes Lovett’s description: 
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While much moral instruction may be conveyed in the school-room, the 
playground will be found the best place for moral training; where all [the 
children’s] faculties will be active, and when their d spositions and feelings 
will all be displayed in a different manner than when they are in the school-
room, where silence, order and discipline should prevail. But when in the 
playground, the teacher should incite them to amuseent and activity, in 
order to develop their characters . . . (Lovett 49, qtd. in Hunter, “Personality” 
xii) 
He notes that this quotation is troublesome not only for its insistence on “silence, 
order and discipline” in the schoolroom, but also in arranging a complex form of power 
in the playground. This is presented as a particularly symptomatic quotation, yielding a 
substantial insight into Lovett’s agenda. Hunter proceeds to juxtapose it with Kay-
Shuttleworth’s admiring testimony on the use of playgrounds in David Stow’s schools: 
A playground is in fact the principal scene of the real life of children . . . the 
arena on which their true character and dispositions are exhibited; and where, 
free and unconstrained, they can hop and jump about, swing, or play at tig, 
ball, or marbles . . . Amidst this busy scene, the trainer must be present, not to 
check but to encourage youthful gaiety. All is free as air, and subject only to a 
moral observation of any particular delinquency, the review of which is 
reserved for the school gallery, and taken up on the children’s return there, 
and pictured out as a moral training lesson . . . 
A monitor or a janitor won’t do as a substitute for the sovereign authority of 
the master, which all acknowledge, and whose condescension, in taking a 
game or swing with them, is felt as a kindness and a privilege, and who, in 
consequence, is enabled to guide them by a moral, rather than by a physical 
influence. (Kay-Shuttleworth 79, qtd. in Hunter, “Personality” xiii) 
The “unavoidable and striking” similarities here, Hunter suggests, indicate that 
political and economic differences, as well as imputed progressive and repressive 
characters, are belied by a basic similarity in all state educational discourse, which must 
be attributed to the specific tools available for intervention at the time. Hunter claims that 
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“the learning environment overseen by its pastoral te cher . . . was indeed the model for 
the state’s intervention for popular education. It has, however, proved surprisingly 
impervious to modern theoretical analysis” (xiii-xiv). In other words, this is the truth (or 
the central and most important thing) that has thusfar been ignored because researchers 
have sought to confirm a priori convictions. Hunter thus implicitly denies that the 
theoretical concerns one brings to an inquiry have no inconsiderable part in the evaluation 
of what is central or important. It would certainly be presumptuous to eliminate class 
interest, economics and politics from the list of factors in the history of education as 
somehow obscuring the really important thing, namely the pastoral bureaucracy in the 
playground. This is not to say that Hunter’s contention is worthless or false, but that 
proclaiming the discovery of the essential truth (or even the most important part of it) 
involves a set of extremely complex considerations about importance, relevance, 
function, structure, field, level and so on.  
In asking about importance and relevance, one asks a question relative to a whole 
set of conceptual definitions, limitations of scope, admissibility of evidence, types and 
value of data, similarity to descriptions of current situations, allocations of resource and 
status, and paradigmatic, phrasal and propositional arr ngements. Thus one might ask if 
Hunter is describing something that is productive in the current educational setting (that 
is, whether it informs or obscures such current concer s as privatisation). Investigating 
function, one might evaluate the discursive elements he has isolated to see exactly how 
they have acted in the various mutations of education l thought (this would allow one to 
define and delimit new fields). If one is asking questions about levels, it is apparent that 
Hunter’s discovery is situated in particular strata of educational practice, and in the field 
of its discourse, and at the level of particular enunciative events (books on education by 
“experts” is a possible description). One might observe that Lovett and Kay-Shuttleworth 
had cultivated different personae and audiences, that the effects and meanings of similar 
utterances underwent entirely different regimes of interpretation in their respective 
constituencies and underwent significant mutation at different levels of life (for teachers, 
for workers, for trainees, for men and women, in community programmes, in opposition 
to other groups). That people may have acted for control or determination of education as 
a class or that class identification may well have affected pedagogical practice are 
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contentions that are not impaired by the “unavoidable nd striking” similarities adduced. 
Nor are these quotations enough to prove that the pastoral teacher’s techniques of 
sympathetic observation were even discursively important.  
Even if he does not disprove competing contentions, it i  incumbent upon Hunter to 
demonstrate that this “statement” and its attendant co ditions of possibility are crucial in 
the history of mass education. Similarities alone do not fulfil this requirement, although 
his work is important in having opened up new avenues of inquiry. The problem is the 
notion of levels of operation. Recognising that they do not, and cannot, investigate all 
parts of the historical record, practitioners of a historical discipline set up a general object 
to investigate and generate several derivative objects. These objects are more or less 
fictional in that they are made up and maintained as iscursive constructs, but they are 
also in some ways related to a reality that precedes th m and which they recognise as 
authoritative and corrective. Thus, in finding that K y-Shuttleworth promoted 
playgrounds, one is not able to say the contrary (unless a contravening rule, such as the 
interpretation of irony, allows). Practitioners usually have a concept of both what they 
study in general and what they investigate in particular. Moreover, they spend some time 
defining the effects of their objects and of their findings on, if not the “thing itself,” then 
on the rules of investigation. This entails reflection on how the parts of a discipline fit 
together, asking whether a particular finding supersedes another, modifies it, or leaves it 
unaffected. Instead of addressing these questions, Hunter conducts his inquiry on two 
related levels. His positive project arises from the search for a genealogy of state-
educational reason. This is an investigation into a restricted and theoretically guided set 
of discursive elements (which may or may not accurately represent a larger body) and a 
historical assay into the wider forces leading towards state education. His negative project 
is to demonstrate that “principled position” histories are wrong, and poorly founded. He 
argues that historical fact is against both Marxist and liberal historians, and that 
“principled” critiques and investigations fail to recognise their origin in, and debt to, state 
schooling. 
Hunter’s retheorising of the history of mass education employs a selection from the 
theoretical and methodological outlooks of Foucault nd Weber. However, his 
“genealogical” approach to the concept of culture and the development of education 
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diverges somewhat from the actual critical methodolgies of these authors. Hunter brings 
a new interpretive frame and a new principle of selection to educational documents. That 
he presents this principle as an exhaustive representation of the rationality and practice of 
educational administration, however, has very little justification, either in Foucaultian 
epistemology or in school documents concerning the management of students. His mode 
of research and the claims he supports with it diverge from Foucault’s comparatively 
modest claim to be identifying levels of practice and thought which had crucial mutative 
functions in the surviving record.  
Hunter also makes certain claims about the nature of historical change that are 
unsupportable within a Foucaultian problematic. He argues that, since there are separate 
ethical comportments, one cannot influence another. Y t he also claims that modern 
educational practice developed out of two distinct practices and their corresponding 
ethical personae. Like all circular arguments, Hunter’s is both difficult to prove and hard 
to refute. If one adduces evidence of educational management not in keeping with his 
model (Paolo Freire, Pestalozzi, Montessori, and various contemporary educators), this 
shows (in his interpretation) only that the practice in question was not in accordance with 
the “real” or “true” practice, or that it was caused by a confusion on the part of the 
educators. In presenting a view of the state of education that precludes “principled 
positions,” Hunter’s thesis amounts to a narrow delimitation of the “realistic” options for 
change and improvement. 
From this genealogical account, moreover, Hunter draws a moral: one should work 
with the bureaucratic apparatus in assigning to each person a place in discourse by virtue 
of their disciplinary qualifications. Thus, in pursit of a reasonable future for the teaching 
of English, Hunter draws implications from his genealogy for how English teachers 
should view and conduct themselves. Since the modern school was a pastoral-
bureaucratic venture from the beginning, the “principled” dualisms that inform it are 
nothing more than the universalising projection of the prestigious humanities teacher’s 
comportment. “We” should thus “step back from the dominant critique of state 
schooling,” which 
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depends on a series of principled oppositions between the emancipation of 
persons and the interests of the state, between personal development and 
social skilling, between critical and vocational education. (Hunter, “After 
English” 324-25) 
The “oppositional critique” of state schooling that remains committed to these 
binaries fails to realise that  
the modern school emerged as a purpose-built environment in which 
personal inwardness was transmitted as a desirable social skill; in which 
personal development was tied to the state’s interest in disciplining and 
modernising chaotic populations; and in which the teacher supervised his or 
her charges with both the solicitous care of the pastor and the impersonal 
expertise of the bureaucrat. (Hunter, “After English” 325) 
What Hunter advocates is the separation of pedagogy fr m the amateurism of the 
English teacher, and specifically “a postpersonalist ethics pedagogy” (“After English” 
332). The problem with English is that it has always been an “amalgam of introspective 
ethics . . . and literary rhetoric” (“After English” 329). This has been compounded by a 
later development in language teaching where “all uses of language are pictured as texts” 
and “all human activities . . . are also given a questionable linguistic unity through their 
nomination as genres” (“After English” 329). For Hunter, this has two consequences: 
“the language user transcends all historical conditions . . . and is transformed into . . . the 
subject of consciousness,” and the confluence of inward ethics and vague genre 
instruction makes pedagogy impractically ill-defined (330). The solution is to design 
technical rhetoric courses and a separate course in civics, thereby ridding the pedagogical 
space of inefficiencies (332).  
Though often accurate and compelling, Hunter’s characte isation of nineteenth-
century mass schooling suffers from some shortcomings both in analysis and 
interpretation. Hunter imposes a disciplinary morality upon the teacher, one that 
segregates knowledge according to its proper represntatives within a space of functional 
divisions. He identifies the pastoral as a tradition deriving from the emergence of 
compulsory schooling, and as an inefficient aspect of its operation. He replaces the 
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transcendental subject of textuality with a self-disciplining “ethical comportment” which 
should be properly compartmentalised. One normative regime thus replaces another: he 
asks “us” to intensify the disciplinary power of the school. In doing so,he ignores the 
possibility that a textualisation of space enables th  school to function, and constitutes the 
form of its power, and the fact that pedagogy has changed since the nineteenth century. 
With each reiteration of binaries, with each redrawing of oppositions, a new arrangement 
of the old terms comes into view, and forces are aranged in a different way.  
Hunter’s projection of school space onto a comportment, and subsequent critique of 
teaching as a problem of (the teacher’s) ethical self-formation, cuts short the possibility 
of examining school space as more than the conjunction of new statistical techniques with 
a transcendent textual subject. The convergence of an art of government and a liberal arts 
pedagogy centred on notions of culture, rather thanforming a blind spot in the efficacy of 
and the self-analysis of the other, is a key event in the mutation of state power. The 
productive interweaving of these elements and others creates a rich space of 
representation and removal, of alternating scales of perception, recording, concern and 
intervention. The nineteenth century constructs a dynamic, topologically complex space 
of forces and locations, a space which nationalises th  school and schools the nation, a 
space of continuous expansion and problematisation. 
For this thesis the correctness of one or another historical position is secondary to 
the deployment of these positions within the literacy discourse and the power-knowledge 
relations it inscribes. The discourse’s readiness to call for the intensification of 
pedagogical power is the general problem addressed by this thesis, especially where this 
intensification promises something better this time round, while at the same time 
reinstating a relationship of truth and power betwen subject and language, between 
student and literacy. In failing to problematise threlation between the discursive horizon 
of thought and a general space of schooling, Foucaultian instances of the discourse on 
literacy fail to recognise their own constitution ad effectivity within the power-
knowledge coupling of the pedagogical state. 
In the chapters to follow, this thesis traces the outlines of this dispositif, examines 
the relations between this discursive figure and this functioning of power, follows the 
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abstract outline of this machine which constitutes one of the horizons of what is capable 
of being said, and seen, today. It re-reads a selection of texts, mainly from the nineteenth 
century, and constructs an account of the convergence of elements – problem 
populations, national projects, techniques of control, spatial arrangements and 
normalising knowledges – that haunt the knowledges, practices and experiences of 
literacy. The space of the school is the pre-eminent site organising these elements and 
proliferating its concepts, techniques and spaces throughout the social field. Chapter Five 
looks at how literacy operates in a complex space,  pedagogical heterotopia, 
constructing the student, the nation, public discourse, and language as visible substances 







5: The Spaces of Visibility 
This chapter discusses the effect of schooling as part of a particular set of cultural 
parameters structuring the experience, use and understanding of the text in the discourse 
of literacy, arguing that the school constitutes a certain type of place, not exactly physical 
or ideal but practical and conceptual. The chapter outlines Foucault’s concept of 
heterotopia and then proceeds to deploy it as a model f r understanding literacy and 
schooling as practices and cultural forms which, while connected to political and social 
processes, are not reducible to them. The model is used first in an analysis of 
contemporary statements in the discourse of literacy – those dealing in a summary and 
marginal way with public discourse, national and inter ational identities and institutions 
as the foundation for knowledges of literacy – because they are invocations of an 
established and ongoing construction of a pedagogical and textualising distribution of 
spaces generative of literacy as a self-evident experience. Rather than presenting a 
spontaneous “isness” in which literacy simply appears, these descriptions of public space 
generate a space in which literacy emerges as both public and schooled, both 
governmental and inevitable. Because this insistent re/creation of a space with a 
governmental addressee, the nation-state as relevant unit, with development and language 
as signs of an economic and cultural imperative, is a reconfiguration of older, specifically 
nineteenth-century spaces, the chapter then analyses the earlier construction of the school 
as a therapeutic and clinical space optimising the instruction and treatment of the child as 
physiological sequence while at the same time serving the productive demands of the 
state. It examines the ways in which the nineteenth century produced disciplinary 
pedagogical spaces that rendered visible and manipul ble the developing student, the text 
and language as pedagogical and developmental instruments, and articulated the school 
with a “world” understood as the pressures of modernisation and national development.  
Treating literacy as thus co-determined with the school in its mode of being not 
only avoids the reification of literacy as an autonomous social force but also makes it 
possible to approach the question of why literacy has become visible, obvious and true in 
this discourse. Moreover, it permits one to precisely d lineate literacy as part of mode of 
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power, demonstrating that literacy constitutes a mechanism of projecting the general 
relations of the school onto other sites.  
Following its analysis of the construction of schooled spaces and subjects, the 
chapter examines the special knowledges that emerged with the nationalising of social 
space in the nineteenth century, taking the Inspectorate’s observation of Welsh Sunday 
Schools as paradigmatic of how these knowledges invalidated marginal languages and 
groups by relating them to the economic and cultural demands of national progress. The 
nineteenth-century pedagogical heterotopia, a complex and specific distribution, directly 
informs the therapeutic, textualised and organically sequenced forms in which power is 
exercised over students through school, as well as the forms of knowledge and 
description that inform and structure this power. The situating of the text between school 
and demanding world generates a series of available discursive positions, including the 
liberation of the subject through language. Drawing attention to this persistent yet 
mutative arrangement of spaces completes the characterisation of the literacy dispositif 
and locates a moment in which the national language and the text of schooling 
simultaneously emerge. 
Foucault’s Spaces: The School as Heterotopia 
The complex set of relations established between school and world is part of the 
generative matrix of literacy discourse and of the governmental textualisation of 
existence encoded and enacted by it. Foucault’s concept of heterotopias is useful in this 
context because the discursively and practically generated space of schooling that realises 
these relations necessitates a specific set of concepts relating to spaces and an explanation 
of the paradoxical function of a space which is simultaneously both open to all other 
emplacements and also operates on the basis of exclusion and enclosure.  
The complex space of interrelations operated through national schooling requires a 
conceptual schema capable of discerning the often paradoxical functions and processes 
enacted in the literacy dispositif. The spatial complexity of this dispositif was made 
particularly clear in the analysis of the Curriculum Framework, disclosing an 
isomorphism between the spatial division of the school and the internal divisions of the 
literate subject. In order to map the emergence of the spatial order which engenders these 
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effects, and to complete the thesis’ charting of the literacy dispositif it is necessary to turn 
to Foucault’s work on space, and specifically to his work on heterotopias. In a lecture 
presented to the Architectural Studies Circle in 1967, Foucault outlined a project and a 
concern which is central to his work: the historical construction of spaces. He 
characterises space as a central obsession of twentieth-century knowledge and proceeds 
to elaborate on heterotopias, a concept he had already introduced, in a faltering and 
incomplete way, in The Order of Things, and which had been present but unspoken in 
Madness and Civilisation (it plays a fundamental part, also, in Discipline and Punish and 
The Birth of the Clinic).1 Having proposed a general history of emplacements (ways of 
organising space, both within discourse and without), he declares: 
But what interests me among all these emplacements are certain ones that 
have the curious property of being connected to all the other 
emplacements, but in such a way that they suspend, n utralise, or reverse 
the set of relations that are designated, reflected, or represented by them. 
(“Different Spaces” 178) 
These spaces he designates as either utopias or heterotopias. Utopias are unreal 
places maintaining “a general relation of direct or inverse analogy with the real space of 
society” (178). Heterotopias, on the other hand, are real places  
that are designed into the very institution of society, which are all sorts of 
actually realised utopias in which the real emplacements that can be found 
within the culture are, at the same time, represented, contested, and 
reversed, sorts of places that are outside all places, although they are 
actually localisable. (178)  
He proposes six principles for the description of heterotopias: they are present in all 
societies; existing heterotopias can be made to function in new ways; they can, in a single 
                                                 
1 In both of The Order of Things and Birth of the Clinic Foucault’s remarks concerning space are prefatory. 
In The Order of Things, even though he is primarily dealing with formations of knowledge, Foucault makes 
it clear that heterotopias are as much discursive as they are physical places. Utopias, while unreal, “open up 
cities with vast avenues, superbly planted gardens, countries where life is easy, even though the roadt  
them is chimerical” (xvii). Heterotopias, on the other hand, destroy “the apparent syntax [allowing] words 
and things . . . to ‘hold together’” (xvii). In the preface to The Birth of the Clinic is quoted in Chapter Four, 
above. Various sites in Discipline and Punish are clearly given heterotopic descriptions, including 
shipyards, schools, barracks, scaffolds and prisons.  
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space, “juxtapose several emplacements that are incompatible” (181): they are 
“connected with temporal discontinuities” (182); they “presuppose a system of opening 
and closing that isolates them and makes them penetrabl  at the same time” (183); and, 
finally, “they have a function in relation to the rmaining space” (184), either in 
denouncing “all real emplacements” or in creating “a different real space as perfect, 
meticulous, as well-arranged as ours is disorganised, badly arranged, and muddled” 
(184). Schooling, as both a discursive construct and a real set of places, as a heterotopia, 
may be seen as a ubiquitous pedagogised space operating in literacy discourse, and traced 
to nineteenth-century problematisations of school space. The school emerges as a space 
in which the disparate elements necessary for the concept of literacy to take place – both 
discursively and as an experience – are brought together, made visible, and related to 
each other. 
Foucault divides the utopia in general into the utopia of fiction and dream (his 
sense of “utopia”) and the utopia realised, the hetrotopia, necessarily a hetero-place, a 
place of difference from the world of relations to which it refers and which it in fact 
suspends, neutralises or reverses. The school operates as such a space, as a travesty, as an 
ideal representation, and as an inversion of the world. The world is to be found entirely 
represented within its walls; the world is both thenecessary experience for education and 
the experience it is necessary not to have in school. It is within a generative space 
between the school and the world that literacy belongs in all its problems and findings, in 
the relations it establishes between the system of language and its realisation in internally 
represented rules and within a practice of inducing the literacy event, arranging the 
experience, organising a space of appearance, training the separation and analysis of 
performance elements, relating those elements to the world, to a totality of relations, in 
different ways, according as they are designated, reflected or represented.  
Separation from the world is the condition for the demand of the world to be 
formulable and enforceable. Without this removal and rticulation the “world” (or rather 
a fiction of the world) operates as a particular site, as an individual career, as demands 
which are here and now and for a particular purpose, never in terms of a preparation for 
the world in general (though, of course, such removal and articulation have a moral or 
instrumental relation to the demands of other institutions). Moreover, while every 
 212 
emplacement makes it possible to claim that one is learning the rules of the world, it is 
only in school that this function is recognised as necessary, as either lacking or too full 
(teaching critical attitudes does not guarantee participation in power;2 reproducing the 
demands of corporate life reproduces inequitable social relations).3 It is only with school 
that this is recognised as a requisite function, because the school, far from being the site 
par excellence of social reproduction, is the site of the reproduction of the social as 
representation.4 
 
Space(s) in the Contemporary Discourse of Literacy 
That a heterotopia is continuously constructed from a ixture of national planning, 
education provision and utopian dreaming is a notio expressed by contemporary 
curriculum planners themselves. For example, the articulation between utopias and the 
literacy curriculum is the subject of a keynote address by Ken Boston at the Curriculum 
Corporation’s sixth National Conference, held in 1999. Boston argues that throughout 
Australian history a relationship has persisted betwe n the popularity of utopian fiction, 
nation-building legislation and educational reform incorporating new technologies in 
response to the new information economy. He argues that a tradition of nationalist cyber-
utopianism has secured, and will secure in future, a national pedagogical space: 
we now need a strategy for sharing curriculum materi ls and delivery by 
means of a national grid, based on a partnership between the 
Commonwealth, States and Territories to provide a natio al and globally 
competitive digital curriculum platform for all Australian schools. 
                                                 
2 Thompson, conceding that “it does not appear that revolution is just around the corner,” calls for the 
classroom to be converted into a theatre of difference and exclusion, and thus a theatre of the world it 
excludes, with performance pedagogy, that is, a serie  of role-playing scenarios where the lessons students 
receive from this experience (about exclusion and disempowerment) are prompted and prepared by the 
radical educator. 
3 For this argument, see Stuckey (Violence); Marshall (“Educational Research;” “Neo-Liberalism;” “Mode 
of Information”) and Hamilton (“Peddling;” “Fordism”). 
4 Thus the paradoxical research literature which, while it shows the efficacy and even superiority of nn-
school activities in fostering literacy, nonetheless insists on using such data to provide for better inst uction 
within school. See Hull and Schulz for a review of this literature. Heath is important here for bringing to 
this ethnography of communication a pedagogical imperative. 
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The notion that space and literacy are codetermining, whether this is 
connected with an (inter)national space, a classroom r a scriptorium, is a common 
feature of the contemporary discourse of literacy. Illich, for example, argues that 
“lay literacy,” that is, the web of meanings and exp riences that are constructed by 
a literate environment, acts as both a cipher and a central characteristic of European 
societies since the fifth century BCE (Illich 35). Apart from insisting, with Parry 
and his elaborators, on the break between oral and iterate cultures, Illich contends 
that Europe’s relationship to literacy has produced a series of unique “mental 
spaces,” which he also describes as “pedagogical space.” Each epoch has an  
effect that the visible text [has] at that moment o a web of other concepts 
that, in their formation, are dependent on the alphbet. I point to such 
notions as self, conscience, memory, possessive description, and identity. 
The “urgency” of Illich’s plea for research arises from the threat to this inherited 
space by the “cybernetic mind,” a different experience of space, possibly unaccompanied 
by a deep self (45; see also Illich and Sanders, ABC). The articulation of spaces, indeed 
the modeling of thought and experience through a literate space, is persistently invoked in 
the discourse, informing its hopes and fears. 
These highly idealised notions of “space” – a national utopia and a spatialised 
literate mentality – are accompanied by more literal, more concrete analyses of schooled 
space. Bruce Smith, for instance, contends that the liberal classroom of the nineteenth 
century rendered “state control the most rational ad reasonable way to organise the 
provision of Australian education” (73). The classroom constituted a new kind of space, 
producing experts and disqualifying others as a consequence of its own workings, rather 
than simply reflecting and enacting political interests (Smith 73). The liberal classroom 
was not, however, an isolated location, but rather formed a node in a larger network and 
occupied a pre-eminent position in the making of a national space peopled by national 
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subjects speaking a national language. The liberal classroom and the school have a 
heterotopic relation to the spaces that surround them.5 
 
Heterotopias in the Discourse of Literacy 
On a more systematic discursive level, a heterotopic distribution of schooled spaces 
operates implicitly within the contemporary discourse of literacy. The school orders this 
distribution as the organised space of the visibility of literacy. Two examples are 
analysed here as representative of the discourse: David Barton’s statements about the 
ubiquity of literacy and a discussion of literacy debates by Green, Luke and Hodgens. 
Within the discourse as a whole literacy is constituted as discourse, as legitimate current 
concern and as a real set of processes and practices by virtue of being a staple of public 
debate and a shared memory which turns out to be heterogeneous and incompatible. 
Contemporary representations of literacy’s ubiquity acknowledge a constructed 
“everywhere,” a social space thoroughly pedagogised by way of a national language and 
disciplined through the text. Literacy constitutes a pace – and schooling as a space – 
which is at the same time the emplacement of all sttements about literacy and the place 
of their logical noncompossibility. The space of schooling renders literacy multiple and 
contradictory, undefinable and yet always subject to new definitions (as use) and new 
investigation (as the material and cognitive basis for uses). The space that unifies and 
organises literacy (rendering it obvious and intelligib e) also produces the multiple 
literacies that preclude a unified concept of literacy. As will be explained in what follows, 
this contemporary heterotopia, along with many of its d fficulties, promises and 
ambivalences, is related to certain features of the sc ool as it figured in the creation of 
                                                 
5 Since heterotopic relations do not directly imply a relation of similarity, this argument neither endorses 
nor refutes claims that the spatial ordering of curri lum is a direct mapping of knowledge. An example is 
David Hamilton’s enthusiastic recount of his discovery that rhetorical categories of place are analogous, 
and may be precursors, of modern didactics: 
I began to recognise that the content, order, organisation and delivery of a lesson is [sic] 
analogous to the content, order, organisation and delivery of an argument. Moreover, I 
realised that preachers, teachers and court-room lawyers are homologous occupations since, 
respectively, they deliver sermons, lessons, and defens s. (Hamilton, “Dialectic”) 
Whatever the case, it is certain that such an analogy c uld only be recognised in this way very recently. 
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national spaces and subjects and the emergence of a national language in the nineteenth 
century.  
The current self-evidence of literacy is the result of a complex historical 
construction of the nation around the school, the pedagogical subject, and the language 
and text that emerged from them. The heterotopic relations realised by the school unite 
the national space as a complex of pedagogical and developmental sites regulated by 
reified linguistic performance, that is, by literacy. This interrelation of spaces, however, 
is also characterised as a knowledge that is always insufficiently disseminated because of 
the closing of the pedagogical heterotopia to all rea emplacements. This space regulates 
a series of historical relations between therapeutic knowledge of children, the control of 
language and mobile populations, and the relationship between schooling, national 
language and the subjection of national subjects. When literacy theorists define literacy 
as a contested concept, then, they fail to point out either its relative stability or the 
historical arrangement of spatial and conceptual elem nts that secures its function as a 
central concern of power today. That is to say, the relationship of literacy to power 
involves more than access, identity and subjectivity; the form of that power, in creating a 
bond between state and subject through language, is also at issue. 
Literacy discourse always locates literacy, not only i  a number of sites, but also in 
a common space which it pervades. The relationship between the social and economic 
world surrounding the school and the pedagogical spce of schooling runs through 
discussions of literacy, this relational space being consistently deployed and redefined. 
Typical is the construction of the public debate on literacy by Bill Green, John Hodgens 
and Allan Luke in Debating Literacy in Australia: A Documentary History 1945-1994. 
After briefly recognising the extreme recentness of “literacy” as a topic of public debate, 
they tackle what would seem to be the simple problem of defining what has been spoken 
of. Their first step is to recognise that it is an empty term, a repository for assumptions, a 
site of battle: 
What is literacy? Across these documents we find it referred to as “skill,” 
“competence,” “morality,” “tradition,” “heritage,” “knowledge” and so 
forth. What is interesting is that all of these terms are empty sets for 
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contemporary social and cultural norms and values. The picture that emerges 
is that of “literacy” as a continually contested and unfinished concept, an 
empty canvas where anxieties and aspirations from the popular imagination 
and public morality are drawn. (“Introduction”)  
The appeal of the term, they argue, is that “everybod  is an expert on literacy: 
parents, teachers, politicians, journalists and media ‘ xperts’ and, of course, students 
themselves.” They argue that literacy is assumed to be a common experience, because of 
the experience of schooling. It is the common coin, r at least the simulation of it, 
because everyone undergoes the process which, it is assumed, is designed to create 
literacy. But there is more at work in such discussion . Literacy debates occur within a 
public sphere, through a series of sites (“public forums, from talk-back radio shows to 
school parent meetings”), and between a set of persons (“parents, teachers, politicians, 
journalists and media ‘experts’ and, of course, students themselves”). Above all, what 
gives literacy its fascinating power over “everyone” is that it is “an important cultural 
touchstone: a point of shared cultural practice and experience.” In the face of change, the 
school secures a universal experience: “in the midst of dynamic social change and 
cultural diversity, the experiences of schooling and ‘becoming literate’ are shared social 
events.” This account may be also, however, read in a different way, with “literacy” not 
merely something that all have in common: it is by virtue of schooling that “literacy” 
becomes a recognised substance of experience. 
At the back of these statements is a confusion of tongues, groups and interests 
making up a society, a culture, a nation. Green, Hodgens and Luke continue:  
But people have dramatically different memories of becoming literate. 
Depending on the time and place of their schooling, these range across 
innumerable versions of the 3R's and the “basics” to grammar school literary 
education, from religious training to bilingual education, from phonics 
teaching to creative writing instruction, from memories of corporal 
punishment and rote learning to open classrooms. These remembrances of 
literacy past, filtered through years of life history and experience, are easily 
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turned into claims about how reading and writing should be taught, about 
what teachers and schools should do. (“Introduction”)  
What is presented here is a urface of emergence. Schooling and public debate 
produce not only normative models but also the outlines of a discursive object. Before a 
scholarly discourse can be put into play and before reading and writing can become the 
object of knowledge, this object must emerge in the social space as a problem, as an 
answer, as a recognised entity, as the traversal of a space that is specific and isolated and 
at the same time public, common and coextensive with the society. If there is a prehistory 
of literacy, it is in here, in a public space which has already seized it, which examines and 
debates it, which forms a popular and shifting concer  about it. Literacy is, in the first 
place, the effect of certain social relations, primarily those concerning school and 
teaching. It is also the result of a debate about “us,” about the nation and the future, about 
the nature of children and learning, and about the purposes and effects of reading and 
writing. As a rhetorical topos, literacy straddles the intimate, the personal and anecdotal, 
the common, the mystical, the national and the public. If there is a “literate society,”6 it is 
first one which concerns itself with its literacy, and through literacy argues about its 
character and its destiny: 
This reliance on personal memory and local experience is part of what 
makes debating and discussing what we should be doing with literacy 
education so difficult. For what at first glance appears to be a cultural 
touchstone and shared experience, turns out to be a collection of diverse and 
conflicting experiences. Since the first compulsory State literacy education 
in the 1400s, one of the persistent beliefs about literacy education has been 
that it could be the “great leveller,” “equaliser” and unifier. In fact, there is 
ample historical evidence that literacy education has served very diverse 
social, political and economic purposes since that time. In many school 
systems, the unequal distribution of kinds and levels of literate practice and 
                                                 
6 See Reeves for an exemplary history of the emergence of the “literate society” in Western Australia. In 
addition to researching instructional practices and extension of schooling, Reeves points to “environme tal 
print” as evidence of the increasingly “literate” character of social relations throughout the nineteenth 
century. 
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skill are used to include and exclude students from credentials and, 
ultimately, occupational and life outcomes. (“Introduction”) 
Insofar as it is a public and official obsession, literacy becomes a thing that needs to 
be understood, a fact of universal interest and debate and a problem for scholarly 
understanding. The “public,” that is, “everyone,” including the reader, is drawn into this 
arena of debate and contention. The universal space of public debate, moreover, is 
discursively connected to the school by a series of moves: the debate is confounded with 
the nation-state and finally collapsed into a debat about the school and schooling. David 
Barton, in Literacy: An Introduction to the Ecology of Written Language, similarly, and, 
again, paradigmatically, uses public space to establi h the relevance and ubiquity of 
literacy. He begins by noting the space of literacy’s emergence as a problem in public 
debate, a problem which is “everywhere:” “In public debate everywhere there is perceived 
to be a crisis in education, and the topic of reading and writing is at the centre of the 
discussion” (1).  
The literacy crisis is, insofar as it appears in an individual book, a mere rhetorical 
commonplace, a way of interesting the reading public. When this topos of public debate is 
present in a great many books, however, it ceases to be merely a rhetorical device. It is, 
rather, an acknowledgement of the one common surface from which literacy becomes a 
“shimmering,”7 that is, a vague content – or multiplicity of conte ts, contexts, meanings, 
situations, problems and tensions – with a very specific function. Constructing literacy as 
the object of public debate assures, before any theory is present, that there is such a thing 
as literacy.8 There is such a thing, regardless of the theoretical a counts which, in fact, 
diminish any formal kernel into a contingent itinerary. Literacy is visible and sayable 
“everywhere.” This is a structured ubiquity, and its features decisively inform the object 
that emerges from it.  
Where is the “everywhere” of which literacy discourse speaks as the site of 
literacy’s obviousness? The space in which literacy ppears is not an abstract open space 
                                                 
7 Deleuze (Foucault 74) coins this term on the basis of a careful reading of Foucault. 
8 Illich gives a concise formulation of the operational space of literacy in his discussion of the “literate 
mind”: it is “a space that is uniform in its characteristics but diverse in all the distortions and 
transformations these permit” (43). The enumeration of public sites of debate can be read as an expression 
of a space that literacy emerges from and modifies. 
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but one structured around sites of national concern. “Everywhere” is “[i]n schools, in the 
community and in political debate” (Barton 1). This is not the “literacy in everyday life” 
that Barton designates as his starting-point. “Everywhere” is where literacy becomes a set 
of relevant social concerns, rather than an operative, analytically and empirically 
reconstructed category. The first of these concerns is one relating to the role of education 
as a social good or service: “More than one hundred years after the introduction of 
compulsory schooling we do not have an educational system which turns out happy, well-
educated people” (Barton 1). A sense not only of failure, but also of a distinct mission, is 
present here. A social goal unites the historical and political “we.” When making this 
complaint, this claim of failure, Barton is speaking for “countries like Britain and the 
United States.” There is a European transcendental subject9 at work, a “we” for which 
one speaks, in the name of a democratic, advanced, and communal dream.  
There is a common and current process, added to this failure, which makes an 
intervention into the “literacy debate” somehow vital. Not only is educational provision 
inadequate as it stands, but “pressures are coming from governments and elsewhere for 
education to account for what it achieves, and there are new demands from rapidly 
changing technologies. This is happening throughout industrialised countries” (Barton 1-
2). The positions from which one sees such issues as development, the North/South 
divide, and so on, are clearly governmental, established at the levels of quantitative social 
science, population and production surveys, mass literacy testing and a range of analyses 
which estimate the overall size of production and the overall per-capita 
production/consumption of a population. Barton is neither arguing for this view of 
humanity, nor has he come to some kind of compromise whereby the committed 
social/cultural missionary must strategically choose his topos, in order to wield some 
                                                 
 
9 Of course such a subject, while functioning in these texts, is all but explicitly disallowed, transferred as it 
is upon national necessities and the need to respect the true being of language. Hence, Leong and 
Randhawa frame the puzzle of literacy between the philosophical tradition and a human imperative to 
develop linguistic consciousness (v). Similarly, Allan Luke (“Getting Over Method” 3) defines the question 
of literacies as “about the kinds of literate cultures [students are] likely to encounter and how we would 
have them design and redesign those cultures and their texts.” The mission, and the subjectivity, also 
includes critical literacy experts, such as Nicolas F raclas, Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Naz Rassool, 
working simultaneously within and against Western-dominated institutions of global governance. 
 220 
influence on the state and on the international education planning bodies.10 Rather, what is 
operating here is an assumption about the nation as the relevant unit when arguing the 
relevance, urgency and extent of literacy. 
The developing countries are the counterpart to this Western concern, and the basis 
for an elaboration of the policy appeal: “in developing countries there is a realisation that 
literacy rates are not increasing in the ways optimis cally predicted twenty years ago; 
cries for universal literacy by the year 2000 are heard less often. In many countries the 
concern for money being spent on education is falling” (Barton 2). The view here, the 
gaze, is not one from within a community, nor is it even what might be called a 
governmental gaze, but rather supra-governmental. Barton speaks here as a “world 
citizen,” as an adviser to the United Nations, to UNESCO and its various programs.11 
Further, the reference to “many countries” leaves it unclear whether he is writing of 
“developing” countries or countries in general, butwhichever it is, there are a number of 
prerequisite views on education operating in this statement. First, education is to be paid 
for and provided, or at least supervised, by the state. Second, the natural unit, though 
merely an artefact of measurement practices and the assumption of state responsibility, is 
the nation state – the “country” – when it comes to assessing the state of education, 
whether it is entering a crisis and whether it is being provided.12  
The discourse of literacy requires a public space in which a crisis of literacy – 
regarding its nature, extent, powers and uses – establishes literacy as an object concern 
and contestation. Barton is paradigmatic, then, in staging the literacy crisis, or at least the 
crisis in education, as a set of public conflicts, hanges, debates and pressures from the 
concatenation of which an insistent questioning results: 
Competing views of what education is for are being made more explicit. 
People may disagree about the nature of “the crisis” but there is public 
unease about what is going on. The purpose of schools and education has 
                                                 
 
10 For a statement of this ethos, see Goodson (“Interview”), where he formulates a model of power as 
“mediated surrender by subordinate groups” (4).  
11 See, for example, Wagner et al., where Barton, thoug  not himself a contributor, is a much cited source. 
12 It should be readily admitted that this is an artef ct of the current mechanisms of evaluation and 
comparison. However, it is also clear that it is an inescapable artefact, and a deep determinant of many 
frames of discussion and concepts in the discourse. 
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often been taken for granted. More and more it is now being called into 
question. Questions about reading and writing turn up in a wide range of 
places: in discussions about falling standards in education; in calls for Plain 
English in documents; the requirements for a trained workforce; the effects 
of new technologies on our lives; the need for adult literacy provision. (2) 
Barton is writing in 1994, long after the purpose of schooling and education was 
brought into question, long after its purpose became suspect and seen as the function of a 
reproduction of social inequality and as the result of compromises among interests, goals, 
institutions, forms of reasoning and social structures. Presenting these questions in this 
way presupposes a unitary social space, a bewildering “us” which calls us to account, 
calls us to answer its questions. The literacy theorist has to answer to this assemblage, has 
to respond to this set of questions, on his/her ownaccount.  
Barton thus places his discourse within a constitutive national, governmental and 
public space. The theorist’s position as authority arises directly from this insistent 
uncertainty concerning language, instruction and policy. From this mass of questions 
about education, language, technology and bureaucracy, Barton shifts to the public 
discussion about literacy, or, on a deeper level, to the assumptions about literacy which 
inform the clamour: 
All sorts of people talk about literacy and make assumptions about it, both 
within education and beyond it. The business manager bemoans the lack of 
literacy skills in the work force. The politician wants to eradicate the scourge 
of illiteracy. The radical educator attempts to empower and liberate people. 
The literary critic sorts the good writers from the bad writers. The teacher 
diagnoses reading difficulties and prescribes a program to solve them. The 
preschool teacher watches literacy emerge. These people all have powerful 
definitions of what literacy is. They have different theories of literacy, 
different ideas of “the problem” and what should be done about it. (2) 
These are sites where empirical problems are related to discourses on literacy, sites 
where the use of a notion of literacy is involved in relations of power, control, 
intervention, the general form of social relations a d the formation of cultural identities. 
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Barton is claiming for literacy a unique mediating position: this is why the task of 
producing and disseminating a properly understood, p wer-sensitive definition of it is 
essential for the discourse. The discourse – Barton is typical here – thus draws a 
relationship between itself and the uncertainties and concerns in public space. This 
particular configuration, involving an ignorant public, social power and a mysterious yet 
ubiquitous object of discussion, ensures the importance of the discourse.  
A writer presenting critical models of literacy is situated outside of the public 
debate, and outside the agencies that inform public debate and operationalise a proper and 
more judicious understanding: 
While there have been radical changes in how reading and writing are taught 
in schools, these new views of reading and writing have failed so far to reach 
the public and to be understood by the media; those in chools and colleges 
have not yet succeeded in getting public support for changing and improving 
the teaching of reading and writing; public understanding of literacy issues is 
not very sophisticated; there is widespread ignorance about language, and the 
most simplistic approaches are latched on to. (Barton 2) 
The specific persons applying the “powerful definitions of what literacy is” are 
replaced by a dual body: the public/media ensemble, on the one hand, and those in 
“schools and colleges,” presumably the researchers who are making changes and 
improvements in the teaching of reading and writing.13 The battle for better 
understanding is here intensified and brought into the narrow confines of schooling. A 
series of semi-equivalences appears: reading and writing; literacy issues; language. These 
are either part of a complex arrangement of distinct elements or a collection of 
synonymous terms all standing for each other. The sp re of conflict is a complex 
articulation and a political one: “those in schools and colleges” require public support for 
changes and improvements in teaching, but the public must first be made to understand 
the nature of what is being taught (“reading and writing” and “language”) and the nature 
of learning (“literacy issues”). The imperative forresearchers is also related to the danger 
of ignorance and the simplistic approaches it permits. Barton implies – and again he is 
                                                 
13 Teachers occupy an anomalous position here, alternting in their alignment with the public or the exprts 
(see Covaleskie; Green, Lankshear and Snyder; McNeil; and Land).  
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typical of the discourse in doing so – that these erroneous approaches are enacted by 
misguided politicians and carried out by misdirected t achers. Here, in the conceptual 
battleground of the public sphere, is a field in which understanding is the answer, in 
which ignorance is the source of recalcitrance, abuse, inefficiency. In fact, the actual 
effects of ignorance are left silent, and we can only infer them from the opposition they 
are brought into with the “changing and improving” teaching methods, and from their 
being “simplistic” and based on the public’s “ignorance about language” and an 
“understanding of literacy issues” which “is not very sophisticated.”  
The space of public controversy from which literacy emerges is again paired with 
an everyday experience of literacy. Barton introduces his conceptual chapter, where the 
model/metaphor of “ecology” is advocated as broad and precise enough to unify the field 
of literacy studies, with another, second introduction, that of “literacy in everyday life.” 
This is wholly different to literacy in the public sphere. Literacy is something one 
“encounters” when waking up in the morning, reading the newspaper and listening to the 
radio (a reading of a written document), and so on. The points to note, for Barton, are that 
everyone is affected by literacy practices, and that t ese practices differ markedly across 
cultures, classes, and any number of social placements (Barton 3). 
It is not a set of common themes or a logical space that organises and secures the 
scattered arguments, models, policies and techniques through which literacy circulates: 
literacy is nothing more than one of the “empty sets” to which it is attached, a cipher for 
contemporary norms and values. As the above examples show, it is the underlying space 
of experiences laid down in memory that renders this term intelligible and yet allows it to 
flit between sites, reorder its signification, transcribe different social domains as instances 
of itself and act as the sign of a promise and a betrayal. This emptiness, however, 
disguises a malleability with a form; it obscures a set of characters and substances that 
are systematically formed by historical relations. Barton’s “everywhere” and the 
“remembrance of Literacy past” are ahistorical reifications, despite gestures at 
historicism which themselves reify “power” and “society.” The space invoked in forming 
the contemporary emptiness of literacy is engendered in a historical space hollowed out, 
and a network of positions generated, in the nineteenth century. This space arises from a 
historical background involving practices which have, since that time, continuously 
 224 
formed and re-formed this persistent discursive formation, the circulation of power 
associated with it, and the spaces in which it appered, the closed and open heterotopia 
which offers literacy everywhere, establishing its formal outlines, its relevant characters 
and the relations that define them. The discourse of literacy finds in this spatial network 
not only certain persistent themes but also a more fundamental historical groundwork. In 
the search for such a groundwork one must first turn to the space in which the subject of 
literacy was formed, the heterotopic disciplinary space which gave rise to knowledges 
concerning the developing child in measuring and training the child’s life, labour and 
language. At the same time, this institution related the developing child to the nation-
state. 
 
Seguin: Therapeutic Space and the Developing Child  
As became evident in analysing the Curriculum Framework, discourse of literacy  
inherits and perpetuates a model of childhood as a development ruled by a sequence of 
cumulative stages, which are both organic and cognitive. This object of knowledge was 
formed within a type of space and a project of control peculiar to the nineteenth century 
and still bears the marks of this first space of appearance. The developmental child first 
emerged not from the systematic study of normal children nor from their education but 
rather from the treatment – the simultaneous study, control and instruction – of abnormal 
children. In 1844, and in a revised form in 1866, Edward Seguin published I iocy and its 
Treatment by the Physiological Method, a book concerning the treatment of idiocy by a 
regime of physiological training and education and  text central to the reform of 
instructional techniques in the nineteenth century and to the establishment of a 
relationship between spaces, bodies and knowledge that would later be essential for 
developmental child psychology. This treatment was primarily a therapeutic affair, 
dealing with children whose abnormality was severe and had become a burden on the 
normal population. At the same time, however, Seguin secured the value of his 
neurophysiological treatment in two ways: he constructed a site of substantial, 
incremental difference from which one can define the developmental course of the child, 
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and presented the treatment and study of these children as a service to the state and 
society.  
By taking children from the places where they interfered with the normal course of 
events, where they cost their parents both in terms of their own needs and in terms of 
opportunities for productive work and income, Seguin could claim to serve society at 
large. Moreover, as some idiots could be taught to perform simple but valuable tasks, 
Seguin’s hospital would be a means of transforming a social drain into a source of value. 
In operating a form of enclosure which at the same ti also revealed the outer, normal, 
unenclosed world, Seguin’s institution acted as a kind of model school space, setting out 
a heterotopic relation in which the abnormal space of instruction reveals the normal and 
natural course of development and in which the fundamental social relations are 
reconfigured as a knowledge of typical development and the pedagogical operation of 
body, space and language. 
What is novel in Seguin’s method is not the impositi n of stages onto instruction: 
there are examples of this more than a century before. In fact, his treatment regime treats 
the human organism as much through stillnesses and ilences as with stimulation and 
motion, where these tactical moves are related to a s rategic knowledge of the developing 
individual. The distinctive element is the introduction of an absolute sequence of 
development dictated by the organism itself, imposing itself by its unchangeable 
resistance to external forces and by its progression from lower to higher stages of 
organisation and defining a sequence which must be und rgone in order for the individual 
to become socially useful and valuable. Social use is an essential but subsidiary goal 
here: even if one does not become useful to the point of self-sufficiency, the nearer one 
approximates to this, the better and happier s/he will be, along with the immediate 
community and the society at large. 
This is where knowledge, as it is manifested in the clinic or specialised hospital, 
becomes the site for the child to appear as the subj ct of three forms of knowledge 
sharing a common organisation: knowledges relating to life, labour and language. One 
sees first of all that life can be recorded in all the minutiae of its unfolding as the organic 
substructure prepares for the peripheral elaborations upon which full human complexity 
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depends, and one can observe the various behaviours of which this is a manifestation. 
With idiots – a group halting at every stage of organic development – one can assign a 
definite function for each organ and for each level of organisation. Thus a picture of 
normalcy is correlated with organic structure, and the child becomes a thing known in a 
certain correlative if not fully causal density. In short, the processes of life come to 
dominate a particular level of perception, and thisis not only manifested in eugenics and 
developmental psychology but also, from a quiet beginning with such pioneers of 
“scientific education” as Montessori, in an elaborated knowledge of the developing child 
in the work of William T. Preyer and enters into the planning of compulsory educational 
systems.14 Life is here accompanied by two other terms which are fundamental to the 
establishment of the nineteenth-century episteme: labour and language. Together, these 
three categories directly invest the operation of Seguin’s hospital. The emergence of a 
modern national pedagogy is thus a specifically date  experiment, emerging from a 
reorganisation of knowledge and a modification of disciplinary techniques to suit that 
new knowledge.  
For Foucault, the modern episteme in the human sciences is characterised by a 
fundamental reorganisation of the study of taxonomy, the analysis of wealth and general 
grammar into biology, political economics and philology. The shift becomes possible 
through a rearrangement of knowledge from the “Classic l” episteme to the “Modern.” 
While the former episteme arrays objects objects of kn wledge according to a 
homogeneous table of identities and differences annou cing the possibility of a general 
ordering of all knowledge, the latter relates these thr e fields of knowledge (the “human 
sciences”) to a heterogeneous origin, to laws of succession and modification that come 
from a source external to the objects studied. At the same time, this shift provides for 
these “Modern” types of knowledge the condition of their possibility. 
These three areas (life, labour and language) converge in Seguin’s work on the 
treatment of idiots, a text central to the reform of instructional techniques in the 
                                                 
14 Chadwick (9) cites Seguin as an authority, but it is through Preyer and Montessori that the general model 
of education as the scientific discovery of natural developmental stages is introduced into anglophone 
education systems. It is Montessori who adapts Seguin’s “method” to normal children, after successfully 
using it to teach “a number of idiots from the asylums both to read and to write so well” as to pass an 
examination at a school for normal children (38). See Goodson and Dowbiggin for a parallel history of 
psychiatry and schooling. 
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nineteenth century and to the establishment of a relationship between spaces, bodies and 
knowledge that would later be essential for developmental child psychology. In the 
regime of instruction and therapy Seguin developed one can also see the development 
and mutation of the techniques Foucault designates as “discipline.” Reading Seguin 
against the insights of The Birth of the Clinic, in addition, establishes the function of a 
visible space in which a form of perception is structured, showing how certain objects, 
the child of developmental psychology and its language, make their first uncertain 
appearance. Seguin’s clinic also marks the construction of a space that relates the 
developing individual, in a difficult and problematic way, to an image of the social 
totality, that is, to the state and the nation.15 
Life 
In The Order of Things, Foucault describes an epistemic break in the life sci nces 
underlying the change from taxonomy to biology. The identity and difference between 
living beings, from Linnaeus to Lamarck, was established on the level of a visibility 
folded in on itself. One arranged beings according to morphological characters that 
defined their appearance in distinction to one another, according to the number of legs, 
the presence of fur, thickness of skin and so on. What all the taxonomic systems had in 
common was their arrangement in a space where a series of real beings was 
superimposed upon an ideal table, where in principle all characters faded into one another 
along lines of visible resemblance. While establishing a variety of differing orders, this 
table referred ultimately to a principle of order, to the possibility of arranging beings 
according to an ordering and representing function which required nothing but a surface 
visibility. 
After Jussieu it was no longer possible to think this way, and with Cuvier, natural 
history was replaced with something approaching a biology. Cuvier arranged beings with 
reference to organic structure and function. Because many unlike organs performed the 
same basic functions (such as respiration, ingestion and reproduction) the criterion of 
                                                 
15 Foucault gives an analysis of Seguin as part of a genealogy of psychiatric power (Psychiatric Power 201-
31). Thus, while his treatment agrees with this one  certain points, its argument furthers a different 
project. Pedagogy, in particular, is not historically interrogated but inserted as a modification of “moral 
treatment” (215) and as establishing “instinct” as a historical coordinate in psychology (222). 
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resemblance was no longer a visible one but related th  knowledge of living things to the 
functions of their organs. Organs were recognised to be coexistent and interactive, to 
have a hierarchy, and to imply other organs and the w ole shape of a living being by their 
presence. From this epistemic break emerged comparative anatomy, where the individual 
is dissected into organs, where the organs are compared to analogous organs rather than 
whole beings to one another. The organs themselves were distinguished into central and 
accessory parts, according to how important they were to survival. Lastly, there emerged 
an ontological division between living and non-living beings, which fixes a primary 
antagonism, and establishes a proximity, between th living and the dead:  
Death besieges on all sides; furthermore, it threatens [the organism] also 
from within, for only the organism can die, and it is from the depths of their 
lives that death overtakes living beings. (Order 277) 
Before and after life, passing into and out of the being through respiration and feeding, 
dead matter is the radically other that partakes of life and makes it possible. 
Seguin sets out the brief history of attempts at treating idiots, with the success of 
the physiological method as its culmination. In doing so he develops a kind of mutual 
determination of the normal child and the idiot. Both, he writes, may be identical as 
infants: helpless, immobile and inarticulate. However, as they age, each day brings the 
idiot’s affliction into clearer relief as the gulf between the normal and the afflicted grows. 
Neither the child nor the idiot is discovered against a blank slate or a background: rather, 
they both form the background to the other and are made determinate by the other. This is 
decades before Preyer “discovers” the development of the child, and certainly Seguin 
does not recover a complete model of normal childhoo  from his investigations. What 
Seguin produces is an image that draws out both the idiot and the model child as possible 
objects of knowledge, observation and medicalisation.  
An infinitesimal interval, and a time for it to enlarge and take definite shape is the 
hollow where this knowledge resides. In surveying the symptomatology of idiots, Seguin 
remarks: 
the majority of young idiots do not differ very senibly from common 
babies; because the power of both may be expressed by the same verb, 
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they cannot. But tomorrow the well infant will use his hands, the idiot will 
allow his to hang in half flexion; the first will move his head at will, the 
second will toss it about; the look of the former pnetrates every day 
farther than the domain of touch; that of the latter has no straight dart, and 
wanders from the inner to outer canthus; the one will sit erect on his spine, 
the other shall remain recumbent where left; the first will laugh in your 
face with a contagious will, the second shall not be moved into an 
intellectual or social expression by any provocation whatever. And each 
day carves more deeply the differential characters of both; not by making 
the idiot worse, unless from bad habits gotten by neglect, but by hourly 
progress of the other. (53) 
This comparison with reference to a temporal origin allows the child and the idiot 
to enter a developmental history that is not only ph siological but also psychological and 
educational. This is not, however, the only means Seguin uses for the identification and 
analysis of the infirmity he studies. He also develops a symptomatology concerned with 
distinguishing idiocy from the various types of infirmity that are confused with it because 
of a superficial resemblance. There is the enfant arriéré, the backward child, who is 
merely slow, while the idiot is arrested in development. There is the dement, or 
masturbator, who superficially resembles the idiot, but is marked by different somatic and 
behavioural symptoms, and whose essence is self-destruction, his “hope, gaiety, 
cheerfulness, friendship, love, future, all given up for the worship of one’s self, and of a 
few apparitions evoked by the mania of self-destruction; his tendency is toward early 
death, through imbecility or dementia” (Seguin 67).  
There is also insanity, of two pronounced types: intellectual and moral. The 
intellectually insane is distinguished from the idiot by “a firm step, bright colours, a 
general richness of tissue,” an emotional impulsivity revealed by the ears and eyes, an 
incapacity of attention and an oscillation between mutism and loquacity (Seguin 68). The 
morally insane also appears healthy, but “his featur s are sharper, his look more shaded 
by the brow, his mind deeper, his intellectual culture easier, his moral propensities worse. 
He is jealous, cruel, unflinching, yielding to force only, losing nothing of his natural 
tendency to cruel sprightliness under a temporary pressure of authority” (Seguin 68).  
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Finally, there is the imbecile, whose degeneration is caused by a deficiency of nutrition in 
later life:  
the same cause which leaves, at the outset of life, the idiot incapable, 
ignorant and innocent, leaves later, the imbecile se f-confident, half-witted, 
and ready to receive moral impressions, satisfactory to his intense egotism. 
(69)   
What makes it necessary to distinguish between these types is their coexistence in the 
single space of the school for idiots and the dangers of treating them in the same way, 
coupled with the necessity, of course, of protecting hem. “But if these children, 
uneducable in ordinary schools, and unprovided withspecial ones, must be, for a time at 
least, indiscriminately treated with idiots, this necessity does not justify their confusion 
with them, nor the social indifference” (Seguin 71). 
For Seguin, there are four types of idiocy, when related to their aetiology: endemic, 
hereditary, parental, and accidental. The endemic form is connected with some forms of 
cretinism; the hereditary form occurs when cases of idi cy or insanity are known to occur 
in preceding or collateral generations; the parental form is referred to certain conditions 
of the mother and father; and the accidental is a result of vicissitudes of the organism 
after birth. It is not at all the causality that unifies the disease, but an invisible centre 
characterised by the dysfunction of an organic structure: “Idiocy is a specific infirmity of 
the cranio-spinal axis produced by deficiency of nutrition in utero and neo-nati” that 
relates to a “specific condition of the mind.” That is, it is related to deficiency in a 
particular function, nutrition.  
All the causes of this deficiency are arranged and discussed. However, a great veil 
hangs over the first months of life: 
But everything pertaining to conception, gestation, parturition, lactation, 
remains enshrouded behind the veil of Isis. If women would only speak, 
we should be able to call upon them in the name of science, a social 
protection they do not seem to need, nor care for in their present mutism; 
and we should soon be enabled to generalise from their individual 
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experience frankly told, the laws of anomalous creation in our race. 
(Seguin 43) 
The identification of idiocy follows the biological methods of Cuvier, as discussed 
by Foucault, which refer causality to organic structure, guided by the want of a vital 
function. The homogeneous space of identities and differences, here the space of the 
school, is cut up by a range of intellectual, behavioural, moral and anatomical marks, 
ranging from the colour of the skin to the convolutions of the brain. This space is cut up 
according to criteria of organic function. Moreover, idiocy is defined by the 
developmental stage of the organism at the time of the deficiency. It is in the organic 
depth of a line receding to an invisible functional ucleus that the idiot and the normal 
child find their co-determining intelligibility:16  
Being given children whose condition prior to birth, in infancy, youth, and 
manhood is perfectly established; having studied th deficiencies and the 
disorders of their functions, their intellectual prog ess and physical 
development under a physiological training, our love for them and their 
fellows must follow them with scalpel and microscope beyond life, to mark 
the peculiarities of their organs as we have done of their functions.  . . . 
That these exceptional children are better subjects, are in fact the only 
subjects fit for the study of the impending questions f anthropology, will 
be readily admitted; considering the relative sameness of the organs and of 
the functions in ordinary subjects . . . And on the other hand, considering 
that idiocy is not an accident like illness or insaity, but a condition of 
infirmity as settled as other permanent conditions f life; that it presents to 
our comparison all the elements of a norma, whether we analyse the 
                                                 
16 Of Seguin’s concept of development, Foucault notes: 
 . . . development is common to everyone, but it is common more as a sort of optimum, as a 
rule of chronological succession with an ideal outcme. Development is therefore a kind of 
norm with reference to which one is situated . . . . (Psychiatric Power 208) 
He further argues that this implies a double normativity, one relating to adulthood (as completed 
development) and to childhood. Idiocy and retardation  
will be situated by reference to two normative leves: the adult, representing the final stage, 
and other children, defining the average speed of development. (Psychiatric Power 209) 
The argument here differs in emphasis: Seguin’s idiots define normal childhood and optimum development 
even as they are thus defined. 
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functions, whether we observe the organs; this correlative status of the 
organs and functions in idiocy is at the same time so certain and so extreme 
that it affords unequalled data to the student of comparative biology. 
(Seguin 75-76) 
William T. Preyer, who is credited as the father of developmental child psychology 
some fifteen years after the revised version of Seguin’s book, has the benefit of the 
obverse side of this call to observation: his developmental psychology is full of 
descriptions of the early infant’s organs such as the brain and the muscular and nervous 
systems, and they relate these organic states, point by point, to stages in the functional 
development of movement, perception, reasoning, will and language. He inherits the 
legacy of so many cadavers and patients, of so many tr ined and instructed souls.  
Biology, then, operates in Seguin’s text as a way of isolating the idiot for his 
pronounced organic and functional correspondences, on which one may base an 
anthropology. However, his is also an educational concern, an attempt to find the 
physiological techniques, based on an understanding of function and sequence of 
development, that will both expedite the development and maximise the capacity and 
obedience of all children. It is through this educational concern that Seguin approaches 
the second term in Foucault’s trilogy: labour. 
Labour 
Foucault notes that, at the archaeological level, th  analysis of wealth was displaced 
by political economy. This was because the essentially arbitrary mechanism of exchange 
value, through which commodities represented each other as equivalences, became 
subject to a source which was external to them. That source was labour, and it operated 
on the principle of toil and subsistence, the healt nd length of life, and the number and 
organisation of workers. Labour introduces a limitation and a history to economics, even 
if, with Ricardo, it grinds economics to a halt and reveals itself as the fundamental 
limitation of exchange, so that, at the end of economic change, at a point of final 
equilibrium, “man” comes face to face with his finitude, with the fundamental and 
limiting reality of his bodily existence (Order 379). 
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The physiological method trains idiots according to a harmony of three “vital 
expressions[:] activity, intelligence and will” (Seguin 83). These functions must at all 
times be trained in concert, avoiding any predominance. Idiocy confers on this method a 
necessity of training every aspect of the human organism that is necessary to perform 
labour: 
Physiological education, including hygienic and moral t aining, restores the 
harmony of these functions in the young, as far as pr cticable, separating 
them abstractedly, to restore them practically in their unity. (Seguin 84) 
The treatment of idiocy begins with prevention, from the conditions of conception 
to the regulation of pregnancy in its activities, excitements, the amount of air and food 
taken by the mother, and medical intervention in cases of preventable transmission by 
“correct[ing] disordered functions, . . . prevent[ig] steady impressions and sudden 
shocks” (Seguin, 85) onto the foetus. Nourishment and warmth must be maintained at the 
neo-natal stage, as must the quality of the mother’s milk. This is not simply because 
nutrition is essential to health but because the ess ntial organs of the nervous system, 
which form an absolute condition for the growth of capabilities, are formed at this stage: 
in early youth, and particularly at the time when the body of the new-born 
actually loses weight, caloric, and substance, if it takes nourishment, this is 
mostly applied to the consolidation and distinction of the two substances 
composing the encephalon. But if this nerve-food is not timely supplied to 
the infant, it becomes idiotic, epileptic, paralytic, or hydrocephalous, 
whatever may have been the cause of the deficiency of nutrition. (Seguin 
87) 
Next comes the “watching of the deficient abilities of the child, and particularly the 
distinction of their constitutional and external causes; many infants look like idiots, or bid 
fair to become such, who are only crippled by something or somebody, and many idiots 
continue for months their marmot-like life, who are thought only dull babies” (Seguin 
87). The difference “may be established only by refer nce to the age appointed by nature 
for the evolution of each function. Among the first, extending the arm, opening the hand, 
grasping, is a series; looking turning the head upon the axis, raising the spine to the 
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sitting posture, is another; hearing voices, listening to catch sounds, reproducing them to 
amuse the organs of audition, is another of the endless groups of capabilities which 
spring up, one after another, and which are so long and vainly expected from idiots” 
(Seguin 87).  
The mother is to be trained not only to “watch over the tardy coming of these 
functions” (Seguin 87), but also to prepare her child for treatment by instruction at home. 
Mere visits to the school will prepare the child for treatment. The treatment proper, even 
though it works upon the lines of disciplinary power analysed by Foucault, emphasises 
the limits of the organism, its fundamental needs and capacities. While details such as 
dress and food are arbitrarily prescribed and detailed, idiocy exerts its own force on the 
world of needs and transforms even the most elementary processes and actions, such as 
immobility, walking and hearing, into something that requires careful explication. Thus, 
with immobility: 
If the immobility of the whole child cannot be enforced at once, we may seat 
him before us, half mastering his legs between our knees, concentrate all our 
attention upon the hands, and eventually upon the one most affected. To 
accomplish our object we put the quietest hand on the corresponding knee, 
whilst we load the delinquent hand with a heavy dumb-bell. Useless to say 
that he does not take hold of it and tries to disentangle his hand; but our 
fingers keep his so bound around the neck of the dumb-bell that he does not 
succeed. On the contrary, we take care to let the weight fall more on his hand 
than on ours; if he does not carry it, he supports it at least. Supporting the 
burden, the more he moves to remove it the more he f els it; and partly to 
escape the increase of the burden, partly by fatigue, his loaded hand becomes 
still: stillness was precisely our object. (Seguin, 104)  
The arrangement of force against force, the minute organisation of bodily parts, the 
analysis and sequentialisation of movements are all f tures of disciplinary power. In 
particular, they are reminiscent of Foucault’s comments on the alteration of the human 
body under the regime of “political anatomy,” when “the disciplines became,” in the 
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seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, “general formulas of domination” (Discipline 137). 
Thus, he writes: 
The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks 
it down and rearranges it. A “political anatomy,” which was also a 
“mechanics of power,” was being born; it defined how one may have a hold 
over others’ bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so 
that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the 
efficiency that one determines. . . . If economic exploitation separates the 
force and the product of labour, let us say that disciplinary coercion 
establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude 
and an increased domination. (Discipline 138) 
Furthermore, the entire sequence of instruction, which runs from the elements of 
motion to reading and writing and is paralleled by a moralising sequence, seems to follow 
what Foucault calls the imposition of disciplinary time: 
It is this disciplinary time that was gradually imposed on pedagogical 
practice – specialising the time of training and detaching it from adult time, 
from the time of mastery; arranging different stages, separated from one 
another by graded examinations; drawing up programs, each of which must 
take place during a particular stage and which involves exercises of 
increasing difficulty; qualifying individuals according to the way in which 
they progress through this series. (Discipline, 159) 
Or again: 
The seriation of successive activities makes possible a whole investment of 
duration by power: the possibility of a detailed contr l and a regular 
intervention . . . in each moment of time; the possibility of characterising, 
and therefore using individuals according to the lev l in the series that they 
are moving through; the possibility of accumulating time and activity, of 
rediscovering them, totalised and useable in a final result, which is the 
ultimate capacity of the individual. (Discipline 162) 
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Seguin’s institution was a purpose-built space combining and accumulating 
knowledge, control and capacity. It is a pedagogised space that prefigures, in many ways, 
the distributed pedagogical apparatus of today. This space is not merely the 
exemplification of the growth of “discipline;” it is also a new modulation of it. Certainly, 
the school for idiots exercises many of the techniques detailed by Foucault. No doubt 
there occurs in the school a microphysics of power, a segmentation of the body into 
useable parts and manipulable actions, an ordering of time, activities and visibilities for 
the moral regulation of a group and a distribution of individuals. While some 
qualifications can be made to Foucault’s general scheme (partitioning, for instance, was 
never total, but oscillated between isolating and congregating individuals), the machinery 
of political anatomy is certainly present.  
However, idiots were never expected to operate withspeed and efficiency: rather, 
they had a specific relationship to normalcy and to function which made their training 
beneficent to humanity and to the state, for they revealed a training that was both 
thorough and moved along the lines of a progress of function. For idiots, their 
relationship to work was arranged so that, first, it would be carried out if it were either 
enjoyable or promoted development and, second, one might work for money if one had a 
particular proficiency, but relations of domination a d exploitation, particularly when 
affecting the health, would make it preferable for the idiot to remain protected by the 
state. Moreover, absolute refusal to work was an organic threshold which, when 
determined as irremediable, was no longer subject to political anatomy. In any case, the 
treatment of idiots does not aim to make idiots work. If it augments labour, it is another’s 
labour, not that of the idiot.17 The idiot is expected to succeed only up to a low level, and 
to show by this failure of completion an outline of human finitude.  
It is true that work will preserve the idiot from “the horrors of idiocy,” but this is 
always as less than normal: 
True, idiots have been improved, educated, and evencured . . . more than 
thirty percent have been taught to conform to social and moral law [and so 
on] . . . but this success, honorable as it is, constitutes only one of the objects 
                                                 
17 That is to say, their incarceration enables the labour of their parents (Foucault, Psychiatric Power 213) 
and their study underpins the training of normal children. 
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to be attained as the honest return due to society for he generous support 
afforded to those who took charge of the new establi hments (Seguin 74-75). 
Now, everything is ready for the triple work of improving idiots, of studying 
human nature from its lowest to its highest manifestations; and of testing on 
idiots the true physiological means of elevating mankind by education. 
(Seguin 77) 
The idiot thus forms the limit of discipline and the condition of possibility of establishing 
it on a new basis, that of the medicalised organism rather than the politico-anatomical 
body.  
The developmental child produced as the object and intervention of this 
disciplinary space affects and limits the operation of discipline itself. The seriation of 
activities and the imposition of disciplinary time undergo a fundamental reorganisation in 
Seguin’s institution. The gradation of stages can no lo ger be organised according to a 
continuous, indefinitely divisible succession. The idiot-normal couple forms the contours 
which it must follow. There is a natural succession of stages which lead to each other by 
a number of specific modes of articulation. At the same time as the natural developmental 
series has been a matter of dispute, it has also formed the bedrock for educational debate 
since Seguin, and particularly since Preyer. Discipline has been replaced by therapeutic 
control, by the processes of determining an organic sequence through observation and 
reporting and constructing techniques to optimise the rate of development. 
As a consequence, the organic sequence cannot be, in th  first instance, referred to 
the will of the trainer, but must carefully articulate the functions with each other, lest the 
primary functions fail to generate secondary or later ones. Thus Seguin discusses the 
labour of the hand as follows: 
The hand displaces and combines objects by prehension: it acts on the 
surfaces as in polishing, drying, etc., by handling; t acts on the substances 
proper, as in carving, cutting, hammering, piercing, by aggression. . . The 
practice of training idiots will show what distance s parates these works, 
what capacities each kind of labour requires; and particularly how the slow 
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and difficult introduction of the child into the class of aggressive works 
will develop in him steadiness, will, and power . . . (Seguin 117) 
These principles emerge despite the techniques of moral instruction used by Seguin 
and his assumption that the sequence could be determined beforehand. Like labour with 
regard to political economy, the developmental sequence is an external source for the 
possibility of “scientific” schooling, confronting the latter with the limitations immanent 
to it.  
The asylum at times based its very functioning on labour, with all the moral charm 
that comes with labour, by retaining only those who, having secured entry and stayed for 
a period, are productive enough to keep the institution going, and free of the taint of 
charity. Thus, the trustees of the Perkins Institution and Massachusetts Asylum for the 
Blind treat pupils on the model of a commercial contract: 
After the first year . . ., an account current will be opened with each pupil; 
he will be charged with the actual cost of his board . . . and he will be 
credited with the amount paid for him by the state, or by his friends; also 
with his earning over one dollar per week will be his own. By the third 
year it will be known whether his earnings will more than pay the actual 
cost of his board . . . . Those who prove unable to r tain their own 
livelihood will not be retained; as it is not desirable to convert the 
establishment into an almshouse, or to retain any but working bees in the 
hive. Those who by physical or mental disability are disqualified from 
work, are thereby disqualified from being members of an industrious 
community; and they can be better provided for in establishments fitted for 
the infirm. (Dickens, American Notes 79) 
Language 
Combining this morality of labour with a disciplinary regime and a biology 
of the organism, Seguin’s treatment represents a pivotal break in a longer 
therapeutic tradition and a crucial event in the formation of educational 
knowledge. The knowledge of the child’s organic development, separated into 
stages and connected to the service of society – both as knowledge of the child 
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and as the production of labour – shifted the practice, scale and goals of education 
fundamentally. When combined with these breaks, Seguin’s use and definition of 
language as a faculty establishes a new object for pedagogy. Language is used in 
Seguin’s disciplinary space as the audible evidence of interior and abstract 
representation. Seguin’s distinction between language as a faculty of 
understanding and speech as mere function encodes language within an 
interrogative power-knowledge apparatus that still erves as a general model for 
schooling. The elaborate “understandings” coded into l teracy in the Curriculum 
Framework, in a wide range of policy documents and across the discourse as a 
whole, derive from the prior insertion of “language” into this ordered therapeutic 
space of instruction.  
Foucault argues that, at the division between the “Classical” and “Modern” ages, a 
transformation occurred in the study of language from general grammar to philology.  
Whereas general grammar treated language as a representation of thought, and thus as 
essentially discursive, philology found in the inter al laws of languages the principle of 
their difference and affiliation. Thus, language ceased to be a representation of 
representation and began to acquire its own singular and enigmatic being. For the first 
time, language became an object of science rather than the more or less efficacious 
vehicle of knowledge. It was at this time, also, that language became the expression of a 
national soul, that it was seen to come from below, from the great anonymous mass rather 
than an elite. Language ceased to indicate the level of a civilisation by the transparency 
with which it communicated thought, and became an anonymous, involuntary change, 
wholly unrelated to thought, but residing in the form of feeling and the mode of life 
specific to a nation. 
Seguin’s comments on the speech of idiots dramatise the use of careful 
interrogation to diagnose speech and illustrate the em rgence of a model of language as 
the organised ability to exchange ideas that resided in individuals. The subject of the 
interrogation is accordingly diagnosed with regard to the invisible organic faculty for 
language revealed in his/her speech. This diagnostic relation is accompanied by a 
pedagogical gaze: the subject succeeds or fails insofar as the speech corresponds to the 
expectations of the trained examiner. Idiots, Seguin maintains, are capable of using words 
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– some possess speech – but without instruction they lack a faculty of language. He 
writes: 
Some idiots are deprived of speech, that is to say, do not pronounce a 
word. Some, speaking a few words more or less connected in sentences, 
have yet no language; for the word language conveys with it the meaning 
the interchange of ideas. In this acceptation, langu ge does not belong to 
idiots before they are educated, nor to those who are but imperfectly so, 
and, consequently, they have a speech more or less limited, but no 
language: strictly speaking, speech represents the function, language the 
faculty. (Seguin, 62) 
Perhaps this description of language as a faculty is a loose use of terminology, or 
perhaps it is a precise expression of what language c me to be in the nineteenth century – 
a distinct power of the mind quite separate from reason, and also from speech. What is 
novel is not the distinction between mere speech and l guage, a distinction which was 
common in the grammatical works of the preceding century. What is new here is the 
normalising status of language; its possession by a normal person, the non-idiot. Seguin 
points to a discovery of this faculty within the normal child in the gradual moving 
division of the idiot and other children, in the constantly widening yet infinitesimal 
comparison made possible by the space of difference in which an observation, an 
identification of salient features, of both pathological and normal symptoms, takes place. 
Seguin (374-376) clarifies what he means by limited speech by recounting his 
exchange with an untreated cretin or idiot named Julien: 
S.- Do you recognise me? 
J.- Yes. 
S.- Where have you seen me? 
J.- Yesterday. 
S.- Yesterday, I was not yet arrived. 
J.- Father has told me your name. 
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S.- Then you know my name, my little friend? 
J.- M. Séguin. 
S.- Well, do you recognise me; have you seen me before? 
J.- Your name is M. Séguin (after a long effort); father told me so. 
I insisted on this point without obtaining any other answer. I touched the 
subject of his progress, which he had heard so often spoken of that he was 
quite fond of listening to it. 
S.- You now learn well, do you not? 
J.- Yes, sir. 
S.- What do you learn with the Curé? 
J.- I will repeat some grammar to you. 
S.- This morning, what have you learned? 
J.- The catechism. 
S.- The whole catechism? 
J.- Shall I recite my catechism? 
S.- No, my friend, but what is an article? 
J.- (A little faster than when he speaks). The article is a little word which is 
placed before the noun; we have but one article, le for the masculine, la for 
the feminine. 
S.- That is very well. Will you give me an example of a noun accompanied 
by an article? 
J.- We have but one article, l  . . . 
S.- Can you tell me the name of a thing which you know, and which requires 
an article? 
J.- I – do – not – know. (This is answered much more slowly than he has 
recited). 
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S.- At least you know an object which has a name, a substantive? 
J.- I – do – not – know. 
S.- But you know what a pronoun is? 
J.- (Quite rapidly). The pronoun is a word which stands in the place of a 
noun. 
The school for idiots is concerned with eliciting the performance of language, 
assembling its elements into a functional unity andrecording and assessing the results. 
This language, which is seen in the school, is quite different to languages that occur in 
philology, the massive impersonal aggregations that define a people: this is a language 
that measures, at every stage of progress, a person. This language is also distinct from 
mere speech, since it requires an understanding mind and a concert of all the vital 
expressions: it is not speech as a surface, but a speech furrowed into the depths of the 
soul. The training of speech participates in a “double progress:” in the “grammaticism” of 
mechanical instruction and in the “natural speech” w ich proceeds from a spontaneity of 
the soul that conforms at the same time “exactly to theories of philology” (Seguin 159). 
Training, which sows, applies only to the speech; nature, which fecundates, rules the 
development of language: 
For a long time we must be satisfied with this double progress, not always 
keeping pace with each other, of formal speech in te training, and informal 
language; later exercises and practice will tend to unite them. (Seguin 159) 
With the work of Seguin, then, a new organisation is conferred upon the school, 
one which combines life, labour and language and pro uces a new knowledge. It gives us 
terms which educational thought has not yet escaped: a child defined by a deep 
organisation which instruction must respect if it is o succeed, a concern with productivity 





Pedagogical Heterotopia  
Tied up with its construction of “development,” Seguin’s institution maintains a 
heterotopic relationship with the world to which its therapy is ultimately addressed. Each 
part of the institution is devoted, in its architecture and furnishing, to eliciting a certain 
physiological process, to ordering space maximally for use and orderly separations, for 
practice and observation, forming at its borders not o ly a preparation for the world 
outside but also a representation and recreation of the world, reordered for instruction: 
weapons are arrayed not only for prehension and motor c ntrol, but for actual warfare if 
the patients are able (as two were) to engage in it (Seguin 262); farming is taught by 
degrees as play, exercise and instruction, culminating in the release of patients to farms, 
where “idiots are not exposed to crushing competition, but receive the concourse of the 
great Helper” (Seguin 264); collections for display are brought by the children and 
assembled “so that references and illustrations from them may be constantly at 
hand”(Seguin 259). Thus with object lessons: 
The objects gathered with the express view of givin object-lessons, do not 
need to be always in sight; where they may be found, a  in such order 
that the qualities by which they resemble one another, or differ, be apposed 
in their resting-places; so that it may suffice to present them as they stand 
there, to exhibit to the children the vividness of their properties. (Seguin 
260) 
The institution is a space of segregation and heterotopic reference: everything is 
reordered and represented, but also excluded: the normal human being and its 
development are seen through the study of idiocy, but the institution can only function to 
study idiocy if its patients are properly selected. Together with a representation of the 
world, the institution for idiots also creates a new object from its inmates, a living and 
modifiable body that is at the same time the representation of the disease that 
characterises it: 
To constitute the broad and lower stratum of a normal institution for idiots, 
they and their congeners must accordingly be chosen in view of forming 
what we may be permitted to call an efficient body f incapacities. In this 
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body the life, though defective, circulates and may improve, because the 
children have been apposed with regard to the repres ntation in the school of 
the many infirmities characteristic of idiocy. (Seguin 266) 
The institution is a completely medicalised space,  place of scientific observation 
and constant experiment, requiring a central and geeral authority capable of directing 
the treatment of each patient according to a “characte .” First comes an initial assessment, 
marking the beginning of the child’s career in the institution: 
The child is weighed, measured in his diverse proportions; his capacity for 
endurance and activity is tested; his powers of intell gence and speech are 
ascertained; his will and habits delineated; a pen-and-ink portrait is drawn of 
his whole being, and kept together with his photograph, as witnesses to the 
point at which he began to be taught. (Seguin 282) 
This is followed by a continuous supervision of theprogress and direction of the 
treatment through a constant and global knowledge of the child: 
Therefore the Superintendent must have an absolute knowledge of the 
children. Others may be more familiar either with their habits, capacities, or 
peculiarities; but none must know them so completely as himself. Then 
come what may, resistance, obstacles in the training, etc., he knows what to 
believe and who to distrust, and can truly superintnd the work. The 
possession of the character of his pupils and of his subordinates is the store 
which supplies his capacity; out of it he draws his be t resources for the 
accomplishment of his subsequent functions. (Seguin 282) 
Underpinning the Superintendent’s functions is “active observation” (283), the intimate 
and timely knowledge of every student’s character and progress. By continually 
generating both knowledge and productive force, the institution produces a power-
knowledge apparatus that is situated between the biological processes of life, the 
productive force of labour and the therapeutic power of language.18 
                                                 
18 On the therapeutic power of language see Seguin (227) for the types of command; also on books and 
exchange of staff as heterotopic-scientific-disciplinary device, see Seguin (289).  
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The space is ordered for the increase of productive force: the functioning of the 
institution is measured by its ability to generate knowledge about idiocy (Seguin 289) and 
by the level of productive activity of its patients. The productivity of the institution 
depends also upon a strict hierarchy and completeness of observation:  
the use of scientific devices does not dispense the Superintendent from 
measuring also the vitality of the children by the physiological standard of 
their activity; to see whether they sleep, eat, play, study, labour with a healthy 
soundness, or show traces of languor or restlessnes i  what they do or refuse 
to do. If these two kinds of evidence coincide in their indications, they call for 
due hygienic interference and instant modifications in the training. Thus the 
Superintendent keeps his eye fixed upon the pupils, and his hand as if he were 
constantly feeling the pulse of the institution. (Seguin 287-88) 
It is for labour and the activity that trains it tha  the Superintendent is concerned 
with diet, and it is from a medicalised knowledge of the developing child that a new 
fundamental basis for educational intervention, a new object of knowledge and power, is 
born: 
the first struggle between the Superintendent and his pupil does not consist in 
showing him letters that he will not look at, but in generating by food and 
hygiene measures a given force to be spent and renovated in increasing ratio: 
this is the A, B, C. (Seguin 288) 
Thus, Seguin’s institution came to know and to discipline the idiot along the dimensions 
of its biological stages, its capacity to work and its understanding performance of 
language, and in doing so generated a knowledge of the normal child and its position 
within society at large. The institution’s heterotopic relation to what was outside 
constituted a fundamental aspect, moreover, of its functioning. The national forms of 
schooling which arose throughout the nineteenth century were, like Seguin’s institution, 
devoted to the immobilisation and discipline of a problem population. Ultimately, such 
institutions were formed under the sign of the nation state and utilised language as a mark 
for disqualifying the forms of life and disciplining the movements and knowledges of 
these populations. Their heterotopic relation to a s cial totality, their status as an image 
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and preparation of the outside world (and the natio as the spatial and linguistic reality of 
that world) was, even more than was the case with Seguin’s therapeutic space, the very 
ground of their being. 
 
Nation and School: Reordering Space and Language 
While the school was constructed in the nineteenth century with a quasi-spatial and 
quasi-governmental relationship to the state, the natio -state itself was being reorganised 
spatially, ethnically and linguistically. The new nation-state organised populations 
towards production, segmenting national space into functional units. This new 
coordination of spaces and populations produced a series of problem populations. While 
the problem populations of the nineteenth century varied greatly, several concerns 
solidify around them. In particular, the relationships these populations developed towards 
language, ordered space and economic recording persist, in mutated but recognisable 
forms, within the discourse of literacy. Schooling, the interrogation of language and the 
traversal and enclosure of space were crucial to the reordering of spaces into national 
complexes. Discourses of development, civilisation and nationality within which these 
problem populations appear are re-invoked and inflected in contemporary literacy 
discourse. 
The problem population is persistently defined, marked, charted and disciplined 
through its language. Contemporary literacy policy inherits this and modifies this 
formula. In the Curriculum Framework, functional literacy involves “the ability to 
control and understand the conventions of English that are valued and rewarded by 
society.” The effect of this is the subordination of one set of student needs (use of non-
standard English) to a greater need (learning to use Standard Australian English 
effectively). Hence, teaching in the English Learning Area involves “recognising, 
accepting, valuing and building on students’ existing language competence” (Curriculum 
Framework 82). This existing competence provides a point at which positive knowledge 
can be generated, the student’s state assessed and instruction enacted more appropriately 
and economically than if s/he were treated as a tabula rasa; an individualising technique 
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at the level both of knowledge (one is evaluated according to one’s position between 
origin and destination) and of procedure (intervention appropriate to this position).  
The connection between the institutional space and the state are, moreover, 
transmuted into the representation of the national language as the point at which language 
and social power coincide. Students “understand that many of the conventions of 
Standard Australian English are highly valued [and] following them is often rewarded” 
(Curriculum Framework 87). They understand that “departing from them may be used by 
some people to make negative judgments about [the offending students] or discriminate 
against them” (Curriculum Framework 87). This awareness ensures a particular general 
direction of student language development which is neither natural nor ascending, but 
must nonetheless be secured as part of an overall therapeutic strategy coordinating a 
national with a school space. The resulting strategy is a setting up of forces, a 
representation of deviation and its punishment. It is a description of the relations of 
power between the student and the society. Needless to say, this representation of power 
is a disappearing act: the school represents the operations of society regarding language 
only as an image of itself. Language is something the school fabricates for the benefit of 
linguistic deviants, and only insofar as a society has already codified this language and 
filtered its expressions into techniques of social preferment and censure.19 
The discourse of literacy finds a series of echoes and counter-echoes in the 
nineteenth century, a network of positions, a cartography which is often surprisingly like 
our own. It was within concerns for the nation, within the construction of the national 
population, that the inability to read and write emerged as a symptom, as more than an 
educational or moral failing: it emerged as the sign of a great divide and of an anti-
civilisation dwelling within the precincts of the metropolis. Indeed, it is in this concern 
                                                 
19 Foucault’s analysis of Seguin focuses, indeed, on the “tautological” use of the school to confirm the 
diagnosis of idiocy and to lead to psychiatric medicalisation: 
the psychiatric power at work here makes school power function as a sort of absolute reality 
in relation to which the idiot will be defined as an idiot, and, after making school power 
function as reality in this way, it will give that supplement of power which will enable school 
power to get a hold of the general rule of treatment for idiots within the asylum. (Psychiatric 
Power 219) 
 This is thus the obverse of Foucault’s analysis: while the school’s function is “tautological” with respect to 
the medicalisation of idiots, it is “redundant” in relation to society. In both cases, it practices a founding act 
in the guise of a repetition: it fabricates what is already “known” through a disciplinary regime. 
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for recording the population, and, through recording, making it available for training and 
national strength, that one encounters the illiterate populations of the nineteenth century. 
Henry Mayhew, in London Labour and the London Poor (1851), introduces his 
subject not with a discussion of poverty, laziness or ignorance, but in terms of an 
ethnographic classification of the world’s population nto wanderers, settlers and the 
“mediate variety, partaking of the attributes of both”: 
almost every tribe of people who have submitted themselves to social laws, 
recognising the rights of property and reciprocal social duties, and thus 
acquiring wealth and forming themselves into a respectable caste, are 
surrounded by hordes of vagabonds and outcasts from their own community. 
Such are the Bushmen and Sonquas of the Hottentot race – the term "sonqua" 
meaning literally pauper. But a similar condition in society produces similar 
results in regard to other races; and the Kafirs have their Bushmen as well as 
the Hottentots – these are called Fingoes – a word signifying wanderers, 
beggars, or outcasts. The Lappes seem to have bornea somewhat similar 
relation to the Finns; that is to say, they appear to have been a wild and 
predatory tribe who sought the desert like the Arabian Bedouins, while the 
Finns cultivated the soil like the industrious Fellahs. (Mayhew 1) 
There are two distinct races of men, but this does not correspond to a divide 
between civilised and barbarous countries. Rather, ir coexistence is as close as 
possible to a universal fact. Mayhew summarises the e nographic findings thus: 
Here, then, we have a series of facts of the utmost social importance. (1) 
There are two distinct races of men, viz.: – the wandering and the civilised 
tribes; (2) to each of these tribes a different form of head is peculiar . . . ; (3) 
to each civilised tribe there is generally a wandering horde attached; (4) 
such wandering hordes have frequently a different la guage from the more 
civilised portion of the community, and that adopted with the intent of 
concealing their designs and exploits from them. (Mayhew 2) 
Alongside the invention of race, nineteenth-century ethnography created a fruitful 
distinction, internal to a nation, between two characteristic ways of using space. Insofar 
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as the national space had come to be imagined throug  a vast range of mapping devices, 
the nomadic tribe was the antithesis of civilisation. There is a barbaric space and a 
nomadic life within the heart of civilisation. The scandal of nomadic lives, with their 
unofficial marriages, their nameless disappearances, th  unassignable and uncontrollable 
spaces they move through rather than occupy, demands of the nation and of the agencies 
of recording their placement within the tables of plitical economy, their immobilisation 
and civilisation. This intolerable existence calls for an end to all that passes outside the 
recording mechanisms of the state. Among the many mobilities and deceptions of such 
lives, deep in the kernel of their secrecy, lies a hidden speech, a fugitive language 
designed for lies and obscurity.20 
The figure recurs throughout the nineteenth-century educational literature of 
reform, with some variations, but always with the general outline of a barbarian within 
civilisation, of a child, soon to be a citizen, without a place secured by the discipline. 
Thus, in his 1868 article, National Elementary Education, Edwin Chadwick quotes the 
schoolmaster Simon Laurie with approval: 
He [the schoolmaster] has a plastic work to do; the work of molding the 
untutored nature of peasant and city boyhood into a shapely form. Nor will 
anyone regard this as an exaggeration of the teacher’s office who has had 
opportunities of contrasting the uncombed, untamed young barbarian of 
civilisation, distinguished for his loose and insolent carriage, his lawless 
manner, licentious speech, and vagrant eye, with the same child, sitting on 
the school bench, well habited and clean, his manner subdued into fitness 
with the moral order around him, his tongue under a sense of law, his 
countenance with awakening thought, his very body seeming to be invested 
with reason. (13)  
                                                 
20 For a detailed description of the nomads in Victoran England and the problems they posed for the 
emerging state apparatus, see Chesney. A similar problematisation occurs in the early imposition of school 
attendance in Australia: see Connell and Irving (190-91) for a discussion of the connection between 
“larrikinism,” working-class mobilisation and the em rging educational state. Letters to the Western 
Australian Colonial Secretary are suffused with a concern about the truancy and intractability of children, 
as detailed in Chapter Six. 
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Bound up with the moral teleology is a complex and volatile rhetoric of civilisation, 
motion and stillness, license and lawfulness, nomadism and settlement. Language is one 
among a list of signs distinguishing the two races within the nation.21  
By the 1970s, the terms had shifted somewhat, but the problem remained the 
backward peoples marked by their relation to space, nd this time also marked by the 
difference of illiteracy: 
The illiterate peasant is generally characterised in terms of his inability to 
read and write . . . . This definition [is] inadequate for distinguishing him 
from the literate. The latter moves fast and far in a world inundated by the 
written word, images, drawings, sketches, diagrams, po ters, film, television 
. . . to an accompaniment of increasingly symbolic noises . . . which 
[underscore] the written or represented element. The assaults on eye and ear 
permanently modify the action of the literate, operat  in depth on his 
sensations and impregnate his sensibility. (UNESCO, Functional Literacy 7) 
The distinction between literate and illiterate is intersected and supplemented by a 
discussion of space; the relationship between the literate and illiterate person has still to 
do with their traversal of space.  
The literate peasant, despite greater mobility, inhabits a well-defined “spatial structure” 
(UNESCO, Functional Literacy 7). It is the creation of a new type of (national) space that 
marks the power of the literate and defines the space of illiterate peasants as empty. If a 
literate space, acting upon both the perceptions and powers of the literate, is the full space 
of modernity, the space of the illiterate is slow and vapid: 
The illiterate peasant moves around much less, and seldom rapidly; he 
lives in a fairly ill-defined spatial structure and in an environment 
generally devoid of man-made symbols, whether graphic or acoustic. This 
non-technicised environment does little to modify his sensations and 
sensibility, or else does it less rapidly. (UNESCO, Functional Literacy 7) 
                                                 
21 The invention of two tribe/races within a nation was by no means confined to European countries. The 
spread throughout Africa of the “Hamitic hypothesis” a  a political is well documented, and has had a 
lasting toll; see Eltringham. 
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“Literacy training,” UNESCO writes, “aims at promoting man’s adjustment to 
change so that he may become both the agent and the object of development” (Functional 
Literacy 9). In this case, the development in question was a combination of 
industrialisation and scientific agricultural reform. UNESCO had, by the time this 
document was written (1973) abandoned basic education nd what it calls traditional 
literacy training, in preference for functional literacy. The document opposes functional 
to traditional literacy in a clear dichotomy: 
Traditional Literacy Functional Literacy 
Isolated, separate, end in itself Group context 
Sufficient command of reading/writing 
mechanisms 
Related to a given environment 
Access to printed word For development 
Diffuse and non-intensive Geared to collective/individual needs 
Standardised, centralised basis Writing and training integrated 
 
Functional literacy is here used in training for industry, but this training, in a Third 
World context “demands not only the acquisition of skills or know-how, but also a 
recasting of the modes of being and functioning” (UNESCO, Functional Literacy 11). It 
is a matter of changing traditional habits: flexible work times must be replaced by 
punctuality; traditional agriculture must be rendered more productive by scientific 
understanding, and so on. The whole network of social relations must be reordered. At 
the same time that the national and international agencies set out to help the 
underprivileged, they delegitimised the knowledges of the problem group and doubled 
the dispossession carried out by a world bent on “development.” 
Development, changing social and economic contexts, competitive pressures, 
globalisation and a range of other terms, become the surface of a world outside, defined 
and confronted by educational authorities and literacy theorists alike. This world acts to 
define the problem group, as dispossessed, deficient, or both. With few exceptions, the 
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tissue upon which this world appears is the nation, defined either internally as the 
operation of forces that define its real historical haracter, or externally as the net 
pressures that act upon its borders. This world permits the characterisation of the 
dispossessed in a wider context, conferring upon them an objective, or at least a systemic, 
status. 
The problem population is made visible by recourse to discourses of development, 
civilisation and the nation. Identifying the physiological sequence of development 
generated a child as the object of scientific and me icalised intervention. Invoking an 
ethnographic space of measurement and space identifed an intractable, nomadic 
population. The nation-state combined the functions f this dual mapping most 
effectively, however, in the establishment of an inspectorate and within the site of the 
school. It was in the reform of schools that the nation l project could most effectively 
impose itself, instituting the discipline of renegade populations. The discourse of 
inspection had, however, to negotiate this project from the beginning, to rewrite the 
imposition of national discipline as a pedagogical service. The example analysed here, 
the inspection of Welsh schools in the middle of the nineteenth century, is a fairly typical 
manifestation of this remaking of needs – linguistic, personal and communal – by the 
self-consciously developing nation. This articulation of needs with demands has 
remained an essential component of literacy discourse, and the school has remained the 
heterotopic site where the nation becomes the visible and distributable object, and the 
tractable social territory, of intervention.  
In 1846, Ralph Robert Wheeler Lingen examined, with h s assistants, all the larger 
schools and educational establishments in Wales. They were instructed by the Secretary 
to the Committee of Council on Education, James Kay-Shuttleworth, “to direct an inquiry 
to be made into the state of education in the principality of Wales, especially into the 
means afforded to the labouring classes of acquiring a knowledge of the English 
language” (Commission on the State of Education in Wales iii). The inquiry was to be 
minute and exact, reporting the legal position of each school, the room size, the state of 
its apparatus, the number of children (both as recorded and as actually attending), the 
organisation and methods involved, the books used and the languages taught, “whether in 
each case in the grammar or not,” the expenses incurred, the number of teachers, their 
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salaries and position in public life, and attendant economic considerations such as 
“whether they have a house rent-free, a garden rent-f e, fuel, or other emoluments” (iii-
iv). Apart from this general injunction that attentio  be paid to minutiae, four themes 
predominate in these instructions: the relationship between Welsh and English languages; 
the role of the Sunday schools as popular religious establishments; the assembly of 
statistical tables; and the certification of masters and teachers (iv). 
The Welsh language was a particular problem in the areas where Lingen visited, 
because it isolated the Welsh from power and status: “[m]y district exhibits the 
phenomenon of a particular language isolating the mass from the upper portion of 
society” (2). Whether in agriculture or in mining and smelting, the Welshman is always 
confined to the bottom of society: 
In the country, the farmers are very small holders, in intelligence and capital 
nowise distinguished from labourers. In the works, the Welsh workman 
never finds his way into the office. . . . Equally in his new, as in his old, 
home, his language keeps him under the hatches, being one in which he can 
neither acquire nor communicate the necessary information. It is a language 
of old-fashioned agriculture, of theology, and of simple rustic life, while all 
the world about him is English. (2-3) 
This knowledge is derived no doubt in part from the comparative grammars that 
had been written and from the Viconican tradition of tying languages to a form of society 
and a level of historical development, but also from the progress of the industrial society 
into which the Welsh were not well integrated, and because of which they suffered the 
status of an anachronism. The Welsh language was dead not because it did not have a 
living tradition but because the state could define the life proper to the nation through its 
complicity with an existing domination and its rewriting of the imposition of national 
demands as the pressure of necessity. 
Welsh was not characterised as a pure deficiency: Lingen recognised the extreme 
elaboration of its performance in matters of divinity. H ascribes this achievement to the 
isolation of Welsh mental faculties: 
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Cut off from, or limited to a purely material agency in, the practical world, 
his mental faculties, so far as they are not engrossed by the hardships of 
rustic, or the intemperance of manufacturing, life,have hitherto been exerted 
almost exclusively upon theological ideas. (3) 
It is in this theological activity that the Sunday-school finds its strength and 
foundation. This “completely unaided” Welsh popular institution revolves around the 
learning and discussion of the Bible by the whole cmmunity as equals: 
Thus, there is everything about such institutions which can recommend them 
to the popular taste. They gratify that gregarious sociability which animates 
the Welsh towards each other. They present the charms of office to those 
who, on all other occasions, are subject; and of distinction to those who have 
no other chance of distinguishing themselves. The topics current in them are 
those of the most general interest; and are treated in a mode partly didactic, 
partly polemical, partly rhetorical, and most universally appreciated. Finally, 
every man, woman, and child feels comfortably at home in them. It is all 
among neighbours and equals. Whatever ignorance is shown there, whatever 
mistakes are made, whatever strange speculations are started, there are no 
superiors to smile and open their eyes. Common habits of thought pervade 
all. They are intelligible or excusable to one another. Hence, every one that 
has got anything to say is under no restraint from saying it. (4) 
The peculiarity of this practice and the fact that it is only tangential to the state’s 
definition of and aims in education are not lost upon Lingen: “Whatever such Sunday-
schools may be as places of instruction, they are real fields of mental activity”(4). Lingen 
goes beyond the mere categorisation of instruction by describing both the content of 
Sunday-school teaching and its social and ritual functions. What is being taught is the 
reading of the Scriptures (the proficiency of which varies with the school in question); it 
is recited and remembered according to “Verses, Chapters and Pwncau . . . [that is] 
point[s] of doctrine, printed in question and answer, with Scripture proofs” (4). Pwncau 
are printed by each denomination for itself, and learning forms the basis of a spatial 
ritual: 
 255 
Each class learns its own part only. As soon as it is well committed to heart, 
the school makes a sort of triumphal procession to other chapels, very often 
to churches, to repeat publicly what they have thuslearned. The mode of 
recitation is a species of chant, taken up in parts, nd at the end joined in by 
all. (4) 
Sunday-school learning thus has a twofold social function: as open, convergent 
public debate and as the interiorised prelude to a performance of recitation. This all tends, 
however, to isolate the Welsh in their own world of theological riches, material poverty, 
superstition and the consolation of the mastery of one’s own tongue which attaches them 
to it: 
The Welshman . . . possesses a mastery over his own language far beyond 
that which the Englishman of the same degree possesse  over his. A certain 
power of elocution (viz. to pray “doniol,” as it is called, i.e., in a gifted 
manner), is so universal in his class that to be without it is a sort of stigma. 
Hence, in speaking English, he has at once to forego the conscious power of 
displaying certain talents whereon he piques himself, and to exhibit himself 
under that peculiar form of inability which most offends his self-esteem. (7) 
Language forms the first seizure of power for the state in the name of life and the 
nation. The language of the minority is rendered at once inadequate, perverse, a 
punishment to its user, the cause of unconscious crowd stupidity and superstitious, 
useless beliefs. Welsh not only directs the mind to theological matters but forms the basis 
of perverse mass action. Lingen relates the religious enthusiasm of Welsh to the Rebecca 
riots and “the Chartist outbreak” (6).  Shortly afterwards, he judges the Welsh language 
incapable of conveying secular matters and, because of th  uses it favours, as radically 
deficient: 
The Welsh language thus maintained in its ground, a the peculiar moral 
atmosphere which, under the shadow of it, surrounds the population, appear 
to be so far correlative conditions, that all attempts to employ the former as 
the vehicle of other conceptions than those which accord with the latter 
seem doomed to failure. (7) 
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The problem of Welsh is not so much that it is used within an isolated, albeit 
coherent and satisfying practice, nor that it occasionally leads to bizarre crowd behaviour, 
but that it creates a popular character that can in no way be integrated into national life as 
it is embodied by business, transport, and industry. The changes in social relations 
brought about by production, which the representative of the state claims to see, claim 
upon him a beneficent and enabling intervention, both f r the good of these forces and for 
the good of the Welsh in adapting to them. To this end, the Welsh language is bound for 
extinction and English is to replace it as the mother ongue. But if this is to occur, the 
existing language and its modes of transmission must be made use of. Lingen calls up 
images of a multifarious network of popular instrucion, an organism for which a foreign 
language is alien. The school, if it is to take up the task of changing the language, and 
through this the ideas of the Welsh, is faced with the problem of the profound cultural 
gulf between the mother tongue and the imposed language of instruction, that is, with the 
political problem of translating the population: 
Through no other medium than a common language can ide s become 
common. It is impossible to open formal sluice-gates for them from one 
language to another. Their circulation requires a network of pores too 
minute for analysis, too numerous for special provisi n. Without this 
network, the ideas come into an alien atmosphere in wh ch they are lifeless. 
(7) 
The native language must become the means of its own extinction:  
Nor can an old cherished language be taught down in schools: for so long as 
the children are familiar with none other, they must be educated to a 
considerable extent through the medium of it, even though to supersede it be 
the most important part of their education. (7)  
Contemporary literacy workers are familiar with this problem: the language forms 
favoured by a group do not correspond to, or have not the same form as, “powerful” 
forms in the society at large. In 1970, Frederick Williams, prefacing a collection of 
papers on the connection between language and poverty, situates the same problem 
within a dual commitment to sociolinguistic field studies and studies of pedagogy 
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(Williams, Poverty vi). Once again, the investigation of language practices must become 
a meticulous map of differences and instruction be made more effective by using the 
minor language as an entry into the standard language, the language of opportunity and 
power. Williams cautions researchers against confusi g language differences with 
deficiencies, which he puts down to “careless interpr tation of standardised tests” and 
“bias on the part of researchers and their techniques” (v).  
One must appreciate and record the difference proper t  every language practice, if 
this injustice is to be overcome. But in acting to pr mote a more benign knowledge, one 
is always acting in concert with the state agencies, with a governmental civilising mission 
which has barely mastered the rhetoric of inclusion. Indeed, the analytical distinction 
between deficiency and difference corresponds to and legitimates a difference and 
division in instructional programs. “Children with rue deficiencies of language require 
quite different programs from those whose language mainly differs from that of the 
mainstream society” (Williams, Poverty v-vi). The children who are merely different 
themselves require programs tailored to the specific haracter of their difference, whether 
it is “bilingualism, dialect differences” or “radically different uses of language” (vi).  
The conjunction between field studies and educationl instrumentalities is an 
inevitable relation since, even if the state is not directly involved in the education, it is 
involved in the measuring of school success and accreditation of schools and teachers. In 
addition, that ineluctable phantom, the nation, resu faces to decide what is a laudable 
goal, to what realities it should conform, and, finally, what the relationship between 
margin and centre must be: 
It is a reasonable and desirable goal that all children in the United States are 
able to function linguistically in standard English in addition to whatever 
language or dialect they have learned in their homes. The reasons for this 
point are simple and practical – the language of our ed cational institutions 
(including its literature), and the language required for most better-paying 
occupations in this country, is standard English. But it is important that 
standard English be developed parallel, or be builtupon, the home language, 
rather than at the expense of it. (Williams, Poverty vi)  
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The development which situated itself at the site of the body, helped by the trained 
eye and the restraining hand of the instructor, is accompanied by the development, both 
natural and compulsory, of a backward people resisting the forces of modernity, forces 
which are bound to change the very environment in which old languages find their home 
and sense. The school fights a battle for modernity, written as the battle to help the poor 
to develop. This mode of transcription has positioned the researcher as the mediator 
between the forces of the nation (the state and the market) and the interests of the 
problem population:  
Still less, out of school, can the language of lesson  make head against the 
language of life. But schools are every day standing less alone in this 
contest. Along the chief lines of road, from the better counties, from the 
influx of the English, or English-speaking labourers, into the iron and coal-
fields, in short from every point of contact with modern activity, the English 
tongue keeps spreading, in some places rapidly, but sensibly in all. 
Railroads, and the fuller development of the great mineral beds, are on the 
eve of multiplying these points of contact. (Commission on the State of 
Education in Wales 7) 
What renders the new education legitimate and truthful is the change of the world it 
both reflects and fights for: 
Schools are not called forth to impart in a foreign, or engraft upon the 
ancient, tongue a factitious education conceived under another set of 
circumstances . . . but to convey in a language, which is already in process 
of becoming the mother-tongue of the country, such instruction as may put 
the people on a level with that position which is offered to them by the 
course of events. If such instruction contrasts in any points with the 
tendency of old ideas, such contrast will have its reflex and its justification 
in the visible change of surrounding circumstances. (7) 
The real language, insofar as it differs from the generalised national language, is the 
object of intervention precisely because of this interval of difference. It is because it 
shares the characteristics of a language with the standard speech that it is valued, 
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promoted and utilised. An empirical knowledge is obtained by ascertaining the real 
language abilities of students, and this in turn enables the school to transform its students, 
to modify their language through their existing language, into that demanded by the 
nation. While there are at least three theoretical and political options here, they 
nonetheless arise from within the same discursive and political location of the mediation 
between the world – whether as mainstream society, modern forces, or a nebulous field of 
rewards and punishments – and the problem population: the Welsh, children, and others 
whose deviance can be identified as linguistic.  
As the instance of the Welsh Sunday schools exemplifies, the problem populations 
included linguistic deviance within their symptomatologies, and their difference implied 
a national language devoid of the opacity, evasiveness and backwardness of the marginal 
groups. The national language was coupled with the national space to create an 
ineluctable demand, an urgent need, within the space of the school, thus reformulating the 
heterotopic conjunction of school and world. However, the model of a purified, 
transparent and national language of interiority, discipline and understanding itself arises 
not from national space per se but from the central pedagogical-disciplinary site of the 
school. The language demanded and invoked by the nation itself emerged as a visible, 
self-evident thing within the ordered, heterotopic space of the classroom. There, under a 
careful regime of visibility and somatic/spatial control, the material devices of instruction 
formed the experience of language that invests the concepts under which literacy 
discourse understands it today.22 
Making Language Appear in the School 
The nation has, as agencies of demand and definition, a number of technologies for 
representing its demands, and it would seem that the definition of the language comes 
from a number of modern dictionaries, business surveys, and so on. The notion of a 
national language, however, is unassignable and diffuse: does it proceed from an 
agglomeration of public debates, newspaper articles, national rituals, pronouncements, 
fictions, performances and small acts of exemplification and instantiation? There is 
nothing about the mythology of nation-states which makes a standard national language a 
                                                 
22 Hence Durkheim’s contention that the classroom’s primary function is to instill a morality of discipline is 
inaccurate: the knowledge imparted directly invests pedagogical discipline. 
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necessary consequence. The points of contact spreading  language of modernity did not 
suffice to create a standard language, but, rather, aided the ongoing project of schools in 
imparting models of progress and language onto the backward peoples. It requires a 
wholly other space, structured and properly, concentratedly national and universal, to 
make this language appear, quite literally, to hang in the air above its subjects. The 
classroom is the pre-eminent space for the emergence of this experience of language. 
Language, as it is experienced within the school, is deliberately constructed from 
the beginning as a real entity standing above and before the community, in a crude 
metaphysics of spatial order. The contention that te notions of language and text begin 
with writing is true, but these notions do not deriv  from the pre-logical relationship 
between speech and writing, nor from the long mutation of texts in their organisation of 
graphical space, but, rather, from a recent form of enclosure and visibility, the national 
classroom, where language is made manifest as a visible object and is felt, embodied and 
enacted through techniques of copying, reciting and correcting. 
The regulation of this language and its appearance is evident in manuals of 
nineteenth century schooling, of which A. B. Orlebar’s is exemplary. Shortly after 
working as an Inspector of National Schools in Victoria, Orlebar, in a textbook setting 
out the arrangement of slates, pupils and text in a classroom, set out a physics, not only of 
lines of sight, but also of light, correction and passage. He arranged the relations between 
the model, the rows of desks, the number of children, light and shadow, the eye, distance, 
size and the guiding line: 
In schools where the formation of large classes is practicable, the children 
should be arranged in parallel rows; not less than en in a row and not more 
than fifteen; and each row being three feet apart, from one similar line to 
another. The model should be hung on a wall before them in as bright a light 
as possible, and the children’s eyes should be in the shade, to obtain the best 
effect. With such arrangements, from 100 to 150 children may be taught 
collectively; for the lines being 5/16 of an inch thick, can be seen distinctly 
by an ordinary eye at a distance of forty feet. Theey  is further assisted by 
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contrast of color, the guiding lines being vermilion, and the letters black on 
a white ground. (Orlebar, qtd. in Austin and Selleck 91) 
The model, a particle of text, perhaps a single character, was ordered according to 
the conditions of visibility in a collective, physical space, noting possible obstructions 
and distortion: 
It must be suspended so high that the children in the remote rows may see 
the model well over the heads of those before them; but not higher, 
otherwise there will be too much vertical foreshortening. (Orlebar, qtd. in 
Austin and Selleck 92) 
Not yet a text, this model, combining sight, orthographic propriety and piecemeal 
correction under the teacher’s supervision, established within an ordered, communal 
space an object that was both handed down to be reproduced and commented upon in its 
visual self-evidence. It was not only this spectacul r materialisation of language that 
formed the basis of the experience of a national langu ge. To be sure, the languages had 
already been separated and historicised as the gradual elaboration of spontaneous speech 
peculiar to a people or to a civilisation,23 and a tradition was taking shape in comparative 
linguistics which would ultimately biologise and raci lise the language group in terms of 
a territory.24 These developments were important also in situating la guage as the 
elaboration of an individual consciousness, as the mark of the free activity of a soul 
endowed with a “mental individuality” (Humboldt, passim). However, this experience of 
the classroom constitutes the appearance of a national and pedagogical language, of 
language as a common possession, as a faculty to which e accede through training, as a 
problematic of definition, imposition and power, and as a material entity. 
This is an epochal event in the experience of languge; this cutting up of space to 
form a proper writing procedure, this setting up, along with the silence, immobility and 
attention of students, a model where language, and also the structure for knowing it, may 
appear. Literacy studies, while not wholly ignoring t, do not recognise this effectuation 
of immobility and making-visible of language, this di ciplinary and ostensive technique, 
                                                 
23 Herder, Humboldt and Schlegel are obvious and influential examples here. 
24 A notorious instance is the work of Friedrich Ratzel. On the nineteenth century’s racialisation of 
language, see Evans (27-41). On the nineteenth-century “discovery” of language, see Pedersen.  
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as a necessary condition for the appearance of textual language and for the emergence of 
the figure of the textualised student. But classroom technique is built upon this model, 
relies upon a restricted grammar for the revelation of language, imprinting it upon the 
child as the bearer of a reproduction, as a knower of her/his own power of it, as an agent 
regularly replicating it both to a certain level of perfection and, having trained his/her 
gaze to see its lines, as a critical subject of this language, the world it purports to 
represent and the power that is claimed for it.  
As the dialogue between Seguin and the “mere speech” of t e cretin Julien 
demonstrates, the act of interrogating a child was passing beyond the mere elicitation of 
mimicry: the recital of the catechism was interrupted by a tabulated knowledge of 
grammar and by a conscious reorganisation of the text into a relation with everyday life. 
Practices like the Welsh pwncau could no longer stand as authentic knowledge: the mere 
memorisation and repetition of a text could no longer serve as a sign of language. 
Moreover, an unschooled tongue was apt, as Mayhew points out, to resist telling the 
truth. In both cases, what is violated is the regulated function of language as 
representation. In Julien’s case, the recitation disguised a real want of development in 
understanding, and understanding, in the depths of the mind, is a recognition that names 
can stand for general concepts which can be recognised as tokens or instances of the 
concept, by a combination of memory, analysis and association. Preyer, thus, points out 
the futility of rote memorisation, which “we require a child to do . . . when he learns 
phrases and vocables the meaning of which he does not understand,” on the grounds that 
it does not develop the understanding (132). 
This interrogation of the understanding is already present in the British Inspectors’ 
Reports, whose method of questioning passes from catechism to the demand for other 
textual operations, and thus, by way of the text, by way of a knowledge of it, to a 
questioning that will diagnose and prescribe remedies and reforms. Moreover, the text 
coexists with an array of concerns and evaluations. Prescriptions for pronunciation and 
reproduction inform the interrogation regarding thegeography and political constitution 
of the country and the events of the Bible, and enable  judgment on the development of 
the children, already marked by their reading and their answers, as the index not only of 
their own intelligence but also of the method, quality, training and class of the teacher 
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and of the physical adequacy of the school space itself. To take a representative example, 
David Lewis, assistant to Lingen, reports his inspection of the Cwmduad Day School: 
the room was so dark that the few children whom I heard read were obliged to 
go to the door, and open it, to have sufficient light. They read the 16th chapter 
of St. Mark’s Gospel, all of them in a wretched manner. . . . The master did not 
question them, nor correct them when reading, thoug I heard several false 
pronunciations. The following answers were made to my questions: Had heard 
of Jesus Christ; he was the son of God; thought he had come on earth; he came 
to save sinners; he was crucified by the Jews; thought he was he was now in 
heaven . . . . Knew the name of the parish, county, and country in which they 
lived. Had heard of the Queen; she lived somewhere n ar London. 6x7=42; 
9x8=49; 3x7=21; 33-16=17; 19+17=36. (Commission on the State of 
Education in Wales 165) 
A delicate set of relations, still detectable and operative in the Curriculum 
Framework, is established between the school and teacher, the text and the world, where 
the child, in its response to examination, is the sign of all of these as well as of itself. This 
intimate and complex set of locating and symptom-reading practices enacted by the 
inspector instantiate and record these relations at a n tional level: in the form of vignettes 
and statistical tables, in the form of problems related to norms (how are the uninstructed 
teachers to assemble reliable statistical data, what are the physical and temporal 
conditions of proper schooling) and in a relation from text to performance to text. This 
act of recording and judging generates the form of kn wledge which, in its reliance upon 
the text as the stable mediator between heterogeneous spaces (the school and its 
instructional space, the child and its cognitive, spatial and economic attributes, the nation 
and its population), constitutes an important part of the experience and the visible surface 
of literacy, both as national concern and common end. It is this form of knowledge, this 
language and text, and this nationalised network of emplacements, that are invoked, 
deployed and instrumentalised in the Curriculum Framework.  
In conjunction with the appearance of language in the classroom, a national space 
was represented in which the mastery of the national la guage was interrogated and 
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performed. It involved an imposing conjunction of elements: a roving inspectorate, 
questioning teachers and children to ascertain both the success of the individual school 
and the growth of the nation towards civilisation; a concern to immobilise the vagrant 
classes, the petty traders, itinerant labourers, foeigners, aborigines, linguistic minorities, 
and to measure their value and their cost to the nation; a massive redrawing of all 
economic and cultural activity into the rise of one i corporated whole, supervised by 
government; a transcription of the population as the health of a single organism; a 
comparison and competition with other countries using the same or comparable 
measures; a problematisation of local systems, rendering them accountable; the 
imposition of a single examination, of mass-testing; the construction of the child as an 
object to be known in its proper mode and stages of development, and to be made 
according to these same modes; a problematisation of instruction at every stage, in terms 
of the character, training, pecuniary incentives and powers of observation of teachers; a 
call for parents to share in the scientific and pedagogical observation of children; a 
multiple construction of the child into a typical healthy child, a backward or arrested 
child, a culturally anomalous and a spatially errant child. The child, the school, the 
teacher, the language they perform, the spaces they traverse, the patterns, values, and 
speed of their work in the national language, were all to be transcribed into the great table 
of the nation. 
While many of these processes occurred prior to the nin teenth century, their 
acceleration, enabled by the project of the psycho-p ysiological study of the child as it 
spread out from the mothers of idiots to all parents, was due to the advent of a recordable 
and testable language and to the new evidentiary sttus of children’s language as the sign 
of their development and the material basis for corection of, and insight into, 
consciousness. Moreover, a concern with the child’s freedom or with the emancipation of 
a social class cannot of itself account for a later, more recent discourse on literacy. These 
options were available from the start as arguments a d emphases, resurfacing with a 
certain regularity, from Froebel to W. T. Harris in the case of the child’s self-activity, and 
from Owen to the Mechanics’ Institutes in the case of the subjugated classes. That 
emancipation may be won through metalinguistic awareness reifies the function of the 
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textualising dyad of school and government, reinstating language, as it is traced around 
the text, as the substance of power.25  
Literacy, in its extension to new and diverse sites, r activates these relations and 
adapts them to new exigencies, including liberatory ones. But it retains, in its 
proliferation and mutation, a certain architecture, a way of resurrecting the same 
questions, a structure that identifies and reifies t a  what is needed. This minimal set of 
relations repeats the call to government, the ordering of space according to a need for a 
certain form of subjection and an awareness of that subjection. Power, need, text, context 
and progress order this space and introduce the imprative for, as well as the bare outlines 
of, an intervention. The pedagogical heterotopia converts all places to itself while 
retaining an ideal form outside of all real spaces. The coordinates established by this 
heterotopia operate insistently within the discourse, from policy documents to critical 
studies, extending a pedagogising and textualising of existence. It is this process that this 
thesis seeks to make evident and, finally, to interrupt. Hence, Chapter Six takes up and 
interrogates a narrative of critical and liberatory literacy by inserting a questioning and 
difficult history of the margins of language, the nation-state, governmentality, text, self 
and the national, developmental subject of literacy. 
 
                                                 
25 Indeed, W. T. Harris (General Government) already articulated educational development with national 
government. See also Stewart.  
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6: Handbooks, Histories and Fictions 
Critical histories of literacy produce a smooth narrative of literacy and power, one 
which, while offering a liberatory program of instruction leaves untouched the bases of 
power in the literacy dispositif. Hence, this chapter undertakes a “counter memory” or 
“history of the present” interrupting this smooth historical narrative and making visible 
the stakes of constructing a past in the image of current knowledges of literacy. Because 
the discourse coordinates heterogeneous knowledges, this alternative history uses a 
variety of sources: children’s fiction, histories, surveys, inspector’s reports and 
handbooks for teachers. Two children’s books, Pinocchio and The Neverending Story, 
demonstrate a dramatic change in the relation between school text and world between the 
nineteenth-century and in contemporary fiction. In the light of this discontinuity, a 
representative history of literacy given in a “criti al literacy” handbook for teachers is 
given a close analysis. The historical narratives produced by such handbooks instruct 
teachers in what to hold as true about literacy. The basic historical mechanism and the 
fundamental deception of such enchiridial fictions is the drawing of a line of essential 
continuity between the reading and writing of the past and the literacy practices of the 
present.1 In response to this, the chapter constructs genealogic l relations of descent 
between today’s literacy and ostensibly unlike things, suggesting a connection between 
new modes of governmentality and the control of language encoded into literacy and 
textuality.2 Additionally, this “history of the present” emphasises a discontinuity, 
focusing on the sudden emergence of literacy in policy in the latter twentieth century. It 
draws upon Foucault’s genealogy of sexuality to argue that, like liberatory discourses of 
sex, critical-liberatory discourses on literacy and the text are related to mutating strategies 
of power. In accounting for the complexity of literacy’s functions in establishing a 
relation of truth between the student and the powers that construct her/him, as well as a 
                                                 
1 This chapter does not address the more populist handbooks for parents, such as Fleisch’s Why Johnny 
Can’t Read. It should be noted, however, that all these books operate on common, but distributed, 
discursive ground. 
2 Bernardette Baker offers a similar critical history f compulsory schooling in the US, arguing that the
exclusion of disabled and special children, along with traditions of enclosure, formed “both ‘external’ 
conditions of possibility for public schooling’s emrgence and ‘internal’ effects that emerged through the 
experiences of confinement” (6). 
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relation between the state’s long-standing imperatives (of measurable achievement and 
constant examination) and the truth of language that operates within literacy discourse, 
this genealogy further explicates the extraordinarily complex yet mundane transcriptions 
in the Curriculum Framework. 
 
Two Very Different Text(book)s 
The instructive difference between nineteenth-century and contemporary 
encounters with texts is demonstrated by two figures: the texts held by Pinocchio and 
Bastian Balthasar Bux. Pinocchio and The Neverending Story are both books written for 
children; they are both concerned with the relation between text, school and world, and 
therefore exemplary pedagogising texts. However, th relations between these three terms 
are radically shifted: whereas the world enjoys primacy over text and school in the 
former, the text and its association with the school encompass and threaten to envelop the 
world in the latter.  
In Pinocchio, Lorenzini tells the story of a piece of wood which, despite the 
author’s best efforts,3 is destined to become human. It can be read as an llegory of the 
transforming power of education for a newly free peopl . Its very first lines remove the 
king from fairy tales and open a space for the charm of common things: 
How it happened that Mastro Cherry, carpenter, found a piece of wood that 
wept and laughed like a child 
Centuries ago there lived-- 
“A king!” my little readers will say immediately. 
No, children, you are mistaken. Once upon a time there was a piece of wood. 
It was not an expensive piece of wood. Far from it. Just a common block of 
firewood, one of those thick, solid logs that are put on the fire in winter to 
make cold rooms cozy and warm. (Collodi 1) 
                                                 
3 In the serialised version the story finishes with Pinocchio’s hanging in Chapter 15. 
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Pinocchio’s adventures, like those of the Italian peo le, move him from one cruel 
master to the next, from one dangerous ruse to another, but finally he graduates from 
being a natural resource (to be used and consumed) to becoming a real boy (the national 
subject, with his loyalties and duties). What is interesting in this pedagogical national tale 
is that the spelling-book and the school are absent from the adventure: Pinocchio 
exchanges the book for a ticket to the Marionette Th atre (Collodi 39). The story entirely 
eludes the school while making the world perform an instructional function: Pinocchio 
learns to tell the truth, to save his maker, to listen to good counsel, and to treasure the 
comforts of home. The discourse of the world completely absorbs the text and evades the 
school.4 Pinocchio is born in the nightmare of a fairy tale, from which he emerges – as if 
educated into being – a real boy. 
Things are quite different in Michael Ende’s The Neverending Story. While the 
school is the unreached destination in P occhio, it is the point of departure in Ende’s 
novel. The text and the reader, doubled in the figure of Bastian, huddle above the school 
in the attic: the text avoids the world. But here, the world disappears in a play of desire: 
above the dour knowledge imparted in the classroom, the text hovers as an infinite 
language without borders, as an other world glimpsed in a dirty mirror, as a glittering 
ruse threatening to trap the reader forever in its endless length if he should, by wishing 
one too many wishes, lose all desire and forget his identity. Another language, 
undisciplined and fantastic, lies just out of reach, in an infinite region where desire and 
madness struggle for the soul. The text and the school, then, form a fleeting territorial 
coincidence, each containing their own worlds. But the text threatens to engulf the world 
and to replace it with a hallucination. Hence, Bastian must in the end return to school and 
family: like Pinocchio, he is changed, he “matures” by living in the fabula, but the threat 
posed by the land of Fantastica is that the text will s allow him, in a space that is both 
boundless and nowhere. 
                                                 
4 For the use of Pinocchio for the purposes of “didactic moralism” in the US context, see Morrissey and 
Wunderlich. 
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Though there are many more aspects to this tale, making it ambiguous and difficult, 
the antagonism between school and world is clearly a fundamental one.5 Beyond the text, 
the real world threatens the boundless confabulation of the text and its revival by the 
reader because it destroys the fabula, imposing “the Nothing” which destroys Fantastica 
and its creatures, turning them into “lies” (Ende 133). The reason why The Neverending 
Story is set above the school is clear, then: it attempts to reconstruct an ideal pedagogical 
space where the text is a fabula restored in its enchantments of desire, horror and terror, 
rather than involved in the dreary lessons Bastian hears going on below him. The threat to 
the alliance between human beings and the infinite literary landscape is precisely the 
school, which binds the text at the edges and assign  it a (de)finite status, converting it 
into a mechanism of discipline. However, it could just as easily be that the text’s efficacy 
is its ubiquity, that control has found a mobile and shifting membrane, an ever-present 
substance in which one finds oneself, without hope f discerning the boundaries to a 
space outside.6 
The relevant passage that forms the cosmology of the book and the world is the 
dying assurance of the werewolf Gmork, who tells Atreyu that once he has passed into 
the Nothing he will become a “lie.” Fantastica is dying because humans have ceased to 
believe it exists, turning more of its creatures into “living corpses” (Ende 151), into lies 
for the use of “the manipulators;” as a result, peopl  believe less in it and more of it dies, 
spreading more lies again: 
“If humans believe Fantastica doesn’t exist, [said Gmork,] they won’t get the 
idea of visiting your country. And as long as they don’t know you creatures 
of Fantastica as you really are, the manipulators d what they like with 
them.” (Ende 152) 
                                                 
5 Among these is its genre: it takes elements of children’s fantasies (but curious fantasies - the Nothing is 
reminiscent of Madeleine L’Engle, for instance, while the infinite fold of the other life draws most clearly 
from C. S. Lewis’ Narnia stories); it reinstates a Borgesian endlessness to language; and it forms what 
Foucault calls a library:  
a site that is nowhere, since it gathers all the books of the past in this impossible “volume” 
whose murmuring will be shelved among so many others, before all the others (“Language to 
Infinity” 100-01). 
6 Deleuze (“Postscript”) uses the computer as the sign of post-disciplinary “societies of control,” an 
argument that can be extended to the extension of literacy and text, as a general means of evaluation, into 
various sites.  
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Lies are the “instrument” by which humans are contrlled, because they live on 
beliefs (Ende 152). Beyond the ideological level of a political fable distinguishing fantasy 
from ideology, Ende inscribes a functional ontology, a distinction between the living 
corpse of the lie and the creature of Fantastica as it really is. Two living worlds coincide 
and communicate but retain their separate natures. Once Fantasticans enter into the real 
world, they cease to be Fantastican and a part of the domain is replaced by a negative 
scotoma, “the Nothing.” In the real world, they become instruments of control and 
destruction. Gmork says of Atreyu: 
“When your turn comes to jump into the Nothing, you t o will be a nameless 
servant of power, with no will of your own. Who knows what use they will 
make of you? Maybe you’ll help them persuade people to buy things they 
don’t need, or hate things they know nothing about, r hold beliefs that make 
them easy to handle or doubt the truths that might save them. Yes, you little 
Fantastican, big things will be done in the human world with your help, wars 
started, empires founded . . . .” (Ende, 152) 
This might easily be interpreted as manifesting the pastoral, introspective 
“principled position” mentioned by Hunter,7 opposing as it does the freedom and 
authenticity of true fantasy against the cynical lies of the manipulators. This simple 
opposition, however, is complicated by the absence of a pastoral guide (indeed, Bastian is 
avoiding schooling in reading this text, and the text is his alibi for absence) and by the 
meeting surfaces of Fantastica and reality, each modifying the other’s state of health: 
“[Bastian] now realised that not only was Fantastica sick, but the human world was as 
well” (Ende 153; emphasis in original). The text and the world may coincide, but fabula 
and reality can never be the same thing. Just as the world threatens to empty the tale of 
the powers of its strangeness, the story threatens to turn into lies and to corrupt the world. 
Ende warns of a dead world and empty lies because the text and the world, poles in a 
circuit of infinite renewal, threaten to merge. 
 
 
                                                 
7 See Chapter Four, above. 
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A Handbook on Texts, Power and History 
There is a gap between these two tales, between the world that could summon up a 
tale and realise it and the text that threatens to engulf both world and story. What has 
happened between the times of these two tales can no doubt be largely traced, but it may 
be traced in a number of ways. The pedagogical text, r presenting the truth of language 
and the discipline of schooling, has escaped the scool under the name of literacy. This 
new text bears both the promise of social inclusion and the threat of absorption into the 
discipline enacted through texts. What made possible this mobilisation of such a text was 
a combination of calls for standardised assessment and attempts at recognition and 
inclusion.8 Within the literacy discourse, the difference between these two texts is 
minimised, since literacy and the text are treated s entities which, though subject to 
different uses, persist over time. The caesura is transformed into a line of continuity and 
takes the form of a law of variation.  
Allan Luke’s short handbook The Social Construction of Literacy in the Primary 
School, presents an argument from a position claiming authority over the interpretation of 
the historical evidence and functions as an “enchiridion” for teachers. Such narratives 
supplement the official policy documents by providing literacy with a set of socio-
historical meanings and a socio-political motivation. They produce a distance from which 
teachers may both interrogate the uses and status of literacy and renew and reform their 
literacy instruction. Beyond this, they pedagogise historical and political thought. Luke’s 
historical treatment of literacy runs: 
Since the Protestant Reformation, schools have beencharged with the 
selection and framing of practices, texts and contexts thought to be worth 
teaching. The evolution of alphabetic literacy in the 4th century BCE in 
Greece was predated by various writing systems in the Middle East and Asia. 
Since their inception, writing systems have been used for the storing, 
recovery, critique and analysis of various knowledges, quite literally as 
memory aids for keeping kinship, agricultural, legal and literary/historical 
records. The movement from oral to literate cultures was far more gradual 
                                                 
8 Graham and Slee offer a thorough Foucaultian interrogation of the concept and practice of “inclusion” in 
contemporary Australian education. 
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and less dramatic than many earlier accounts would have us believe, spanning 
centuries (Graff 1987). The transitions from written o oral cultures is 
evidenced in hybrid literary genres – in conventional forms of written poetry 
which are extensions of spoken genres (e.g. epic, lyr  poetry), and in forms 
of speech which are strongly influenced by written g res (e.g. the lecture, 
the political speech). (Social Construction 9) 
This history is not only worn thin and smooth (the date for Greek alphabetic 
literacy either relies on a special definition or is plainly wrong) but it is involved in a 
form of address that has its own peculiar circumstances and personae. In this booklet 
Luke assumes the position of an expert writing in an auxiliary, but also somewhat 
subversive, relation to state schooling. He is involved in two parallel modes of address, 
telling teachers both what they should hold true about literacy instruction, and also what 
questions they should ask of it and what practices th y should pursue. It is not an 
historical argument: that is presented as already established. Here it is recapitulated, 
inaccurately and hurriedly, but also precisely in terms of this application. Thus, it is not 
important to be right about the date of the phonetic alphabet’s invention, but it is 
necessary to outline a certain argument, namely, that li eracy makes possible certain 
institutions and therefore plays a role in the regulation of power. 
Luke follows this historical sketch with a lengthy interpretation, one which it is 
clearly important for teachers to remember, which it is mperative for them to understand 
if they are to problematise their teaching and transform it, continuously, into the proper 
form of power. The interpretation stresses the role of the alphabet in social institutions 
and the control of populations, via literacy, by elite groups. This historical argument, 
though short, continues for several closely-typed pages, and serves as the foundation for 
the understanding of contemporary schools being advocated. I follow this argument here, 
taking care to chart the function of such a history in an argument and exhortation 
concerned with schooling. 
For Luke, literacy enables the historical development of certain social institutions: 
from commercial and agricultural enterprises to religious establishments, 
from the emergence of disciplines of analytical scien es to new means of 
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government surveillance and monitoring of the populace, from the 
development of new and hybrid genres of literature o the mass 
dissemination of “how to” manuals and popular texts. (Social Construction 
9) 
Luke is arguing, in fact, that literacy is far more than the condition of possibility of 
some institutions: it makes possible certain social pr ctices, forms of knowledge, modes 
of power and types of narrative. Luke streamlines the historical narrative to tell the story 
of literacy as a technology of social exclusion, for 
Throughout its early evolution, literacy as a technology of social 
development and control remained in the hands of a patriarchal elite . . . . To 
be literate was to have access to and control of dominant patriarchal 
knowledges and cultures. (Social Construction 9-10) 
The selection here is produced with an eye to correting the teacher’s perspective, 
to abolishing the utopian hopes conjured up by the “literacy myth.” Teachers should 
know that literacy is a “‘double edged’ sword,” both including and excluding, liberating 
and controlling. Luke sets up this knowledge as an ethical moment, a moment of choice, 
discernment and evaluation: 
What is needed is a sustained, informed revaluation of the place and 
potential of literacies in Australian life and work, not the expectation of 
educational, social and economic panaceas. Many of the current claims and 
controversies over literacy which teachers must address are premised on 
assumptions about the social consequences of literacy for students, 
communities and nations. (11) 
Luke draws some general conclusions: that literacy is defined by its social uses, 
that there are a variety of literacies, that these are introduced through “literacy events” in 
communities, homes and schools in the interaction between child and text (24), that 
“schooling [is] responsible for constructing and shaping for students the potential 
functions and uses of literacy” (43), that children should be taught a critical 
understanding of the way texts work (42), and that it is up to teachers and the community 
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at large to design social futures by constructing lteracies appropriate to the demands of a 
future communication-saturated society.  
It is at the price of despecifying the historical, of writing it under a specific and 
teleological sign, that one can write thus about schooled literacy and the claims made 
concerning it. It is difficult to argue against any of Luke’s conclusions because what lies 
at the very core of the argument is the figure of literacy, a figure that rewrites history as 
the tale of itself and enters into every social act and space. Luke’s argument, which is a 
distillation of other historical arguments, tells u not only what one should conclude 
about the historical evidence and what one should do on the basis of it, but also writes a 
history secured by the ontological guarantee of what it seeks. The presence of text and 
writing automatically means that literacy, in some form, is operating.  
But the sign of literacy operates with a strange fluidity, organising historical and 
social spaces into pedagogical ones, pedagogising the space of thought in which such 
arguments are made. It is this power of literacy to cover over, to enter into and convert 
practices into versions of itself that is the symptom of its function within a pedagogising 
regime. It is this that constitutes, not its relative eternity as a variable, but its absolute 
modernity, its timely situation within modern forms of power. It is necessary to ask what 
history of literacy can resist, finally, the call to form the ethical moment of choice and the 
imperative to hail educators as those responsible for constructing the future. Such a 
history would take the mode of being of literacy and the practices of schooling, as well as 
their conjunction, as very recent things formed by the conjunctures of concepts and 
techniques, of placings, practices and forms of perception that are discontinuous by virtue 
of the fragility of their interrelations. It would thus deny the name of literacy to much that 
bears it today. Such a history would deprive the present of the right to rename the past so 
easily.9 
 
                                                 
9 This is intended in the way Michael S. Roth characterises the “history of the present” in Discipline and 
Punish: 
The genealogy of the present form of the prison is a criticism of this form because it 
undermines the claims of the ideology of the prison to being concerned with eternal 
problems, and because it uncovers the prison’s link with practices it seemed to have left 
behind. (Roth 43) 
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A Foucaultian History of Literacy 
As a counterpart to the historical enchiridion of the discourse of literacy, then, 
another handbook may be offered, another sparse set of landmarks, in the form of a 
critical history that writes power into literacy in a different way. The enduring struggle 
between an educational state (now figured as the globalising neo-liberal nation-state)10 
and the subjects it excludes (variously defined by class, race, gender or sexuality and 
subsumed under a rubric of difference) has, in the discourse of literacy, a descent from 
the nineteenth century. Hygiene and lighting, the norms of the hospital, a disciplinary 
structuring of space and the deployment of the teach r’s authoritative gaze and voice, 
were elements adopted and codified by the schools. In addition, a concern runs through 
the nineteenth century to fix populations in space, to regulate their speech, to create a 
transparent relation between the reader and what he/she says about, and within, the text. 
Since the nineteenth century, the regulation of langu ge in organised spaces has 
constituted the marked substance for the practices of government. Language has become 
the variable that both grades and includes subjects, making each subject visible and 
composable upon a table of abilities; the governable totality of the nation (and a world of 
nations) has become a tractable image of progress. Concurrently, language becomes 
visible as difference as well as deficiency, modifying and intensifying governmental 
operations. What emerges is an imbrication, much like that delineated in The Will to 
Knowledge, between dreams of popular liberation and a form of bio-power operating on 
the body’s production of language.  
To literacy may be applied Foucault’s argument concer ing sex, namely, that rather 
than being repressed under a prudish Victorian regim , and rather than being the key to 
“our” liberation, “sex” is a form of knowledge that developed from the techniques of 
power that deployed it as truth. Foucault’s critical history reconstructs the discourse on 
sex as multiplying and proliferating, in a complex mechanism of excitation and 
incitement (Foucault, Knowledge 48). Drawing the discourse on sex into a relation with
the production of truth, Foucault sees the novelty of “sex” in the West’s last few centuries 
                                                 
10 See Gur-Ze’ev (288) for a statement of the challenges facing “any courageous attempt to re-articulate 
counter-education and resist the violent logic of capitalism, and not solely its violences that become 
visible.” See also Kenway, Pusey, Porter, et al., Seddon and Green (“Re’right’ing”). 
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as the result of “too much rather than not enough discourse, in any case an interference 
between two modes of production of truth: procedures of confession, and scientific 
discursivity” (64-65). A similar relationship between language and truth emerges in the 
nineteenth century. In the nineteenth century, langu ge both constituted the truth of 
particular nationalities and enabled a complex redeployment of speech. First, with the 
spread of mass schooling, a utopian representation of language and nation as coincident 
was made possible: children would be part of a spectacle of unity staged for themselves. 
As a consequence, their language was both rendered more “ordinary” and 
“representative” (middle-class) and more tightly contr lled. Second, the creation, from 
the eighteenth century, of national tongues, generated n ethnographic totality of 
mankind, returning a map, and a fantasy of race, to the colonising countries (the vignette 
standing for this here is Mayhew’s London Labour and the London Poor). Third, a whole 
set of languages became both the objects of study an  the site of eradication, but this was 
haunted by a desire to “represent” the subject whose language was removed, most 
notably in collections of folklore, and in literature. Fourth, language became the locus for 
a continuous and extensive pedagogisation of spaces and bodies, from the very small (the 
child) to the very large (the nation). 
In attempting to account for the manifold objectives, means, persons and groups 
involved in the deployment of sex in bio-politics, Foucault begins with “four specific 
mechanisms of knowledge and power centering on sex” – “a hysterisation of women’s 
bodies,” a pedagogisation of children’s sex,” “a socialisation of procreative behaviour,” 
and “a psychiatrisation of perverse pleasure” (Knowledge 104-05). Similarly, the 
nineteenth-century deployment of language involves several specific mechanisms: a 
developmental biologisation of speech, a symptomatology of subaltern languages,11 a 
pedagogising subjectivation of children’s language, and an economic moralisation of 
enclosure. This nineteenth-century form mutates into a cultural ontology of language 
practices subordinated to a centre, a distribution of developmental types and speeds, a 
textualising pedagogy of language and a mobile and co tinuous enclosure by language 
itself.  
                                                 
11 See Wardle (9-10). 
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In the final chapter of The Will to Knowledge, Foucault positions the concern with 
sexuality within the historical practice of governmentality, and specifically within the 
form of bio-power. Whereas until the seventeenth century the sovereign’s “power of life 
and death” was exercised as the power to kill the subject or refrain from killing, and 
corresponded to a right of seizure (Knowlegdge 136), modern regimes, based on 
“government” rather than “sovereignty,” sought to seize and control the forces of life and 
the anatomical possibilities of human beings, exerting “a power bent on generating 
forces, making them grow, and ordering them” (136).12 An array of techniques for 
managing, measuring and regulating the forces of life, and a set of political technologies 
for disciplining the body and rendering it efficient, form the basis of Foucault’s argument 
about “the importance assumed by sex as a political ssue” (145). Among the many 
historical changes in the form of power in Western countries, he writes of the “growing 
importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense of the juridical system of 
the law” (144). A normalising power “has to qualify, measure, appraise, and hierarchise   
. . .” (144). Once this relation to life became a part of political techniques, however, it 
was subject to reversals:  
What was demanded and what served as an objective was life, understood as 
the basic needs, man’s concrete essence, the realisation of his potential, a 
plenitude of the possible. Whether or not it was Utopia that was wanted was 
of little importance; what we have seen has been a real process of struggle; 
life as a political object was in a sense taken at face value and turned back 
against the system that was bent on controlling it. (145) 
Literacy belongs within this general expansion of bi -power, of a set of knowledges 
and practices which produced language as a political object by applying a power of 
observation, regulation, and normalisation to the school, the teacher, the student and the 
text. Beyond Foucault’s historicising of the body, in the elaboration of a science of 
language and the mind,13 there is a supplementary history of the techniques of power, 
more or less subtle, geared towards the making of productive individuals: 
                                                 
12 See also Mayo. 
13 See Tolchinsky for a typical latter-day example.  
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This political investment of the body is bound up, in accordance with 
complex reciprocal relations, with its economic use; it is largely as a force 
of production that the body is invested with relations of power and 
domination; but, on the other hand, its constitution as labour power is 
possible only if it is caught up in a system of subjection (in which need is 
also a political instrument meticulously prepared, calculated and used); the 
body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a 
subjected body. This subjection is not only obtained by the instruments of 
violence and ideology; it can also be direct, physical, pitting force against 
force, bearing on material elements, and yet without involving violence; it 
can be calculated, organised, technically thought out; it may be subtle, make 
use neither of weapons nor of terror and yet remain of a physical order. That 
is to say, there may be “knowledge” of the body that is not exactly the 
science of its functioning, and a mastery of its forces that is more than the 
ability to conquer them: this knowledge and this mastery constitute what 
might be called the political technology of the body. (Discipline and Punish 
25-6) 
Literacy constitutes a knowledge arising from this political investment of the body, 
from a whole series of image-repertoires, from a battery of problems to do with the 
control of meaning that arose in the last two centuries, from ways of transforming certain 
problem populations, from new functional sites where language became a tactical device 
of truth and power. In addition, literacy is a very recent concept, insofar as it is 
constituted within certain minimal discursive relationships between agencies, types of 
person, forms of knowledge, subjection and governance. These conditions constitute a 
specific arrangement of relations between certain objects (text, language, student, 
school), surfaces of emergence (the demanding, changing world), points of diffraction 
(phonics or whole language;14 basic skills or critical literacies; standardised t sting or a 
culturally sensitive typology of language use) and  type of subjectivation (the 
recognition and elaboration of language as the substance of the developing self).  
                                                 
14 This opposition arises from a previous distinction between synthetic and analytic techniques in reading 
instruction: see Sully (195-6). 
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Literacy is a form of power that generates a proliferation of problematising 
knowledges, one that defines itself as the politics of instruction and secures its right to 
represent society in a managed contestation. The role of the state is essential to this, not 
as the univocal imposer of curricula but as the arbiter, as the site of compromise and 
contest, between ever-reconstituted interests, groups and definitions. It should be noted, 
of course, that the state ends up inscribing a preference for certain interests, but it should 
also be recognised that the state keeps the contest op n, allows all voices at least a token 
hearing, a transcription into the terms of reference, into policy documents. This political 
dimension is a correlate of the reconfiguration of language and text within schooling, 
bridging the interval between the two texts mentioned above. The power engendered by 
this reconfiguration enjoins one to maintain the student and the text in a mutual relation 
of elaboration. The school acquired its own particular invention, the secular school 
textbook. No such book exists or existed outside of the school, and although the same 
material artefact may persist across social space, and may even be read in different 
places, only the organised space of instruction and interpretation, only the school, permits 
it to exist in its particular and distinguishing relations to interpretation, assessment, and 
the hierarchical distribution of literate abilities and understandings. The textbook, 
“language” and the school are important elements in he pedagogisation of social space.15 
The pedagogical text, which represented both the truth of language and the evidence of 
discipline, has since been generalised: it has escap d the confines of the school under the 
name of literacy. Having one’s literacy defined and i cluded carries with it the pleasure 
of recognition and the hope of integration, but it also carries with it the threat of 
absorption into the ubiquitous disciplinary mechanism of the text.16  
In the nineteenth century, the rule of force in schools was replaced by a careful 
rearticulation of space, signals and language. It is no accident, then, that punishment, long 
associated with an encounter with the Word, should in the nineteenth century become 
unified with an instruction in language: the ABC, grammar, phonology, tone, spelling, 
                                                 
15 Kaplan extends this category to hypertexts, as do everal policy documents (see Lo Bianco and 
Freebody) and other works on critical literacy (see Hayes; Taylor; Mikulecky; Kirkley). 
16 From this point of view, the political economy of the text book and its cultural politics (see Apple; D  
Castell, Luke and Luke) are subsidiary issues. Studies of the ideology of children’s books (see Dixon) 
similarly assume their pedagogical function as textbooks. An early example of the conversion of texts to 
textbooks is Adler. 
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writing and elocution are the disciplines for a proper disposition of the body and the 
instilling of good habits. The language of the school acquired a technology of 
moralisation as it replaced physical punishment as the most direct means of control. 
Thus, an 1873 manual of school discipline instructs teachers not to raise the voice in 
anger, not to strike a child, not to use such “wrongful and injurious” punishments as 
locking the child in a closet, or enforcing “unnatural and long-continued attitudes of 
restraint,” since these “are all a resort to mere physical force, instead of moral incentives, 
and involve no appeal to a sense of honor or duty in a child” (New York Board of 
Education 4-5). The problem with the methods of force is that they enforce physical 
rather than moral habits, they undermine the teacher’s authority, and do not result in real 
obedience (5). The art of discipline is defined by a prohibition against violence, and 
involves a complex of signals and automatic responses, a modulation of the voice 
combined with a coding of authority into the space of instruction. 
The training of the senses in the work of Seguin had as its basis the 
intellectualisation of every modality, but here thebody is disciplined by language and 
space: language in the instructing voice and in the tasks of reading and writing, space in 
the arrangement and ordering of pupils and in the arrangement of visible authority. The 
teacher must be a master of lines of sight and the use of the voice as a signal: 
In directing the various movements required of the pupils, care should be 
taken never to touch them. The teacher should take such a position before 
the class as will command the eye of every pupil, and thence direct by the 
voice, or by a signal. Pupils must be habituated to the impression that the 
teacher will give his commands but once, and that tey must be obeyed at 
once. (New York Board of Education 5)  
While such practices are no longer the norm today the retain an important role, for 
it was through them that the alliance of language and space, far from being a textual 
peculiarity, was established as the model of power for the school. Much of this general 
model still persists in manuals of classroom discipline, with an emphasis on fostering a 
cooperative and supportive environment. However, th nineteenth century writers were 
clear in relating this technology of language and space to the maintenance of an 
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efficacious power relationship. The teacher’s authori y and the student’s submission were 
ensured by a careful use of the voice which, however disapproving, must never be harsh, 
since anger and resentment destroy authority: 
On the contrary, the language used, and the tones of the voice, should always 
express a feeling of sympathy with the child. This is the way to win the 
youthful mind, and to bend the will, through the affections; a different course 
will antagonise it, and prevent all real submission, securing only a temporary 
semblance of obedience. (New York Board of Education 5) 
This is a long way from the discourse of literacy as it stands today, yet it provides a 
polemical model, a line of descent that marks the school’s knowledge of language as 
deeply imbued in the disciplining of children. A disciplinary use of language within the 
school has initiated the catoptrics in which an image of language as discipline was born. 
In its relationship with a given text and the teacher’s authoritative knowledge of it, the 
performance of the student is a sign leading, in its imperfections, to an image, never 
complete but always gestured at, of the language as a set of proprieties. It is possible to 
establish both a line of descent for the forms of government, control, regulation, 
assessment, and correction, and a locus of recent establishment and invention of this 
particular “language.” Language is the “system,” neither wholly invisible nor wholly 
manifest, through which a text selects its particular form. Language is moreover modified 
by practices which have their own systems of approval, codes of ethics, distribution of 
cultural rewards, and “logics.” Language instruction and the teaching of language can be 
said to arise from a single, recently assembled ordering space.17 This accounts, in a 
genealogical way, for the success of the teaching of ational languages: the class forms 
the real locus of a national representation, as a set of individuals arrayed according to the 
one authority, subject to the same knowledge, engagi  in work that, fundamentally, 
unites them in the common task of submitting and learning.  
Alongside the model of language as a system of regulations, if not somewhat 
earlier, emerged the textual spectacle of language displayed in the classroom. It is with 
                                                 
17 This accords with and somewhat extends Deleuze and Guattari’s contention (Thousand Plateaus 75-6) 
that language orders: here language (as both ordering and ordered) is itself the corollary of a disciplinary 
space.  
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the Lancaster schools that the book became the common property of all, coterminous 
with the walls of the classroom, and an ideal possession beyond its material 
manifestations. Lancaster seized upon the new economies realised by the factory, 
converting its internal space into the inside of a book, always open and in use: 
It will be remembered, that the usual mode of teaching requires every boy to 
have a book: yet, each boy can only read or spell on  lesson at a time, in that 
book . . . . [I]f a spelling book contains twenty or thirty different lessons, and 
it were possible for thirty scholars to read the thirty lessons in that book, it 
would be equivalent to thirty books for its utility. To effect this, it is desirable 
the whole of the book should be printed three times larger than the common 
size type, which would make it equal in size and cost t  three common 
spelling books, value from eight-pence to a shilling each. Again, it should be 
printed with only one page to a leaf, which would again double the price, and 
make it equivalent in bulk, and cost to five or sixcommon books; its different 
parts should then be pasted on pasteboard, and suspended by a string, to a nail 
in the wall, or other convenient place: one pasteboard should contain the 
alphabet; others, words and syllables of from two to six letters. The reading 
lessons gradually rising from words of one syllable, in the same manner, till 
they come to words of five or six letters, or more, preparatory to the 
Testament lessons. (Lancaster 50) 
By the twentieth century, the curriculum had elaborted a complex and political 
distribution of language, not only over the space of the classroom, but throughout the 
territory to which its students belonged. “English” was divided not only into grammar 
and composition, but also into the history of English, and it was ramified by 
racial/national history and geography,18 as Lingen had previously wished for the Welsh. 
By removing children from their locality, an “abstract” experience of the nation, and of 
the national language, was made possible. It is this language, with its continuous 
judgements of competence, with its insistence on the presence and attention of the pupil, 
and with its confessional revelations of character, that re-emerges in the space of 
                                                 
18 See Willis and Central Board of Education. 
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innumerable literacies, innumerable rule-bound system  that, formalisable as a set of 
rules, can be employed in a power of naming, represnting, marking and instructing, a 
power that rewards by its total and individualising clusion. 
On a completely different scale, a state recording apparatus emerged, a technology 
for collecting the barest data of the ability to read and write, for assembling a table which, 
at one glance, could act as an image of the nation, of its progress and reversals. The 
census, which had been in existence for some time, now joined the examination to 
provide “reliable” literacy rates, and attendance reports determined, under the threat of a 
school closure, how many students were in their appointed places. In Britain and 
Australia this was done at the price of universal compulsion, of paying “Compulsory 
Officers” and police, to arrest or report vagrant children, to punish their parents. In a 
letter (dated November 6 1888) to the Secretary of the Central Board of Education, 
Charles Barclay Kidson, Secretary of the Perth District Board of Education, performs and 
represents the supervisory and disciplinary hierarchy thus: 
Sir, 
        I have the honour to inform you that the District Board of Education 
has directed me to draw you attention to a family of the name of 
Campbell, living in the most deplorable state of poverty, in Howlett’s 
Cottages, Roe Street. Owing to the laziness of the fat r, a worthless 
drunkard and well-known to the Police, the children, six or seven in 
number, are nearly destitute of clothing. The District Board are given to 
understand that these children never attend a School. 
        The District Board suggests that the children should be removed from 
the custody of the parents, and that they should be placed at the 
Orphanage. 
The “present method of punishing,” Kidson’s letter continues, is insufficient, and he 
suggests that an “Industrial School should be instituted.”  
An apparatus of enforcement and obligation accompanied the introduction of 
compulsory universal education, making use of existing institutions to punish, correct 
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and, above all, to enclose the child. The Industrial Schools Act (1874) divided truants 
into criminal and non-criminal. While the former were surrendered to parents or 
guardians, the latter could be sentenced to five years of imprisonment or penal servitude. 
The Western Australian Commissioner of Police (in a letter to the Colonial Secretary of 
1st July 1887) explains the benefits of Police legislat on: 
The 19th Section of the Police Act 25 Vic. No. 15. on the subject of 
vagrancy will enable the Police in many cases to bring these waifs and 
strays under the notice of the Magistrates, and if in those cases the children 
be handed over to an “Industrial Institution” the public will be great gainers 
except with reference to the money charges – But even on this head, 
computed on the principle of profit and loss, the balances will be to the 
public; because in such an Institution the children ca not steal, and may 
possibly have good principles instilled into them. 
In addition to these coercive measures, a technology of retention had of necessity 
been developed. The old regulation of the teacher’s manner, the Christian schools’ use of 
emulation, “Love” and the sympathetic voice was industrialised and put to work in 
“controlling and directing the influence lads have over each other” (Lancaster 34), and 
later embedded within the teacher’s language, as both the instrument of discipline and the 
matter to be learned. But this is insufficient in accounting for the specific power of the 
educational state’s control of space and the self. What supplements and perfects these 
measures is a relation of the student to her/himself a  composed of a substance that 
belongs to the space and naturally requires education. J. J. Findlay points out that, for 
nineteenth century education, the creation of a self that required instruction was a central 
event: 
the reaction in the child’s inner self to the interest taken by adults in his 
welfare is a capital feature in the entire story of nineteenth-century education. 
(Findlay 148) 
Indeed, this event was both epochal and personal, as Ad ms implies: 
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The becoming aware of the self as a being to be educated is as clear and 
definite an event – albeit of much more importance – as the becoming aware 
of the existence of the platypus. (Adams 73) 
It has been argued that a long struggle brought about the secularisation of the 
curriculum, and that literacy is the perennially contested terrain that we have inherited 
from the English-speaking working classes, or even th  working class of Europe.19 And 
yet mass schooling was conceived as both a Christiani ing and an industrialising project. 
If, for instance, the Welsh poor were not exactly unchristian, their piety was taught at the 
expense of the demands of the modern world, their vibrant popular forms were irrelevant 
to a world that, for the education official, made demands on the forms and uses of their 
knowledge. A number of borrowings occurred between th  educational authorities of the 
countries of Europe in the nineteenth century, building upon a foundation of graded 
discipline in the three R’s and the catechism. At the same time, a number of popular 
institutions were gradually invalidated, such as the hedge school, the dame school and the 
Sunday schools, by applying a set of new criteria alien to them. The school adopted the 
norms of the hospital in hygiene and lighting, as well as in the authority of the teacher’s 
gaze. Most clear of all, a concern runs through the nin teenth century to fix the student in 
space, to regulate her/his speech, to create a transparent relation between the reader and 
what he/she says about, and within, the text.  
A history of literacy as power-knowledge is also a history of exclusions, divisions 
and limitations. In forming the proper school, a network of educational authorities 
emerged, defining the proper school as a place of light, hygiene and authority, of a 
language and a curriculum designed for the new times faced by the modern 
industrialising nation. A nation had not only to be unified under the sign of a single 
language, but its members also had to be fixed in space, for their productivity and 
capacities to be known. It was under these conditions that a dual process occurred: a 
scandal concerning the itinerant and unaccountable mode of existence of the poor and 
criminal classes, and a morality attached to recording and recognising the language, 
trajectories and economic output of this population. In this sense, Mayhew and Binney 
                                                 
19 See Vincent (Popular Culture passim). 
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stand as the counterpart to Seguin, Itard and Montessori: along with the scientific project 
of discovering the processes specific to childhood an  exploiting them in instruction and 
discipline emerged a concern to render in writing the real speech and economic existence 
of the unaccountable populations. This knowledge, with its philological collections of 
folk-tales and adages, was disingenuous in its lamentations on the imminent 
disappearance of such cultures: it was part of the process of rendering them improper and 
unviable. The problem of exclusion was the counterpart of a state demand for inclusion, 
for greater efficiencies in national production. Writing, both as the recording of these 
populations and the discipline that came to be expected of them, was thus part of a 
disciplinary process of enclosure and partitioning.20 
With a great many variations, schools (Parish, Sunday, Dame, hedge and Charity 
schools) came to represent the scandalous practice of partisan indoctrination of religious 
and political kinds, once the state came to inspect and evaluate them. An institution for 
criticising and disqualifying schools was arranged, numerating the faults of the smaller 
and now unqualified institutions. Among the many criteria for judging poor schools 
inadequate, the failure to teach reading and writing (or even speaking, in the national 
language) took its place alongside political sedition and disease.21 Frequently in the 
English Sunday Schools of the early nineteenth century, he program was in fact to instill 
a terror of sin, and writing was often actively discouraged.22 We can see the criteria of a 
good school in Lingen’s rhetorical questions regarding a good school: 
Is light essential, and that the scholars should be under the control of the 
master’s eye? . . . Is ventilation essential to healt , nd space to discipline 
and method? . . . Is it at any rate desirable to be protected from the weather? 
(Commission on the State of Education in Wales 15-17)  
Schools in all their variety came to be disciplined by an inspectorate, which insisted 
upon the meeting of certain basic criteria derived from concerns for discipline, health and 
enclosure. The need for light calls upon a long iconography of reason, but this time it is 
structured in a new way. The hierarchy of gazes depends upon a complete illumination of 
                                                 
20 See Foucault (Discipline 141-43). 
21 See Vincent (Mass Literacy 27) and Walkerdine (“Developmentalism”). 
22 See E. P. Thompson (414-5) and Raymond Williams (135-6). 
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its objects: the master’s authority consists in seeing and controlling, ideally in an 
incorporeal way, the pupils in his care; the pupil’s mastery relies upon the clear light in 
which s/he sees the objects of a future mastery, on the clear “light” of exposition and 
instruction, on the light that renders books legible and things visible; discipline and 
method require a space ordered by a light that permits the authoritative gaze. 
This history of the school does not of itself constitute a genealogy of the practices 
of literacy. One must draw lines of descent from various, often heterogeneous sources. 
The school itself was the space of a convergence: it was not only a place of representation 
but also the laboratory of certain forms of ordering and administrative and operational 
assessment. Individual instruction became mass instruction through certain techniques 
and through the functional reordering of the class space, and became more efficient 
through the division of students into classes and gra es. Moreover, in the 
operationalisation of literacy discourse, the problem of representing the world and its 
forces is brought into close articulation with the psychological development of the reader, 
so that the figure of understanding has certain landmarks within the student him/herself. 
State intervention in education was formulated as aproblem not of the general 
population but of the specific populations: of the poor, the mentally deficient, the 
working classes, the freed slaves, and various ethnic groups. The problem of the poor was 
constituted as a problem of fertility and death, and of the relation between fertility and 
food supply.23 The mass schooling of the nineteenth century focussed its efforts at reform 
and control upon the children of the poor. What made the schooling of the poor inevitable 
and practicable underwent a series of modifications. The child in the nineteenth century 
was primarily the object of a charity enthralled by the theology of work, an object 
thought reformable by the imposition of an arbitrary environment, subject to techniques 
of punishment imported from the prison reforms. The c ild constituted a social danger, 
not only in terms of criminality and pauperism, butalso with regard to the desire to locate 
and fix it, to render it productive for, and of, the society. Schooling was part of a larger 
project of the spatial anxieties that surrounded th category of the poor: the promiscuous 
mingling of bodies and the spread of disease; the secretive and furtive parasitism of 
                                                 
23 See Mitchell Dean’s The Constitution of Poverty for a Foucaultian history of Poor Law repeal in the
1830s. 
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begging and theft; their illegitimate marriages avoiding the official duties and a place in 
the parish register; their unknown contribution to the national economy; the unknown 
provenance of their children; their lack of Christian knowledge; their improper and often 
exclusive language; entire lives lived without the cognizance of the authorities, a scandal 
of ignorance for the state and the society.  
Thus, there arose a whole range of Christian philant ropic efforts (the Sunday and 
Charity schools, certainly, but also the “child abduction” societies like the Children’s 
Friend Society).24 What made these efforts cogent and intelligible was not the idea of an 
autonomous childhood endowed with certain rights but childhood as the site of battle 
between a poor, opportunistic and nomadic class – tactical in its use of spaces and 
categories invented by others – and a disciplined, utopian, investing and reforming class 
– or, more precisely, groups who set up these distinctions and this scandal and acted upon 
them. This battle involved transportation and extraleg l punishment (modeled on 
techniques current for prisoners), but at the same ti  it attempted an alignment of this 
refractory class with the demands made on it by society (industrial urban society or 
colonial society) and by God. The poor must be fixed in space and given legal identities, 
skills and capacities and a trained habit of work; and they must know enough Scripture 
for salvation. They must therefore also have a properly educational childhood. 
Poverty, and the childhood of poverty, were distributed across a number of sites 
and non-sites, places where they become visible and also places specifically constructed 
for their disappearance, which are sometimes the very same places under a new order of 
description. Children appear in prisons, workhouses, factories, and schools (Charity, 
Sunday etc.). In the early nineteenth century, there was a reaction against the instruction 
of the poor in Mechanics’ Colleges, and even for Methodist schools and hedge schools: 
for a great many men of the elite, these were hotbeds of Jacobinism and revolution. Over 
time they would be slowly destroyed with accreditation, inspection, the funding of 
assisted schools, and the institution of a standard syllabus, but at this time a focus on 
children, associated as they already were with reproduction and an anxiety about their sex 
and their death, about the salvation of their souls, was underwritten by a further anxiety 
                                                 
24 See Blackburn for a detailed history of the Children’s Friend Society.  
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concerning their delocalisation. It is not true to say, as Noelene Reeves (53) does, that 
education in England was concerned with the reproduction, and the colonies with the 
establishment, of a social order: both sites were producing a fundamentally new object, 
the population as a disciplined and moralised body of workers, and both set their sights 
primarily on reforming the “rising generation.” If the children of deported prisoners 
received religious instruction through reading tuition and the catechism in the colonies, it 
is because they were considered part of the same population, the children of the poor, 
who were subject to virtually the same regime in Engla d, Wales and Scotland.  
The desire for a knowledge of the poor had been stimulated in the reading public 
through melodramas and novels. Hugh Cunningham identifies three discourses in the 
mid-nineteenth century concerning street-children: a religious discourse of rescue, a 
“professional” discourse of limiting juvenile delinquency, and a literature of “child-
watching” (Cunningham 101-02). A central moment of his literature is Henry Mayhew’s 
London Labour and the London Poor, where children of the street are assembled as part 
of a statistical and ethnographic study. In this work, as mentioned in the preceding 
chapter, the problem of poverty was formulated in terms of a division between a settled, 
thrifty and civilised race and a mobile, deceiving, and uncivilised one.  
Insofar as speech and language are concerned, the poor and criminal alike speak 
cobbled-together languages belonging to another rac, a language of travellers: 
The language spoken by this rambling class is peculiar in its construction: it 
consists of an odd medley of cockneyfied English, rude provincialisms, and a 
large proportion of the slang commonly used by gypsies and other 
“travellers,” in conveying their ideas to those whom they wish to purchase 
their commodities. (Mayhew 479) 
In his calculation of the numbers of each of his sub-populations and their respective 
exchanges, Mayhew repeatedly invokes the imperative of ascertaining these numbers. 
Such knowledge, however, is rendered impossible because of the mobility of the poor: 
The number of children out daily in the streets of L ndon, employed in the 
various occupations I have named, together with others which may possibly 
have been overlooked – including those who beg without offering any 
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article for sale – those who will work as light porters, as errand boys and the 
like, for chance passengers, has been variously calculated; probably nothing 
like exactitude can be hoped for, much less expected, in such a speculation, 
for when a government census has been so frequently found to fail in 
correctness of detail, it appears highly improbable that the number of those 
so uncertain in their places of resort and so migratory in their habits, can be 
ascertained with anything like a definite amount of certainty by a private 
individual. (Mayhew 479) 
It is only by way of the records found at the places of detention that Mayhew, and 
his readers, may come to an approximation. A desire to know and record confronts the 
poor nomadic race in nineteenth century Europe, and detention, enclosure, punishment, 
moralisation through work and Bible reading, is the correlate of this knowledge: 
Taking the returns of accommodation afforded to these children in the 
casual wards of workhouses, refuges for the destitute and homeless poor; of 
the mendicity and other societies of a similar description, and those of our 
hospitals and gaols, -- and these sources of information upon this subject can 
alone be confidently relied upon, -- and then taking into the calculation the 
additional numbers, who pass the night in the variety of ways I have already 
enumerated, I think it will be found that the number of boys and girls selling 
in the streets of this city, and often dependent upon their own exertions for 
the commonest necessaries of life, may be estimated at some thousands, but 
nearer 10,000 than 20,000. (Mayhew 479-80) 
It was not a desire to immobilise the poor child that determined the insertion of this 
child into a relation of pedagogy, but a desire to control its movement and to know it in 
its totality in order to save it, body and soul. For this reason there was an increase of 
disciplinary measures, long before they became enforced by law, on condition that the 
child be both poor and a vagrant: children were abducted by their saviours, who sought to 
transplant them into new gardens of labour and thrift, and by their punishers, who would 
give them order and discipline. Their destinations varied – from the homes of the 
charitable rich who would take them as servants to he Ragged Schools – but the issue at 
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stake remained the right of seizure and the moral authority of their benefactors over the 
right of their parents to dispose of them as they pl ased, and over the children’s right, so 
severely circumscribed by their poverty, to decide their actions for themselves. It is not 
surprising, then, that a consistent theme in education l plans is to establish, beyond the 
influence of parents, a utopia of perfect justice and self-discipline, a miniature society in 
which teachers could mould the character of the next g neration, away from the vicious 
influence of their cruel and ignorant parents. This is the rhetoric that pervades the 
establishment both of schools and of education system . It is clearly at work in the first 
plans of the state education systems.  
Slowly, with the rise of the inspectorate, the Christianising mission became 
progressively subordinated to the problems of space and time in the accountancy of 
results, and more “governmental” concerns over hygiene, conduct, attendance, self-
discipline and work took precedence. One can see this in calls for “half-time” schooling 
and other proposals to make instruction more efficint, in the emergence of factory 
schools, in the calls for better lighting and ventilation, and in the institution of 
examinations and attendance rolls. It is not that a Christian education was no longer 
considered necessary, but that other, autonomous factors began to play a far more 
important part. Predominant was the relation between school results and the economy, 
where costs had to be established relative to results, where funding was directly related to 
measurements of effectiveness. Two models of discipl ne and work came to be related in 
the single space: the system of rewards and punishments administered in prisons, and the 
system of observation and maximum efficiency practiced by the factory.  
The ability to read and write formed part of all these regimes, in different but 
related forms. In the prison and the bark, it formed part of the moralising routine, where 
reading was instituted and imagined in a way modeled upon the reformatory practice of 
solitary confinement, where the crude soul was forced to both encounter its own guilt, 
and in the Bible or a suitably religious text, such as the Common Prayer Book. It is 
significant that at this time tattoos were being made by prisoners as pictographic 
autobiographies, as counter-texts, as a “body” to resist these practices on the “soul,” as a 
memory that could not be erased or denied. A text and a space of confinement, a set of 
daily routines arranged around a timetable, were cetainly common elements here; in both 
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school and prison one sees the assumption of a legitimate power to punish, and the 
technical association of the text with a possible reinsertion of the individual into society 
and an actual disciplining of the soul.  
The soul was not only disciplined by the silent act of reflection: the text became the 
basis, within the school, of a regular practice, derived from the catechism, of inspection. 
A kind of jealous appropriation of the story of the self occurs, with regard to the proper 
codes (the proper national and transparent language, a legitimate, disciplined and 
moralised orthography, a moral grammar and a grammar of morality – no shouting or 
avoiding the interview, silence and volubility at the proper times, letters rather than 
hieroglyphs), with regard to the medium (the book and speech, perhaps the diary, but not 
the body: inscription rather than incision) and to a propriety of affect (a calm speech, a 
reflective tone: the speech act is a representation involving distance from the 
representand, not an action or an assault), and lastly the proper frame for truth. The 
Gospels and the Prayer Book were the medium and template for an introspective reform 
through which one may read one’s life and judge it. As a corollary, other frames and 
languages are removed from this solitary reflection upon the self: the events and passions 
of one’s own life, the argot of one’s company, secret signs of recognition, the desire of 
emulation, love of distinction and the intemperate nd superstitious worship of saints. 
C.A. Browning, a medical officer in charge of teaching prisoners on transport ships to 
read, imparts the succinct formula: “read, mark, understand, believe and obey your 
Bibles” (Browning, Address to Prisoners 14; qtd. in Reeves 65).  
It may be claimed that a resemblance between the treatment of children and 
prisoners is accidental, that both penal regimes and educational ones had an accidental 
connection in the especially Christian (or Christianising) attitudes of the reformers 
involved. To argue this is to miss the reformatory character of both institutions, to 
imagine the function of their spaces as negative and punitive on the one hand and 
instructive on the other. Where the text enters the functioning of such spaces is not only 
in the rolls of attendance or the report of good behaviour: it is encountered, as the 
singular Word which is true, which lives in the heart of the believer and is renewed every 
day. Such a Word goes far beyond, and is far more equivocal and volatile than, the pious 
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textbooks that also appeared, advising both prisoner a d poor child to be “contented with 
his station” (Trimmer, The Servant’s Friend, qtd. in Goldstrom 23).  
Through the second half of the nineteenth century, he child is given the peculiar 
status of a being endowed with its own mentality, a specific organic development, a way 
of life and rights proper to it alone. While the role f language is given special 
prominence here by many authors, it is in the sense of a larger description of the child 
coming into the joys of representing, and thereby knowing, the world outside. Hence, 
what tends to stand in the place of the normal child is the experience of an other, of the 
idiot, the deaf and blind child, children evacuated of a history, of any social antagonism, 
or indeed of any rights. Coupled with this organic on-child that gives one basis for 
seeing the regular course of development of the normal child is the Mignon-child: a child 
acrobat with a body testifying to its parents’ cruelty, a poor street-seller who has assumed 
the cares and disposition of a woman at the age of eight, an image of concern, an insistent 
call for intervention, a figure in poetry and melodrama.25 Indeed, with the emergence of 
this proper language and place, a number of figures, both literary and sociological, 
appear. Mayhew, typical of Victorian “child-watchers,” devoted intense attention to the 
figure of the little girl who is both far too old for her age and far too innocent. This figure 
reappears, doubled, in Dickens’ Little Dorrit: Little Dorrit is far too small, having been 
malnourished as a child, and Maggy, who is far too large, is mesmerised by the access 
she has to tales and text, to the shop-front bills and to the fairy tales in which, by a slight 
displacement, Little Dorrit reveals herself.26 The idiot child is parodic and tragic, 
entranced by a text that she will never master. A child deprived of all senses (Laura, at 
the Perkins Institution and Massachusetts Asylum for the Blind) also appears in Dickens’ 
work, as a network of ironies and pangs – she does n t know her mother is standing next 
to her, she cannot see the beautiful scenery – and a series of poignant joys – she can read 
block words, she is a transparent representation of her own character and feelings, and 
she is fond of making things for her doll. Forever doomed to childhood, Laura is the 
therapeutic counterpart to the solicitous pity and u trammeled voyeurism of “child-
                                                 
25 See Steedman (99) and Cunningham (123-5). 
26 See Dickens (Little Dorrit  434-35). By way of reference to a “Fairy Tale,” Dorrit is enmeshed in a 
multiple interrogation. Her response, and escape, is via a conspicuous speech dysfunction; she 
compulsively repeats “No,” “thank you,” and “O no” (435). 
 294 
watching” (Dickens, American Notes 79-90). It is the blind child who performs the most 
solicitous role:  
They all clamoured, as we entered, to the assistant-m s er, who accompanied 
us, “Look at me, Mr. Hart! Please, Mr. Hart, look at me!” evincing, I thought, 
even in this, an anxiety peculiar to this condition, that their little feats of 
agility should be seen. (American Notes 91) 
The child constructed by the child-watchers imposes observation as a duty and calls 
out for recognition by authorities. On the other hand, the secretive classes of the city 
produce a language of danger and subterfuge: there is a proliferation of secret, rude, and 
dangerous tongues, languages of the downtrodden that have their own separate origin in 
the dark. In his long digression on argot, Hugo alternates between describing it as 
original, as a monstrous corruption of French, as alanguage of secrets and as a source of 
literature: 
Argot is the language of the dark. 
Thought is aroused in its gloomiest depths, social philosophy is excited to its 
most poignant meditations, before this enigmatic dialect which is at once 
withered and rebellious. Here is chastisement visible. Each syllable has a 
branded look. The words of the common language here app ar as if wrinkled 
and shriveled under the red-hot iron of the executioner. Some seem still 
smoking. A phrase affects you like the branded shoulder of a robber suddenly 
laid bare. Ideas almost refuse to be expressed by these substantive condemned 
of justice. Its metaphor is sometimes so shameless that we feel it has worn the 
iron collar. (667) 
This language of menace and low power, along with the secret languages of street-
sellers, was being erased and disqualified. This reticence about language as power is at 
the heart of literacy discourse: it licenses the teach r’s authority with a moralising and 
disciplining meta-language. Also disqualified by pedagogy is the language that does not 
exactly correspond with the text. The discipline of reading in schools gave birth to a new 
relation to the text, and to the imposition of an old figure of natural correspondence upon 
the act of reading. It is within this site that thecorrespondence of the text to speech 
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becomes a problem of discipline and correction, and what had seemed a natural act of 
reading was redefined.  
Nor was this the only time that the rights of the language of the text were asserted 
over the rights of the language of the reader. Daniel Defoe’s account of a “dexterous 
dunce” in a Somersetshire school deserves quoting, to show that the relation between text 
and language was by no means settled in the eighteent  c ntury, and that the univocity of 
reading was the effect of a discipline schools did not universally impose until later. 
Visiting this country school, which was taught by a relative of his, Defoe sat in on a 
reading performed by one of the pupils: 
Coming into the school, I observed one of the lowest scholars was reading 
his lesson to the usher, which lesson, it seems, wa a chapter in the Bible.  
So I sat down by the master till the boy had read out his chapter. I observed 
the boy read a little oddly in the tone of the country, which made me the 
more attentive, because on inquiry I found that the words were the same and 
the orthography the same as in all our Bibles. I observed also the boy read it 
out with his eyes still on the book and his head (like a mere boy) moving 
from side to side as the lines reached cross the columns of the book. His 
lesson was in the Canticles, v. 3 of chap. v. The words these:- “I have put 
off my coat. How shall I put it on? I have washed my feet. How shall I defile 
them?” 
The boy read thus, with his eyes, as I say, full on the text. “Chav a doffed 
my cooat, how shall I don’t? Chav a washed my veet, how shall I moil 
‘em?” 
How the dexterous dunce could form his mouth to expr ss so readily the 
words (which stood right printed in the book) in his country jargon, I could 
not but admire. (A Tour 219, qtd. in Fox 62)  
One is faced, then, with a long concatenation and separation of different practices, 
institutions and forms of rule. One is also faced with the loss and adoption of a series of 
goals; for the catechism, while surviving in a certain formal manner, was also converted 
to the purposes of examination, and the competitive relation between pupils was 
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dispersed into a range of divisions and tabulations, into normalising and individualising 
practices. It is arguable, also, that “conduct” haschanged into the self-discipline of the 
“on-task,” self-directed, autonomous learner. Beyond this, however, conduct has become 
a discipline that responds to the continuous and differentiated mapping of linguistic 
spaces through “context.” 
Among these lines of descent and mutation, what seem  to be a very recent 
difference is the discovery of literacy as an autonomous line of psychologico-technical 
development. The capacity to read and to write becam  n object of intervention and a 
sign of minimal learning achievement in the nineteen h century, within a morality of 
knowledge and work. In the middle of the century, with the work of Seguin, there 
emerged a relation of “love” for the child insofar as the child underwent the stages of 
learning and taught the pedagogue the truth about itself and about the proper means of 
instruction. Unlike the solicitude for the salvation and dignity of the soul that runs from 
Comenius to Pestalozzi, this love is articulated upon the limbs of the body, and finds as 
its principle of observation and intervention not the mind but the organism, as a thinking, 
working, speaking, living being.  
Literacy discourse assumes the space of schooling as both utopian and dystopian, as 
both an ideal service of constructing the perfect so iety – whether as a reproduction of 
good forms of authority, the perpetuation or strengthening of a Christian ethos, or as a 
progressive or transformative agency – and as a signal failure, as a site to fix, to reinvent 
in its methods and materials. The school is an organised space of revelation in a number 
of ways. In that it arrays and assesses students, the chool creates at least a threefold 
visibility: as the object of the school’s primary division of space, the student is defined in 
being within the school; in the arrangement of pupils into classes, students are arrayed in 
a physical space and separated from the students of o her classes and grades; in the 
accumulation of a documentary and assessment case-history, the student exists as an 
individual trajectory and as an element in a table. The table of results is also commonly 
published, that is, rendered up to the public as more or less equivocal evidence of the 
school’s success in helping its students in the transition into further education and into the 
world of work. “Payment” is certainly “by results,” though both results and payment are 
distributed and varied according to the agencies and criteria involved.  
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Schooling, as an enclosure from and disclosure of the world, must have a 
representation or, better, a sample of the world for which it is a deferral and preparation. 
The text is a multiplicity of layers when it is used as a representation. Not only are the 
outlines of its structure the outlines of the world’s emands (genre theory says as much), 
but the textbook is the basis for a performance of interpretation, which is itself a text 
functioning as evidence, as symptom, as the occasion for correction within a larger 
course of treatment. The text is two-way: one sees in it the stage of development, the 
interruptions, hesitations, inadequacies and competenc s of the student, but also in the 
class, ethnic and gender assumptions of the world – as dominant ideology, as prestigious 
genres, as preferred ways of talking, reading and being around the text. The text is the 
very instrument of the school’s power of instruction, f the teacher’s power to intervene. 
This power is almost always in need of an alibi, of evidence, since every mark can be 
unfair, subjective, subject to another interpretation. The mode of being of discipline has 
moved into the text, from at least the nineteenth century, when punishment ceased, in 
theory, to be corporeal. The gentle teacher is armed with the text as evidence, is disguised 
and revealed as the loving guide to the truths of language. The text is the body of 
evidence, the visible sign of the truths of language. “Representation” is thus the sign of 
the school’s enclosure of language, of its meticulously regulated and localised monopoly 
on the powers of language. 
There is an important absence so far in this account, which concerns the advent of 
standardised national literacy testing. In one sense, it is a completely extraneous practice, 
somehow bursting onto the scene as a new imperative, closely following the birth of a 
range of voluntary associations and pressure groups. Thi  technical discourse, using 
standardised tests, questionnaires and statistical te hniques, produces a table of national 
literacy achievement, not because that is the most accurate way to represent literacy, 
intelligence or educational attainment, but because it b st suits the instrumentalities of 
national policymaking.27 This whole series of documents is designed for the s ate, for the 
Department and all the official agencies. In fact, it is produced by these agencies for 
themselves and for each other. Thus, the first Australia-wide literacy survey was 
requested of the Australian Council for Educational Research by the House of 
                                                 
27 See Kearins, Mensh and Mensh, and de Lemos.  
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Representatives Select Committee on Specific Learning D sorders, and was to be read by 
the State Directors-General and Directors of Education who had approved the study  
(Keeves and Bourke, Literacy and Numeracy 1). 
This intra-governmental mode of address was at leasinitially prevalent, but the 
“specialist” audience of directors, committees and political representatives, as well as 
researchers, was of necessity extended to the teachers through the principals. There were 
two main factors involved in this spread of the techni al literature. On the one hand there 
is the legacy of the payment by results system, which as never really left Western 
education, and remains a point of antagonism between researchers and teachers. On the 
other hand there is the beginning of an attempt to generate a univocal system of reporting, 
as both instrument and representation, and to integrat  teachers into this system by 
training them as assessors and reporters in the language of experts, which has become 
another point of contention, and another contest for authority. Whereas the earlier 
Inspectorate judged the school (in terms of attendance, hygiene standards, light and the 
effectiveness of instruction) and either maintained or closed it, the survey and testing 
researchers studied the (non-)emergence of a predefin  psycholinguistic set within a 
population, sought to discover the appropriate sites of intervention, and to reorganise 
teaching accordingly. It was thus important for researchers to win the assent of teachers, 
both as to the object studied and the means of realising it. In establishing the reality of the 
object, researchers invoked a world in which literacy is both an impersonal demand and 
the means to serve the needs of all persons subject to that demand. 
The 1976 study of literacy and numeracy by Keeves and Bourke, involving the 
Australia-wide testing of students for specific skill  and capacities, sets down as its 
justification the picture of a political, social and economic world for which literacy has 
become a concern, a goal, a demand and a term of political definition and manipulation. 
The world of which so many reports and studies speak, and which so many policy 
documents reproduce as the source of “demand,” is con tructed here, much like the world 
of modernity invoked by the British Inspectorate. The first source of the concern for 
literacy is international: “Across the world, in recent years, there has been a growing 
concern for the achievement of literacy” (Keeves and Bourke, Literacy and Numeracy 4). 
While UNESCO has long concentrated on literacy for developing countries, the concern 
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for literacy has been revived in Britain and the United States, “within the developed 
countries, where it has commonly been assumed that the highest possible levels of 
literacy have existed” (4). It is with the introduction of the world and its concern, and 
with the concept of “minimum standards of competence for life in a modern, democratic, 
industrial society” (4) that literacy arrives in its present form in the Western countries.28  
UNESCO had already formulated a definition of functional literacy (distinct from 
both basic literacy and literacy proper), and it isthe “portability” of that concept, its 
dependence on a social realisation of its form, that allows Keeves and Bourke to use it. 
They quote UNESCO’s definition and cite it as the problematic basis for their assessment 
instruments (6). The relevant definition (UNESCO 1965) reads: 
A person is literate when he has acquired the essential k owledge and skills 
which enable him to engage in all those activities in which literacy is required 
for effective functioning in his group and community, and whose attainments 
in reading, writing and arithmetic make it possible for him to continue to use 
those skills towards his own and the community’s development and for active 
participation in the life of his country. (qtd. in Keeves and Bourke, Literacy 
and Numeracy 6)  
The point here is not that the quest to find the truth of literacy is corrupted by a 
preliminary assumption that the proper object of investigation is an assumed set of basic 
skills necessary for social survival in a “modern, democratic, industrial society.” The 
point is not whether there are such basics, or evenwhat they are. At the discursive level 
what is significant is that literacy, in being defined as the necessary set of textual skills 
within a particular social regime, also opens up the discursive desire for a “social order,” 
a desire for a world that exerts a pressure upon a society, which in turn demands of its 
population a particular yield, and, alongside this, a whole set of discourses about literacy 
said to arise from certain groups; especially “stakeholders,” “peak bodies,” and all the 
other unities that serve to simplify and render manageable a murmur which is not always 
saying much about either literacy or education.  
                                                 
28 In Britain the relevant study is the Bullock Report (Dept. of Education and Science 1975). 
 300 
With the 1970s one sees research which threatens to reactivate the old English 
model of “payment by results” tied to a newer US model of bureaucratic control through 
the measurement of objectives, a combination of the summative and formative forms of 
assessment.29 The reconfiguration of literacy as a concern for “developed” countries 
coincides with, and is immanent to, the technicisation of teacher perception. The problem 
of teacher assessment has ever been the teacher: teachers must be made to agree with the 
technical descriptions, and these descriptions will thereafter become true, since their 
objectivity lies in their production from more than o e site. What this tradition of testing 
accomplished, then, was a new, precise and repeatabl  language of description, which 
would render teachers more useful to the state’s expert authorities, which would confirm 
the objectivity and verifiability of literacy by establishing a language proper to its 
description. In the early work of the 1970s, the stati ical data often relied on teacher 
judgement and reporting: teachers, principals and even State Directors of Education 
would fail or refuse  to report, or would report inexpert opinions,30 so that data were often 
unreliable, that is, did not all arise from the same set of perceptual and descriptive codes.   
Several imperatives, already operating in educationl research institutions, are 
evident in this report: results must be comparable nd portable across systems, and at the 
same time must be submitted to multiple regression to yield correlations between 
achievement and an array of possible factors, such as retention rates, gender, social class, 
ethnic background, school system and state or region. In addition to this comparative, 
external form of objectivity, literacy and numeracy were to carry with them an i ternal 
objectivity, a relation between achievement and a stated basic minimum. Literacy, along 
with numeracy, was to become a key variable in a natio l mapping project, designed to 
locate in space the various factors which led to functional illiteracy. Low literacy levels 
were to be correlated with a variety of factors, each of them constituting a specific 
learning disability:  
There is, nevertheless, an awareness, stemming from a variety of sources, that 
some children in Australia, because of specific learning problems and social, 
economic, ethnic, geographic, cultural or linguistic d sabilities, may be failing 
                                                 
29 See Hamilton (Curriculum Evaluation 111-16). 
30 See Keeves and Lietz for a short history of the Australian context. 
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to achieve an adequate level of competence in the basic skills of literacy and 
numeracy before they leave school at the end of the period of compulsory 
schooling. (Keeves and Bourke, Literacy and Numeracy 4) 
Moreover, the competences were to be as specifically defined, and as univocally 
produced by the test questions as possible. Where tis was impossible, the appearance of 
objectivity was secured by aligning the “impression of level of performance” with “an 
approximately normal distribution of marks” (Keeves and Bourke, Literacy and 
Numeracy 70).  
Teachers, however, remained a problem for this regim , since they constituted the 
fundamental instrument, even before the testing, for the assessment, and yet were also the 
partial viewer with only a small part of the landscape in view, and often, as this work 
continued, the target of intervention as a result of this survey work, very often a punitive 
intervention (the withdrawal of funds, the “self-criticism” style of school reform, the 
intensification of outcomes demands, restructuring o  a business model). A quite short 
history, always full of distrust, concerns the attempts of the educational research 
authorities to give their gaze, accurate and objectiv , o the teachers. ACER’s National 
Literacy Survey (1997) attempted to solve the problem by training teachers to make 
“valid” measures: 
Data from the Survey represents much more than a snapshot of student 
achievement: by integrating the assessment processes with classroom 
learning programs over a six week period of time, each participating teacher 
was able to allocate about eight hours to the assessment of his or her 
students, resulting in a valid estimate of each student’s achievement. Finally, 
a fruitful investigation was made of the relationship between students’ 
achievements on common tasks administered under timd conditions and 
students’ achievements on classroom tasks where stud nts had opportunities 
to review, revise and edit their work. (Forster and Masters iii) 
The univocalisation of teacher and test is accomplished by means of a co-
emplacement. The extension of the term representatio  is precisely used: one represents 
by showing, pointing to, but also by assuming the place of that which is represented. The 
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representational metaphysics do not end there – by being in the same place, by occupying 
this metamorphic, assimilative time, the teacher and the test begin to assume the same 
schema of perception, they begin to assume the sameinstitutional and recording identity, 
slipping only slightly at the edges (and this slip itself is a call to further merging). 
Representing here means not only to take the place of, but also, by virtue of the place one 
occupies, to be the thing itself.  
What is represented here is a certain product, a specific, dated performance, but this 
is merely the problem it is essential to have in mid before this entire project is started. 
The problem of representation is not merely that it is an imprint, a surface artefact of an 
encounter. The object itself here is its own representer, its own scandal of interpretation. 
The problem is that the object disagrees because it i  not yet the object it must become. 
One might extrapolate a tendency in such a solution to the problem of representation, one 
that will approach the ideal of a perfect coincidenc , of a perfect identity between 
reporter and reported, sustained by a univocal schema of construction and interpretation.31 
The fact that teachers were mobilised nationally to perform and perceive the 
performance of their students by a top-down fiat impl es a massive effort of codification 
from a powerful group of experts to a group of easily-controlled executors. This is done 
through a set of technical knowledges that are non-reversible: a teacher’s disagreement 
about the criteria and language of description will not be heeded, while a failure to 
implement and use them will be corrected. The coincidence of reporter and reported, of 
local and central knowledges, is thus not a relation of mere correspondence, but one of 
imposition and erasure. At the same time that the teacher is erased, the student is both 
erased and constituted through multiple correlations: her or his performance is explained 
as the issue of the various factors that define her/him as a linguistic being. Language is 
thus both explained as a social effect and as a thing in the abstract, divorced from its 
constituting relations, arranged along a single scale of universal competence. The 
condition of this univocity is erasure.  
                                                 
31 This emphasis on the control of teacher assessment, or its subordination to standardised testing and 
published results, is widespread: for the English “cutting edge” policies of disciplining literacy asse ment 
and teaching, see Goodwyn. The National Literacy Survey is possibly unique in creating a standardised test 
to make teacher assessment into both a superfluous echo and a necessary confirmation. 
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It is important to note that literacy research, in order to come to a definition of its 
object, had to derive it from a characterisation of the social, political and economic world 
and the demands that issue from it. Literacy obtains its objectivity from this world, which 
is both the pretext for bringing the concept into being and the obverse side of its proper 
definition: literacy is what the world wants, the absence of which it will punish. It is with 
this assumption, that literacy is a cultural demand  something to be supplied for a 
culture by schools, that other constructions of literacy begin. Literacy is no longer an 
absolute universal but a dependent variable with a universal name: if literacies are 
culturally constructed, and if they form different subjects, with different powers and 
modes of action, then teachers and education planners ar  implicitly always designing the 
social subjects they would like to create.  Policy makers are not faced with the awful 
realisation that they are exercising a kind of power to form persons, positions, and ways 
of being, since this is what they do anyway. The question for educators is not, then, how 
to evacuate power from the classroom and allow the real student to emerge in her self-
activity and with the teacher’s attentiveness. That course would only lead to frustration 
and the reproduction of unequal distribution of cultural and social capital and a resulting 
inequality in power. Hence, Allan Luke asks: “What kinds of social power and cultural 
knowledge should be constructed in literacy education?” (Social Construction 44). Luke 
situates the literacy worker and planner at the same level: they are both subject to the 
inevitable realisation that, as the people responsible for conferring and constructing 
literacy, they are involved in a fundamental sorting and selection: 
Whether we like it or not, literacy is tied up with the distribution and 
division of knowledge and power. For teachers, the matter at hand is who 
gets what kinds of literacy from schooling. (44) 
But this is already the result of a form of subjection and, as the Curriculum 
Framework demonstrates, it occurs at the state policy level, where even the most careful 
and power-conscious analysis can become part of a subjection it shares with other agents 
of the discourse, where the most critical of literacies is also the most effective form of 
tying up a subjection to language in a recognition of the truth of one’s language; where 
the progressive “metacognitive” levels in fact enforce, beyond any particular ideology of 
development, the practice of a developing, self-rega ding subject of educational 
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discipline. This call to linguistic subjection has both a general framework and a plurality 
of detailed, codified methods of instrumentalisation. In its generality it emerges as a set 
of arguments for according to language the status, first, of the absolute prerequisite for 
learning, economic success, and authentic modes of being, and second, of the formal 
system, the substance and the matter in which all development occurs.  
To take an early general example of this subjectivation, Doughty and Thornton, in 
Language Study, the Teacher and the Learner (1973), argue the need for awareness of 
language structures implicitly present in everyday practice as the basis of all learning.32 It 
is because of the obviousness of language that it mus be studied: 
It is precisely the commonplace and the familiar in our use of language for 
living which is in most need of exploration, if we are to understand how we 
use language to learn. We need to be able to create a climate of opinion in 
which no teacher would be willing to accept that his everyday familiarity with 
language, as a competent native speaker, was sufficient in itself to provide 
him, as a teacher, with what he needs to know about its nature and function. 
(23) 
All teachers must come to recognise that language must be questioned and analysed as a 
linguistic object, that is, in terms of its “nature and function,” especially as a means to 
learning.  
Language is presented as the absolute precondition, not only for learning, but also 
for being human. Language is the medium with which one obtains an essential 
relationship to oneself, to the world, and to others: 
I have focused attention upon the fact that man is a problem-solving animal 
whose integrity as an individual sentient self depends upon his continuing 
ability to make sense of his world and to form relationships with other 
similarly individual sentient selves. His ability to do either of these things is 
profoundly affected by his capacity to language. (43) 
                                                 
32 This orientation was adopted in early Australian work in critical language education through the work f 
Halliday (Halliday; “Literacy”). 
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Language informs the powers of the human being through an exclusive access, if not to 
the truth, then to the means by which truth is mediat d: 
Values, capabilities and habits are transmitted through language, moreover, 
and it is these values, capabilities and habits, which guide him [i.e. “man”] 
in his interpretation of the world and his relationship with others, because 
they provide him with his only models for judging what is and is not the 
case. (43) 
In doing this, language is the instrument of the culture whose values it has “built 
into” it (43); a culture, with all its “categories, attitudes and assumptions” (43) manifests 
itself in language in the action of providing an access to truth. A study of language, an 
awareness of its workings within learning, aims to render these values, this cultural mind, 
explicit, and thereby to liberate the student and the teacher from the constraints of any 
particular pre-established cultural universe. This may be part of a general liberation, but 
the immediate goal, by situating the teacher and stu ent at the level of language, is to 
impart the habits of a changing, post-industrial world: 
So we are faced with the inescapable fact that man’s major means for 
making sense of his world has built into its elements and structure a bias 
towards interpreting experience in terms of a pre-existing set of categories, 
attitudes and assumptions. Should he live in a world subject to continuous 
social and cultural change, therefore, this bias mut act as a continuous 
check upon his attempts to make sense of the new, because it will always 
make it easier for him to language the new in terms of what he found 
appropriate for languaging the old. (43-44)  
Students and teachers are to ascend above the plane of their constitution in language; they 
are to conceive of themselves as abstract linguistic beings, to recognise their own 
constitution and substance in language, to see themselves and their world anew, as the 
workings of language. To language oneself, to languge the world, is to inhabit a region 
apart from any determination, all the better to meet th  demands of a changing world.  
A hierarchy of instruction levels operates here, running from the basal reading 
programs to the teaching of critical literacies, and each level makes either a claim to 
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superiority or (as is more common now) to complementarity. In either case, the argument 
is not simply for greater justice, but for a greater discipline, and an intensification of 
language activity. Thus, one of the goals of language study is to present what amounts to 
an inflection of the statistical dream of locating the factors of language production in the 
service of this activity itself: 
To show what personal, cultural, social and linguistic factors brought into 
the learning situation by teacher and learner do most to determine the 
climate for language activity. (Doughty and Thornton 69)  
It is in the imperative to language that one can locate the complaint that basal 
readers privilege technical skills to the detriment of meaning; meaning itself is the sign of 
the subjection to language in its most successful, most complete form.  
Literacy discourse is a discourse of abstraction, of taking away the moorings of the 
real and floating it upon the sea of a changeable language. The progressive discourse of 
critical literacy and meta-cognition is the counterpart, in its mode of subjection, of the 
statistical discourse of objectivity. Whereas the on looks to bind the student in the 
inescapable fact of linguistic constitution, the other seeks to remove all the constituent 
and complicating factors, to render the student as the function of language alone. The 
rhetoric of liberation through literacy is most audible not where the student recognises the 
arbitrariness and interestedness of language, texts and narratives, but at the point where 
the subject may form her/himself to meet the demands of this changing world. If statistics 
and critical literacy studies present themselves as antithetical discourses, and the 
acquisition of mechanical skills is opposed to the autonomous search for meanings, it is 
because these oppositions are corollaries within a si gle disciplinary regime. The 
Curriculum Framework embodies the convergence of the various disciplinary and 
political orientations in literacy discourse into a seamless implementation by the state of 
an inescapable subjection to language. 
Literacy, in its present form at least, is a very recent invention. In fact, it does not 
become a central term in Western education systems until the 1970s, and in Australian 
education not until 1975, when it is framed within a concern for the measurement of 
poverty and as a correlative of it. Even those works which play a role in the emergence of 
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literacy in scholarly discourse (Parry, Lord, Havelock) are only taken up later as 
problematic authorities within a new discourse with an educational set of applications, 
desires and roles. The older technical literature on reading acquisition is now challenged 
and supplemented not only by a new awareness of the connections between dialect, 
literacy, power and social chances, but also by a reinvigorated statistical control, a 
standardised testing on an unprecedented scale and in new levels of detail. A whole new 
operation of knowledge and power emerges, this timearising from the other as nation. 
The nation becomes a sort of macro-pupil, in competition with other national cohorts: 
The need to target standards in this way has been giv priority in the light of 
research findings from comparisons of reading attainment in different 
countries. The most recent research of this kind involved assessing the 
reading attainment of a nationally representative sample of 1,817 nine year 
olds (Y4) in England and Wales. The test was the same s that used in a 
survey of 27 other countries in 1991 and includes narrative, expository 
(factual) and “document” material (charts, tables, graphs, lists, etc.). This 
research has indicated that Britain is generally out-performed by countries 
like Finland, France and New Zealand. (Beard 9) 
At the same time, the focus on language moves away from what was essentially an 
imposition of grammar-school snobbery, and an emphasis, no doubt drawn from the 
nationalisms of decolonising movements, is placed on language as the key to identity, 
existence, authenticity33 and truth. No longer is the student to learn an imposed language, 
whether it is the best that has been said and thought or not: the language closest to truth, 
and best for authentic subjectivity, is that which is in actual use. The interval between the 
pupil and the substance of discipline is made almost invisible: the language as the real 
and effective substance of communication, as a living historical entity, becomes the 
medium in which one not only sees oneself, but in which one makes oneself. 
In the support they lend to the literacy dispositif, critical histories of literacy pose 
the specific danger of a smooth and continuous narrative that elides the mutation in 
modes of power with which literacy is directly invol ed. Within this textualising regime 
                                                 
33 See, for example, Green, Lankshear and Snyder. For a radical use of this notion, see Bennholdt-Thomsen 
et al. 
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literacy is not simply access: it is everywhere the sign of a careful dispossession of space 
from the body. Literacy is not a key to freedom: it is he visible surface of a mode of 
control, encoding the body within a continuous disciplinary space. “Illiteracy” is the first 
move of a complex dispossession and training of meta-docile, textualised bodies; 
“illiteracy” and its synonyms presuppose the constitution of literate spaces. “Illiteracy” 
and the various forms of textual and linguistic aberration are thus also refusals and flights 
from a regime. The inclusion of certain marginalised t xtual subjects - always in relation 
to a centre - constitutes an incorporation of the speaking body into the productive 
mechanism of the nation-state. 
This counter memory resituates the history and the interpretation of literacy 
furnished by Luke within a disciplinary apparatus. In writing about literacy as a 
dimension through which social power is distributed, Luke’s exemplary history ignores 
how a power-sensitive concept of literacy emerges as both reason and vehicle for a new 
and continuous mode of power. The recognition of prestigious language modes is 
primarily a gesture of initiation and a securing of subjection. The hope of liberation, 
though distant and unclear, is strategically related to the operation of power as a 
continuous mechanism operating within defined topo-sensitive regimes but without clear 
limits to its extension. Literacy always follows a mass dispossession by the nation state 
and accompanies an investment of subjects with a disciplining knowledge. Presenting 
literacy as always unevenly distributed disguises th  concept’s revolutionary form, its 
continuous dislocations and constant reimposition of demands. It is not merely the 
selection of texts or their connection with political-economic systems which encodes 
power relations through literacy instruction; the textualisation of space through schooling 
constitutes a disciplinary spatial network.  
Luke’s historical interpretation also ignores the strategic power-effects of literacy 
as a way of mimicking a virtual, discriminatory social order under the sign of inclusion 
and access. Literacy encodes a set of appropriate pr ctices within a range of strategic 
dimensions from the individual’s competence to the economic competition among 
nations. Literacy socialises the school’s distribution of worth. Whereas IQ and other 
cognitive tests could always be questioned as a formalised and pseudo-scientific 
discrimination, literacy derives its legitimacy from the accurate mapping and replication 
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of social power and its unequal distribution. Critical literacy is the extreme expression of 
the insertion of its meta-docile subject into a total regime of textual competence. The 
literacy dispositif is the continuation and intensification of bio-power, seizing the body 
through its production and performance of language. What lies at the very foundation of 
literacy is a recent restriction of language to the text, which the extension of “text” to all 
social sites confirms rather than annuls. 
Literacy is a concept custom-made for imposing virtual images of the social order 
upon performed language, and for justifying both linguistic normalisation and a 
continuously discriminative network of social discipline. The danger presented by this 
invisibility makes it imperative to interrupt and interrogate the smooth historical narrative 
presented by critical literacy theorists and educators. The only sufficient disruption is one 
which recasts the nature of literacy and illiteracy, one which causes the discourse to 
pause, to question itself. Interrogating the discourse’s textualised, schooled and 
nationalised subject de-nationalises the text, de-pedagogises the schooled subject, and 
opens a space where language and subject may enjoy,if n t freedom, then a language and 
a body temporarily capable of mewing, crouched on the floor of one’s room, wandering 




Deleuze and Guattari argue that if desire is repressed it is because every position of 
desire, no matter how small, is capable of calling into question the established order of a 
society (Anti-Oedipus xxvi). It is not the intention here to close down the desires that 
literacy discourse enacts but to “molecularise” them, to free them of any idea that they 
necessarily imply a complex, require a proper set of pr cedures, or belong to one place 
rather than another. The desire to extend and empower through literacy and the 
recognition of other literacies bears certain dangers with it, along with its strategic 
possibilities. It was a “non-linguistic” assemblage, a small and ephemeral movement and 
combination, a meow, that set off this thesis and ma e literacy appear as a mobile 
ordering and a continuous working of pedagogical power. Perhaps it was capable of 
calling the social order into question as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, but it was 
necessary also to move through these questions carefully, to see where the ordering is at 
work. 
This thesis introduced the topic of literacy with a paradoxical incident, a biographical 
detail which at first sight bore little relation to schooling, power or language. It showed 
that in some way schooling and literacy insert thems lves into a machinery of social 
production and into the production of everyday concer s and processes, that literacy 
enters into our most material and non-linguistic moments through a teleological division 
of time and space, a pedagogisation which is at the same time a textualisation of 
existence. The concern for literacy makes development and “writing it down” inseparable 
constituents of the path of the individual toward accomplishment. Literacy is not merely a 
cultural concern or a reflection of social relations: it is an element structuring the very 
interstices of our lives.  
It has taken some time and labour to discover, in a certain way, what is meant by a 
gliding meow. That the thesis began with the question of what such an act could mean, 
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and with the laughter that made it possible, was not accidental. From this laughter 
emerged a tentative outline of literacy as a discourse. It is in the most innocuous places 
that literacy establishes itself, conferring identity o the practice it grows upon. Even the 
practice of listing in the discourse, drawing attentio  to the establishing of a noumenal 
literacy, of a definiendum which is nonetheless there, does more than summarise the 
research and the wide diversity of opinions and uses of literacy. Within such ordinary 
functions, listing confers upon literacy an ontological guarantee. Such an assertion 
obviously flies in the face of a de-foundational discourse, but this is the consequence of 
such listing: it gives literacy a place and a reason to appear as a concept, attached to and 
lending coherence to a series of objects. The very confusion of the discourse, the danger 
literacy represents in being used as a way to exclude people from participation, coupled 
with its promise to effect more equitable social relations, impels more to be said and 
studied about its nature. 
The calling into question of the social (and spatial) order facilitated through literacy had 
to be directed and mobilised. The mapping of the organising space that first appeared as 
an intimation needed a supplement, a detailed articula on of its elements. Thus the thesis 
analysed the transcription of literacy discourse into a state pedagogy in the Curriculum 
Framework. It noted how the central elements of literacy discourse – text, world and 
student – are arranged in a way that intensifies th power of the pedagogical relations 
inscribed in policy documents. Literacy discourse, in this application, does not liberate: it 
articulates the student with the text and the regulations governing their meeting. This is a 
form of inductive or regulated confirmation by the teacher and student of 
“understandings” of language. It is within this place of operation that literacy attains an 
unchallenged power in setting the boundaries of the self, in defining its substance, and in 
charting the acts, the understandings and the uses in which it is manifested.  
Literacy is part of a discursive formation that is autonomous with regard to the disciplines 
of which it forms an intersection. Also, it is a formation paralleling the power of 
schooling and one that legitimates and institutes it a , if not natural, then as that which is 
proper to the student. Furthermore, the knowledge constituted in such a discourse is 
involved in, and readily renders itself transcribable into, a governmentality, a project 
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which insists on finding the nature or the proper functions of each segment of the 
population in order to develop the power inherent in these properties and thus to increase 
the power of “government.” This is particularly evident in the inflection of three themes 
of governmentality in literacy discourse: life (as development), language (as literacy and 
the knowledge and abilities that are consequent to it) and labour (as the world of work 
and the demands it places on language).  
The insufficiency of the discourse in providing an account of itself and its effects are due 
to this governmentality – here taking the form of pedagogisation – which literacy 
discourse effects rather than, as it claims, represnts. The forms of circularity 
characterising the historical, epistemological and political dimensions in literacy 
discourse arise from the presumptive ontological gurantee of literacy (the idea that, 
whatever it is, it must exist) and from a model of anguage and text that arise within a 
historical pedagogical practice where language of a specific kind emerged as both object 
and instrument of discipline. To write literacy into the historical archive, historians had to 
assume that what is presented as a variety of definitions, uses and relations is a species of 
literacy, despite all appearances to the contrary. History is used to cleanse literacy of 
contemporary misunderstandings, but only on the assumption that literacy forms an 
intelligible ahistorical essence.  
In dealing with literacy as a set of epistemological problems, this thesis discussed the 
rewriting of the world, via Derrida, as text by the knowledges of literacy. As an 
experience deriving from a particular social practice l teracy is knowable, but that 
knowledge cannot be generalised to other practices, even if they are categorically similar. 
The space of visibility in which an object called literacy emerges is both the only means 
by which one can know literacy and, at the same tim, a guarantee that this same literacy 
does not operate elsewhere. Thus, the literacy discour e is marked by the fatal relations 
that also lie at its foundations: its object is also it  ground, both its limit and its origin. 
The political dimension of the discourse likewise operates a system of undecideable 
alternatives in the political aspects of literacy discourse, where representation of 
marginalised groups also entails their normalisation, the recognition of a dominant 
language and the social relations associated with it.  
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The unity of the discourse can be seen in its parallelisms across disciplines, and in the 
circularities and undecideable problems that it concer s itself with. In historical studies, 
the problem of using the category of literacy to select historical data is illegitimate as 
history, but necessary to the discourse. Moreover, it results in an address to a 
transcendental subject of history, even where this is explicitly denied. Even the most 
critical histories, anchored and instigated by the category they seek to challenge 
(literacy), retain the language of the powerful mythology they challenge (terms such as 
progress, increase, true and false literacies). Analysing the literacy discourse as a set of 
transversal statements reveals that the history of literacy is a paradoxical enterprise in 
terms of representing a real entity but intelligible as the construction of a social reality. 
The discourse is structured by possible strategies of definition and argument, which are 
themselves undecideable. These dispersals are part of the one discursive formation. 
The space of this pedagogised language became a general o e in the nineteenth century, 
located in a number of sites along with the school – in prisons, transport ships, hospitals 
and mental institutions. At the same time as mass schooling institutes a series of 
techniques for measuring, managing and instructing the population, it also constructs a 
space within which language, nation and discipline are spatially interrelated and visible. 
The endless commentary on education and literacy was made possible by the invention of 
these interrelations; it is not the mere combination of confused half-memories and 
nationalism. In establishing literacy as a recognised ubstance, the public space of 
contention came before the pedagogical space of instruction, and both of tese spaces 
bore the sign of language united with the production of a disciplined national population.  
In charting the doubles of literacy, its power to write itself into social space, and its 
various functions as sign of the spaces and processes of power, it has been necessary to 
use an arsenal of Foucaultian concepts. To capture as exactly as possible the way power 
is deployed through language as a mode of pedagogical discipline, the thesis examined 
the relationship between discourse (as a combinatio nd grappling of the visible with the 
sayable) and the power that discourse works with, the constitution of power-knowledge, 
the history of disciplinary techniques, governmentality nd bio-power, the construction of 
an emanative spatial regime, the function of schooling and, in a modified way, of the text. 
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The thesis also discussed some of the works on literacy and education that make use of 
Foucault, and although it draws much of value from them, it finds them very much a part 
of the discourse, with the same set of objects, problems and speaking positions. It is this 
set of relations that the study has sought to uncover, not to analyse ideology or to 
participate in the pedagogy of subjection to language. It is not that the present work is 
outside this discourse, but rather that it required a different critical deployment of this 
same discursive field.  
This navigation and mapping of literacy as discourse and substance of power has resulted 
in a narrative with some surprising reversals. The undetermined nature of literacy, its 
status as definiendum, rather than undermining the authority of the discourse, effects a 
mobility of the disciplinary mechanisms operationalised through the notion of the text. 
Literacy discourse negotiates a constant reinscription of the relations between three major 
terms – the student, the text, and the world – in a neverending disciplining of language as 
the indispensable truth of being. The capture of literacy discourse in the Curriculum 
Framework is by no means the final word: it is a strategic reorganisation in a continuing 
deployment. 
The thesis elaborated the notion of a space of visibility, and characterised literacy as a 
knowledge dependent on the pedagogical organisation of space. This space is dominated 
by the figure and the practice of schooling, which generates a threefold knowledge of the 
student as a developing and language-using being destined for employment. Further, the 
thesis tied literacy to a nineteenth-century project of mapping social space, a project that 
delineates two races and two languages, which divisions are later reactivated by 
international literacy projects and contemporary policies.  
Drawing on the example of the Welsh Sunday-schools under the British Inspectorate, the 
thesis showed that the normalising of language results from a discursive and political 
situation, and is made possible by linguistic knowledge, rather than a simple cancellation 
of non-standard languages. It argued that the notio f a national language is a product of 
the organisation of pedagogical space in the ninetee th century. While schooling made 
this language visible, the medicalisation of idiots f rmed the possibility of knowing the 
 315 
child as a developing being and of a pedagogy that traced and intensified a real curve of 
learning and growth rather than imposing arbitrary stages of instruction based purely on 
institutional preferences. Moreover, a “world” is rendered visible, marking certain 
languages and language practices as retrograde. The stud nt, the text, and the world 
appear in a systematic interrelation in the pedagogical spaces of the nineteenth century. 
The knowledge of literacy derives from an earlier project of recording, locating and 
immobilising problem populations, and in constituting a national population as the object 
of government. The notion that emancipation may be won through metalinguistic 
awareness “reifies” the function of the textualising dyad of school and government, 
reinstating language, as it is traced around the text, p rformed by the student and 
corrected by the school, as the substance of power.  
This is not to say that literacy discourse, in public or private, is merely the repetition of 
formulas and relations set down a century ago. The nin teenth century has no discourse 
on literacy, nor did it foresee one. A discourse of literacy arose only in the twentieth 
century: if literacy discourse systematically construc s its objects, then the objects of 
which literacy is the unifying concept do not exist before the twentieth century. 
Differences in the cultural position and constitution of “reading and writing” are rewritten 
as different practices in literacy by the imposition of this term onto the historical archive. 
Further, the call for the recognition of “other” literacies, whether they be of different 
cultures, classes, or places, does not of itself constitute a liberatory orientation. In all its 
relations literacy corresponds to the extension of pedagogy into the world in the form of 
the text. Literacy discourse constitutes literacy as a need, as a reason for the expansion of 
mechanisms of recording, of bringing cultures, classes and places into a single, if 
variegated, model of language. When seen from an archaeological and genealogical 
persepective, this discourse may be characterised in terms of the way it disperses 
knowledge within a correlative field and as an element in a mode of power. This thesis 
has been concerned, then, with what this mode of power consists in, with the concepts, 
spaces and practices of which it is composed. It is not concerned with the nature of 
language or learning, nor with the nature of schooling, outside their discursive and 
political effects. 
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The thesis shifts the discourse, showing that it is po sible to provide a counter-narrative 
focussing on the historical constitution of the knowledges and power connected to the 
discourse on literacy. The final chapter countered th  history and interpretation given in a 
handbook of advice because, for a variety of reasons, teachers are addressed as both the 
centre of operation in this discourse and as an obstacle to good pedagogy. It argued that 
the concerns for literacy are far more determined by historical antecedents than the 
discourse suggests. Taking Foucault’s notion of bi -power, it described the emergence of 
a disciplinary use of language – and its avatar the text – as a mobile assemblage for the 
general distribution of diciplinary norms. Literacy enables the desire to extend this 
discipline to the whole social field: the danger becomes, then, one of conceiving of 
literacy as exclusion. This desire for the extensio of textuality is not an ideology or an 
institutional imperative: it is a form of power operating directly within the permanently 
undefined “concept” of literacy itself.  
This is not to say that literacy is “bad” or “good,” but rather that it should not be confused 
with a second nature, or conceived of as a right. It is a historically constituted complex of 
forces, a key component in making certain sorts of human beings, and a way of 
deploying, in ever-widening fields, the discipline of the text. Each of these operations and 
their correlates come into question at different moments, and are rearranged in strategic 
ways. The intention of this thesis has been to intensify that questioning and render 
explicit and problematic a historical and strategic complex, the relation to language that 
insists on the “recognition” of literacies and regulates the relation between the student, 
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